Talmud

Continuing the discussion that began in the first Mishna of the perek (see yesterday's daf) the Mishna on our daf teaches that a husband has the right to be mefer (able to annul) his wife's acceptance of nezirut - as he has the right to annul any oath that she takes upon herself that will affect their relationship (as we learned on yesterday's daf, if he does not do so then she will be obligated in the laws of nezirut and he no longer has any say in the matter). The owner of an eved, however, does not have the right to annul his slave's oaths. The Mishna concludes with the statement that when a husband is mefer and annuls his wife's acceptance of nezirut, it is annulled forever; if he does so to his eved, when he becomes free he completes his obligation. The Rosh offers two possible approaches to understanding this Mishna:

1. This Mishna is a continuation of the previous Mishna, and it teaches that a man who annuls his wife's nezirut erases it completely. Thus, even if the marriage ends, either through the husband's death or divorce, she is no longer obligated to keep her commitment to be a nazir. In the case of, however, the owner's power to force him to neglect his commitment exists only as long as the eved is obligated to accept his orders. Should he become free, he will be obligated to keep his commitment and will become a nazir.
2. Our Mishna is teaching a new halakha that deals with the question: "Can the husband or owner change his mind about the nezirut?" The Mishna teaches that if a husband annuls his wife's oath of nezirut, even if he decides later on that he wants her to keep her word, she has no obligation to be a nazir. If he objects to his slave's commitment, however, should he change his mind and decide to allow the eved to be a nazir, the obligation will take effect.

Who can choose to become a nazir? The Torah specifically says that both men and women can become nezirim (see Bamidbar 6:2). The first Mishna in the ninth perek of Massekhet Nazir teaches that non-Jews (Canaanites) cannot become nezirim, although avadim - non-Jews who are slaves and owned by Jews - can, theoretically, accept nezirut upon themselves. While Rashi says simply that a non-Jew's acceptance of nezirut is not significant and that he can therefore continue to drink wine, cut his hair and come into contact with the dead, Tosafot and the Rosh argue that the main idea here is to teach that should a non-Jew accept nezirut, keep all of its restrictions and then desire to bring the sacrifices of a nazir in the Temple, his offerings will be rebuffed. Although a non-Jew can bring voluntary sacrifices in the Beit HaMikdash, he cannot bring the sacrifices of a nazir. With regard to non-Jewish slaves, the halakha is that a non-Jew who is sold to a Jewish person as a slave (eved) will be obligated to keep the same mitzvot that a Jewish woman is obligated to keep. The Mishna teaches that there are differences in the levels of obligation of a woman and a slave with regard to nezirut. While a woman's husband cannot forbid her from keeping her commitment to nezirut (although he does have the power of hafara - annulling her oaths, as will be discussed on tomorrow's daf), the owner of an eved can refuse to allow the slave to keep the laws of nezirut. In the next Mishna (62b) we will learn that even if the owner refuses to allow the eved to keep the laws of nezirut, the slave's commitment to do so remains, and should he become a free man, he will be obligated to become a nazir.

The Mishna (59b) discusses the case of a nazir who may have come into contact with a dead body, who also may be a metzora. In both of these cases (the nazir tameh and the metzora) there is a biblical commandment requiring the person with these conditions to cut his/her hair. The Mishna works to set priorities on which hair cutting takes precedence. The Gemara on our daf  presents a question that Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai's students asked him - why can't we have this person shave his head once and have it count for both the requirement of the nazir and the requirement of the metzora? Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai responds that their point would have made sense if the hair removal in both cases served the same purpose. In truth, however, the underlying purpose of the two haircuts differs, and so the same act cannot be used for both. Specifically, the nazir needs to remove his hair, while the metzora shaves to grow his hair, so he can shave it again after the days of his counting. The metzora under discussion is a metzora muhlat - one who has been examined by the kohen and deemed to be a metzora. Such a person must remove himself from the community until he recovers from his condition. Upon recovery, he brings a sacrifice and purifies himself, returning to his home after he has removed all of his hair (see Vayikra 14:8-9). Once there, he waits another seven days outside his house, at which point he removes his hair a second time, brings another set of sacrifices and then can return to the community. Thus the metzora cuts his hair twice; his first haircut is preparation for the second, unlike the nazir who has no further obligation to grow his hair.

When the Torah forbids a man to dress in women's clothing (see Devarim 22:5) what is its intention? Is every situation of cross-dressing forbidden by the Torah, or is it only when there is a specific intent to mingle with members of the opposite sex for inappropriate purposes? This question appears to be a point of disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov and the Tanna Kamma. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov forbids any situation in which a man dresses like a woman or a woman dresses like a man, while the Tanna Kamma objects that the Torah only forbids this in a situation of to'eva (an abomination), which would only occur if the purpose was to allow a man to sit among women or a woman to sit among men. The Rambam seems to follow the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov, since he rules that this prohibition is not based on a concern with sexual impropriety, but rather is connected with issues of avoda zara (idol worship), which is the to'eva referred to in the Torah (see Rambam Sefer HaMitzvot Lo Ta'aseh 40). One situation that the Gemara states specifically as being considered "women's clothing" is shaving parts of the body like the underarms or pubic area. In fact, Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba quotes Rabbi Yohanan as ruling that such behavior is forbidden by the Torah and would make the man who shaved those areas of his body liable for malkot (lashes). Still it should be noted that in the responsa (legal/religious response to a formalized question) the Ge'onim put forward that the definition of what is considered "men's clothing" or "women's clothing" is subjective, and therefore is dependent on time and place. Thus, if the accepted norms of a given community are for men to dress a certain way (to wear kilts, for example) or to act a certain way (to shave their underarms, for example), those behaviors would no longer be considered "women's dress."

Although the Torah forbids a man from removing the hair around his head - pe'at roshkhem - and from shaving his beard - pe'at zekanekhah (see Vayikra 19:27), nevertheless, in the case of a nazir who has completed his nezirut and must remove all of his hair, he is permitted to do so. The underlying principle that allows him to do this is the rule that. "Aseh doheh lo ta'aseh" - fulfillment of a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. One of the sources offered by the Gemara for the idea of aseh doheh lo ta'aseh is the commandment of tzitzit. Although the Torah forbids sha'atnez (a mixture of wool and linen fibers - see Devarim 22:11), immediately following we find the commandment to place gedilim (tzitzit) on one's clothing (see verse 12). This is understood by the Sages to permit sha'atnez when placing tzitzit on a garment. The Shiṭṭah Meḳubbeẓet offers two explanations for this case. One is simply that wool tzitzit are placed on a linen garment, which is permitted for the mitzva even though the two fibers will be connected. The second suggestion is that the strand of tekhelet - the blue strand - which is always made of wool, can be combined with strands of linen when tying the tzitzit. Another lesson that the Gemara suggests may be derived from this pasuk is that ordinarily tzitzit should be made from the same material as the garment. The exceptions are wool and linen, which can be used to make tzitzit no matter what the garment is made of. Rava derives this from the fact that the Torah teaches that tzitzit are placed on the corners of the garment (see Bamidbar 15:38) which is understood to mean that the tzitzit should match the corner - i.e. they should be made from the same material - yet the passage in Devarim that places the prohibition of sha'atnez and the commandment of tzitzit in the same context implies that tzitzit should be made of either linen or wool.

As we have learned (see daf 41) Jewish law forbids a man from rounding, or removing the hair around, his head - pe'at roshkhem - and from shaving his beard - pe'at zekanekhah (see Vayikra 19:27). These prohibitions do not apply to women, since they do not have beards, nor do they apply to children. Nevertheless, Rav Huna teaches that an adult who cuts a child's hair in the forbidden manner will be held liable. In a rather disturbing passage, the Gemara relates that Rav Adda bar Ahava asked Rav Huna who cuts his children's hair in such a manner, to which he replied that Hova - his wife - was the one who did it. Rav Adda bar Ahava responded "Hova should bury her children!" Following this exchange the Gemara concludes that as long as Rav Adda bar Ahava lived, Rav Huna's children passed away at a young age. According to Tosafot, Rav Adda bar Ahava actually saw that Rav Huna's children had their hair cut in a forbidden manner, while Rashi suggests that it was simply common practice to cut children's hair this way after they recovered from an illness. The Meiri understands Rav Adda bar Ahava's caustic statement as being based on Rav Huna's ruling that adults cannot cut children's hair in a forbidden manner, which created a situation according to which his wife was purposefully performing a prohibited activity. The Rosh suggests that Rav Adda bar Ahava's statement was simply one of surprise - "according to your opinion, how can Hova do this? Does she want to bury her children?" Not only according to the Rosh, but even according to the other rishonim, Rav Adda bar Ahava certainly did not intend to curse Rav Huna's children. The Sages believed, however, that even an innocent statement made by a person as pious as Rav Adda bar Ahava would have significance, based on the passage ki-shegagah ha-yotzeh mi-pi ha-shalit: "Like a mistaken word uttered by the ruler [that must be followed]" (see Kohelet 10:5).

We have learned that although a nazir cannot allow himself to become tameh met, not all situations of tum'at met automatically undo the efforts of the nazir. In some cases a nazir may become tameh met, yet he will simply resume his nezirut after he completes the purification process. In the Mishna on our daf , Rabbi Eliezer quotes Rabbi Yehoshua as teaching that only those situations of tum'at met that are severe enough to undo nezirut will be considered severe enough to make someone liable for entering the Temple precincts in a state of tum'ah. The discussion of the Gemara focuses on a technical point. Was the source of this teaching really Rabbi Yehoshua, or, perhaps, was it Rabbi Yehoshua bar Memel, which is the implication of a number of the sources? The Gemara's conclusion is that when the tradition is passed on by three people (or more), only the first and last of the teachers must be named specifically; the middle names can be left out. To support this statement, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak presents a teaching from Nahum ha-Lavlar regarding a question of how pe'a must be given in a situation where several different crops are planted in a single field. This law is quoted in the name of Rabbi Mi'asha who received the teaching from his father, who received the teaching from the zugot - the pairs of early tannaim listed in Massekhet Avot - who received the teaching from the prophets, who received it as an oral tradition from Mount Sinai (halakha le-Moshe mi-Sinai). In this list of rabbinic scholars, the names of Moshe and Calev are left out, indicating that as long as the first and last teachers are mentioned by name, some of the middle names can be left out. The expectation that Moshe and Calev would be included stems from the above-mentioned Mishna that introduces Pirkei Avot: Moshe received the Torah from Mount Sinai, passing it to Yehoshua, Yehoshua to the Elders - of whom Calev was the first - the Elders to the prophets, who passed it on to the Anshei Knesset haGedolah.

As we learned on yesterday's daf, although a nazir cannot allow himself to become tameh met, not all situations of tum'at met will force him to begin his nezirut over again. According to the Mishna (54a-b) there are many cases where the nazir may formally become tameh met, but he will not need to begin his nezirut over again, rather he will have to wait a week and undergo the process of taharah - purification - after which he will be allowed to resume his nezirut at the point where it was interrupted. Similarly, he will not have to shave his head like a nazir tameh. One such case is tum'at eretz ha-amim - the ritual defilement of foreign lands. There are two suggestions made by the Gemara to explain this enactment of the Sages. Tum'at eretz ha-amim is either mishum avira - "because of its air" - or mishum gusha - "because of its earth." Rashi explains these positions as technical statements. The Gemara is asking whether a person must step on the ground outside of the land of Israel to become tameh, or whether even traveling through its air would be enough to subject the individual to rabbinic tum'ah. The Rosh takes a different approach to explaining this law. According to the Rosh, saying that the air of foreign countries is the source of tum'ah essentially means that the reason for the rabbinic enactment does not stem from a fear that there are dead bodies there, rather it is an independent decree whose purpose is to discourage Jews from living outside the land of Israel. According to this approach, the idea that tum'at eretz ha-amim is mishum gusha means that outside of Israel we are concerned that there are bodies buried in places that we do not know about, so we must always assume that there is safek tum'ah - the possibility of tum'ah - wherever one goes.

In the last Mishna (49b) we learned that although a nazir cannot allow himself to become tameh, not all situations of tumat met will force him to begin his nezirut anew. The Mishna on our daf lists cases where the nazir may formally become tameh met, but he will not need to begin his nezirut over again, rather he will have to wait a week and undergo the process of taharah - purification - after which he will be allowed to resume his nezirut at the point where it was interrupted. Similarly, he will not have to shave his head like a nazir tameh. Among the cases that appear in the list are a gollel and a dofek, both of which are connected with traditional burial practices, and are, apparently, parts of the tombstone itself. The commentaries disagree about the definition of gollel and dofek. Rashi explains that the gollel is the cover of a casket, while the dofek refers to the stones upon which the cover rests. Tosafot point out that in several places the Gemara discusses whether an animal can be used as a gollel, and it is difficult to imagine a live animal being used for that purpose. They suggest that the gollel is a rounded stone that was used to close up a burial cave (several such stones have been found near ancient burial caves in Israel). During the times of the Mishna, common burial practice was to place the dead body in a temporary grave where it would decompose. At a later date, the bones would be removed and transferred to a family burial cave. The round shape of the gollel stone allowed it to be rolled, closing the cave, yet easily opened when necessary. According to this approach, the dofek was the frame upon which the gollel rested. This image was taken from the English edition of the Koren Talmud Bavli (Steinsaltz Talmud), Tractate Sukka daf 23, page 111.

As we have seen, the last Mishna (49b) teaches that there are many different cases where a nazir who becomes tameh met will be forced to conclude his nezirut by cutting his hair and undergoing the process of tahara - purification - after which he will begin his nezirut again from the beginning. Our Gemara notes that the Mishna repeats the statement al elu aha-nazir megale'ah, "In these situations the nazir will have to shave," twice, and suggests that the first statement comes to exclude the case of an etzem ke-se'orah - a situation where the only part of the dead body is a bone the size of a barley grain. In such a situation, only actual physical contact with the bone or actually carrying the bone will lead to tum'ah severe enough to force the nazir to shave. If, however, the nazir walked into a house in which such a bone was present - a situation of tum'at ohel that usually would create a situation of ritual defilement - the nazir would not become tameh. The second statement of al elu aha-nazir megale'ah is understood to exclude the case of even ha-sekhukhit. Although the term sekhukhit is usually understood to be another version of the word zekhukhit - glass - in our case it appears to be related to the words sikukh and kisuy - meaning "covering" - and to refer to a stone that is held over the body as a type of tent. Rashi offers two other suggestions, either that it refers to an even misma - a heavy rock that is placed on the dead body, which would not transfer tum'ah to the nazir even if he sits on it, or else it is a rock that is carried by the nazir on his back that passes over a dead body. The Shiṭṭah Meḳubbeẓet quotes the Rosh as suggesting that the term even ha-sekhukhit really does mean "glass" and that it refers to a transparent rock that does not bring about tum'ah.

The Gemara teaches that with regard to the issue of tum'at met many of the unique cases presented in the last Mishna (49b) will only take effect if we have the entire body of the dead person. If a limb is missing, then some of the laws will not apply. This ruling leads the Gemara to discuss other situations where a creature that has died is no longer whole - will that creature still be considered significant enough to make someone tameh? This daf discusses tum'at sheretz - the lower level ritual defilement that comes with contact with a dead animal - not tum'at met. In an attempt to respond to this question, the Gemara quotes a baraita that compares two words in Vayikra (11:31, 32) - ba-hem, which seems to indicate coming into full contact with the animal will create a situation of tum'ah, and me-hem, which seems to indicate that even coming into contact with part of the animal will create tum'ah. The baraita's suggestion is that even part of an animal will create tum'ah if its size is large enough to have been an entire creature. This minimal size is fairly small - ke-adasha, "the size of a bean" - which the Gemara says is the size of a homet when it is first born. The homet is one of the eight types of crawling creatures that are listed in the Torah as being tameh (see Vayikra 11:30), but it is not clear to us what its proper identification is. Two different traditions have developed over the years in identifying it:

1. The Arukh, Rashi and others suggest that it is a snail. This identification works well with our Gemara, since a newly hatched snail is the size of a bean.
2. Rav Sa'adia Ga'on and others suggest that it is a chameleon.

In modern Hebrew homet means "gecko" - a term generally applied to a sub-family of small lizards, which lends credence to the suggestion of homet referring to a chameleon.

As we discussed on yesterday's daf, one case of tameh met that disqualifies a nazir is melo tarvaad rakav - "a full ladle of dust." This is one of several situations where the nazir is considered tameh met. Our Gemara asks what appears to be a very odd question. Rabbi Yirmeya asks whether rakav that comes from the akev - the heel- will make someone tameh met. In the end the Gemara concludes by saying, "teiku" - there is no clear ruling in this case. The commentaries have a very difficult time explaining why a dead person's heel should be treated any differently than the rest of his body. The Meiri - who appears to have a variant reading in the text - suggests that Rabbi Yirmeya is not referring specifically to the heel, rather the question is about any part of the body that a person can survive without, and we are discussing a case where that body part is cut off of the person and buried. The direction taken by most of the rishonim is that the term akev really does mean a heel, and the question is whether the heel, which has less active functions in the body than other limbs, would have the same rules and regulations with regard to the issues of tum'at met. In truth, the flesh and skin of the human heel are markedly different than most of the rest of the human body. This difference manifests itself in the blood vessels and nerves, as exhibited in the fact that we find that there is much less sensitivity to pain and injuries. This fact has led important contemporary scholars to suggest that the entire physical development of the heel differs from that of the flesh of the rest of the body.

As we learned on yesterday's daf, there are several different situations where a person is considered to have become tameh met - ritually defiled by his contact with the dead. Among the cases of tum'at met that are considered significant enough to force the nazir to shave and begin his nezirut from the beginning is the case of melo tarvaad rakav - "a full ladle of dust." Unlike the other cases of the Mishna where the units of measurement have fairly clear definitions (such as ke-zayit, "the size of an olive", or ke-se'orah, "the size of a grain of barley"), the term tarvaad, which means "a ladle" lacks a clear definition. This leads the Gemara to try and clarify the size of this unit of measurement. Two possibilities are raised in the Gemara:

1. Hizkiyya says that it means melo pisat ha-yad - the size of the palm of one's hand
2. Rabbi Yohanan says melo hofnav - the palm and fingers of one's hand (a handful).

The expression melo hofnav is a term that appears in the Torah in the context of the amount of ketoret (incense) taken by the Kohen gadol as he prepares to enter the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur (see Vayikra 16:12). In that case, however, it is clear that melo hofnav does not refer to an objective amount, rather every Kohen gadol would take a handful, each according to the size of his hand. Nevertheless, we know that many of the objective units of measurement have their source in the size of parts of the human body, and, over time, those measurements came to have objective standards based on the average size of a finger or a foot. In our case, the Gemara works with the assumption that for a halakha that is described in the Mishna, there must be some standard measurement.

While it is clear that a nazir cannot allow himself to become tameh met, not all situations that are considered tum'at met will necessarily force the nazir to begin his nezirut anew. In fact, as we will see in the upcoming mishnayot, there are circumstances in which the nazir will formally be considered tameh met, but he will not need to shave his hair and he will be allowed to return to the nezirut that he began once he has completed the process that will make him tahor (ritually pure) again. What cases of tum'at met are considered significant enough to force the nazir to shave and begin his nezirut from the beginning? Among the cases listed in the Mishna on our daf are the following:

• The dead body itself
• An olive size from the dead body
• An olive size of netzel - body fluids
• A full ladle of rakav - dust from a corpse
• The spine
• The skull
• The limb of a dead person
• The separated limb of a live person

The case of netzel (body fluids) refers to either one of two cases. Certain parts of the living body are in liquid form, such as lubricating fluids in the joints of a healthy person, or pus in the case of an infection. These liquids ordinarily harden after death, since the normal body functions that created them cease to function. A second situation would be found when a dead body is left in a very hot place - for example if someone died in a fire - and the fat in the body may melt and become liquid for a short time, hardening when the heat source is removed. These body fluids that become solid are what the Mishna refers to as netzel.

As we learned on yesterday's daf, although a kohen gadol and a nazir are prohibited from coming into contact with a dead body, both of them will be obligated to deal with a met mitzva (a situation where no one is available to bury a dead person). In examining the source for this halakha, our Gemara quotes a baraita that describes how a person who is on his way to bring his Passover sacrifice or to perform a brit on his son will go to perform these mitzvot even if he hears that a close relative has died; nevertheless, if he comes across a met mitzva he is obligated to stop and take care of the burial, even at the expense of missing these important commandments. The mitzvot of korban Pesah and brit milah are unique among positive commandments, as they are the only ones that are considered so central to Jewish life - both of them represent joining the Jewish community - that someone who does not perform them is liable to receive the punishment of karet . Rashi notes that the story presented in the baraita may be describing one person who is on his way to perform both of these mitzvot, since a person cannot bring a korban Pesah unless all members of his family are circumcised. Rabbeinu Peretz points out that even though a father can circumcise his son while he is in a state of tumah, still we can derive an important lesson from this ruling. The baraita is teaching that a person is obligated to postpone the required brit milah and spend as much time as is needed for the burial preparations for the met mitzva. Some of the commentaries assume that the baraita is discussing a nazir who was on his way to bring the korban Pesah and perform the brit milah; others suggest that the baraita could be referring to anyone, but the message of the centrality of taking care of the needs of the met mitzva remains applicable in all cases.

The sixth perek of Massekhet Nazir begins on our daf, and its focus is on the law forbidding a nazir to allow himself to become tameh by coming into contact with a dead body. The first Mishna in the perek compares and contrasts these laws in the context of a nazir and a kohen gadol, since neither of them can allow themselves to become ritually defiled. The Mishna teaches that a kohen gadol and a nazir are similar in that they cannot even participate in the funeral of an immediate relative; nevertheless, both of them are obligated to take care of the needs of a met mitzva - someone who has died in a situation where no one is there to bury him. The Mishna asks: In the event that a kohen gadol and a nazir come across a met mitzva together, which one of them should forgo his state of purity and deal with the met mitzva? According to Rabbi Eliezer, it is the kohen gadol who should step forward; according to the Hakhamim, the pure status of even an ordinary kohen takes precedence over that of a nazir. Rabbi Eliezer's reasoning is that for a kohen gadol to reestablish his ritual purity, he merely needs to wait a week, undergoing the ordinary process of purification. The nazir, however, also needs to bring sacrifices, pointing to the greater severity of his tumah. The Hakhamim argue that the ritual status of the kohen is greater, since it is kedushat olam - permanent holiness - as opposed to a nazir, whose unique status is temporary. Several explanations are given in an attempt to clarify how the kedushat olam of the kohen differs from the status of a nazir, given that a nazir can also choose to accept his status as a nazir forever. Rabbi Avraham min ha-Har suggests that it means that the kohen is born with his kedusha, as opposed to the nazir who accepts his status later in life. The Talmud Yerushalmi argues that kedushat olam refers to the fact that the kedusha of a kohen is biblically imposed, while nezirut is created by the statement of the nazir. According to the Rashash, what is unique about the kohen is that his kedusha will be transferred to his children and his children's children, while the nazir's status will not carry over to the next generation.

As we have learned, a nazir cannot cut his hair during the period of his nezirut; after he has completed his nezirut he is commanded to cut his hair and burn it. What if he has no hair? Our Gemara quotes a baraita that discusses a case of nazir memorat: a nazir who is totally bald. In such a situation, Beit Shammai rules that there is no need to take a razor to his head, while Beit Hillel rules that he must do so. There are two readings offered by the Gemara with regard to this disagreement. According to the first approach, Ravina explains Beit Shammai's position as meaning that there is nothing that the nazir can do to fulfill his obligation; according to Beit Hillel once the nazir performs the symbolic act of shaving he has fulfilled his obligation, even though there was no hair to cut off. According to the second approach, Rabbi Avina explains that according to Beit Hillel the nazir is obligated to shave, but he cannot, while Beit Shammai believes that since he cannot cut off his hair he is not obligated to do so. In any case, the Gemara parallels the question of cutting the hair of a bald nazir to the question of placing oil and the blood of the sacrifice on the right thumb and big toe of a healed metzora who has brought the required korbanot (see Vayikra 14:14-17). What if the metzora has no thumb? The baraita offers three positions on this matter:

• Rabbi Eliezer rules that the metzora will remain tameh forever.
• Rabbi Shimon says that the oil and sacrificial blood should be placed where his thumb should be.
• The Hakhamim say that in such a case, the left thumb can be used instead of the right.

Rabbi Pedat identifies Beit Shammai with Rabbi Eliezer, which matches Ravina's explanation. According to the second version, Rabbi Avina disagrees with Rabbi Pedat's position.

After a nazir completes his nezirut, he is obligated to visit the Temple and bring three sacrifices - a hatat (sin offering), an olah (an offering entirely burned on the altar) and a shelamim (an offering that is shared by the kohanim and the owner, aside from what is burned on the altar). In addition, the nazir is obligated to cut his hair. Although the Torah clearly states that the nazir's hair be cut petah ohel mo'ed - "in the entrance to the Tabernacle" (see Bamidbar 6:18), our Gemara quotes a baraita that explains that doing so would be derekh bizayon - degrading. The requirement is therefore understood to be that the hair is cut in conjunction with the shelamim sacrifice, which is the only sacrifice that is said to be brought petah ohel mo'ed (see Vayikra 3:1-2). This also makes sense according to the flow of events, since the hair is burned under the pot in which the meat of the shelamim is cooked. In the baraita, Rabbi Shimon Shezuri suggests that another halakha can be learned from the passage petah ohel mo'ed - one which obligates only a nazir, but not a female nezira. The explanation offered is that the sight of a woman with her hair uncovered was inappropriate in the Temple, so she should have her hair cut in the privacy of her home. In response to the objections that we find that a sota (a woman accused of adultery - see Bamidbar 5:18) has her hair uncovered in the Temple, Rabbi Shimon replied that the nezira comes kohelet u-pokeset - wearing makeup and rouge - while the sota does not. The makeup described by the Gemara is kehal, כחל - more commonly known by its Persian name, kohl - which was prevalent in many ancient cultures across the world. Kohl's black-blue color is derived from the mineral stibnite (Sb₂S₃), crystals of which are ground up and mixed with oil, fat or butter, then applied to the area around one's eyes to emphasize them and make them appear larger. Stibnite is toxic and modern makeup has replaced the use of the substance, which is banned as a health risk in most developed countries.

We have already learned that a nazir is prohibited from coming into contact with a dead body, as well as cutting his hair and eating or drinking grape products. The Mishna on our daf teaches that there are differences between these various prohibitions:

• If a nazir becomes tameh or if his hair is cut, he must begin his nezirut anew, but if he drinks wine his nezirut continues even though he transgressed a prohibition.
• There is a difference between these two laws. Coming into contact with the dead obligates the nazir to bring a sacrifice and start his nezirut from the beginning; having his hair cut does not obligate him to bring a sacrifice, and at most he will need to count 30 days, even if he had accepted a lengthier nezirut on himself.
• The prohibitions against becoming tameh or cutting hair may be pushed aside by other considerations - e.g. taking care of a met mitzva (a dead person who has no one to bury him) or a metzora (a leper) who is obligated to shave his body upon recovering from his tzara'at. There are no exceptions to the rule about drinking wine, which will always be forbidden.

The Gemara derives the rule that forbids all situations of drinking wine for a nazir from the pesukim (see Bamidbar 6:3), and it appears to refer to a case where a person had taken a vow to drink wine. That vow cannot be fulfilled, since the obligation of nezirut is more powerful than the vow that had been taken. Rashi suggests that one case that is more powerful than nezirut is drinking wine at kiddush and havdalah, which would be permitted since this wine is obligatory and the nezirut cannot override this obligation. Most of the commentaries, however, disagree with this position. The Rambam argues that making kiddush and havdalah over wine is only a rabbinic obligation, and it certainly does not take precedence over the biblical laws of nezirut.

Although a nazir cannot allow himself to become tameh even for his immediate relatives, a kohen is permitted - in fact, with the exception of a kohen gadol, he is required - to participate in the funeral of his immediate relatives, including his mother, father, son, daughter, brother and unmarried sister (see Vayikra 21:1-3). Rav is quoted by Rav Hisda as teaching that this is true only if the father's body is whole; if his head was removed from his body, the kohen is not allowed to become tameh. The Ramban, in his Torat ha-Adam, limits this to cases where a limb was removed at the time of death or after death. If the relative lived without a limb, upon his death we consider his body to be "complete" and the kohen is expected to participate in his burial. The Gemara quotes a baraita that appears to contradict Rav Hisda's teaching. We find that although a kohen cannot allow himself to become tameh through contact with a limb that was cut off from his father's body while he was still alive, should his father die he will become obligated to search for every body part to bury, even an etzem ke-se'orah - a bone the size of a grain of barley. Clearly even if this bone was missing, the kohen is nevertheless involved in his father's burial. In response, the Gemara suggests that there is a disagreement among the tannaim, and that the baraita follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, while Rav Hisda followed the other sages. In order to understand the concept of etzem ke-se'orah, it should be noted that most of the bones in an adult body are much larger than a barley grain. Still, there are some very small bones that are found in an adult. An example of this would be sesamoid bones, thus called because they are the size of sesame seeds, which are formed in the musculature around bone joints. There are also certainly bones this small found in the tiny bodies of infants.

We have learned that a nazir cannot cut his hair. The Mishnayot on our daf discuss whether the nazir would be allowed to perform activities - like shampooing his hair - that may lead to some of his hair being removed. The first Mishna teaches that a nazir can be hofef or mefaspes, but he cannot be sorek. While sorek is understood as combing hair, which is forbidden according to the Gemara because the intent of combing is to pull out dangling hairs, the other two terms are the subject of some discussion among the rishonim. Hofef is defined by the Arukh as meaning to simply scratch his hair. In his commentary to the Mishna, the Rambam explains hofef as rubbing one's hair with one's hand, while mefaspes means to use one's nails or some other hard object. Tosafot and the Rosh understand hofef as meaning to use soap or shampoo to wash the hair, and mefaspes as separating the hairs from one another. In the second Mishna of the daf, Rabbi Yishmael teaches that hafifa cannot be done using dirt, since it pulls out hair. During Talmudic times, when acceptable soap was not available, it was common practice to use other materials that broke down fats and oils. These were usually specific types of plants or minerals that were available. On occasion people used earth that was known to contain such minerals for shampooing. Since these materials were very coarse, particularly when combined with earth, one could expect that their use would lead to some level of hair removal. According to the Rambam, Rabbi Yishmael's position in the second Mishna is not disagreeing with the first Mishna; he is simply making a point that shampooing with dirt will certainly cause hairs to be removed, which is forbidden. One of the commentaries quoted in the Shiṭṭah Meḳubbeẓet disagrees. His reading of the second Mishna adds the word "af" at the beginning of Rabbi Yishma'el's statement, indicating that Rabbi Yishmael believes that even if the nazir does not intend to remove his hair, such a questionable activity is forbidden.

Jewish law forbids a man from removing the hair around his head - pe'at roshkhem - and from shaving his beard - pe'at zekanekha (see Vayikra 19:27). Common practice today accepts that the only prohibition involved in shaving one's beard is if it is done with a razor, but otherwise it is permissible, even if it mispara'im ke-en ta'ar - even if it is cut with a scissors so close to the skin as to appear to have been done with a razor. In the context of discussing the requirement to shave one's head in the cases of nazir and metzora (see yesterday's daf) and the potential conflict that removing all of one's hair presents, the Gemara discusses whether pe'at ha-rosh also is forbidden only with a razor, or if it will be forbidden even if it is mispara'im ke-en ta'ar. From our Gemara's conclusion, Tosafot understand that pe'at ha-rosh differs from pe'at ha-zakan, and although pe'at ha-zakan is forbidden only if it is done with a razor, shaving pe'at ha-rosh will be forbidden no matter what method is used. The Me'iri, who follows the Rambam's approach to this question, suggests that the Gemara raises the possibility that pe'at ha-rosh will be forbidden in all circumstances as part of the discussion, but that is not the final conclusion of the halakha. According to his reasoning, even pe'at ha-rosh will be forbidden only if it is done with a razor. In this case, we do not find a clear conclusion in the halakha, and both opinions are quoted in the Shulḥan Aruk (see Yoreh De'ah 181:2). The Rambam's ruling appears in his Mishneh Torah (Sefer ha-Maddah, Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah, chapter 12). It is interesting to note that the traditional picture of the Rambam presents him with a beard, but with no hair on his pe'at ha-rosh, indicating, perhaps, that the Rambam cut off his pe'at ha-rosh using mispara'im ke-en ta'ar. The images of shaving lines were taken from the Hebrew edition of the Steinsaltz Talmud, Tractate Makkot, page 94. The portrait of Rambam was taken from a tremendously informative article written by Yitzchak Schwartz, MD, at the Rambam Medical Center in Haifa, Israel. Dr Schwartz writes, "Maimonides’ traditional portrait and autograph...[is a] nineteenth-century imaginative depiction, courtesy of the Granger Collection, NY, is possibly by the American illustrator Arthur Burdett Frost." The full article, which is quite worth reading, appears here in the Rambam Medical Journals.

Our Gemara quotes a Mishna from Massekhet Nega'im, which teaches that there are three people who shave their heads and fulfill a mitzva by doing so. They are:

1. A nazir
2. A metzora - a leper
3. The levi'im, for when the Levites were first consecrated for work in the mishkan their bodies were shaved (See Bamidbar 8:7).

In all of these cases, the obligation is to shave the head totally with a razor. If one leaves even two hairs, or removes the hair by other means, he does not fulfill his obligation. In response to the challenge that these laws are obvious, the Gemara suggests that we may have thought that the obligation was simply to remove the hair by any means, and there was no specific obligation to do so by mean of a razor, so that even nasha - depilatory cream - could be used. The Mishna therefore needed to teach us this rule. The source of the term "nasha" is unclear, and some prefer a variant reading that appears in the Mishna in Nega'im that the word is nasham, which is understood to mean that it is medicinal cream of some sort. Even today we find that creams are used for hair removal, which work on a basis of chemicals that break down the hair so that it can be removed simply by brushing it off. Generally speaking sulfur salts are the active chemical in such creams, and it is possible that nasha was made from similar compounds, perhaps with the addition of lime. Nasha successfully removed hair for an extended period of time, and sometimes the compounds were so strong that they permanently removed the hair. In truth, the nazir is not obligated to remove his hair, although, as noted, he fulfills a mitzva by doing so, and should do it even if a significant amount of time had passed since his nezirut was completed.

We have already learned that a person who accepts upon himself a standard nezirut is obligated to grow his hair for thirty days. The Mishna on our daf teaches that if his head is shaven during that period - even against his will, for example by bandits - he will need to begin his nezirut anew, since he must have 30 days of growth. This halakha leads the Gemara to discuss an apparently trivial matter - does hair grow from the end or from the root? The argument is that if it grows from the bottom, or the root, then as long as some hair remained it is not a problem, since the hair of nezirut remains to be cut off at the end of the nezirut. If, however, it grows from the top, once you cut the nazir's hair off, even if you leave some at the bottom, you have removed the hair of nezirut. One of the proofs brought in an attempt to solve this conundrum is the case of blorit d'goyim - the non-Jews' blorit hairstyle.The Gemara's assumption is that this proves that hair grows from the bottom, since we see that the hair that was braided remained tight, while the hair closer to the head became loose. This proof is eventually rejected by the Gemara, which argues that the looseness at the bottom may be the result of some other development. Many suggestions are offered to define the term blorit, but no word in Greek or Latin is a perfect match for it. It is a hairstyle, with hair grown long - particularly on the sides and in the back of the head. The hair was then tied and braided into different shapes. Later on, the braided hair was shaved off in a special pagan ritual. This image was taken from the Hebrew edition of the Steinsaltz Talmud, Tractate Nazir, page 173.

The Mishna (34a-b) brought two opinions about the amount of grape juice or wine that a nazir must drink in order to be held liable. According to the Mishna rishona (first) the amount is a revi'it (one-fourth of a log), which is the usual requirement for drinking, while according to Rabbi Akiva the amount is a ke-zayit (the size of an olive) which is usually the amount required for solid foods. Our Gemara explains Rabbi Akiva's position as being based on the passage that forbids drinking wine or other grape products and concludes va-anavim lahim ve-yeveshim lo yokhel - that neither fresh nor dried grapes can be eaten (see Bamidbar 6:3). Since the pasuk concludes with a statement about eating, that defines all of the other categories mentioned, as well. In truth, there are two approaches to the disagreement between the Mishna rishona and Rabbi Akiva. According to the first, the Mishna rishona rules that the laws of nezirut match the normal laws of eating and drinking, i.e. ke-zayit for eating and revi'it for drinking, while Rabbi Akiva believes that all of the rules of nezirut are based on a ke-zayit. According to the second approach, the Mishna rishona rules that all the laws of nezirut - both eating and drinking - require revi'it, while Rabbi Akiva says that they all require ke-zayit. The reading that appears in our Gemara matches the first approach, while the Rosh accepts the second approach, based on his reading of the Gemara that presents the Mishna rishona (called the Tanna Kamma by our Gemara) as saying that all things forbidden to the nazir are compared to drinking. The Meiri offers an alternative perspective. He has the reading that appears in our Gemara, according to which the Mishna rishona does not compare all things forbidden to the nazir to drinking, meaning that solid food from grapes cannot be combined with wine or grape juice, since they are separate entities. Rabbi Akiva disagrees, claiming that ke-zayit and revi'it are basically the same amount, just one is for solids and the other for liquids. Given that the pasuk uses the terminology of "eating" also when discussing wine, we learn that with regard to nazir there is no difference between grapes and wine, and they can be combined to add up to the minimum requirement.

When we discuss the prohibition of eating forbidden foods, it is important to note that only foods that are edible will make a person liable for punishment if he eats them. In the event that the food has spoiled and is no longer fit for human consumption, then the usual prohibition would not be in force. This law - noten ta'am lifgam, mutar - has its source in nevelah, i.e. meat that has not been slaughtered properly that is forbidden. The Torah teaches (see Devarim 14:21) that nevelah cannot be eaten, rather that it should be given or sold to a non-Jew. From this we deduce that nevelah only needs to be given away or sold if it is edible; if it is not edible, then there is no prohibition attached to it. A classic example of noten ta'am lifgam is the case of pots that were used to cook non-kosher food, and we assume that the pot itself absorbed some of the taste of the forbidden food. In such a case, as Rav Huna bar Hiyya points out, we assume that any taste that was absorbed remains only for a day. Once the pot is an eino ben yomo - the taste in the pot is more than a day old - any taste that might transfer from the pot is considered bad, and will not be considered significant. According to Rav Huna, when the Torah required the people in the desert to place pots captured from the Midianites through fire to remove all taste from them (see Bamidbar 31:23), that requirement applied only to those pots that had been used within the last day. All others may have been subjected to the same treatment, but only for reasons of safek - of doubt - because of the possibility that they had been used so recently.

When defining the amount of food that needs to be eaten - either the amount needed to fulfill a commandment or the amount needed to determine whether a person is liable for punishment for having eaten something that is forbidden - we must look not only at the volume of food, but also at the amount of time during which the act of eating is performed. Generally speaking, in order for an act of eating to be considered significant, a person must consume ke-zayit be-kheday akhilat peras - an amount the size of an olive in the amount of time that it takes to eat half a loaf of bread. Our Gemara posits that this amount is a biblical law. Tosafot point out that the fact that ke-zayit be-kheday akhilat peras is a biblical law is clear from a Mishna in Massekhet Keritot (12b), but our Gemara is searching for a source that teaches whether we use the same criteria to determine the significance of the act of eating when the kezayit is mixed together with other food, rather than the simple case of eating a kezayit on its own. One test case is kutah haBavli - a Babylonian dip made with mouldy bread mixed with whey and salt - where we find a disagreement whether you will be held liable for eating it on Pesah. The Gemara points out that this food is unique because it is used only as a condiment, so no one will ever eat an olive's worth within the allotted time, and if someone does, we do not consider that to be significant, since batlah da'ato etzel kol adam - literally, "His opinion is nullified in the face of everyone else."

According to the first Mishna in the perek (34a), there is a disagreement about the definition of "products" with respect to the nezirut prohibition against eating or drinking grape products. The Tanna Kamma of the Mishna teaches that any part of the grape - including pits and skins - counts toward the amount that is required for the nazir to be held liable - one ke-zayit, an amount the size of an olive. There was an older tradition called the Mishna rishona that required drinking a revi'it in order to be held liable, although Rabbi Akiva insists that if a person dipped his bread in wine, then here, too, the amount was a ke-zayit. In our Gemara, Rabbi Abbahu quotes Rabbi Yohanan as teaching that the rule of a ke-zayit of wine for a nazir is unique in the annals of halakha. Generally speaking, when we check to see whether there is a certain amount of issur (forbidden food) we judge this based solely on the size of the forbidden food itself. The fact that there is other, permitted food mixed with it is of no consequence. The rules of nezirut are the only place in the Torah where heter mitztaref le-issur - a mixture of permissible and forbidden foods will be seen as adding together to have the full amount required for punishment. Only in the case of nazir does a piece of bread the size of an olive absorb wine and create a full-size forbidden mixture. According to our Gemara, the source for this rule is the word mishrat (Bamidbar 6:3) in the passage forbidding a nazir to eat any wine products. Mishrat means "soaked" and is understood to forbid something that has absorbed wine. Rabbi Avraham min haHar has a different reading in the Gemara, which derives it from the fact that the passage reads ve-khol mishrat anavim - and all liquor of grapes - which is an inclusive statement.

The Mishna on our daf relates the story of a person who sees a koy and declares one of three things:

1. "I am a nazir if this animal is a hayya (a wild animal)," or
2. "I am a nazir if this animal is a behema (a domesticated animal)," or
3. "I am a nazir if this animal is both a hayya and a behema."

In all of these cases the Mishna rules that the person becomes a nazir. According to the conclusion of the discussion in Massekhet Bikkurim, the koy is recognized by the halakha for its unique status. Regarding some laws it is considered a hayya, with regard to others a behema, and regarding some others it appears to be a unique creation. Many of the commentaries understand our Mishna as ruling that the person in our case becomes a nazir min ha-safek - because of the doubtful status of the koy. The Rambam, however, believes that the person is not referring to the true definition of the koy, but rather to its status according to Jewish law. Since Jewish law treats the koy as a hayya with regard to some laws and as a behema with regard to others, an element of his statement is true, thus making him a nazir. Koy - כוֹיּ - refers to an animal that has the features of both a wild animal and a domesticated one. Many problems arise in trying to identify the koy. It is mentioned numerous times in the Mishna and the Gemara, not because it is a common animal, but rather because it is useful in discussion that explore the parameters and limits of the laws of domestic animals versus wild animals, and allows it to be a test case for many halakhot. As early as the mishnaic period, the Sages disagreed on the identification of the koy . Some maintain that it is a hybrid born to a  deer, or another kosher wild animal, and a goat. According to many researchers, the koy is identified as the water buffalo. There are allusions to this identification in some medieval rabbinic sources. Others reject this idea and claim that water buffalo did not live in Eretz Yisrael during the time of the Mishna, when the koy was first mentioned. Others maintain that the koy is a unique type of animal - an Ayal HaBar. The Ayal HaBar can be identified with the mouflon sheep, Ovis musimon, which, according to many, is the forerunner of domesticated sheep. The mouflon is a mountain-dwelling long-haired wild sheep subspecies, distinguished by its short hair and grey color; a nimble climber, it lives in mountainous regions, today mainly in uninhabited areas in Europe. While there are a number of opinions as to the specific subspecies of mouflon a koy may be, it is likely that the clear similarities between a koy and a sheep, together with its being a wild animal, led to the Sages’ confusion about its classification. There is also uncertainty with regard to both the origin of the term koy and its proper vocalization, themselves the subject of talmudic disagreement. These images were taken from the English edition of the Koren Talmud Bavli, Tractate Nedarim daf 18b, page 70.

The Mishna (32b) tells of a group of people walking together who spy a figure walking towards them:

1. One person says: I will be a nazir if that is So-and-so approaching us.
2. The second one says: I will be a nazir if it is not So-and-so.
3. The third says: I will be a nazir if one of you is a nazir.
4. The fourth says: I will be a nazir if you are both nezirim.
5. The fifth says: I will be a nazir if all of you are nezirim.

Beit Shammai rules that all of these people are nezirim, based on his position which appears in the first Mishna in the perek (see 30b-31a) that even a mistaken nezirut takes effect. Beit Hillel says that only those whose conditions were not fulfilled become nezirim. Beit Hillel's statement is obviously problematic - clearly those people whose conditions were not fulfilled should not become nezirim - and Rav Yehuda suggests amending the Mishna to read that only those whose conditions were fulfilled should become nezirim. Abayye has another suggestion to explain Beit Hillel. He suggests that there is an additional statement attached to the original one, and the person added ee nami lav ploni hu - that also if it were not the person, he would become a nazir. Thus, the statement of Beit Hillel means that if the original condition was not fulfilled he will become a nazir, assuming that the second condition is fulfilled. Rashi explains this to mean simply that the person says, "I will be a nazir if that is So-and-so approaching us, and also if it is not So-and-so I will be a nazir." The other rishonim point out that this obvious ruling hardly needs to be taught by the Mishna. The Me'iri suggests that the case is more complicated. When a man says, "I will be a nazir if the man approaching us is Reuven and not Shimon," and then it turns out that it was another person entirely, although his primary statement was not fulfilled (it was not Reuven) since his secondary statement was fulfilled (it was not Shimon) he becomes a nazir.

From the perspective of the Mishna, the sacrifices that are brought at the end of the nezirut are so critical to the nezirut itself that if a person accepts nezirut and then discovers that the animal he had intended to bring as a korban had been stolen, he is not a nazir. This is only the case, however, if the theft had already taken place when he accepted nezirut. If he accepts nezirut and the animal is stolen later on, his nezirut does take effect, since this is considered nolad - a situation that developed after the vow of nezirut had taken place - and ein pot'hin be-nolad: we do not undo a vow based on an event that takes place after the vow has been taken. The Rambam teaches that in the case where the animal had been stolen before nezirut was accepted, there is no need to even have the vow annulled by a rabbi, since it turns out to have been made in error. Thus, even in the case where the animal was stolen later, the Mishna is simply saying that the vow was valid, leaving open the possibility that the man can approach a rabbi and appeal to have the nezirut annulled on other grounds. The Mishna points to a disturbing - and interesting - case, where the tanna Nahum the Mede erred with regard to this halakha. When the Second Temple was destroyed, nezirim who arrived in Jerusalem with the intention of bringing their sacrifices discovered that they would be unable to do so, creating a situation that they would never be able to complete their nezirut. Nahum the Mede asked them whether they would have accepted nezirut had they known that the Temple would be destroyed and that they would be unable to bring their sacrifices. Upon hearing their answer that they would not have accepted nezirut, Nahum the Mede released them from their nezirut. Upon hearing of his ruling, the Sages proclaimed that this would work only for those people who accepted nezirut after the destruction had taken place. If they had accepted nezirut while the mikdash was still standing, the situation would be considered nolad and they could not have their vows removed so easily.

The first Mishna in the fifth perek of Massekhet Nazir deals with mistakes made when declaring something to be a sacrifice. The example brought - about which Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel differ - is a case where a man declares, "Shor shahor she-yetze mi-beiti rishon, harei hu hekdesh" - that he is prepared to sacrifice "the black ox , which will come out of my house first." If a white ox comes out first, Beit Shammai believes that it becomes hekdesh (consecrated), while Beit Hillel rules that it does not. This disagreement leads the Gemara to discuss the advantages and disadvantages connected with white animals and black animals. Rav Hisda teaches that "black among white is a deficiency" and that at the same time "white among black is a deficiency." These statements are understood by the commentaries as follows. According to The Meiri, "black among white is a deficiency" refers to a situation where there is a row of white animals, and black ones appear among them. In such a case, the black animals lower the value of the group, and the potential purchaser may choose to look elsewhere to purchase his animals. The case of time "white among black is a deficiency" refers to a white spot on a black animal. If an animal is from a particular breed that is ordinarily black, rather than pointing to a mixed breed, a white spot may very well indicate an injury or some other deficiency in the animal. Sometimes such a spot can show that the animal suffered a serious blow to that particular part of the body that caused the hair roots to lose their natural pigment. Even if there are no other physical manifestations of this blow, it is possible that internal damage was done to the animal, as well.

The Mishna on our daf teaches about a case where a son can shave (i.e. cut off his hair following nezirut) based on his father's nezirut: ha-ish megale'ah al nezirut aviv. The Mishna explains that the case is where the father was a nazir and set aside money for his end-of-nezirut sacrifices without specifying which they were for, but he died before completing his nezirut. Should his son say, "I accept upon myself nezirut, and will use his money for my sacrifices," he is allowed to do so. Rabbi Yosei argues that in such a case, the money cannot be used by the son, and must go instead to voluntary sacrifices. He suggests that the case of ha-ish megale'ah al nezirut aviv is when a father and son are nezirim together, and the father set aside money to pay for the sacrifices that he needs to bring upon completing his nezirut without specifying which korbanot they are for. In such a case, if he dies before the period of nezirut is over, his son can make use of the sacrifices for himself. The explanation for this appears to be that in the first case, according to Rabbi Yosei, there is no connection whatsoever between the nezirut if the father and the son, since the son's nezirut begins only after the father's has ended. In the second case, however, the fact that father and son are experiencing nezirut together allows the son to make use of his father's money. There is an alternative reading to this Mishna, which offers a diametrically opposite approach to the case of ha-ish megale'ah al nezirut aviv. According to the alternative reading, all agree that in a case where the father and son are nezirim at the same time, the son can use his father's money for the sacrifices. The argument is in the case where the son accepts nezirut in the wake of his father's death. The explanation according to this reading is that when the father and son are nezirim at the same time, the son has an independent obligation and cannot use his father's money. When he accepts nezirut and states that it will be based on his father's obligation, he has the right to do so.

The Mishna (28b) teaches that a father (and only a father, not a mother) can make his son a nazir. The source for this law is a point of disagreement between Rabbi Yohanan, who simply says halakha hee be-nazir - there is an oral tradition regarding the laws of nezirut that permits this, and Resh Lakish, who says kedei le-hankho be-mitzvot - that it is permitted so that the father can educate his son with regard to the commandments. It appears that the concept of kedei le-hankho be-mitzvot is a rabbinic commandment upon a father to teach his child and help prepare him to fulfill mitzvot when he becomes an adult. According to this, the father in our Mishna is preparing his son to keep the mitzva of nezirut, should he choose to accept nezirut upon himself when he grows up. This approach presents several problems that are hinted to by the rishonim and spelled out by the Sfas Emes. From several statements in the Gemara it is clear that people were not encouraged to become nezirim and that a nazir was considered in some way to be a sinner. If so, how can we consider it obligatory upon a father to prepare his son for nezirut? The Sfas Emes responds to this question by pointing out that the Gemara does acknowledge that nezirut is considered positive under certain circumstances (namely, when it is done for the sake of heaven) and in such a case, it would certainly be considered a mitzva. In a situation where a father recognizes that his son needs to be more careful than the average person, he may feel it appropriate to prepare him for nezirut in its positive sense.

In many communities today Orthodox women wear wigs in order to cover their hair in public. Some suggest that the source for this tradition is from today's daf. The Mishna teaches that in a case where a woman has completed her nezirut and begins bringing the sacrifices that conclude her time as a nazir, her husband can no longer object to her nezirut and be mefer - the one to nullify her vow of nezirut. He can do so, however, if she is bringing sacrifices after having become temeah and is returning to her status as a nezira, since he can argue that her refraining from wine affects their relationship. Rabbi Meir argues that even if the nezirut is over the husband can object, arguing that he can reasonably claim that having a wife with a shaven head is unpleasant for him. The Gemara explains the disagreement between Rabbi Meir and the Tanna Kamma as an argument about whether wearing a pe'a nokhrit - a wig - is acceptable. The Tanna Kamma is comfortable with a pe'a nokhrit, while according to Rabbi Meir the husband can object to a wig since it is zuhama - it is dirty. Rashi explains the idea of zuhama according to its usual meaning - it gets dirty. Since during Talmudic times the techniques of connecting the hair to the covering that is placed on the head were not well developed, it was impossible to properly brush and wash the wig, and they often became dirty. Tosafot point out that even in settings where there was a lack of hygiene, her husband was more likely to object since this dirt was not a natural part of the woman's body. The Meiri claims that in this case, zuhama might refer to the fact that the wig could not be brushed and combed well, and its unkempt look may have been unpleasant to her husband. Finally, the Rosh suggests that the very idea of a woman wearing someone else's hair may have been objectionable to her husband.

We have been discussing cases where an animal was set aside to serve as a sacrifice and then that sacrifice can no longer be brought (e.g. a woman's nezriut was nullified by her husband, or the owner of a sin-offering dies before it is brought). In such cases, can the sacrifice be switched for another purpose? We have seen that although in some cases it might be switched to a similar korban, in cases of hatat - of a sin-offering - it cannot be switched. Our Gemara quotes a baraita that understands the word korbano - "his offering" - (see Vayikra 4:23) to limit a hatat so much that even if someone's father dies, leaving an unsacrificed korban hatat, the son cannot make use of the animal for his own sin-offering. Although this may appear to be obvious, given the fact that no sin-offering can be switched from one to another, Rabbeinu Peretz suggests that we may have thought that there was an exception in the case of a son, who not only receives an inheritance from his father, but actually steps into his father's place with regard to many halakhot. We may have thought, therefore, that by sacrificing the hatat we view the son's korban as though it had been brought by his father. In the course of this Gemara we learn that the word korbano actually appears three times in the section on sin-offerings (see Vayikra, chapter 4, pesukim 23, 28 and 32), and none of them are essential for the laws of the korban hatat itself. From this the Gemara derives three halakhot that emphasize the need for the sin-offering to be uniquely his and no one else's. He cannot use a korban set aside by his father, he cannot use a korban even if it was set aside for a similar type of transgression and finally he cannot use money set aside by his father for purchase of a different hatat.

As we learned, the Mishna (24a) distinguished between two cases when money was put aside for a nazir's sacrifices and then it turned out that there was no need to bring those sacrifices. For example, a woman accepted upon herself to be a nezira, and when her husband found out he was mefer - he nullified his wife's vow. If the money was set aside for the sacrifices without specifying which money was for which korban, then the money should be used for voluntary olot sacrifices; if the money was set aside with specific sacrifices in mind, each of them should be used for a similar korban on a voluntary basis (i.e. not for the sacrifices of a nazir), except for the hatat - the sin offering - which must be destroyed. Our Gemara gives the teaching in the name of Rav, as brought by Rav Huna, who claims that this distinction is true regarding money that was set aside. If, however, an animal was set aside then it will always be clear which sacrifice it is for. The simplest explanation of this ruling is that since each of the different korbanot sacrificed by a nazir is brought from a different animal, we can know exactly which sacrifice the nazir had in mind: the hatat (sin-offering) is a female animal, the olah (burnt-offering) is a male and the shelamim (peace-offering) is a two year old ram. Thus if circumstances prevent the sacrifices from being brought at the end of the nezirut the hatat will be left to die, while the olah and shelamim will be brought as a voluntary olah and shelamim. Tosafot argue that this cannot be the intention of Rav Huna in the name of Rav, since this ruling can be understood from the Mishna. Rather Tosafot suggest that we are dealing with a case where the animal that was set aside clearly cannot be brought as the korban of a nazir, e.g. he set aside several parim - cows - that cannot be brought as one of the sacrifices. The ruling is that we must see these animals as having been set aside to pay for all of the sacrifices, and since each of them includes a portion of the hatat sacrifice we will have to let these animals die - similar to the ruling that money set aside for a hatat that cannot be brought must be thrown into the Dead Sea.

We learned on yesterday's daf that when an animal for sacrifice cannot be brought for its original specific purpose, we try to offer it instead as a similar voluntary korban. Some sacrificial animals that are set aside in response to a very specific incident - for example, a korban hatat - cannot be switched to a general purpose, and as such are left to die. Our Gemara contrasts the case of a korban hatat with that of an asham (guilt-offering), which is also brought to atone for certain specific transgressions. The similarity notwithstanding, the ruling is that in a case where the animal designated for hatat is left to die, the asham is ro'eh - it is allowed to graze normally until it receives a mum (a blemish) that makes it unfit to be brought as a sacrifice, at which time it can be sold and a voluntary sacrifice can be bought with the proceeds. The Gemara points out that there is a process involved in declaring the unusable asham an animal that should be ro'eh, after which the status of the animal changes. Rav is quoted by Rav Huna as teaching that once the animal has been assigned to be ro'eh, it is a kosher korban if it is slaughtered with the intention of being sacrificed as an olah (burnt-offering). From this the Gemara concludes that if the animal had not yet been assigned to be ro'eh, the animal could not be brought as a korban olah, and if it is sacrificed with that in mind, it is pasul (rendered unfit). The Meiri quotes two opinions about when the asham becomes an animal that is ro'eh - either when the treasurer of the Temple declares it to be so, or else when it is turned over to the shepherd who is told of the animal's special status, and the need to keep track of when the animal developed a mum. Once the animal has been assigned to be ro'eh, it is no longer an asham, and if it is brought as a voluntary olah sacrifice, it will be kosher. The problem with sacrificing the animal prior to its change of status is simply that an asham cannot be brought as an olah.

The Mishna on our daf discusses a case where a woman accepts the laws of nezirut on herself, and then sets aside an animal for the sacrifice that she will bring upon completing her nezirut. According to the Mishna, if her husband is mefer and nullifies her vow - based on his powers as described in Bamidbar (30:9) and throughout Massekhet Nedarim - the status of the sacrifice will depend on a number of factors. If the animal belonged to her husband, it can simply be returned to the flock. If the animals belonged to her:

• The hatat (sin-offering) is left to die, since the hatat cannot be used for any other purpose.
• The olah (burnt-offering) can be brought as a voluntary olah sacrifice.
• The shelamim (peace-offering) is brought as a voluntary shelamim sacrifice, but it must be eaten the same day, like the shelamim of a nazir.

If she had put aside money for the sacrifices, if she had not designated them for specific sacrifices, the money become a nedava - it is either given to the Temple for general sacrifices or else she brings olot. If she had designated the money for specific sacrifices, those that can be brought as voluntary sacrifices should go for those purposes; the money designated for the hatat, "Yelkhu le-yam ha-melah" - should go to the Dead Sea. When the Talmud mentions Yam ha-Melah, the Dead Sea, sometimes the intention is to any salty sea (as opposed to a fresh water lake) while other times it refers specifically to the Dead Sea, known in Talmudic literature as "The Sea of Sodom." Forbidden object are thrown into the Dead Sea because there are no fishermen or other people who would come across these objects. An additional reason may be that the high concentration of salts in the water of the Dead Sea would dissolve anything that was thrown into it.

The Mishna on our daf introduces a case where a woman accepts the laws of nezirut on herself, and then proceeds to perform acts that are forbidden to a nazir. According to the Mishna, if her husband is mefer and nullifies her vow - based on his powers as described in Bamidbar (30:9) and throughout Massekhet Nedarim - she will not be punished, although Rabbi Yehuda rules that she will receive makat mardut - Rabbinic lashes. Just as someone who transgresses a biblical prohibition is liable to receive malkot - lashes - as punishment, the Sages instituted malkot for a variety of transgressions, as well. The Talmud Yerushalmi and the Ge'onim list a number of practical differences between these two punishments - Biblical malkot have a prescribed number - 39 - which are given under strict medical supervision. Makat mardut have no limit; they are given until the transgressor offers contrition and commits himself to refrain from the transgression in the future. While biblical malkot are given only for specific, active transgressions based on the ruling of the courts, makat mardut apply to a wide variety of things, including neglecting mitzvot aseh (positive commandments) and rabbinic prohibitions. Rav Sa'adia Ga'on argues with this and rules that makat mardut are no more than 13 lashes, and Tosafot suggest that they are modeled on the biblical punishment and are limited to 39 lashes. Some of the rishonim suggest that not all makat mardut are created equal - depending on the severity of the act and the need to discourage its repetition, makat mardut may be either harsher or less severe than biblical malkot. The simplest interpretation of the term mardut is that it is from the word mered - rebellion or uprising - that this is the punishment given to someone who is rebelling against Jewish law or Jewish practice (see the commentaries to I Shmu'el 20:30).

The Mishna (20b) teaches that if a man says, "Hareini nazir," and his wife agrees, saying, "Va-ani - and I," the husband can choose to be mefer her acceptance of the status of nezirut, even though his own commitment remains intact. If, however, a woman says hareini nezira - "I accept upon myself the rules of a nazir" - and her husband says va-ani in response, the husband can no longer annul his wife's vow of nezirut, and they will both become nezirim. At first, the Gemara tries to use this ruling to conclude that once such a neder has been approved by the husband, he cannot change his mind because he would essentially be annulling his own neder. That is to say, once he erases the neder made by his wife, it will become clear that his own statement of va-ani no longer refers to a meaningful commitment and his commitment to nezirut will disappear, as well. After some discussion, however, the Gemara explains that there is a different rule that is applicable in this case. In fact, we do not consider the husband's statement as merely accepting nezirut himself, rather we understand it to be an emphatic approval of his wife's statement - so emphatic that it cannot be undone. The Ran in Massekhet Nedarim (21b) explains that the statement that he made - va-ani - is seen as a statement of emphatic approval, as if he said "I approve of your neder forever." By accepting personal nezirut we understand him to be saying that he is so comfortable with the idea of nezirut that he is willing to accept it upon himself. Had he, in fact, desired to reject his wife's vow, we would have anticipated that he would have clearly said that he was accepting nezirut upon himself even as he was forbidding his wife from keeping her vow.

The Mishna (20b) teaches that when a person accepts nezirut upon himself, others who hear him can join by saying va-ani - "And I." Reish Lakish limits this to a situation where the statement of va-ani is made tokh kedei dibbur - within the amount of time it takes to say something - which the Gemara interprets to mean within the amount of time that it takes for a student to greet his teacher. In an attempt to offer support to Reish Lakish's position, the Gemara points out that our Mishna appears to limit the number of people who can join the nazir by saying va-ani to just two individuals, since it says va-ani just two times. The suggestion is that since a third person would not be able to say va-ani within the time limit, it appears that we are limited by the time restraint. This reading of the Mishna is rejected by the Gemara, which uses an interesting phrase: tana ki rukhla lihshiv ve-lezil? - "Is the author of the Mishna a peddler that he must list all cases?" In other words, the Mishna may believe that even more people responding va-ani can become nezirim; it did not feel obligated to repeat the word over and over again. The rukhla - the peddler mentioned by the Gemara - is one who traditionally traveled from one community to another, servicing small villages or, in larger cities, going from house to house with his wares. Such a person usually traveled with his peddler's basket, a box that contained many compartments holding perfumes, jewelry, and small utensils like thread, pins and needles. Since he carried many items, upon engaging the interest of a potential customer the peddler would recite a list of things that he had for sale. The ability of peddlers to recite this list led to the expression used by the Gemara relating to a detailed repetition of a list of things.

Choosing to become a nazir is essentially a type of neder. Thus, a woman who accepts upon herself to be a nezira can have her statement annulled by her father or husband if they object to it on the day that they hear of it, just like any other case of neder. The first Mishna in the fourth perek rules that in a case where a woman says hareini nezira - "I am hereby a nazir" - and her husband says in response va-ani - "I am, as well" - the husband can no longer nullify his wife's vow of nezirut. The Gemara in Massekhet Nedarim (70a) initially tries to use this ruling to conclude that once the woman's neder has been approved by her husband, he cannot change his mind and do hafara on the neder (nullify the vow) later that day, since a hakama (a statement of support for the vow) that has been made cannot be changed. The Gemara explains, however, that there is a different rule that is applicable in this case. In fact, we do not consider the husband's statement as merely accepting nezirut himself; rather we understand it to be an emphatic approval of his wife's statement. The Ran in Massekhet Nedarim explains that the statement that he made - va-ani - is seen as a statement of approval, as if he said "I approve of your neder forever." In this case, it appears that his statement expresses his approval. By accepting nezirut himself we understand him to be saying that he is so comfortable with the idea of nezirut that he is willing to accept it upon himself. Had he, in fact, desired to reject his wife's vow, we anticipate that he would have clearly said that he was accepting nezirut upon himself even as he was forbidding his wife from keeping her vow.

We find an argument between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai regarding a person who completes a lengthy nezirut in the Diaspora and comes to Israel to bring the obligatory sacrifices when his nezirut is complete. Beit Shammai rules that such a person must complete a 30-day nezirut in Israel before bringing the sacrifices, while Beit Hillel rules that such a person must begin his nezirut from the beginning - no matter how long it is. The Mishna on our daf tells the story of Queen Helene, who took upon herself to become a nezira for seven years should her son return safely from war. Upon his safe arrival at home, she began her nezirut, and upon completion of the seven years she went to bring her sacrifices in Israel, where she was told by Beit Hillel that she was obligated to begin her nezirut over again. The Mishna relates that at the very end of those seven years she became temeah and was forced to begin her nezirut a third time. Helene was the queen of Adiabene, a small kingdom in the north of Syria on the banks of the Euphrates. In the generation prior to the destruction of the Second Temple, Helene, together with her sons Monbaz and Izats, began to study Torah with Jews who traveled through their kingdom, and eventually converted to Judaism. It appears that other members of the ruling elite did so as well. Helene visited Jerusalem a number of times and made donations both to the Temple and to the destitute people living in Israel. Her children followed in her footsteps, and even sent troops to support the Jewish uprising during the Great Revolt. It appears that she and other members of her royal family are buried in some of the ornate burial chambers in Jerusalem. As is mentioned in several places in the Talmud, Helene was a giyoret tzedek - a sincere convert to Judaism - who accepted upon herself the constraints of halakha as taught by the Sages.

We have been discussing a case where someone accepts nezirut upon himself while standing in a cemetery, creating a situation where the nezirut begins in a problematic situation of tumah. Which is a greater defilement: a situation where a nazir comes into contact with a dead body, or one in which the actual nezirut begins in a state of tumah? The Gemara explains that we may have thought that the latter was the greater defilement and that just as a nazir who becomes tameh must have his hair cut off and bring sacrifices (see Bamidbar 6:9-10), so too would someone who established his nezirut under forbidden circumstances be obligated. However, examination of the passage ve-timeh rosh nizro - "...and he defiles his consecrated head," (Bamidbar 6:9) leads the Gemara to conclude that this is not the case. In fact, only the nazir who actively becomes tameh needs to cut his hair and bring sacrifices; the individual who was never a nazir tahor (a ritually pure nazir) is not subject to these requirements. Tosafot explain that the Gemara derives this from the words ve-timeh rosh nizro because those words are superfluous - the entire law could have been taught without them. Thus the Gemara concludes that they are written in order to emphasize that it is only someone who had been a nazir and became tameh who has to have his hair cut and is obligated to bring the sacrifices of a nazir tameh. When referring to the sacrifices of the nazir, the Gemara specifically mentions tzipporim - the doves that are brought by the nazir who becomes tameh. Tosafot and other rishonim point out that the Gemara is bringing the tzipporim as an example, but the rule would be the same for all of the sacrifices of a nazir tameh.

On yesterday's daf we were introduced to the opinion of Rabbi Yohanan, who says that if a person accepts nezirut upon himself while standing in a cemetery, he does become a nazir, his status as tameh notwithstanding. The Gemara on our daf accepts Rabbi Yohanan's position and concludes that a person who is warned that he should not accept nezirut given his situation (he is standing in a cemetery and will immediately become tameh) will be punished with malkot (lashes) if he does so. This ruling leads Rava to ask whether there is a minimum length of time that a nazir must remain in the cemetery in order to be liable for malkot. This question is based on a parallel law that we find regarding the Temple. Just as a nazir cannot enter a cemetery, it is forbidden for a person who is tameh to enter the precincts of the Temple. With regard to a tameh person in the Temple, the law is that unless he is there for a length of time that is considered "significant" - defined as the amount of time that it takes to bow down - he is not liable for punishment. Rava's question is whether the law would be the same for a nazir. The Meiri points out that Rava does not anticipate that the requirement would be identical for the nazir and the tameh person entering the mikdash; nevertheless, the concept of a minimum stay might be applied here as it is in the case of the Temple. Since the rule requiring a minimum stay in the Temple is a law whose source is a halakha le-Moshe mi-Sinai - an oral tradition from Mount Sinai - it is not clear whether it can be applied to other halakhot as well. The conclusion of the Gemara is teiku - the question remains standing with no final decision.

The third perek of Massekhet Nazir that begins on today's daf deals with issues having to do with the exact length of time of nezirut and when it ends. The complications occur less in cases of simple nezirut and more often in situations where two or more instances of nezirut occur one after another, or where the nezirut is interrupted if the nazir becomes tameh. As we have learned, the standard length of nezirut is 30 days. While this is ideally kept as thirty full days, if someone cut his hair on the thirtieth day, we view him as having fulfilled his obligation (this is either because, biblically, the obligation is only 29 days, or because we apply the rule of miktzat ha-yom ke-kulo - we count part of the day as a full day - see the opinions of Rav Mattana and bar Pada on daf 5). What happens when a person accepts two consecutive neziruyot? Can the thirtieth day count as both the last day of one nezirut and the first day of another? With regard to the nazir who becomes tameh, the rule is clearly stated in the Torah that tum'ah "undoes" the days that have been kept and the nezirut must begin anew. What if a person has completed the days of his nezirut but becomes tameh before bringing the sacrifices that indicate the end of his nezirut? Must he begin his nezirut over again, or can we view the nezirut as having been fulfilled? The Mishna on our daf raises the case of a person who accepts nezirut upon himself while standing in a cemetery. The Gemara quotes Reish Lakish as ruling that no nezirut can take effect in such a case, and even when he leaves the cemetery he will not become a nazir unless he repeats his desire to do so. Rabbi Yohanan argues that the nezirut will take effect. Not only does he become a nazir as soon as he becomes tahor (ritually pure), but even while in the cemetery he is not allowed to drink wine or cut his hair.

The Mishna on our daf teaches about a person who accepts nezirut upon himself twice. First he says, "When my son is born, I will become a nazir." Then he says, "I accept upon myself to be a nazir for 100 days." It is clear to the Mishna that he must keep the laws of nezirut immediately. The question that arises is what to do if his son is born in the course of the next 100 days. The Mishna says that if his son is born any time up until the seventieth day, lo hifsid kelum - he does not lose anything. If he is born after the seventieth day, soter shivim - he has lost seventy. There are two basic approaches to the rule taught in the Mishna. According to Rashi, if the son is born before the seventieth day, the man interrupts his 100-day nezirut and keeps the standard 30-day nezirut that he accepted upon himself in celebration of his son's birth - the nezirut that he accepted first. Upon completion of those 30 days, he can return to the 100-day nezirut that he had begun earlier. Should the son be born later than the seventieth day, since no nezirut can last less than 30 days all of the previous days are lost and the man must begin his 100-day nezirut over again. Tosafot and the Rosh offer a different approach. Should the son be born prior to the seventieth day, then the 30-day nezirut in honor of the son's birth can be included within the 100 day nezirut, and the man can fulfill both of his obligations during that period; he will bring two sets of sacrifices at the end of that period. If the son was born after the seventieth day, then the father must begin a separate 30-day nezirut to honor his son, and when that is over, he should return to and complete his original nezirut.

Two unusual cases of nezirut on mentioned on today's daf: nezirut Shimshon and someone who says, "I will be like Moshe on the seventh day of Adar." The case of nezirut Shimshon involves a person who specifically states that he wants to accept upon himself this type of nezirut. Unlike someone who accepts standard nezirut, a nazir Shimshon is allowed to come into contact with the dead. Unlike someone who accepts nezirut for his entire life, a nazir Shimshon can never cut his hair. The Sages had a tradition that nezirut Shimshon was also unique in that the person who comes to regret having accepted this nezirut cannot be released from his obligation by the Sages. Rashi suggests that the source for this is the fact that Shimshon himself did not choose to be a nazir, rather the condition was imposed on him by a heavenly angel. Thus, Shimshon could not escape his fate as a nazir, and neither can someone who bases his own nezirut on the model of Shimshon. According to most of the commentaries, it is not clear whether the person who says, "I will be like Moshe on the seventh day of Adar," has, in fact, accepted nezirut. We can probably assume that on the day of his death, many of his followers in the desert accepted upon themselves nezirut as a symbol of mourning for their great leader, since many of the laws of nezirut - for example, not cutting hair or drinking wine - mirror basic laws of aveilut. On the other hand, perhaps this statement is a reference to the day that Moshe was born, which was certainly a day of celebration, or, at any rate, was not a day that he accepted upon himself nezirut or other prohibitions. Another approach suggested by Rashi is that the person may be viewed as saying that just as Moshe did not drink wine on the day of his death, similarly he is accepting upon himself nezirut.

The Mishna at the end of the last daf discusses the individual who makes his nezirut conditional on having a son. Obviously, if the man's wife gives birth to a son he becomes a nazir. Should his wife give birth to a daughter, a tumtum or an androginos (hermaphrodite) he will not become a nazir. Any of these offspring will suffice to obligate him in nezirut if his original condition was that he would become a nazir when he had a child. Our Gemara suggests that although these rulings appear obvious, we may have thought that the term ben - a son - might be understood as a general term for a child. According to the Talmud Yerushalmi the obvious case in the Mishna is the case of a daughter - who is clearly not a son. The cases of tumtum and androginos, however, may have been seen as sons because of the element of maleness that each of them have - which is why the Mishna needs to rule in these cases. When the Gemara discusses an androginos, it is talking about someone who appears to have both male and female sexual organs; a tumtum is someone who does not appear to be either male or female. Medicine recognizes two types of androginos. True androgyny presents both male and female sexual glands, while a Pseudohermaphrodite has the appearance of both male and female sexual organs, although the individual actually has only one set of sexual glands. The Gemara describes a tumtum as someone whose gender cannot be determined. Under certain circumstances, the physical covering that hid the sexual organ may be removed (in the language of the Gemara it is nikra, or "torn" off) and the individual can be identified as male or female. Nevertheless, the likelihood that a man whose testicles have developed within his body will be able to have children is slim at best. This is certainly the case in someone who was truly a tumtum, that is to say, that their sexual organs did not develop because of a low level of hormones. In such a case, even if the person's physical situation improves, he will not be able to father children.

Our Gemara presents the case of a man who appointed a messenger to arrange a marriage on his behalf. Rabbi Yohanan rules that if he gave no instructions, we must assume that his messenger did his bidding and that he is now married to someone. In the event that the messenger does not return and we do not know to whom the man is married, we are forced to conclude that the man cannot marry anyone, since she might be an immediate relative (a sister, daughter, mother, etc.) of the woman to whom he is married. Rava points out that he will be able to marry a woman who has absolutely no single female relatives, since we can be certain that there will be no forbidden relationships. The question raised by the rishonim is whether this situation should affect other people as well. Perhaps we must suspect that every woman may be the unknown wife of the man in the original story - and now no one can get married! Even if we accept the word of the woman that she never accepted kiddushin from anyone, how can we be certain that her father did not accept kiddushin on her behalf when she was a child. Several approaches are put forward to distinguish between the man who appointed the original messenger and all other men in the world. In his Sefer HaYashar, Rabbeinu Tam explains that our assumption that a messenger always is assumed to fulfill his task only works on a Rabbinic level. Thus, on a biblical level the man really can marry whoever he wants. The ruling that forbids him to marry is a kenas - a penalty that the Sages placed on him for being so flippant about marriage that he sent a messenger out without specific instructions regarding who his wife was to be. Obviously this penalty applies only to the man and not to anyone else. Another suggestion is that in this case specifically we cannot assume that the messenger fulfilled his mission because it is not totally in his hands - marriage can only be accomplished with the agreement of the woman, and we cannot be sure that he found a woman who agreed to the marriage. Thus we are in a situation of safek - of doubt - which will affect the man himself, but no one else.

As we have seen in Massekhet Nedarim, it is essential that we understand the intent of the person when they accept a vow upon themselves. The Mishna on our daf teaches that if a person is offered a cup of wine and says, "I am a nazir from that," we assume that he truly intends to accept nezirut. Nevertheless, the Mishna continues with a story about a woman who was drunk and refused another cup of wine, saying, "I am a nezira from that," where the sages ruled that she was merely refusing that drink, but she was not accepting nezirut on herself. The Gemara explains that the Mishna is essentially teaching that we must distinguish between cases where the person's intent must be assumed to have the standard meaning, and cases where circumstantial evidence points to a different interpretation. Clearly, the point that the Mishna is making is that a person who has drunk enough to recognize that he should not be drinking more may "swear off" another drink, but we cannot assume that he is accepting true nezirut. Should a person be drunk enough to have lost control of his senses - in the language of the Gemara, "as drunk as Lot" - his statements will not be taken seriously in any case. There is a variant reading of the Mishna that has the woman who refuses the drink shekula - bereaved - rather than shikkora - intoxicated. This appears to be the reading that the Rambam had both in his Commentary to the Mishna and in his Mishneh Torah where he rules (Sefer Hafla'ah Nezirut 1:11) that a person who is in mourning or in a state of bitterness, who refuses a cup of wine that is offered to him by his comforters saying, "I am a nazir from that cup" will not be considered a nazir, and will only be prohibited from drinking that particular cup. This explanation helps clarify why the Mishna brought an example of a woman who refuses to drink (it is difficult to imagine why the Mishna would choose as an example the unusual case of a drunk woman, but we can well understand the case of a grieving woman.)

The Mishna on our daf presents a very strange case - a person who proclaims: "This cow said, 'I am hereby a nezira if I stand up'." Just as we found in yesterday's Mishna, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree in this case, with Beit Shammai ruling that the person becomes a nazir and Beit Hillel ruling that he does not. The Gemara opens with the obvious question: how can we possibly understand the suggestion that the cow spoke? Rami bar Hama explains that the cow was lying down and a person who was trying to get the cow to stand up said, "This cow thinks that no one can get her to stand up? I will be a nazir from her meat if she gets up on her own!" Tosafot and other rishonim point out that it is not uncommon to find people who project thought and speech onto animals - or even inanimate objects. One example that is brought is the passage in Yonah (1:4) that, "The boat thought that it would break apart." The general approach of the rishonim to our Mishna is that it is describing a colloquial statement made by a person, which is not made with the clarity of meaning and purpose that we ordinarily expect from a halakhic statement. In his responsa, the Rashba brings an explanation in the name of Rabbeinu Barukh that we view the statement as follows. According to the person's statement, we view the behavior of the cow as a declaration of a vow of nezirut not to stand. The person follows this by announcing that if the cow "stands" (thereby abiding by her "vow") then he will accept nezirut. The Rosh offers the approach of Rav Yosef ish Yerushalayim who says that the cow's behavior appears to be announcing that she is presenting herself as a nezira - that she is forbidden to all. The person's statement essentially agrees - if he cannot rouse her, her meat will be forbidden to him like a nazir.

The second perek of Massekhet Nazir continues with a discussion of how we understand expressions that appear to relate to nezirut. The first Mishna in the perek brings a disagreement between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai with regard to a person who says, "I accept nezirut to refrain from eating gerogarot and deveilah." Gerogarot are dried figs and a deveilah is a collection of dried figs that are pressed together. Although nezirut prohibits specifically grape products, Beit Shammai rules that this person becomes a nazir, while Beit Hillel says that he does not. The Mishna concludes with the teaching of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that even according to Beit Shammai the individual will not become a nazir, rather that the man's statement must be taken seriously and we understand him as having taking a neder to refrain from eating figs. Without Rabbi Yehuda's explanation, Beit Shammai's position seems difficult to understand, since the person did not accept any prohibitions that relate to nezirut. Several suggestions are raised by our Gemara, with the general approach being that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree about whether we can discount the person's statement entirely or if we should accept that part of his statement has validity, even as we reject another part of his statement. A different approach appears in the Tosefta, and is quoted in the Talmud Yerushalmi in the name of Reish Lakish. The suggestion is that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree about whether we can see the statement about figs as being an example of kinuye kinuyim. The first Mishna in the tractate (2a) taught that substitute expressions could be used to accept nezirut; is it possible that even the substitute expressions can have other words that can substitute for them? Specifically, can a reference to gerogarot - which are similar to grapes, in that they were also called tirosh, which in modern Hebrew means "grape juice" - be considered kinuye kinuyim of nezirut? Rabbi Ya'akov Emden adds another consideration. Since eating large amounts of figs leads to a sense of intoxication, perhaps they should be considered kinuye kinuyim of nezirut.

We have been discussing the expressions that a person might use to accept nezirut for longer than the standard 30 days. One case presented by the Mishna on today's daf is the person who says, "I am hereby a nazir in accordance with the capacity of the house," or, "...the capacity of the basket." In such a situation the person will be asked what his intention was. If he simply meant that he was taking a serious responsibility upon himself, his nezirut will be the standard 30 days. If, however, he says stam nazarti - "I took a nazirite vow without specification" - then we view the basket as if it was filled with the smallest item usually placed there - mustard seeds - and he will be a nazir until the day he dies. Tosafot point out that this is true only if the house or the basket was empty. If they were full, however, we will count the objects and the length of his nezirut will be based on the amount of objects in the house or the box. Edible mustard is extracted from a number of different plants - Sinapis nigra (white mustard) or Brassica nigra (black mustard) and similar plants. Often it is a mixture of these plants that are used to make mustard. These plants belong to the Cruciferae family, and grow wild in Israel. The black cabbage, a leafy vegetable, is a related plant whose seeds are used to make the mustard spice. This cabbage is the largest plant from the Cruciferae family that grows in Israel. Normally it grows up to two meters in size, although there are unusual cases where it can grow as large as five meters in height. Since these seeds are very tiny (1.5-2 millimeters), they are often used by the Talmud as an example of something that is small.

We have learned in Massekhet Nazir that stam nezirut sheloshim yom - the standard length of time for nezirut is 30 days - but that a person can accept a longer period of nezirut, as well. For example, the Sages had a tradition that a person could accept nezirut olam: nezirut that would remain in force for a person's entire life. The Mishna and Gemara on our daf discuss how we interpret a person's statement about the length of nezirut. Thus we find that statements like, "I accept upon myself a large nezirut," or, "I accept upon myself a small nezirut," are understood to mean simply that the individual sees his nezirut as "a big deal" or not. They do not affect the length of the nezirut, which remains the standard 30 days. Even a statement like "I accept nezirut from here until the end of the world" will be interpreted to mean that the person accepting the nezirut sees it as a serious, difficult commitment, but that statement will not affect the length of the nezirut. In order for a person to be obligated in nezirut forever, his statement must be a clear one. A person who says that his nezirut should extend his entire life becomes a nazir olam. Similarly, statements like "I accept nezirut like the dust of the sea" or "like the sand on the oceans" will obligate the person to be a nazir olam. The Me'iri and others distinguish between these cases and the case in the Mishna, of "I accept nezirut from here until the end of the world," by pointing to the expression mi-kan - "from here" - which indicates an out-of-the-ordinary intent, as explained above. Rashi on the Mishna, however, does not distinguish between these cases and suggests that in all cases where the implication is that a person accepted nezirut olam, he is obligated in nezirut for his entire life. The case in the Mishna is where the individual says "I accept upon myself a large nezirut, from here until the end of the world." Only in such a case will we interpret his intention to be simply a statement that he accepts a standard nezirut, which appears to him to be a very difficult task.

We learned on yesterday's daf of a disagreement between Rav Matana and bar Pada regarding the source of the idea that stam nezirut sheloshim yom - the standard length of nezirut is 30 days. Based on their different readings of the words of the Torah, only Rav Matana really believes that nezirut is 30 days; bar Pada concludes that the standard length of nezirut is 29 days. How does bar Pada - an amora - explain the clear ruling of the Mishna, which requires 30 days? Our Gemara explains that bar Pada interprets the 30th day as referring to the day after nezriut when the concluding sacrifices are brought and the nazir shaves his hair. In explaining the Mishna's teaching (see 16a) that a nazir shaves his hair on the 31st day, but that if he shaved on the 30th day he has fulfilled his obligation, Rav Matana says that standard practice is to wait until the full 30 days are over, but that the concept of miktzat ha-yom ke-kulo - that we count part of the day as a whole day - would allow the nazir to shave even on the 30th day. Bar Pada, on the other hand, does not accept the idea of miktzat ha-yom ke-kulo. He suggests that the standard practice would allow the nazir to shave on the 30th day (since minimum nezirut is only 29 days), but that the Sages ruled that we add a rabbinic day on to the standard nezirut. The Rosh explains that since many people say round numbers - something we even find in the Torah, where the traditional 39 lashes are referred to as 40, or the 49-day count of sefirat ha-Omer from Pesah to Shavuot is called the 50-day counting - it was viewed as prudent to add an extra day to the standard nezirut. Nevertheless, if a person were to shave on the 30th day, he would fulfill his biblical obligation and his nezirut would be complete.

Someone who accepts nezirut without specifying the amount of time remains a nazir for 30 days (in the language of the Mishna, "Stam nezirut sheloshim yom."). This law appears in the Mishna on our page with no explanation. The Gemara demands a source for this rule. Rav Matana suggests that the source is a gematria - that it is based on the numerical value of the letters of the word yihiyeh. Gematria assigns a numeric value to each of the Hebrew letters. The first ten letters (aleph through yod) are valued at 1-10. The next nine letters (kaf through kuf) are valued at 20-100. The final three letters (resh through taf) are the numbers 200, 300 and 400. The Torah teaches (Bamidbar 6:5) that someone who accepts nezirut "will be holy" - kadosh yihiyeh. Taking the value of the letters:

• י - yod = 10
• ה - heh = 5
• י - yod =10
• ה - heh = 5

we arrive at a total of 30. In his commentary to the Mishna, the Rambam argues that Rav Matana does not really suggest that the gematria is the source for this halakha, but rather that there was a long-standing tradition - a halakha le-Moshe mi-Sinai - that standard nezirut lasts for 30 days. Rav Matana points to the gematria as a reference point, but not as a true source. Our Gemara also quotes bar Pada who says that the root word nazir appears 29 times in the Torah. In truth, this is not a source for the rule that appears in the Mishna, as it seems to offer a position that argues with the Mishna's ruling. The Talmud Yerushalmi brings two additional opinions, although the authors of these opinions have different names. and adds a number of others:

1. The Torah teaches that the nazir is to keep the rules ad melot ha-yamim: "Until the days are over." The yamim of the nazir are compared to the yerah yamim of an eshet yefat to'ar (see Devarim 21:13) - 30 days.
2. We can only talk about "completion" of days in the context of a month, which, in the Jewish calendar, is sometime "lacking" (29 days) and sometimes "full" (30 days).

Does the Torah consider someone who accepts nezirut upon himself to be a holy person who aspires to higher levels of spirituality, or is he in some way a sinner? The Gemara tells of Shimon haTzaddik who testified that only on one occasion did he agree to partake of the sacrifice of a nazir who became tameh - he was obligated to bring a sacrifice because he broke his nezirut. The Talmud Yerushalmi suggests that he refused to partake of any sacrifices brought by nezirim - even from those who successfully completed their obligations. Once, a nazir came to the Temple who was particularly attractive and had beautiful curly hair. Shimon haTzaddik asked him why he chose to become a nazir and obligate himself to cut off his hair at the end of his nezirut. The man explained that he was a shepherd and he chanced to see his reflection in a pool. Taken with his own beauty, the evil inclination tried to overpower him. To protect himself, he accepted a vow of nezirut in order to donate his hair to God. Shimon haTzaddik accepted this as a legitimate explanation, but otherwise rejected the value of nezirut. The "evil inclination" alluded to by the Nazaraite is understood in a variety of different ways. The Rivan suggests that realizing how good looking he was made him think that he could have his way with women. The Arukh also connects it with sexual behavior, suggesting that seeing how attractive he was made him desirous of homosexual relations. The Maharsha and others argue that this is not necessarily an issue of sensuality, but rather that his appearance gave him the idea that he should abandon his father's flocks since someone of his talents should not remain a simple shepherd. Shimon haTzaddik is the first sage mentioned in Pirkei Avot. Although we have little information about him, it appears that he was the High Priest at the beginning of Greek rule in Israel and that it was he who welcomed Alexander Mokdon, who conquered the land. He is mentioned in both Josephus and Sefer Ben Sira, which describes how glorious he appeared upon leaving the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur.

On yesterday's daf we learned that one way for a person to express that he wants to become a nazir is by use of yadot nezirut - intimations. Hareini mesalsel or hareini mekhalkel are examples of such expressions, and in both cases the amora Shmuel rules that they only have significance if the person pulls at his hair when he says them. What do these expressions mean? Although the term silsul appears in Tanakh (Mishlei 4:8, mentioned by the Gemara, is one example) and is not uncommon, its original definition remains unclear. Some suggest that it means "to be raised," as appears to be the meaning in the passage in Sefer Mishlei. Another meaning suggested for the word is "to make pretty" or "to beautify." The word is also used in the context of making something in the shape of a circle. All of these can be understood as relating to growing and styling one's hair. The word kilkul appears relatively often in the Mishna and refers specifically to the hair above the temples, although it can be used to refer to an overgrowth of hair on other parts of the body as well (like on Niddah 52b). While it is not clear that this is the source, we find a similar word - kakul - in Persian, and in Syriac another similar word is used to mean "a full head of hair." In illustrating the Mishnaic use of the word, the Gemara quotes a passage in Massekhet Shabbat (88b) which describes that the amount of sid (Calcium Hydroxide, also known as lime) that is considered significant with regard to the laws of carrying on Shabbat is kedei lasood kilkul - enough to use as depilatory cream on the hair above the temples. In virtually every generation, women have viewed body hair as aesthetically undesirable and have utilized various methods for removing it. During Talmudic times, one method - usually used by poor women - was the use of lime. This technique demanded great care, as the highly alkaline substance could lead to burning of the skin, and, on rare occasions, even death.