

כִּים כֶּסֶף – Money pouch



Leather money pouch from the Roman period

## NOTES

גוזלות מנתחי – גוזלות can release themselves, etc. – רוכי: This discussion also appears in the Jerusalem Talmud, with several variations. One opinion cited there is that this *halakha* applies not merely to fledglings but to eggs as well, and the Gemara therefore concludes that this mishna is certainly in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

וְלָמָּה לִי לְשֹׁנוּי עֲלֶיהָ שְׂאֵי גִזְלוֹת הוֹאִיל וְעֲשׂוּיִן לְדָדוֹת? וְהָאֵתְמַר עֲלֶיהָ דְּהֵיאָּ דְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר; חֵד אָמַר: בְּשֵׁי בִּיסִין מִחֲלוּקָתָא, אֲבָל בְּכִים אֶחָד – דְּבָרֵי הַכֵּל חוֹלִין, וְחֵד אָמַר: בְּכִים אֶחָד מִחֲלוּקָתָא, אֲבָל בְּשֵׁי בִּיסִין – דְּבָרֵי הַכֵּל מִנְהָ מוֹנָח וּמִנְהָ מוּטָל.

The Gemara asks: **And why do I need to answer with regard to it: Fledglings are different, since they typically hop? But wasn't it stated with regard to that mishna, which deals with a money pouch, that Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree over it: One of them said: The dispute applies only to a case of two pouches, with one hundred dinars in each pouch. However, if all of the money was in a single pouch, everyone agrees that it is non-sacred money, as it is unlikely that only half of the money was removed while the other half was left in its place. And the other one of them said: The dispute applies only to one pouch, but with regard to two pouches, everyone agrees that one hundred dinars of tithe is left and one hundred dinars has been removed.**<sup>8</sup>

בְּשֵׁלְמָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר בְּשֵׁי בִּיסִין מִחֲלוּקָתָא – הֵינּוּ דְּאִי־טְרוּךְ לְשֹׁנוּי הֵכָּא שְׂאֵי גִזְלוֹת הוֹאִיל וְעֲשׂוּיִן לְדָדוֹת. אֵלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר בְּכִים אֶחָד מִחֲלוּקָתָא, אֲבָל בְּשֵׁי בִּיסִין – דְּבָרֵי הַכֵּל מִנְהָ מוֹנָח וּמִנְהָ מוּטָל, הֲשִׁתָּא לָמָּה לִי לְשֹׁנוּי עֲלֶיהָ? הָאֵתְמַר בְּשֵׁי בִּיסִין לֹא פְּלִיגִי.

The Gemara explains: **Granted, according to the one who said that the dispute deals with a case of two pouches, this is why it was necessary to answer here: Fledglings are different, since they typically hop. However, according to the one who says that the dispute involves a case of one pouch, but with regard to two pouches everyone agrees that one hundred dinars of tithe is left and one hundred dinars has been removed, now consider: Why do I need to answer, with regard to it, that there is a difference between that *halakha* and the case of fledglings? You said that they do not disagree even with regard to two separate pouches, and therefore they certainly do not disagree in the case of fledglings.**

אָמַר רַב אֲשִׁי: הֵכָּא בְּגִזְלוֹת מְקוּשְׁרִים וְכִיסִים מְקוּשְׁרִים עֲסָקִינָּה. גִּזְלוֹת – מְנַתְחֵי אֶהְדְּדִי, בִּיסִין – לֹא מְנַתְחֵי אֶהְדְּדִי.

Rav Ashi said: **Here we are dealing with fledglings tied together and with money pouches tied together.** In other words, when it is stated that the dispute applies to one pouch, this refers to two pouches that are tied together, as well. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the rabbis agree only with regard to two pouches that are entirely separate. Consequently, it is necessary to explain that there is a difference between pouches tied together and fledglings tied together: **Fledglings can release themselves<sup>N</sup> from each other, and therefore it is possible that only one of them escaped, whereas pouches cannot release themselves from each other.** Therefore, it is evident that someone must have taken them. Since they were tied together, he certainly took both of them.

וְרַבִּי אָמַר לָךְ: בִּיסִין נַמִּי, וּמִנָּה

The Gemara asks: **But if that is indeed the case, and it is obvious that someone came and took the money, what is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi's reasoning? The Gemara explains: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi could have said to you: Pouches, too, sometimes**

## Perek I

Daf 11 Amud a

דְּמִתְעַבְּל קְטָרִיָּהוּ.

their knot becomes worn and untied. Consequently, it is possible that someone took only one of the two pouches.

בְּתוֹךְ הַקֵּן וּמִצְּאָ לִפְנֵי הַקֵּן אֲסוּרִין. לִימָא מְסִיעָ לִיהָ לְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: רוּב וְקְרוּב – הֵלֵךְ אַחַר הָרוּב.

§ The mishna taught that if one designated fledglings **inside the nest and found them before the nest**,<sup>h</sup> they are prohibited. The Gemara comments: **Let us say that this supports the opinion of Rabbi Hanina, as Rabbi Hanina said: In a case involving a majority and an item that is near, one follows the majority.** Since doves from the outside world are more numerous than those that one designated, the assumption is that these fledglings are from the majority, and therefore they are prohibited.

## HALAKHA

בְּתוֹךְ הַקֵּן וּמִצְּאָ לִפְנֵי – Inside the nest and found before the nest – תִּקֵּן: If one designated fledglings inside a nest and found them at the entrance to the nest, they are permitted. If one found them before the nest, they are prohibited. However, if there is no other nest in the vicinity, i.e., within fifty cubits (*Magen Avraham*), they

are permitted. In a case where there is another nest nearby, if the fledgling cannot see it, e.g., it is around a corner, they are permitted. All this applies only if the fledglings are able to move merely by hopping; if they are able to fly, they are prohibited (*Shulhan Arukh, Orach Hayyim* 497:14).

HALAKHA


Hops fifty cubits – מדרה חמשים אמה: A fledgling does not hop farther than fifty cubits. Consequently, if a fledgling that can only hope is discovered within fifty cubits of a nest, it belongs to the owner of that nest. If it is found farther away, it is the property of the finder (Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 260:8).

Carrying a pestle – טלטול עלי: A large, heavy pestle used for crushing wheat for porridge is considered a vessel whose primary function is a prohibited use. It may be handled for a permitted purpose, e.g., for slicing meat upon it, as the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel (Shulhan Arukh, Orach Hayyim 499:5).

A hide before those who will tread on it – עור לפני הדורסן: It is permitted to remove the hide of an animal slaughtered on a Festival and leave it in a place where people will tread on it, even if there is no meat on it at all, in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel (Shulhan Arukh, Orach Hayyim 499:3).

BACKGROUND

קורן וזית – Corner



Two dovecotes around the corner from each other

Fledgling doves and their dovecotes – זוגלי הימים ושוכביהם: In general, doves have a highly developed sense of their surroundings, which allows them to return to their nests from a great distance. This ability does, however, require a certain amount of familiarity and practice, which is why young fledglings can lose their way. The sense of sight is especially important in this regard. A fledgling that cannot fly can recognize its dovecote only while it remains visible. If the dovecote is around a corner, the young bird will no longer be able to see it, and will not know how to return to it.

אמר אביי: בדרף רבא אמר: בשני קנין זו למעלה מזו עסקינן ולא מבעיא זמן בתחתונה ולא זמן בעליונה, ומצא בתחתונה ולא מצא בעליונה – דאסירן, דאמרינן: הנה אלו לעלמא, והנה אשתרבוכי אשתרבוכי ונחותר.

אלא אפילו זמן בעליונה ולא זמן בתחתונה, ובא ומצא בעליונה ולא מצא בתחתונה – הנה נמי אסירי, דאמרינן: הנה אלו לעלמא, והנה סוכי סריד וסליקו.

ואם אין שם אלא הן הרי אלו מותרין. היכי דמי? אילימא במפורחין, איכא למימר: הנה אלו לעלמא והני אחרני נגהו.

אלא במדדין. אי דאיכא קן בתוך חמשים אמה – אדדויי אדדו, ואי דליכא קן בתוך חמשים אמה – פשיטא דמותרין, דאמר מר עוקבא בר חמא: כל המדרה – אין מדרה יותר מחמשים אמה.

לעולם דאיכא קן בתוך חמשים אמה, וכגון דקיימא בקרן זוית. מהו דתימא: אדדויי אדדו, קא משמע לן: כל היכא דמדרה והדר חוי לקניה – מדרה, ואי לא – לא מדרה.

מתני' בית שמאי אומרים: אין נוטלים את העלי לקצב עליו בשר, ובית הלל מתירין. בית שמאי אומרים: אין נוטלין את העור לפני הדורסן, ולא יגביהו, אלא אם כן יש עמו כזית בשר. ובית הלל מתירין.

Abaye said, in refutation of this claim: Here we are dealing with a ledge<sup>n</sup> affixed to the front of the nest, where all the doves gather. Therefore, the principle pertaining to a majority and an item that is near does not apply to this case. Rava said: Here we are dealing with two nests, one above the other, i.e., adjacent nests rather than any two nests. And it is not necessary to state that in the case of one who designated the fledglings in the lower nest and did not designate those in the upper one, and he found fledglings in the lower one and he did not find fledglings in the upper one, that the fledglings are all prohibited. The reason is that we say: These that were in the lower nest went to the outside world, while these still present have dragged themselves and come down.

Rather, even if one designated fledglings in the upper nest and did not designate fledglings in the lower one, and he came and found fledglings in the upper one and did not find fledglings in the lower one, those in the upper nest are also prohibited, as we say: Those that he originally designated went to the outside world, and those in the lower nest have clutched and climbed. Therefore, there is cause for concern in both of these cases.

The mishna states that if there are no others there apart from them, they are permitted. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say that the mishna is dealing with fledglings that are already able to fly,<sup>n</sup> it is possible to say that those that he designated went to the outside world, and the ones that are present are other ones.

Rather, the mishna must be referring to fledglings that can only hop from one place to another. However, if it deals with a case where there is another dove nest within fifty cubits, the fledglings might have jumped and come from that nest; and if there is no nest within fifty cubits, it is obvious that they are permitted, for from where could they have come? As Mar Ukva bar Hama said: With regard to any creature that hops, it does not hop more than fifty cubits.<sup>h</sup>

The Gemara answers: Actually, it is referring to a case where there is another nest within fifty cubits, and it deals with a situation where the additional nest is situated around a corner<sup>b</sup> from the first nest, rather than in a straight line from it. Lest you say: The fledglings jumped from one nest to the other, the mishna therefore teaches us that anywhere that a fledgling hops and turns and sees its nest, it will continue to hop. But if it can no longer see its original nest, it will not hop any farther.<sup>b</sup>

**MISHNA** Beit Shammai say: One may not take a large pestle<sup>n</sup> from a mortar, which is normally used for crushing wheat in the preparation of porridge, for any other purpose on a Festival, e.g., to cut meat on it; and Beit Hillel permit it.<sup>h</sup> Likewise, Beit Shammai say: One may not place an unprocessed hide before those who will tread on it,<sup>h</sup> as this constitutes the prohibited labor of tanning on a Festival. And one may not lift<sup>n</sup> the hide from its place, as it is considered *muktze*, unless there is an olive-bulk of meat on it, in which case it may be carried on account of its meat; and Beit Hillel permit it in both cases.

NOTES

Abaye said, with a ledge – אמר אביי בדרף: Tosafot Yeshanim ask: Earlier, the Gemara cited Abaye's statement in explanation of the first part of the mishna. Why didn't Abaye himself refer to that section? The difficulty concerning the first part of the mishna stemmed from Rabba's explanation rather than the mishna itself, which is not the case with regard to the last clause. Therefore, Abaye preferred to issue his observation in relation to the mishna itself, as opposed to a particular interpretation of it (Petaḥ Einayim).

If we say that the mishna is dealing with fledglings that are able to fly – אילימא במפורחין: In addition to the prohibition of

*muktze*, this case also entails the prohibited labor of trapping. However, the Gemara omits this issue, as the issue of *muktze* is sufficient to prohibit these fledglings (Rabbi Aharon Halevi; see *Simḥat Yom Tov*). According to other commentaries, this mishna is not referring to fledglings that can actually fly, but to ones that can fly a little; the prohibited labor of trapping does not apply to them (Ran).

One may not take a large pestle – אין נוטלין את העלי: Tosafot raise the question: Why is a pestle entirely prohibited? Shouldn't one be allowed to use it for permitted purposes, despite the fact that its usual function is prohibited? The same question was

raised in the Jerusalem Talmud. Tosafot explain that the large pestle is *muktze* due to monetary loss. It is therefore prohibited to use it even for permitted purposes. Alternatively, it falls into the category of a large vessel that has a fixed location and is not used for any other purpose (Rid). Other commentaries suggest that handling a pestle is not prohibited due to *muktze* at all, but because it has the appearance of a weekday activity (*Meiri*).

And one may not lift – ולא יגביהו: There are two separate issues here: First, Beit Shammai prohibit carrying a hide unless it has meat on it; second, even if it did have meat on it, one may not place the hide before those who will tread on it (*Meiri*).



Mortar...pestle – מְדוּבָה...מְדוּבָה: Since antiquity, mortar and pestle have been used as a device for milling, by pounding. It is the first known means of grinding grain. The grain was placed in the mortar, which is a shallow depression in a stone, and pounded with the pestle, which is a rod-like stone. Due to the relatively sizeable amount of the substance usually processed at one time, rather large mortars were often used. Smaller ones served for processing herbs and spices. For the sake of convenience, larger mortars were often attached to the ground by means of clay. Occasionally, they were hewn out of natural rock. Refined versions of the mortar and pestle continue to be used in kitchens to prepare pastes and other finely ground elements of cuisine. They are also used in pharmacies and chemical laboratories.



Mortar and pestle, with dried peppers ready for grinding



Large mortar and pestle

גמ' תנא: ושׁוין שאם קצב עליו  
בשר – שאסור לטלטלו.

**GEMARA** The Sage taught in a *baraita*: And Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that if one already cut<sup>N</sup> the meat he needs for the Festival on the pestle, it is prohibited to move the pestle farther on the Festival. The reason is that the vessel is *muktze* as a utensil whose primary function is a prohibited use, and therefore it is permitted to handle it only when one requires it.<sup>H</sup>

אמר אביי: מחלוקת בעלי אבן  
בתבוא גרמי – דברי הכל מותר.  
פשיטא, עלי תנן!

Abaye said: This dispute applies specifically in the case of a pestle;<sup>N</sup> however, in the case of a wooden anvil used for breaking bones, everyone agrees that it is permitted. The Gemara asks: This is obvious; we learned in the mishna: A pestle.<sup>N</sup> Why would one think that an object not even mentioned in the mishna is prohibited?

מהו דתימא: הוא הדין דאפילו  
תבוא גרמי נמי, והאי דקתני עלי –  
להודיעך כחן דבית הלל, דאפילו  
דבר שמלאכתו לאסור נמי שרו, קא  
משמע לן.

The Gemara answers: Abaye's statement is necessary, lest you say: The same is true, i.e., Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree, even with regard to a wooden anvil used for breaking bones; and that which the mishna specifically teaches: A pestle, is to convey the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Beit Hillel, that they permitted moving even an object whose primary function is a prohibited use. Abaye therefore teaches us that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to a wooden anvil used for breaking bones.

איכא דאמרי, אמר אביי: לא נצרכא  
אלא אפילו תבוא גרמי חדתי. מהו  
דתימא: ממלך ולא תבר עלה, קא  
משמע לן.

Some say a different version of the previous discussion. Abaye said: It is necessary to say only: Even a new wooden anvil used for breaking bones is also permitted. Lest you say: Perhaps one will reconsider and not break bones on it, but rather set it aside for a different purpose, Abaye therefore teaches us that this is not a concern.

ובית שמאי לא חיישי לאמלובי?  
והתניא, בית שמאי אומרים: אין  
מוליכין טבח וסכין אצל בהמה,  
ולא בהמה אצל טבח וסכין, ובית  
הלל אומרים: מוליכין זה אצל זה.

The Gemara asks: And is that so? Are Beit Shammai not concerned about the possibility that one might reconsider? But isn't it taught (*Tosefta, Beitza* 1:13): Beit Shammai say: On a Festival, one may not lead a butcher with a knife in hand to an animal located far from him, so that he can slaughter it; nor may one lead an animal to a butcher with a knife, lest he reconsider, in which case he will have handled the knife unnecessarily, which is prohibited; and Beit Hillel say: One may lead them from one to the other, as they are not concerned about unnecessary use of the knife.<sup>H</sup>

בית שמאי אומרים: אין מוליכין  
תבלין ומדוך אצל מדוכה, ולא  
מדוכה אצל תבלין ומדוך. ובית  
הלל אומרים: מוליכין זה אצל זה.

By the same reasoning, Beit Shammai say: One may not bring spices or a pestle to a mortar, nor a mortar to spices and a pestle,<sup>B</sup> as he might change his mind and will have handled these utensils on the Festival for no purpose. And Beit Hillel say: One may bring one to the other, as there is no concern that he may reconsider. This shows that Beit Shammai are, in general, concerned that one might reconsider, as they prohibit one to handle items for this reason.

## NOTES

And they agree that if one cut, etc. – ושׁוין שאם קצב וכו' – The authorities disagree over whether it is entirely prohibited to carry the pestle or whether it is only prohibited to carry it from the sun into the shade, i.e. in order to preserve it from damage.

The dispute applies in the case of a pestle, etc. – מחלוקת בעלי וכו' – Why would Abaye suggest an explanation that has relevance only to the opinion of Beit Shammai? It can be claimed that this statement teaches a *halakha* with regard to Beit Hillel's approach as well. Not only do they allow one to

carry a wooden anvil for the purpose of breaking bones, but they even permit him to return it to its place (*Kikkayon DeYona; Rishon LeTziyyon*).

Pestle – עלי – Some commentaries describe a pestle as a large beam with an iron piece attached to its end. They explain that this pestle was not used for cutting. Rather, one would insert a knife or cleaver into the meat, and then strike the knife with the pestle to break the bones. An alternative explanation is that a pestle is a board used for crushing wheat grits (*Meiri*).

## HALAKHA

A pestle upon which one cuts meat – עלי שקצב עליו בשר – If a pestle has already been used on the Festival for the permitted purpose of cutting meat, it may subsequently be moved from that spot to be used again for a permitted use or if its place is required. However, it may not be moved for the purpose of safekeeping (*Shulhan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim* 499:5).

A butcher, knife, and animal – טבח סכין ובהמה – It is permitted to bring an animal or a knife to a butcher. One is even permitted to carry an animal on one's shoulders in order to bring it to the butcher. A butcher is permitted to carry a knife to a place where there is an animal to be slaughtered, even if it could have been slaughtered on the eve of the Festival. This ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel (*Shulhan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim* 498:2).

**Salting a hide – מליחת עור**: It is permitted to lightly salt meat for roasting while it is placed on the hide of an animal that has been slaughtered on a Festival. One may even salt meat on various spots on the hide in this manner, in order that the salt should fall on the hide and preserve it, as stated in the *baraita* (*Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 499:3*).

**Salting fats – מליחת חלבים**: It is prohibited to salt the fats of an animal slaughtered on a Festival, nor may one turn them over or spread them out on pegs in the wind. However, it is permitted to remove the fats from the place of the slaughter (*Taz, citing Haggahot Ashrei; Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 499:4*).

NOTES

**And one may not turn them over – ואין מהפכין בהן**: This is not prohibited due to *muktze*, as the fats are suitable as food for dogs. Rather, the Sages prohibited turning fats over to prevent one from salting them (*Meiri*).

הכי השתא?! בשלמא בהמה – אתי לאמלוכי, דאמר: נשבק האי בהמה בחושה, ומיינתא בהמה אחריתי דשמינה מינה. קדרה נמי אתי לאמלוכי, דאמר: נשבק האי קדרה דבעיא תבלין, ומיינתא אחריתי דלא בעיא תבלין. הכא מאי איכא למימר – ממלך ולא תבר? ביון דשחטה – לתבירא קיימא.

”בית שמאי אומרים אין נותנין את העור.” תנא: ושון שמו לחין עליו בשר לצלי. אמר אביי: לא שנו אלא לצלי, אבל לקדרה – לא.

פשיטא, לצלי תנן! הא קא משמע לן: דאפילו לצלי בעין קדרה אסור.

תנו רבנן: אין מולחין את החלבים ואין מהפכין בהן. משום רבי יהושע אמרו: שוטחן ברוח על גבי יתדות,

אמר רב מתנה: הלכה כרבי יהושע. איכא דאמרי, אמר רב מתנה: אין הלכה כרבי יהושע. בשלמא למאן דאמר הלכה כרבי יהושע – אצטריך, סלקא דעתך אמינא: יחיד ורבים הלכה כרבים – קא משמע לן: הלכה כרבי.

אלא למאן דאמר אין הלכה, פשיטא! יחיד ורבים הלכה כרבים! מהו דתימא: מסתבר טעמיה דרבי יהושע, דאי לא שרית ליה ממנע ולא שחיט, קא משמע לן:

ומאי שנא מעור לפני הדורסן?

The Gemara refutes this: **How can these cases be compared? Granted, in the case of an animal, one is liable to come to reconsider, as he might say: Let us leave aside this animal, as it is thin, and we will bring a different animal, fatter than it.** With regard to a pot, too, one is liable to come to reconsider, as he might say: **Let us leave aside this pot of cooked food, as it requires spices and would take great effort to prepare, and I will bring a different one that does not require spices and can be cooked as it is.** However, here, with regard to a wooden anvil used for breaking bones, **what is there to say? Will one reconsider and not break the bones? Since he has slaughtered an animal, it stands ready for its bones to be broken, as it cannot be eaten in any other way.**

It was taught in the mishna that Beit Shammai say: **One may not place an unprocessed hide before the one who will tread on it.** The Sage taught (*Tosefta, Beitzta 1:13*): **And Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that one may salt meat for roasting on this hide, and there is no concern that some of the salt will fall on the hide, which would be similar to tanning the hide by salting.** Abaye said: **They taught that one may salt meat only for roasting, in which case it is not salted a great deal. However, in the case of meat for a pot, i.e., for cooking, the Sages did not say that one may salt it on the hide, as meat must be well-salted on all sides before cooking, and a large amount of salt will inevitably spill onto the hide.**

The Gemara asks: It is obvious the one may not salt meat for cooking in a pot, as we explicitly learned in the *Tosefta* just cited: **For roasting, and not for cooking.** The Gemara answers: **This comes to teach us that even the permission to salt meat for roasting applies only if one does so in the usual manner. However, if one salts it in a manner of meat salted to be cooked in a pot, which requires more salt than is necessary for roasting, it is prohibited.**

The Sages taught: On a Festival, one may not salt the fats of an animal, which is done so that they will not decompose and emit a foul odor. This is true even if the animal was slaughtered on the Festival. **And one may not turn them over.** The fats are unfit for use on the Festival, and therefore they are *muktze*. **They said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua: One may spread the fats out in the wind on pegs to prevent them from decaying.**

Rav Mattana said: **The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. Some say that Rav Mattana said: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua.** The Gemara asks: **Granted, according to the one who said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, this statement is necessary. Otherwise, it might enter your mind to say that since this is a dispute between an individual and the many, one should apply the principal that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the many.** Rav Mattana therefore teaches us that, in this case, the *halakha* is in accordance with the opinion of the individual.

However, according to the one who said that the *halakha* is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, this is obvious. In a case involving an individual and the many, the *halakha* is in accordance with the many. The Gemara answers: **This ruling is nevertheless necessary, lest you say: Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion is more reasonable, for if you do not permit him to air out the fats, he will refrain and not slaughter an animal at all.** Rav Mattana therefore teaches us that this factor is not taken into consideration.

The Gemara asks: **And in what way is this case different from placing a hide before those who will tread on it, which Beit Hillel, whose ruling is accepted as halakha, permit for the very reason that, if one is not allowed to do so, he will refrain from slaughtering animals?**

הָתָם לֹא מוֹכְחָא מִלְתָּא, מִשּׁוּם דְּחָזוּ לְמוֹגָא עֲלֵיהּ. הֲכָא אֲתִי לְמִימַר: מֵאֵי טַעְמָא שָׂרוּ לִי רַבְנֵי – כִּי הֵיכִי דְלֹא לְסָרְחַ, מַה לִּי לְמִשְׁטַחֵינְהוּ מַה לִּי לְמַלְחֵינְהוּ.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מוֹלַח אָדָם כַּמָּה חֲתִיכוֹת בְּשׂוֹר בְּבֵת אַחַת, אַף עַל פִּי שְׂאִינוּ צְרִיךְ אֲלָא לְחֲתִיכָה אַחַת. רַב אֲדָא בַר אֲהֵבָה מְעַרִים וּמְלַח גְּרָמָא גְּרָמָא.

מִתְנִי' בֵּית שְׁמַאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵין מְסַלְקִין אֶת הַתְּרִיסִין בְּיוֹם טוֹב, וּבֵית הַלַּל מְתַרְוִין אַף לְהַתְּוִיר.

גַּמ' מֵאֵי תְרִיסִין? אָמַר עוּלָא: תְרִיסֵי חֲנוּיֹת.

וְאָמַר עוּלָא: שְׁלֹשָׁה דְבָרִים הִתְרוּ סוֹפְן מִשּׁוּם תְּחִלָּתָן, וְאֵלוּ הֵן: עוֹר לְפָנֵי הַדּוֹרְסָן, וְתְרִיסֵי חֲנוּיֹת,

The Gemara answers: **There**, in the case of spreading out the hide, **the matter is not so evident<sup>N</sup>** that it is spread out for tanning **because** in its current state, **it is fit to recline on**, and therefore it can be said that one placed it for this purpose. However, **here**, with regard to fats, he himself might **come to say: What is the reason that the Sages permitted it to me? So that it will not emit a foul odor**. If so, **what is the difference to me if I spread them out**, and **what is the difference to me if I salt them?** This reasoning will lead one to salt hides, which is a prohibited labor.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: **A person may salt on a Festival several pieces<sup>NH</sup> of meat at one time, although he requires only one piece**, as it is all one act of salting. Rav Adda bar Ahava would **employ artifice<sup>N</sup> and salt bone by bone**. After salting one bone, he would say: I prefer this one instead, and would thereby salt all the meat in his possession.

**MISHNA** Beit Shammai say: **One may not remove the shutters [terisin]<sup>L</sup> of a store on a Festival**, due to the prohibition against building and demolishing. **And Beit Hillel permit one not only to open the shutters, but even to replace them.<sup>H</sup>**

**GEMARA** The Gemara asks: **What are these shutters?** Ulla said: This is referring to **shutters of shops.<sup>N</sup>** The marketplace shops or stalls were large crates or wagons, not buildings. They were closed at night with shutters. The shopkeepers would open the shutters on the Festival so that people who did not manage to finish all of their Festival preparations before the Festival could take the articles they required and settle accounts with the storekeeper later. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed whether the shutters may be opened and closed on the Festival itself.

And Ulla said: With regard to **three matters**, the Sages **permitted** an action **whose result is undesirable in order** to encourage a desirable **initial action**. **And these are the three matters**: First, they permitted spreading out the **hide** of an animal slaughtered on a Festival **before those who will tread on it**, a stage in its tanning. This was permitted because the Sages wish to encourage slaughtering the animal to enable celebration on the Festival. **And second**, the Sages permitted the replacement of **shutters of shops** on a Festival, so that storeowners could supply the Festival requirements for those in need.

NOTES

הָתָם לֹא מוֹכְחָא מִלְתָּא – הָתָם לֹא מוֹכְחָא מִלְתָּא – This answer applies only to one who acts of his own accord. What should a Sage say to someone who comes to inquire how to proceed? Some commentaries answer that he say that it is permitted to place the hides; and if they are trodden upon, so be it (Rashba).

**A person may salt several pieces – מוֹלַח אָדָם כַּמָּה חֲתִיכוֹת:** Some explain that Shmuel permitted only one act of salting, so that the maximum amount of meat that may be salted is whatever quantity can be salted at once. According to this explanation, Shmuel's ruling is more stringent, as Rav Adda permitted salting one bone at a time (*Meiri*). However, other commentaries explain the rulings in the opposite manner: Shmuel permitted one to salt as much meat as he wishes, provided he does so all at once, whereas Rav Adda was stringent and allowed this practice only by means of artifice (Rid; see *Petaḥ Einayim*). Yet others maintain that this leniency does not apply to salting meat by itself, but to the salting of meat on a hide, which causes the hide to be salted as well (*Shitta Mekubbetzet*, citing Rabbeinu Ḥananel). A similar opinion is stated in the Jerusalem Talmud.

**Artifice – הֲעֲרָמָה:** This term refers to a situation where one intends to perform an act prohibited by the Sages but seeks to do so in a permitted manner by stating that he has a different intention in mind. The early authorities point out that in several instances the Sages penalized one who unlawfully employed artifice for taking liberties with the *halakha*. In this case, the Sages allowed artifice in order to encourage celebration on the Festival (Rashba). Alternatively, they prohibited only the kind of circumvention that is obvious to all observers, but not something that does not have the appearance of a transgression (*Meiri*). Yet others maintain that the entire need for artifice in this case is merely a stringency.

**Shutters of shops – תְרִיסֵי חֲנוּיֹת:** Most commentaries accept Rashi's explanation that these shops were similar to wooden boxes detached from the ground and could therefore be considered vessels. Some, however, maintain that they were actually attached to the ground, but as their shutters were designed with various functions in mind and were continually detached and reinserted, the shutters themselves were regarded as vessels (*Meiri; Shitta Mekubbetzet*).

HALAKHA

**A person may salt several pieces – מוֹלַח כַּמָּה חֲתִיכוֹת:** It is permitted to salt several slices of meat at one time, even if one requires only one of them, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. If one is certain that the meat will spoil, he may salt one piece after the other, even after the meal, by employing artifice, as stated by Rav Adda bar Ahava (*Shulḥan Arukh HaRav; Mishna Berura*). It is permitted to salt meat even when one could have done so before the Festival (Rema), although some prohibit this (*Ba'al HaTurim*, citing *Yam Shel Shlomo*). If no loss is involved, one should act in accordance with the stringent opinion (*Mishna Berura; Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 500:5*).

**The removal and replacement of shutters – סְלוּק וְתַתְּוִיר:** It is permitted to remove shutters that are not attached to the ground to take spices and other items required for the joy of a Festival from shops. These shutters may even be replaced on a Festival, in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel (*Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 519:1*).

LANGUAGE

**Shutters [terisin] – תְרִיסִין:** From the Greek *θυρεός*, *thureos*, a stone or board placed by a door in order to keep it locked. Alternatively, it is related to *θύρα*, *thura*, meaning door.



**The replacement of a bandage – חזרת רטיה:** If a bandage came off of a wound and fell onto the ground on Shabbat, one may not replace it on Shabbat. If it fell onto a vessel, one may replace it, but not if he removed it purposely (*Magen Avraham*), although some permit this in a case where one removed the bandage in order to fix it. These *halakhot* apply everywhere but the Temple. However, in the Temple, one may even place a bandage *ab initio*, as the Sages did not apply rabbinic decrees pertaining to prohibited labor in the Temple (Rambam *Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat* 21:27; *Shulhan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim* 328:25).

NOTES

**And even of houses also – ואפילו דבתים נמי:** Some explain that this is referring to shops inside houses, not to vessels. The removal of shutters from these shops is necessary for the Festival, but their replacement is prohibited, as there is no concern that items might be stolen from a shop located inside a home (*Meiri*).

**Rabbinic decrees prohibiting labor do not apply in the Temple – אין שבות במקדש:** The prohibitions of *shevut* are all rabbinic stringencies concerning various types of labor on Shabbat. These types of labor were prohibited either because they might lead to the performance of a prohibited labor, or because they have the appearance of weekday activities, or for some similar reason. These decrees were never applied to the Temple, both due to the fact that all work performed there was in the honor of God and because priests are diligent and scrupulous in their observance of mitzvot. The early authorities and later authorities discuss the details of these *halakhot* at length, as it is clear from the mishna that not all cases of *shevut* are permitted in the Temple. In this case, the Rambam apparently rejects the statement of the Gemara, as he permits placing a bandage on a wound in the Temple without any qualification. It is an application of the principle that labor prohibited by rabbinic decree does not apply in the Temple (Rambam *Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat* 21:27; *Maharsha*).

וחזרת רטיה במקדש.

And the third permitted action is the replacement of a bandage<sup>H</sup> in the Temple. If a priest had an injury on his hand, he would have to remove the bandage while performing the Temple service, as it is prohibited for any item to interpose between his hand and whatever he must handle as part of the rite. After concluding his Temple service, he was allowed to replace the bandage on Shabbat, despite the fact that this is ordinarily prohibited, so as not to discourage him from engaging in Temple service.

ורחבא אמר רבי יהודה: אף הפותח חביתו ומתחיל בעיסתו על גב הרגל,

And *Rahava* said that *Rabbi Yehuda* said: There is also one other matter, i.e., another instance where the Sages permitted an action whose result was undesirable in order to encourage a desirable initial action. This concerns a *haver*, a member of a group that is meticulous with regard to the *halakhot* of ritual impurity, who opens his barrel of wine or prepares and begins to sell his dough to pilgrims for the sake of the Festival.

ואליבא דרבי יהודה דאמר יגמור.

And this is according to the opinion of *Rabbi Yehuda*, who said: He may finish selling all the bread made from that dough and all the wine in the barrel. Wine or dough sold to the general public is usually classified as ritually impure, as it might have been touched by an *am ha'aretz*, one who is not careful with regard to the *halakhot* of ritual impurity. During a Festival, however, the Sages decreed that all wine and dough sold in Jerusalem is ritually pure, so as not to embarrass ignorant people, and they may therefore be bought even by a *haver*. *Rabbi Yehuda* adds that even if a large quantity of wine or dough remains after the Festival, it retains its status as ritually pure and one may continue to sell it to a *haver*. This is a case of permitting an action whose result is undesirable for the sake of an initial action, in that the Sages maintained the wine and dough's status as ritually pure after the Festival in order to encourage people to sell wine and dough on the Festival.

עור לפני הדורסן תנינא! מהו דתימא: טעמייהו דבית הלל משום דחזו למוגא עליהו, ואפילו מערב יום טוב נמי, קא משמע לן: התירו סופן משום תחלתן, דיום טוב – אין, דערב יום טוב – לא.

With regard to *Ulla's* statement, the Gemara asks: We already learned the *halakha* that one may spread out an animal's hide before those who will tread on it. Why did *Ulla* find it necessary to restate an explicit teaching of a mishna? The Gemara explains: Lest you say that the reason of *Beit Hillel* is because the hide is fit for reclining on it, and therefore even if the animal was slaughtered on the eve of the Festival, it would also be permitted to spread out its hide on the Festival. *Ulla* therefore teaches us that the reason for the leniency is that the Sages permitted an action whose result was undesirable in order to encourage a desirable initial action. Consequently, in the case of an animal slaughtered on a Festival, yes, this *halakha* applies; but with regard to one that was slaughtered on the eve of a Festival, no, one may not spread out its hide.

תריסי חנויות נמי תנינא: [ובית הלל מתירין אף להחזיר]. מהו דתימא: טעמייהו דבית הלל משום דאין בגין בכלים ואין סתירה בכלים, ואפילו דבתים נמי, קא משמע לן: התירו סופן משום תחלתן, דחנויות – אין, דבתים – לא.

The Gemara further asks: We already learned the *halakha* of the shutters of shops as well, as the mishna states that *Beit Hillel* permit one even to replace them. The Gemara explains: This, too, is necessary. Lest you say: *Beit Hillel's* reason for being lenient is that there is no prohibition of building with regard to vessels and no prohibition of dismantling with regard to vessels. Since these shops are not attached to the ground, they are vessels rather than houses, and it is therefore permitted to replace their shutters; and as a result, the dismantlement and replacement of shutters of large vessels, even of those found in houses, should also<sup>N</sup> be permitted. To counter this logic, *Ulla* therefore teaches us that the reason the Sages allowed the replacement of shutters of shops on a Festival is because they permitted an action whose result is undesirable in order to encourage a desirable initial action. Consequently, in the case of the shutters of shops, yes, they permitted their replacement; in the case of those of houses, no, they did not allow it.

חזרת רטיה במקדש נמי תנינא: מחזירין רטיה במקדש אבל לא במדינה. מהו דתימא: טעמא מאי – משום דאין שבות במקדש, אפילו כהן דלאו בר עבודה הוא, קא משמע לן: התירו סופן משום תחלתן, דבר עבודה – אין, דלאו בר עבודה – לא.

The Gemara further asks: We already learned the *halakha* of the replacement of a bandage in the Temple as well: One may replace a bandage in the Temple but not in the rest of the country. The Gemara explains that this *halakha* is necessary. Lest you say: What is the reason that a bandage may be replaced? It is because rabbinic decrees prohibiting labor do not apply in the Temple.<sup>N</sup> Since the prohibition against applying a bandage is by rabbinic law, this leniency should apply to all who are in the Temple, even to a priest who is not a candidate to perform the Temple service. *Ulla* teaches us that this is not the case; rather, it is an instance where the Sages permitted a result for the sake of an initial action: If one is a candidate for service, yes, he may replace his bandage; if one is not a candidate for service, no, he may not replace his bandage.


Opening a barrel on a Festival – פתיחת חבית ברקל – If one opened a barrel of wine for selling during the Festival period or began preparing dough, these items remain ritually pure throughout the Festival, even if they were touched by an *am ha'aretz*. However, anything left over after the Festival is considered ritually impure, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis (Rambam *Sefer Tahara, Hilkhot Metamei Mishkav UMoshav* 11:10).

BACKGROUND

Shutters and hinges – תריסים וציירים – When a shop was closed, the owner would insert the hinge or hinges into the side of the door and bolt it shut. Upon opening the store, the shutter was used as a counter on which the merchandise was placed.



Hinge on the side



Hinge in the middle

פתיחת את חביתו נמי תמנא: הפותח את חביתו ומתחיל בעיסתו על גב הרקל, רבי יהודה אומר: יגמור, וחקמים אומרים: לא יגמור.

The Gemara asks a similar question with regard to Raḥava's addition: We already learned the *halakha* of one who opens his barrel of wine, as well: In the case of one who opens his barrel<sup>I</sup> to sell its wine, and similarly in the case of one who begins selling his dough for the sake of the Festival, the substance is ritually pure. If some is left over, the *tanna'im* disputed whether it retains its presumed status as ritually pure after the Festival and one may continue to sell it to a *haver*. Rabbi Yehuda says: He may finish selling the wine or dough, and the Rabbis say: He may not finish. What is added by including it in the list of matters where a result is permitted for the sake of an initial action?

מהו דתימא: טומאת עם הארץ ברקל בטרהה שויה רבנן, ואף על גב דלא התחיל נמי, קא משמע לן: התירו סופן משום תחלתן, התחיל – אין, לא התחיל – לא.

The Gemara explains: Raḥava's statement is necessary. **Lest you say:** It is permitted to finish selling the wine or dough because the Sages rendered the ritual impurity of an *am ha'aretz*<sup>N</sup> on a Festival as ritually pure, and although one did not begin to sell this wine or dough on the Festival but at an earlier stage, he should likewise be permitted to finish, as items do not contract ritual impurity on a Festival. To counter this logic, Raḥava therefore teaches us: In this case, too, the Sages permitted an action whose result is undesirable in order to encourage a desirable initial action. If one had begun, yes, he may finish selling; if one had not begun, no, he may not do so.

ועולא מאי טעמא לא אומר הא? בפלוגתא לא קא מיירי, הנך נמי פלוגתא ננהו! בית שמאי במקום בית הלל אינה משנה.

The Gemara asks: And Ulla, what is the reason that he did he not state this *halakha* alongside the other cases he listed? The Gemara answers: He is not dealing with a case that is a matter of dispute.<sup>N</sup> He listed only cases where the ruling is unanimous. The Gemara challenges this: These other three matters are also subject to dispute, as they all involve a disagreement between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. The Gemara answers: When Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, Beit Shammai's opinion is not considered a legitimate opinion in the *Mishna*, and it is completely disregarded. Since everyone knows that Beit Shammai's opinion is entirely rejected by *halakha*, it is not taken into consideration. Therefore, those cases are not viewed as disputes at all.

מתניתין דלא כי האי תנא, דתנא, אומר רבי שמעון בן אלעזר: מודים בית שמאי ובית הלל שמסלקין את התריסין ביום טוב, לא נחלקו אלא להחזיר. שבית שמאי אומרים: אין מחזירין, ובית הלל אומרים: אין מחזירין. במה דברים אמורים – בשיש להן ציר, אבל אין להן ציר – דברי הכל מותר.

The Gemara comments: The *mishna* is not in accordance with the opinion of this *tanna*,<sup>N</sup> as it is taught: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that one may remove shutters on a Festival. They disagree only as to whether it is permitted to replace<sup>N</sup> them, as well, as Beit Shammai say: One may not replace them, and Beit Hillel say: One may even replace them. And in what case is this statement said? When these shutters have a hinge<sup>B</sup> that can be inserted into a slot in the side of the vessel. However, if they do not have a hinge, everyone agrees that it is permitted, as this is merely replacement of a board, and it is not similar to building.

NOTES

**טומאת עם הארץ – הפותח את חביתו:** The Sages decreed that an *am ha'aretz*, who is not careful about observing mitzvot and is not particular with regard to ritual impurity, should be considered ritually impure. An *am ha'aretz* confers ritual impurity to anything he touches. However, the Sages did not apply this decree to all cases. With regard to consecrated objects, they were aware that even an *am ha'aretz* is careful to handle them in a state of ritual purity. Likewise, during a Festival, the Sages wanted all Jews to be united on these special days and suspended the decree that an *am ha'aretz* is presumed ritually impure.

**He is not dealing with a dispute – בפלוגתא לא קא מיירי:** Why didn't Abaye also cite the case of retrieving a ladder from a dovecote, which is similarly permitted due to its beginning? Some commentaries answer that he listed only things that appear in a *mishna*, not rulings from a *baraita* (Rabbeinu Peretz). He likewise did not list the situations in which the Sages permitted a midwife or an army that set out to rescue

Jews to return on Shabbat, because in those cases the reason for the lenient ruling is clear, and no addition of Ulla's was necessary (Rashba; see *Shitta Mekubbetzet*).

**The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna – מתניתין דלא כי האי תנא:** Some commentaries connect this discussion to Ulla's statement. Were it not for Ulla, one might have thought that there is no dispute here at all, as one source is referring to shutters of houses while the other is dealing with shop shutters (*Tziyyun LeNefesh Hayya*).

**They disagree only as to whether it is permitted to replace, etc. – לא נחלקו אלא להחזיר וכו' –** This is difficult, as the Gemara is apparently clarifying the opinion of Beit Shammai alone, which is not generally done. Some explain that this teaches a novel element according to the opinion of Beit Hillel, as well. One would otherwise assume that the removal of shutters also involves a prohibition, and that it was permitted only where it can be justified due to the joy of the Festival (*Bigdei Yom Tov*).

The hinges of shutters – ציורי התריסים: The Sages permitted the removal and replacement of shop shutters only if their hinges are in the middle of the board. If they are on the side, it is prohibited. If the shutter has no hinges at all, their removal and replacement is permitted in all cases, in accordance with the opinion of Abaye (*Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 519:1*).

והתניא: במה דברים אמורים – בשאין להן ציר, אבל יש להן ציר – דברי הכל אסור. אמר אביי: בשיש להן ציר מן הצד – דברי הכל איין להן ציר כל עיקר – דברי הכל מותר, כי פליגי – בשיש להן ציר באמצע.

The Gemara challenges this claim: **But isn't it taught in a baraita: In what case is this statement said? What is the situation in which Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree? They disagree when the shutters do not have a hinge; however, if they have a hinge, everyone agrees that it is prohibited.** Abaye said that the two sources can be reconciled: **When they have a hinge on the side, everyone agrees that it is prohibited**, as the placement of a hinge in the side is a complicated endeavor that resembles building. **If they have no hinge at all, everyone agrees that it is permitted**, as it is considered merely the replacement of a board. **When they disagree, it is with regard to a case where they have a hinge in the middle rather than on the side.**<sup>H</sup>

Perek I  
Daf 12 Amud a

מר סבר: גורנין ציר באמצע אטו ציר מן הצד, ומר סבר: לא גורנין.

One Sage, Beit Shammai, holds that we issue a decree and prohibit a hinge in the middle due to a hinge on the side; and one Sage, Beit Hillel, holds that we do not issue this decree. Since placing a hinge of this type does not constitute the prohibited labor of building, it is permitted.

מתני' בית שמאי אומרים: אין מוציאין לא את הקטן, ולא את הלולב, ולא את ספר תורה לרשות הרבים. ובית הלל מתירין.

**MISHNA** Beit Shammai say: One may carry out on a Festival neither a minor child,<sup>N</sup> nor a lulav, nor a Torah Scroll into the public domain, as none of these are required for the preparation of food; and Beit Hillel permit it.<sup>H</sup>

גמ' תני תנא קמיה דרבי יצחק בר אבדימי: השוחט עולת נדבה ביום טוב לוקה.

**GEMARA** The tanna who reviews mishnayot teaches a baraita before Rav Yitzhak bar Avdimi: One who slaughters a gift offering<sup>N</sup> on a Festival is flogged for transgressing the prohibition: "No manner of work shall be done on them" (Exodus 12:16). Since this slaughtering was not performed for the purpose of eating, the action constitutes a prohibited labor on a Festival.

NOTES

אין מוציאין... את הקטן: In the Jerusalem Talmud, it is stated that the same dispute applies to carrying out adults as well, and the mishna mentioned a minor only to convey the far-reaching nature of the stringent opinion of Beit Shammai. With regard to the basic approach of the mishna, Rabbeinu Hananel explains that it mentions only those objects that are carried for the purpose of a mitzva rather than for themselves. A minor is carried for his circumcision; a lulav is taken out for the mitzva to shake it; and a Torah Scroll is transferred to read from it. This clarifies the Gemara's comments concerning the slaughter of a burnt-offering on a Festival: Beit Shammai prohibit this despite the fact that it involves a mitzva. Conversely, Rashi and most commentaries maintain that the mishna merely cites examples that serve some sort of purpose, not necessarily that of a mitzva.

השוחט עולת נדבה – וכו': Some say that Beit Shammai prohibit not only a gift-

offering, but also the burnt-offering of appearance, which is brought to the Temple by pilgrims on the three Pilgrim Festivals. They prohibit the slaughter of this offering, despite the fact that it is an obligation of the Festival. However, as the Gemara originally thought that this mishna is also in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, it did not raise the issue of the burnt-offering of appearance (Rabbi Aharon HaLevi). *Tosafot* and many later authorities analyze Beit Hillel's opinion at length. Some commentaries do not agree that Beit Hillel indeed permit the sacrifice of a gift-offering on a Festival (see *Kerem Shlomo*). Some maintain that the key point is not the prohibition itself, but the claim that one is liable to receive lashes for it; even if Beit Hillel prohibit the offering, they do not concur that the transgressor is flogged for this act (*Meiri*). Certain later authorities suggest that although the positive mitzva of the Festival remains in place, according to the opinion of Beit Hillel, the prohibition does not apply to this case.

HALAKHA

Carrying out on a Festival – הוצאה ביום טוב: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. Since carrying out is permitted for the requirements of food preparation, it is also permitted for other purposes. Consequently, it is permitted to

carry out a child, a Torah Scroll, or vessels to the public domain. Some authorities say that it is proper to refrain from removing items that serve no purpose of the Festival at all (*Taz; Mishna Berura; Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 518:1*).