The Gemara cites an alternative version of the previous discussion:

There are some who say that the question was posed differently, and the dilemma Abaye raised before Rabba was about whether or not a dense thicket of reeds can serve as a double post. Rabba said to him: We already learned this law in the following baraita: If a tree, or a fence, or a barrier of reeds was present, it can serve as a double post. Does this not refer to a thicket of reeds?

The Gemara refutes this: No, it may perhaps refer to a barrier of reeds where each reed is less than three handbreadths apart from the next. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, it is exactly a fence.

The Gemara cites an alternative version of the previous discussion:

It is permitted.

Huna said: In the case of two courtyards, it is prohibited to carry, even if the residents of the two courtyards made an eiruv together. This is because of a decree lest they come to say that an eiruv is effective for the area between the upright boards. Rava, however, disagreed and said: If they made an eiruv together, it is permitted to carry to/from the area between the boards, and vice versa, with the preparation of the eiruv, the two courtyards are regarded as one.

Abaye said to Rava: What was taught in a baraita supports your opinion, for the baraita states: In the case of a courtyard, one end of which interposes between the boards surrounding a well, it is permitted to carry from inside the courtyard to the area between the upright boards, and from the area between the boards into the courtyard? Rabba said to him: It is permitted.

Abaye then asked him: And if two adjacent courtyards interposed between the boards surrounding a well, what is the law? Is it permitted to carry from inside them to the area between the boards, and vice versa? Rabba said to him in response: It is prohibited.

Abaye further inquired of Rabba: With regard to a courtyard, the open end of which interposed between the boards surrounding a well, what is the law with regard to carrying from inside the courtyard to the area between the upright boards, and from the area between the boards into the courtyard? Rabba said to him: It is permitted.

Abaye said to Rava: What was taught in a baraita supports your opinion, for the baraita states: In the case of a courtyard, one end of which interposes between the boards surrounding a well, it is permitted to carry from inside the courtyard to the area between the upright boards, and from the area between the boards, and vice versa; with the preparation of the eiruv, the two courtyards are regarded as one.

A courtyard, one end of which interposes between the boards – if the boards are made as a single entity to serve as a double post, one may carry from the courtyard into the area between the upright boards and from the area between the upright boards into the courtyard. However, if there are two courtyards it is prohibited, unless the residents established a joining of courtyards. This ruling is in accordance with Rav, since a straightforward reading of the baraita supports him (Maggid Moishe; Rambam Sefer Zemanim; Hilkhot Shabbat 17:34).

A courtyard, one end of which interposes between the boards – if it is breached, it is permitted to carry both ways.
Other water came on Shabbat – יָבְשׁוּ מַיִם בַּשַּׁבָּת
If the water in a well dries up on Shabbat, it becomes prohibited to carry in the area between the upright boards, surrounding the well, in accordance with Rabbi Elazar (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 17:34).

A partition erected on Shabbat – חַיָּיבד ׳ְּשִׁיטָא! אִי לָאו מְחִיצוּה
It is permitted to carry in an area surrounded by a partition that was unwittingly erected on Shabbat. If the partition was intentionally erected on Shabbat, it is indeed considered a partition, but only for matters of halakhic stringency. Consequently, it is prohibited to carry from an area enclosed by such a partition into the public domain and vice versa, and the Sages prohibited carrying within the area as well. This rule is in accordance with Rav Naĥman’s understanding of the baraita (Shulhan Arukh, Oraĥ Ĥayyim 362).

One who throws into the area between the boards – מְבַטְּלִי מְחִיצָּּתָא, הָא אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר
It is permitted to carry from an area enclosed by such a partition into the public domain, and he resolved for me, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 17:33).

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that this is a refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna, for the baraita explicitly contradicts his opinion? The Gemara rejects this argument: Rav Huna could have said to you: There, the baraita is dealing with a case where the two court-yards later became joined by means of the wall that separated them being breached, and it is clear to all that it is a single courtyard, so there is no concern that people will say that an eiruv is effective for the area between the boards.

Abaye asked Rabbi yet another question: If the water in the cistern dried up on Shabbat, what is the law? Is it still permitted to carry between the boards? Rabbi said to him: The boards are considered a valid partition only on account of the water; since there is no longer any water here, there is also no longer a valid partition here.

Ravin raised a dilemma: If the water in the well dried up on Shabbat, and then on the same Shabbat it rained and other water came in its place, what is the law? Is the original allowance to carry restored? Abaye said to him: The case where the water dried up on Shabbat should not be a dilemma for you, for I already raised this dilemma before my Master, Rabbi, and he resolved for me that it is prohibited to carry in the enclosed area.

The case where other water came on Shabbat should also not be a dilemma for you, for this is a case of a partition erected on Shabbat, and it was already taught in a baraita: Any partition erected on Shabbat, whether it was erected unwittingly, or whether intentionally, whether by unavoidable accident, or whether willingly, it is called a valid partition. The fact that it was erected in a prohibited manner, in violation of prohibitions related to building, does not negate its effectiveness.

Ravin raised a difficulty: Was it not stated with regard to this halakha that Rav Naĥman said: They only taught that such a partition is called a partition as a stringency; it is prohibited by Torah law to throw objects from an area enclosed by such a partition into the public domain and vice versa, but to carry in it as a full-fledged private domain is not permitted by the Sages?

The Gemara refutes this objection: Rav Naĥman’s statement applies only in a case where the partition was erected intentionally. Since the partition was erected intentionally on Shabbat, the Sages imposed a penalty that it is prohibited to carry within the enclosed area. However, in the case of a partition that was erected unwittingly or that arose by itself, no such penalty was imposed, and it is permitted to carry there.

Rabbi Elazar said: One who throws an object from the public domain into the area between the upright boards surrounding a well is liable. The Gemara asks: This is obvious, for were it not a valid partition, how could he be permitted to draw water from the well? This shows that it is a full-fledged private domain.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Elazar’s ruling is only necessary to teach that in the case where one arrange an enclosure similar to the upright boards surrounding a well in the public domain, in a place where there was no well, and threw an object into it from the public domain, he is liable.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Isn’t this obvious as well? As, were it not regarded as a partition in general, how could he be permitted to carry in the case of a cistern? The Gemara explains: It is only necessary to teach you that even though such a partition does not bar entry and many people pass through it, it nonetheless considered a partition in regard to Shabbat.

The Gemara asks: And what is he teaching us by this statement, that the passage of many people does not come and negate the effectiveness of a partition? But Rabbi Elazar stated this idea once before.
As we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says the following with regard to the upright boards surrounding a well: **If the path of the public domain passes through the area of the wells and the posts and obstructs them, he must divert it to the sides,** or else the partition is invalid. And the Rabbis say: **He need not divert the path of the public domain, for even if many people pass through there, the partition is valid.** With regard to this mishna, Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar both said: Here, the Rabbis informed you of the strength of partitions. Therefore, we see that Rabbi Elazar already expressed his opinion that the validity of a partition is not canceled by the passage of many people through it.

The Gemara asks: If it was derived from there alone, I would have said that what Rabbi Elazar meant is that here the Rabbis informed you of the strength of partitions, **but he, Rabbi Elazar, does not agree with them.** He therefore teaches us in his present ruling that what he meant is that here they informed you of this law and he agrees with them.

The Gemara clarifies several laws related to this issue: **With regard to a person, it was said in connection to these laws that it is necessary that his head and most of his body be inside the domain from which he is drinking.** However, a question may be raised with regard to a cow standing in a public domain and drinking from a private domain, or vice versa: **Is it necessary that its head and most of its body are inside the domain from which it is drinking, or not?**

The Gemara clarifies: Wherever one holds the bucket from which the cow is drinking but does not hold the animal, there should not be a dilemma for you, for it is certainly necessary for its head and most of its body to be inside, as the cow might move backward and pull the bucket with it, causing him to carry it from one domain to the other. Where there should be a dilemma for you is where he holds the bucket and also holds the animal. What is the law in such a case?
A manger that interposes into the area between the upright boards – אֵבוּס בֵּין הַ׳ַסִּים: Rashi explains that the animal is standing in a private domain, while the feeding trough is located partly in the public domain and partly in the area between the upright boards surrounding a well.

Most commentaries, however, maintain that this is a case where an animal is standing in the public domain and eating from a manger, one end of which interposes into the area between the upright boards surrounding a well (see Tosafot; Rashba; Ritva).

HALAKHA

One who changed his mind and carried out – נלכד אפיה הוה: If one picks up an object in a private domain intending to put it down somewhere else in that domain, but then decides to carry it out to the public domain, he is exempt from liability according to Torah law, because the initial lifting up of the object was not done for this purpose, as stated by Rabbi Yoĥanan. However, this is prohibited by rabbinic decree (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 13:12).

He said to him: We already learned a resolution to this dilemma, for we have learned in the mishna: It is permitted to bring the upright boards closer to the well, provided that the enclosed area is large enough for a cow to stand in, with its head and most of its body inside the partitioned space and drink. Does this not refer even to a case where one holds the cow and also holds the bucket? The Gemara rejects this argument: No, this may refer exclusively to the case where he holds the bucket but does not hold the animal.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: And where he holds the bucket but does not hold the animal, is it permitted to give his animal to drink in such a fashion? Wasn’t it taught in the following baraita: A person may not fill a bucket with water and hold it before his animal on Shabbat; but he may fill it and pour it out into a trough, and it, i.e., the animal, drinks of its own accord? Consequently, we see that it is prohibited to give an animal to drink from a bucket if he does not hold the animal.

The Gemara refutes this: Wasn’t it stated with regard to this baraita that Abaye said: Here we are dealing with a cow standing inside a house with windows open to the public domain, eating from a manger or trough that stands in the public domain that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, i.e., it constitutes a private domain, and one end of this manger interposes into the area between the upright boards surrounding a well?

In such a case, it is prohibited to fill a bucket with water in the area enclosed by the upright boards and hold it before the animal, unless the animal is within the enclosed area. This is a rabbinical decree, lest one see that the manger was damaged on the side in the public domain and go to fix it, and he might take the bucket with him, thereby carrying it from the private domain to the public domain. Rather, he must pour out the water into the manger, so that it reaches the animal on its own.

The Gemara asks: Even if he carried the bucket into the public domain, would he be liable in such a case? Didn’t Rav Saĥra say that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoĥanan said: With regard to one who transfers objects from corner to corner in a house, and changed his mind about them while carrying them and carried them out! to the public domain, he is exempt because the lifting at the first moment was not for that purpose of carrying out to a different domain; when he picked them up, he intended merely to move them around his house. Here too, then, one should not be liable, since when he picked up the bucket he did not intend from the outset to carry it into the public domain; accordingly, there is no room for such a decree.

Rather, say that the decree is due to a different concern, that at times one would fix the manger and then bring the bucket back in again, thereby carrying from the public domain into the private domain. In this case one picks up the bucket from the outset with the intention of carrying it from a public domain into a private domain.

Some say a different version of the previous discussion. With regard to a person, we said that it is sufficient if its head and most of its body are inside the domain from which he is drinking. But a question may be raised with regard to a cow standing in a public domain and drinking from a private domain, or vice versa: Is it sufficient if its head and most of its body are inside the domain from which it is drinking, or not? Perhaps all of the cow must be in that domain.

The Gemara clarifies the question. The case where one holds the bucket from which the cow is drinking and also holds the animal should not be a dilemma for you, as it is certainly enough if its head and most of its body are in the domain. Rather, the case where there should be a dilemma for you is where he holds the bucket but does not hold the animal. What is the halakha in such a case?
Feeding an animal between two domains – פדככ תולאכקה: The distance between the upright boards and the well is equal to the head and most of its body. If an animal is standing with its head and most of its body in a private domain, one is permitted to feed it, even if the entire animal cannot enter the private domain. The halakha follows this opinion because according to the first version it is obvious, and according to the second version the issue remains an unresolved problem. The halakha is decided according to the straightforward conclusion (Maggid Mishne; Rambam Sefer Zemanim; Hilkhot Shabbat 17:29).

NOTES

An animal and a camel – פדככ תולאכקה: The distance between the upright boards and the well is equal to the head and most of its body. If an animal is standing with its head and most of its body in a private domain, one is permitted to feed it, even if the entire animal cannot enter the private domain. The halakha follows this opinion because according to the first version it is obvious, and according to the second version the issue remains an unresolved problem. The halakha is decided according to the straightforward conclusion (Maggid Mishne; Rambam Sefer Zemanim; Hilkhot Shabbat 17:29).

The Gemara asks: But would he be liable in such a case? Didn’t Rav Safra say that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoĥanan said: With regard to one who transfers objects from corner to corner in a house, and changed his mind about them while carrying them and took them out to the public domain, he is exempt because the lifting at the first moment was not for that purpose of carrying out to a different domain; when he picked them up, he intended merely to move them around his house. Here too, then, he should not be liable, since when he picked up the bucket he did not intend from the outset to carry it into the public domain; accordingly, there is no room for such a decree.

Rather, we must say that the decree is due to a different concern, that at times one would fix the manger and then bring the bucket back in again, carrying from the public domain into the private domain. If this is the case, he picks up the bucket with the intention of carrying it from a public domain into a private domain. In any case, no proof can be brought from this source.

The Gemara cites a different proof. Come and hear the following baraita: A camel whose head and most of its body are inside a private domain may be force-fed from inside the private domain. Now, force-feeding is like the case where he holds the bucket and also holds the animal, as one cannot force-feed an animal without holding it by its neck, and nonetheless we require that its head and most of its body be inside the domain where it is eating.

Rav Aĥa bar Rav Huna said that Rav Sheshet said: A camel is different, as since its neck is long, its head and most of its body must be inside; otherwise it could stretch its neck into the public domain, and the one feeding it might come to carry the bucket from the private domain into the public domain. In the case of other animals, however, there is no reason for such stringency.

The Gemara attempts to cite yet another proof. Come and hear the following baraita: An animal whose head and most of its body were inside a private domain may be force-fed from inside the private domain. Now, as stated above, force-feeding is like the case where he holds the bucket and also holds the animal, and nonetheless we require that its head and most of its body be inside the domain where it is eating. The Gemara refutes this argument: What is this animal that is taught in this baraita? It is also a camel.
The permission of upright boards surrounding a well – בהמת תניא. The permission to carry where upright boards surround a well, was initially instituted so that Festival pilgrims could give their animals water to drink, rather than so that people could drink (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 17:30).

**HALAKHA**

**Perek II, Daf 21, Amud a**

**NOTES**

Must climb up and climb down – מספר יהל美术מה. The author of Grin YAAkav amends this phrase so that it reads logically. Must climb down, and climb up. However, Tosafot (Pesahim 2a) teach that it is the way of the Gemara to mention ascending and entering first, even if this does not correspond to reality. Some commentators explain that the Gemara uses this phrasing to teach that one can do it several times (Rav YAAkav Emden).

We require something that is fit for humans – קבץ יד יר. The question is asked: if the permission to utilize upright boards surrounding a well is intended for animals alone, why must the water be suitable for humans? The answer is that in fact this permission occasionally applies to humans as well, as in the case of wide cisterns. While people can sometimes descend into a cistern to drink, animals cannot do so and must drink from a bucket or manger. Consequently, it is required to make use of such boards for their benefit. Nevertheless, the primary concern is for humans.

**HALAKHA**

Who is permitted to use the upright boards surrounding a well – בהמת תניא. One is not permitted to rely on the upright boards surrounding a well for his own needs. Rather, he must descend into the well or cistern and drink, or erect a proper partition around it. However, if one cannot descend into the cistern, he is also permitted to draw from it for his own use (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 17:30).

The Gemara objects: Wasn’t it taught as animal in one baraita, and wasn’t it taught as camel in the other baraita? The implication is that this law applies not only to camels, but to other animals as well.

The Gemara answers: Were these two baraitot taught next to each other? Had both of these baraitot been taught together, we would indeed expect the tanna not to teach the same law using different formulations. However, since these two baraitot come from different sources, it is possible that one of the tanna'im referred to a camel with the generic term animal, and hence no proof can be brought from here. This same idea that a camel is different was also taught in another baraita: Rabbi Eliezer prohibits this in the case of a camel, since its neck is long.

Rabbi Yitzĥak bar Adda said: Upright boards surrounding wells were only permitted to Festival pilgrims.7 The Gemara raises a difficulty: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that boards surrounding wells were permitted only for cattle?8

The Gemara answers: What is the cattle mentioned here? It means the cattle of festival pilgrims. However, a person must climb up and climb down9 into the well, and drink there.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is that so? Is the allowance of upright boards for animals alone? Didn’t Rav Yitzĥak say that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Upright boards surrounding wells were permitted only where the wells contain potable, running spring water? If the allowance is only for animals, what is the difference to me if it is spring water and what is the difference to me if it is collected water? Granted, collected water is inferior to spring water, but it is still suitable for animals to drink. The Gemara answers: We require something that is fit for humans.10

The Gemara examines the baraita cited in the course of the previous discussion. Returning to the matter itself, the statement quoted above: Upright boards surrounding wells were permitted only for cattle, but a person must climb up and climb down into the well and drink there. But if the wells were too wide for him to climb, they are permitted for a person as well.11 A person may not fill a bucket with water and hold it before his animal on Shabbat, but he may fill it and pour it out into a trough, and the animal drinks of its own accord.

Rav Anan strongly objects to this explanation: If so, what purpose do the boards surrounding a well serve? The Gemara immediately expresses its surprise: How can he ask what purpose do they serve? They allow people to draw water from the wells, which would otherwise be prohibited.

Rather, Rav Anan’s question should be understood as follows: What purpose is served in requiring that the enclosed area be large enough for the cow’s head and most of its body, if in any case the cow may not be given to drink straight from the bucket?