

NOTES

Openings for ritual impurity – פִּתְחֵי טוּמְאָה: If a person dies inside a house, the entire house becomes ritually impure. If the house does not have doorways, it is impure on all sides. If it does have doorways, the doorways become ritually impure, since it is possible that they will be used to remove the corpse from the house. However, if the intention is to carry the corpse out through a particular doorway, or if only one of the entrances is suitable for the task, only that opening becomes ritually impure. The others remain ritually pure.

HALAKHA

An opening of four handbreadths – פִּתְחוֹ בְּאַרְבָּעָה: If there is a corpse in a house, even if the corpse is very large, an opening four handbreadths wide is considered the opening through which the corpse will be carried out (Rambam *Sefer Tahara, Hilkhot Tumat Met* 7:1).

אָבֵל בְּגָדֵי עֲשִׂירִים לְעִנְיִים – לֹא!

וְכִי תִימָא: הֵכָא לְחוּמְרָא וְהֵכָא לְחוּמְרָא, וְהִתְנַמָּא: רַבִּי שְׁמַעוֹן בֶּן אֱלֶעָזָר אוֹמֵר: מְעַרְבִין לְחוּלָה וְלִקְוֵן כְּדֵי מְזוּנָה, וְלִרְעִבְתָּן בְּסַעוּדָה בִּינוּמִית שֶׁל כָּל אָדָם? קְשׁוּאָה.

וְכִי אָמַר רַבִּי שְׁמַעוֹן בֶּן אֱלֶעָזָר הֵכָא? וְהִתְנַמָּא, רַבִּי שְׁמַעוֹן בֶּן אֱלֶעָזָר אוֹמֵר: עוֹג מֶלֶךְ הַבָּשָׁן פִּתְחוֹ כְּמִלּוֹאוֹ!

וְאֵבַיִי: הֵתֵם הֵיכִי לִיעֲבִיד – הַדּוּמִי נְהִדְמִיָּה, [וְנִפְקִיָּה?]

אֵיבַעֲיָא לְהוּ: פְּלִיגִי רַבְנָן עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי שְׁמַעוֹן בֶּן אֱלֶעָזָר, אוּ לֹא? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַר בַּר חֲנָה, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: עוֹג מֶלֶךְ הַבָּשָׁן פִּתְחוֹ בְּאַרְבָּעָה.

הֵתֵם דְּאֵיכָא פְּתָחִים קְטַנִּים טוֹבָא, וְאֵיכָא חַד דְּהוּי אַרְבָּעָה. דּוּדָאֵי כִי קָא מְרוּחַ – בְּהֵהוּא קָא מְרוּחַ.

But the clothing of the wealthy does not need to be three by three handbreadths in order to become ritually impure for the poor because even smaller pieces of cloth are significant for the poor. Therefore, the law with regard to the poor is not determined by the customary practice of the rich. So too, the law of *eiruv* pertaining to the rest of the world should not be determined by the customary practice of the Persians to eat roasted meat as a food in itself.

And if you say: Both here the ruling is stringent, and there the ruling is stringent, i.e., with regard to ritual impurity the *halakha* is stringent with respect to the poor and declares scraps of cloth that are only three by three fingerbreadths impure, but with regard to *eiruv* the *halakha* requires enough roasted meat to suffice for two meals as a food in its own right, in accordance with the practice of the Persians, then there is a difficulty: Wasn't it taught in a *baraita* that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: One may establish an *eiruv* for an ill or elderly person with an amount of food that is enough for him for two meals, and if he eats less than the average person due to his sickness or age, a smaller amount of food is required in order to establish an *eiruv* on his behalf; however, for a glutton, we do not require food in an amount that would satisfy him but merely enough food for two meals measured according to an average meal for the typical person? This indicates that the *halakha* with respect to an *eiruv* is lenient and not stringent. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is difficult.

The Gemara raises a difficulty with the aforementioned *baraita*: Did Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar really say this? Wasn't it taught in another *baraita* pertaining to the laws of ritual impurity that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Og, king of the Bashan, or any similar giant, requires an opening as big as his full size? If a person dies in a house and it is not clear how his corpse will be removed, all of the openings in the house are considered ritually impure,ⁿ as the corpse might be carried out through any one of them. If the corpse can fit through some of the openings but not through others, only the larger openings are ritually impure. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that in the case of a giant the size of Og, king of the Bashan, one opening can only prevent the others from contracting impurity the others if it is large enough for Og's corpse to fit through. This indicates that the law is determined by the measure of each particular person and not by some general measure.

The Gemara asks: And what does Abaye say? How does he reconcile his position with regard to an *eiruv*, which maintains that we follow the customary practice of most of the world and not that of particular locales, with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar's ruling with regard to the corpse of a giant? The Gemara answers: There, in the case of a giant, what should we do? Should we cut the corpse into pieces and carry it out? We have no choice but to carry it out through an opening large enough for the corpse to pass through. However, in the case of the food for the two meals of an *eiruv*, there is no such logistical constraint, and the law should be determined in accordance with the usual practice.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Do the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, or not? Come and hear a proof from that which Rabba bar bar Hana said that Rabbi Yohanan said: Og, king of the Bashan, requires an opening of four handbreadths^h in order to save the other openings in the house from becoming ritually impure. This indicates that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

The Gemara rejects this proof: There, we are dealing with a case where there are many small openings, and there is one that is four handbreadths wide. Therefore, it may be assumed with certainty that when one widens one of the openings in order to remove the corpse from the house, he will widen that opening. Consequently, that opening is ritually impure while the others are not. However, if all the openings in the house are equal in size, they are all ritually impure, as we cannot know through which opening the corpse will be carried out.

Sinai – סיני: Rav Yosef was given the nickname Sinai in contrast to his colleague, Rabba, who was called: The one who uproots mountains. Sinai denotes one who received the Torah itself, i.e., one who is exceedingly knowledgeable with regard to the *halakha* and whose positions are based on the most authoritative sources. The one who uproots mountains refers to one who employs sharp logical reasoning in deriving halakhic conclusions.

HALAKHA

An *eiruv* of raw eggs – **עירוב בביצים חיות**: One may establish an *eiruv* with raw eggs. Two eggs are required, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef (*Shulhan Arukh, Orach Hayyim* 386:7).

What is permitted to one who vows that nourishment is prohibited to him – **במה מותר הנודר מן – המזון**: One who takes an oath and says: Anything that nourishes should be prohibited to me, is prohibited to eat anything other than water and salt (*Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De'a* 217:19).

A vow and *eiruv* – **נדור ועירוב**: If one vows that he is prohibited to eat or if he swears not to eat, he may still participate in an *eiruv hatzeirot*, a joining of courtyards (Rambam; Rashba). This ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, since his is a minority opinion (Vilna Gaon). Some authorities rule that if an item is prohibited to a person, he may not use it for the *eiruv hatzeirot*. However, he may use it for the *eiruv tehumin*, the joining of boundaries, which is established in order to enable him to travel for the performance of a mitzva (*Magen Avraham*). If one made the food prohibited by making a vow called a *konam*, in which one gives an item the prohibited status of a sacrificial offering, an *eiruv* may not be established with it because the food now resembles consecrated objects (Rema based on *Tosafot; Shulhan Arukh, Orach Hayyim* 386:8).

אמר רב חייא בר רב אשי, אמר רב מערבין בבשר חי. אמר רב שימי בר חייא: מערבין בביצים חיות. וכמה? אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק: אחת. סיני אמר: שתים.

“הנודר מן המזון – מותר במים כו.” מלח ומים הוא דלא איקרי מזון, הא כל מילי איקרי מזון. לימא תיהוי תיובתא דרב ושמואל, דרב ושמואל דאמרי תרויהו: אין מברכין “בורא מיני מזונות” אלא על חמשת המיני בלבד.

ולא אותביניה חדא זימנא?! לימא תיהוי תיובתיהו נמי מהא!

אמר רב הונא: באומר: “כל הון עלי, מים ומלח הוא דלא זיני, הא כל מילי – זיני.”

והאמר רבה בר בר חנה: כי הוה אבולגא בתרייה דרבי יוחנן למיכל פירי דגינסוס, כי הוינן בי מאה – הוה מנקטינן לכל חד וחד עשרה עשרה, כי הוינן בי עשרה – הוה מנקטינן לכל חד וחד מאה מאה, וכל מאה מינייהו (לא) הוי מחזיק להו צנא בת תלתא סאוי. והוה אביל להו לכולהו, ואמר: שבועתא דלא טעים לי זינא! אימא מזונא.

אמר רב הונא, אמר רב: “שבועה שלא אוכל כפר זו” – מערבין לו בה. “כפר זו עלי” – אין מערבין לו בה.

מיתיבי: הנודר מן הכפר – מערבין לו בה. מאי לאו דאמר “עלי”? לא, דאמר “זו”.

הכי נמי מסתברא, דקתני סיפא: אימתי – בזמן שאמר “שבועה שלא אטעמנה”.

Returning to the laws of *eiruv*, Rav Hiyya bar Rav Ashi said that Rav said: **One may establish an *eiruv* with raw meat** because it can be eaten when necessary, even though it is not ordinarily regarded as food. **Rav Shimi bar Hiyya said: One may also establish an *eiruv* with raw eggs.** The Gemara asks: **How many eggs are required for an *eiruv*?** **Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said: One.** **Sinai,**^p a nickname of Rav Yosef, **said: Two.**^h

We learned in the mishna: **One who vows that nourishment is prohibited to him is permitted to eat water and salt.** The Gemara infers from this: **It is only salt and water that are not considered nourishment, but all other food items are considered nourishment. Let us say that this is a refutation of the position of Rav and Shmuel. As it was Rav and Shmuel who both said: One only recites the blessing: Who creates the various kinds of nourishment, over the five species of grain alone, but not over other types of food.**

The Gemara asks a question: **Did we not already refute their position on one occasion from a different source?** The Gemara answers: **Indeed, we already refuted their view, but let us say that there is a refutation of their position from here as well.**

Rav Huna said: We can resolve the difficulty from the mishna by saying that it is referring to someone who vows and says: **Anything that nourishes is prohibited to me.** In that case, **it is water and salt that are permitted to him, as they do not nourish, but all other food items are prohibited, as they do nourish.** This inclusive formulation includes anything that provides even a small degree of nourishment; but the particular term *mazon*, nourishment or sustenance, used in the blessing over food, is reserved only for the five species of grain.^h

The Gemara asks: **Didn't Rabba bar bar Hana say: When we were following Rabbi Yoḥanan to eat of the fruits of Genosar, very sweet fruits that grow in the region of the Sea of Galilee, when we were a group of a hundred people, each and every person would take ten fruits; and when we were a group of ten, each and every person would take a hundred fruits for him. And each hundred of these fruits could not fit into a three-se'a basket. And Rabbi Yoḥanan would eat them all and then say: I swear that I have not yet tasted something that nourishes.** Didn't we say that only water and salt are excluded from the category of things that nourish? The Gemara corrects the rendition of the story: **Say that he said as follows: I have not tasted sustaining food, but fruit is certainly considered something that nourishes.**

Rav Huna said that Rav said: **If one said: I swear that I shall not eat this loaf, one may nonetheless establish an *eiruv* for him with it** because the food used for an *eiruv* does not have to be edible for the particular individual the *eiruv* services. However, if one said: **This loaf shall be forbidden to me, one may not establish an *eiruv* for him with it,** as this formulation indicates that he is prohibiting himself to use or benefit from the loaf in any manner.^{hN}

The Gemara raises an objection based upon the following *baraita*: With regard to **one who vows not to benefit from a loaf, one may nonetheless establish an *eiruv* for him with it. What, is it not referring to one who said: This loaf shall be forbidden to me?** The Gemara answers: **No, the *baraita* is only referring to a case where he said: I swear that I shall not eat this loaf.**

The Gemara comments: **So too, it is reasonable to understand the *baraita* in this fashion, as it was taught in the latter clause: When do we apply this *halakha*?** **Only when one said: I swear that I shall not taste it.**

NOTES

A vow and an oath – **נדור ושבועה**: The commentaries disagree whether the accepted distinction between a vow and an oath applies in this context or whether this is a special issue connected to two other disputes: Whether or not *mitzvot* were given for man's benefit, and whether or not an *eiruv* may be established exclusively in order to permit traveling for a purpose that does not constitute a mitzva (see Rashba and Ritva).

The basic difference between an oath [*shevua*] and a vow

[*neder*] is as follows: In the case of an oath, one prohibits himself from performing a certain action, but the object itself does not become prohibited, even from his perspective. In the case of a vow, the situation is usually the opposite: One imposes a prohibited status on an object without restricting himself. This difference is particularly significant in cases where an object is utilized for the sake of a mitzva, but one took a vow or an oath not to benefit from it.

A vow and consecration – נדר והקדש: The main difference between a vow and consecration is the range of their application. A vow is a type of consecration for the one who took the vow, meaning that for him the prohibition is like that of consecrated objects. However, actual consecrated objects are prohibited to all people and not only to the one who consecrated them.

אָבֵל אָמַר "עָלַי" מֵאִי? הֲכִי נִמְיָ דְאִין מְעַרְבִין לוֹ בְּהָ – אִי הֲכִי, אֲדִתְנִי "כֶּכֶר זֶה הִקְדַּשׁ" – אִין מְעַרְבִין לוֹ בְּהָ לְפִי שְׂאִין מְעַרְבִין בְּהִקְדָּשׁוֹת, לִפְלוֹג וְלִיתְנִי בְּדִידָה: בְּמַה דְּבָרִים אָמוּרִים – דְּאָמַר "זוֹ", אָבֵל אָמַר "עָלַי" – אִין מְעַרְבִין לוֹ בְּהָ!

אָמַר לְךָ רַב הוּנָא: אֵלֵא מֵאִי, כָּל הֵיכָא דְאָמַר "עָלַי" מְעַרְבִין? קְשִׁיָא רִישָׁא!

חֲסוּרֵי מִיחְסָפָא וְהֵכִי קְתַנִּי: הַנּוֹדֵר מִן הַכֶּכֶר – מְעַרְבִין לוֹ בְּהָ, וְאִפְּלוּ אָמַר "עָלַי" נַעֲשֶׂה בְּאוּמֵר שְׁבוּעָה שְׁלֵא אֲטַעְמֶנָּה.

מְכַל מְקוֹם קְשִׁיָא לְרַב הוּנָא! הוּא דְאָמַר: כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. דִּתְנָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: "שְׁבוּעָה שְׁלֵא אוֹכֵל כֶּכֶר זֶה" – מְעַרְבִין לוֹ בְּהָ, "כֶּכֶר זֶה עָלַי" – אִין מְעַרְבִין לוֹ בְּהָ.

וּמִי אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הֲכִי? וְהִתְנָא, זֶה הַכֶּלֶל: אָדָם אוֹסֵר עַצְמוֹ בְּאוֹכֵל – מְעַרְבִין לוֹ בְּהָ, אוֹכֵל הַנְּאָסֵר לוֹ לְאָדָם – אִין מְעַרְבִין לוֹ בְּהָ. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: "כֶּכֶר זֶה עָלַי" – מְעַרְבִין לוֹ בְּהָ, "כֶּכֶר זֶה הִקְדַּשׁ" – אִין מְעַרְבִין לוֹ בְּהָ, לְפִי שְׂאִין מְעַרְבִין לוֹ בְּהִקְדָּשׁוֹת!

תְּרֵי תַנְיָא, וְאֵלֵבָא דְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.

"מְעַרְבִין לְנוֹזֵר בֵּין כּוֹ". מִתְמַתִּין דְּלֵא כְּבִית שְׂמַאי. דִּתְנָא, בֵּית שְׂמַאי אוֹמְרִים: אִין מְעַרְבִין לְנוֹזֵר בֵּין וְלִישְׂרָאֵל בְּתֵרוּמָה. בֵּית הַלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: מְעַרְבִין לְנוֹזֵר בֵּין וְלִישְׂרָאֵל בְּתֵרוּמָה. אָמְרוּ לְהֵן בֵּית הַלֵּל לְבֵית שְׂמַאי: אִי אֲתֵם מוֹדִים

The Gemara asks: **But if he said:** This loaf shall be forbidden to me, what is the *halakha*? **So too, one may not establish an *eiruv* for him with it.** But if so, there is a difficulty. **Instead of teaching** in the continuation of the *baraita* that if one said: **This loaf is consecrated property, one may not establish an *eiruv* for him with it, as one may not establish an *eiruv* with consecrated objects,ⁿ let him make an internal distinction in the case of a non-sacred loaf itself and state: **In what case is this statement said?** Only where one said: I swear that I shall not eat this loaf. **But if one said:** This loaf shall be forbidden to me, **one may not establish an *eiruv* for him with it.** This indicates that Rav Huna's understanding of the *baraita* is incorrect.**

Rav Huna could have said to you: **Rather, what would you say, that wherever one said:** This loaf shall be forbidden to me, **one may establish an *eiruv* for him with it?** If so, there is a difficulty from the first clause of the *baraita*, which states: When do we say this? Only when one said: I swear that I shall not taste it. That indicates that if one said: This loaf shall be forbidden to me, **one may not establish an *eiruv* for him with it.**

The Gemara answers that the *baraita* is incomplete, and it teaches the following: With regard to **one who vows not to benefit from a loaf, one may nonetheless establish an *eiruv* for him with it.** And even if one said: This loaf shall be forbidden to me, **it is as though he said: I swear that I shall not taste it.** Therefore, the loaf itself is only forbidden to him as food, but he can use it for the purpose of an *eiruv*.

The Gemara comments: **Nevertheless, the difficulty remains according to the opinion of Rav Huna.** The Gemara answers: **He stated his view in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer; as it was taught in a *baraita* that Rabbi Eliezer says:** If one said: I swear that I shall not eat this loaf, **one may establish an *eiruv* for him with it;** but if he said: **This loaf shall be forbidden to me, one may not establish an *eiruv* for him with it.**

The Gemara asks: **Did Rabbi Eliezer really say this? Wasn't it taught in a *baraita*:** **This is the principle:** With regard to a person who prohibits himself from eating a particular food, e.g., if one said: I swear that I shall not eat this loaf, **one may establish an *eiruv* for him with that loaf.** However, if the food was prohibited to a person, e.g., if he said: This loaf shall be forbidden to me, **one may not establish an *eiruv* for him with it.** Rabbi Eliezer says: If he said: **This loaf shall be forbidden to me, one may establish an *eiruv* for him with it.** However, if he said: **This loaf is consecrated property, one may not establish an *eiruv* for him with it, as one may not establish an *eiruv* for him with consecrated objects.** Therefore, Rabbi Eliezer does not distinguish between the two differently worded types of vows, but between a vow and consecration.

The Gemara answers: It must be explained that these are **two *tanna'im*** who both held according to Rabbi Eliezer. Two later *tanna'im* disagreed with each other in reporting Rabbi Eliezer's opinion.

We learned in the mishna: **One may establish an *eiruv* for a nazirite with wine^h and for an Israelite with *teruma*,** even though they themselves may not partake of these foods. The Gemara comments: **The mishna was not taught in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, as it was taught in a *baraita* that Beit Shammai say: One may not establish an *eiruv* for a nazirite with wine and for an Israelite with *teruma*.** Beit Hillel disagree and say: **One may establish an *eiruv* for a nazirite with wine and for an Israelite with *teruma*.** Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: **Do you not concede**

One may establish an *eiruv* for a nazirite with wine, for a nazirite with wine and for an Israelite with ritually pure *teruma*. This ruling is as stated in the mishna, in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel (*Shulhan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim* 386:8).

שְׂמַעְרֵבִין לְגִדּוּל בְּיּוֹם הַכַּפּוּרִים?

that one may establish an *eiruv* for an adult even on Yom Kippur,ⁿ despite the fact that he may not eat on Yom Kippur? It must be because eating is permitted to a minor.

אָמְרוּ לָהֶן: אָבֵל. אָמְרוּ לָהֶן: כִּשֶׁם שְׂמַעְרֵבִין לְגִדּוּל בְּיּוֹם הַכַּפּוּרִים, כֵּן מְעַרְבִין לְנֹזֵר בֵּין וּלְיִשְׂרָאֵל בְּתְרוּמָה.

Beit Shammai said to them: Indeed [aval],¹ it is so. Beit Hillel said to them: Just as one may establish an *eiruv* for an adult on Yom Kippur, so too, one may establish an *eiruv* for a nazirite with wine and for an Israelite with *teruma*.

וּבֵית שַׁמַּי: הֵתָם – אֵיכָּא סְעוּדָה הָרְאוּיָה מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם, הֲכָא – לֵיכָּא סְעוּדָה הָרְאוּיָה מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם.

And how do Beit Shammai explain the difference between these cases? The Gemara explains: **There**, with regard to Yom Kippur, **there is at least a meal that was fit** to be eaten by that person **while it was still day**, on the eve of Yom Kippur. **Here**, in the cases of wine for a nazirite and *teruma* for an Israelite, **there is no meal that was fit** to be eaten by them **while it was still day**, on Friday.

כִּמָּאן – דְּלֹא כַחֲנֻנְיָהּ. דְּתַנְיָא, חֲנֻנְיָהּ אוֹמֵר: כָּל עֶצְמָן שֶׁל בֵּית שַׁמַּי לֹא הָיוּ מוֹדִים בְּעֵירוּב, עַד שֶׁיוֹצֵא מִטְּתוֹ וְכָל כְּלֵי תְשׁוּמֵי שְׂוִי לְשָׁם.

The Gemara asks: **In accordance with whose** opinion was that entire *baraita* stated? It was **not taught in accordance with** the opinion of **Ḥananya**, as it was taught in another *baraita* that **Ḥananya says: The whole view of Beit Shammai**, i.e., their fundamental position, was that **they did not concede** to the very possibility of **joining Shabbat borders** [*eiruv tehumin*] by simply placing food in a particular location. Rather, they hold that one's Shabbat residence remains the same **until** he literally moves his residence, such as if **he carries out his bed and his utensils to there**, to a new location.

כִּמָּאן אֲזֵלָא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: עֵירוּב בְּשַׁחֲוִים – לֹא יֵצֵא בְּלִבְנִים, בְּלִבְנִים – לֹא יֵצֵא בְּשַׁחֲוִים. כִּמָּאן? אָמַר רַב נַחֲמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: חֲנֻנְיָהּ הִיא, וְאֵלִיבָא דְּבֵית שַׁמַּי.

The Gemara asks: **In accordance with whose** opinion is the ruling that **was taught** in the following *baraita*: **If one established an *eiruv* in black clothing**, and Shabbat commenced while he was still dressed those clothes, **he may not go out in white clothing**. If one established the *eiruv* while dressed **in white**, **he may not go out in black**. **According to whose** opinion is this *halakha*? **Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said: It is the opinion of Ḥananya**, and it is **in accordance with** the opinion of Beit Shammai.

וְלִחְנֻנְיָהּ בְּשַׁחֲוִים הוּא דְּלֹא יֵצֵא – הָא בְּלִבְנִים יֵצֵא? הָאֵמַר: עַד שֶׁיוֹצֵא מִטְּתוֹ וְכָלֵי תְשׁוּמֵי שְׂוִי לְשָׁם! הֲכִי קָאָמַר: עֵירוּב בְּלִבְנִים וְהוֹצֵרֵךְ לְשַׁחֲוִים – אֵף בְּלִבְנִים לֹא יֵצֵא. כִּמָּאן? אָמַר רַב נַחֲמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: חֲנֻנְיָהּ הִיא, וְאֵלִיבָא דְּבֵית שַׁמַּי.

The Gemara asks: **And according to** the opinion of **Ḥananya**, is it with **black clothing that he may not go out**, but **in white clothing he may go out**? **Didn't Ḥananya say** that according to Beit Shammai an *eiruv* is not effective at all **until one carries out his bed and his utensils** to the place he wishes to establish as his residence? The Gemara answers: The wording of the *baraita* must be emended and **this is what it said**: **If one established an *eiruv* while dressed in white clothing**, and he **needed black clothing** but did not have it with him, **he may not go out even in white clothing**. **In accordance with whose** opinion was this *baraita* taught? **Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said: It is the opinion of Ḥananya**, and it is **in accordance with** the opinion of Beit Shammai.

”סוּמְכּוֹס אוֹמֵר בְּחוּלִין.” וְאֵילוּ לְנֹזֵר בֵּין לֹא פְּלִיג, מֵאֵי טַעְמָא – אָפְשָׁר דְּמִתְשִׁיל אֲנִירוּתִיהּ.

We learned in the mishna: **Summakhos** disagrees and **says**: One may not establish an *eiruv* for an Israelite with *teruma*, but only **with** regular, **non-sacred** food items. The Gemara notes: **But** with regard to the mishna's ruling that an *eiruv* may be established for a **nazirite with wine**, **Summakhos does not appear to disagree**. **What is the reason** for the distinction? The Gemara explains: A nazirite **can ask** a Sage to annul his vow and release him from **his nazirite status**,ⁿ and then he himself will be able to drink the wine.

אֵי הֲכִי תְרוּמָה נִמְי אָפְשָׁר דְּמִתְשִׁיל עִילוּיָהּ! אֵי מִתְשִׁיל עֲלָהּ – הֲדָרָא לְטִיבְלָא.

The Gemara asks: **If so**, in the case of *teruma* as well, **one can ask** a Sage to annul **its** status. *Teruma* is consecrated through a verbal declaration by the one separating it, and that declaration, like other consecrations and vows, can be nullified by a Sage. The Gemara answers: Such a course of action would not help. **If one asks** a Sage to annul his declaration that turned the produce into *teruma*, the produce **will return** to its status as *tevel*, produce from which the requisite dues and tithes were not separated, and he will still be prohibited to consume it.

NOTES

That one may establish an *eiruv* for an adult on Yom Kippur – שְׂמַעְרֵבִין לְגִדּוּל בְּיּוֹם הַכַּפּוּרִים – It is unclear why Beit Hillel originally thought that Beit Shammai would agree in this case. Some commentaries explain that the question is actually referring to the laws of the joining of courtyards [*eiruv hatzeirot*], as certainly Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai agree that it is permissible to join courtyards for Yom Kippur, even though eating is prohibited (*Shem Mishimon*). Beit Shammai's answer, that the food is fit to be eaten before Yom Kippur, indicates that they do not accept the view that the laws of affliction that apply to Yom Kippur, including the prohibition of eating, begin before nightfall according to Torah law. If it were prohibited to eat before nightfall, the *eiruv* would not be valid according to Beit Shammai, even according to the opinion that an *eiruv* takes effect at the end of the day (see Rashba; Ritva).

Can ask to be released from his nazirite status – מִתְשִׁיל אֲנִירוּתִיהּ: One may ask a Sage to annul a vow, oath, or consecration. One expresses regret at having made the vow or oath or at having consecrated certain items and asks the Sage to annul his statements. A vow that has been annulled is regarded as though it had never existed.

LANGUAGE

Indeed [aval] – אָבֵל: Generally used by the Sages to mean but or although. However, its biblical meaning is not entirely clear. In the language of the Sages, there are instances in which the word has a different connotation, e.g., indeed, or in truth. The same is true in the Aramaic translation of the Bible, in the few cases where this word appears in the Bible. According to its use in this context, the word is closely related to the Arabic *balā*, which also means indeed or in truth.

NOTES

Haverim are not suspected of separating *teruma* from produce not situated near the produce – לא נחשדו חברים לתרום שלא מן המוקף – This statement should have been formulated as follows: It is prohibited to separate produce as *teruma* if it is not adjacent to the produce it comes to exempt. However, the phrase that is used in this context is different because it was the common rabbinic expression (Ritva). Separating *teruma* in this manner is prohibited because the produce it comes to exempt might have been lost, in which case the separation of the *teruma* does not take effect (Rashi).

What makes it necessary – ומאי פסקא: This expression is used where it is necessary to explain that a statement is referring to a unique and rare set of circumstances, even though there is no support whatsoever for this explanation in the formulation of the statement. In this case, the Gemara has explained that there is exactly the necessary amount of food that can be used for an *eiruv*. There is not even a single extra kernel of grain, which is the absolute minimum that one must separate as *teruma*. Since such a circumstance is clearly rare and surprising, the Gemara asks: Why it is necessary to claim that this is the case under discussion?

All in accordance with the particular person involved – הכל לפי מה שהוא אדם: The required measure is reduced according to the size or eating habits of a person who is smaller or eats less than the average. However, a person who is bigger or eats more than average does not need to increase the measure in accordance with his size (*Hatam Sofer*).

HALAKHA

The amount required for an *eiruv* for different people – שיעור עירוב לאנשים שונים – One may establish an *eiruv* for an invalid or for an elderly person with an amount of food that is enough for him. However, a glutton does not require more than two average meals for the typical person. This law is accepted by the *Shulhan Arukh* and by all of the commentaries and halakhic authorities, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar and the unattributed mishna in tractate *Kelim* (*Shulhan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim 409:7*).

A priest in a *beit haperas* – כהן בבית הפרס: One may establish an *eiruv* for a priest in a *beit haperas*. Although he is prohibited to enter such a field *ab initio*, since he may go there in times of need, the Sages allowed it (*Shulhan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim 409:7*).

A person may blow on the dust in a *beit haperas* – מנפת אדם בית הפרס: One who has to pass through a *beit haperas* may blow upon the ground before each step. If he does not find a bone the size of a grain of barley, he retains his ritual purity and may offer the Paschal lamb. In addition, if the ground in a *beit haperas* is well-trodden, those who pass through it are permitted to offer the Paschal lamb. In the case of an obligation involving *karet*, like the offering of the Paschal lamb, the Sages were not strict with regard to the ritually impure status of a *beit haperas* (Rambam *Sefer Korbanot, Hilkhhot Korban Pesah 6:8*).

ולפרוש עלה ממקום אחר! לא נחשדו חברים לתרום שלא מן המוקף.

ולפרוש עלה מיניה וביה! דלית בה שיעורא.

ומאי פסקא? אלא סומכוס סבר לה כרבנן, דאמר: כל דבר שהוא משום שבות – גזרו עליו בין השמשות.

כמאן אזלא הא דתנן: יש שאמרו הכל לפי מה שהוא אדם: מלא קומצו מנחה, ומלא חפניו קטרת, והשותה מלא לוגמיו ביום הכפורים, ובמזון שהי סעודות לעירוב. כמאן? אמר רבי יורא: סומכוס היא. דאמר: מאי דחזי ליה בעינין.

לימא פליגא אדרבי שמעון בן אלעזר; דתניא, רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר: מערבין לחולה ולזקן כדי מזונן, ולרעבתן בסעודה בניגות של כל אדם!

תרגומא אחולה וזקן, אבל רעבתן – בטלה דעתו אצל כל אדם.

“ולכהן בבית הפרס.” דאמר רב יהודה, אומר שמואל: מנפת אדם בית הפרס והולך. רבי יהודה בר אמי משמיה דרב יהודה אמר: בית הפרס שנידש טהור.

The Gemara asks: Let him separate *teruma* for that produce from produce located somewhere else and thus permit it to be eaten. The Gemara answers: *Haverim*, members of a group dedicated to the precise observance of mitzvot, are not suspected of separating *teruma* from produce that is not situated near the produceⁿ it comes to exempt, as this is prohibited *ab initio*.

The Gemara asks: Let him separate *teruma* from the produce used for the *eiruv* itself and consequently permit the rest of the produce to be eaten. The Gemara answers: We are dealing with a case where, after removing *teruma*, it would not contain the amount required for an *eiruv*, i.e., one would be left with less than the quantity of food sufficient for two meals.

The Gemara asks: What makes it necessaryⁿ to say that the mishna is referring to this very unique case? Rather, we must retract all that was stated above and say as follows: Summakhos agrees with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: Anything that is prohibited on Shabbat due to a rabbinic decree [*shevut*], the Sages issued the decree to apply even during twilight. Even though this period is of questionable status with regard to whether it is day or night, the Shabbat restrictions instituted by the Sages apply then as they do on Shabbat itself. Consequently, since it is prohibited to separate *teruma* on Shabbat, it is prohibited during the twilight period as well. Therefore, during twilight, when the *eiruv* would go into effect, it is impossible to cause it to become permitted to an Israelite.

The Gemara now asks: In accordance with whose opinion is the ruling that we learned in the following mishna: There are *halakhot* with regard to which they stated that measures are all in accordance with the particular person involved,ⁿ e.g, the handful of flour that a priest scoops out from a meal-offering, and the handfuls of incense the High Priest would offer on Yom Kippur, and one who drinks a cheekful on Yom Kippur, and with regard to the measure of two meals’ worth of nourishment for an *eiruv*. All these measures are determined by the particular individual involved. In accordance with whose opinion is this *halakha*? Rabbi Zeira said: It is in accordance with the opinion of Summakhos, who said: We require that which is fit for him, the particular individual, and we do not follow a standard measure.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the aforementioned mishna disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. As it was taught in a *baraita*: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: One may establish an *eiruv* for an ill or elderly person with an amount of food that is enough for him for two meals; and if he eats less than the average amount due to his sickness or age, a smaller amount of food is sufficient. But for a glutton we do not require food in an amount that would satisfy him; we measure on the basis of an average meal for the typical person.^h

The Gemara answers: When the mishna says that the measure of food for two meals is determined by the particular person involved, interpret that as referring to an ill or elderly person. But with regard to a glutton, we do not determine the measure of food by his standard for a different reason, namely because his opinion is rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other people. Therefore, there is no reason to be stringent with him and determine the measure according to his particular needs.

We learned in the mishna: One may establish an *eiruv* for a priest in a *beit haperas*,^h an area in which there is doubt concerning the location of a grave or a corpse. The Gemara explains that the reason for this is as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: In a time of need a person may blow on the dust in a *beit haperas*^h before taking each step, so that if there is a bone beneath the dust he will expose it and avoid it, and he may thus walk across the area. Similarly, Rabbi Yehuda bar Ami said in the name of Rav Yehuda: A *beit haperas* that has been trodden underfoot, creating a path, is pure, as we assume that it no longer contains any bones as large as a kernel of barley. Both of these statements indicate that the ritual impurity of a *beit haperas* is a stringency decreed by the Sages. Therefore, since there is a way to avoid becoming ritually impure there, even a priest may place his *eiruv* in a *beit haperas*.

”רבי יהודה אומר אף בית הקברות.”
תנא: מפני שיכול לחוץ, ולילך בשידה
תיבה ומגדל. קא סבר: אהל זרוק שמייה
אהל.

We learned in the mishna that **Rabbi Yehuda says**: An *eiruv* may be established for a priest **even in a cemetery**, an area which the priest may not enter by Torah law. **It was taught**: This is permitted because the priest **can interpose and walk between the graves inside a carriage, a crate, or a cupboard**. These containers do not contract impurity because of their large size, and anything found inside of them remains pure. From here we see that **he holds** the following: **A moving tent^N is called a tent**, and therefore the carriage, box, or cupboard are also considered tents. They shield a person carried in them from the impurity imparted by the graves in a cemetery.

ובפלוגתא דהני תנאי: דתנא: הנכנס
לארץ העמים בשידה תיבה ומגדל, רבי
מטמא. רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה מטהר.

The Gemara notes that this matter is the subject of a **dispute between the following *tanna'im***, as it was taught in a *baraita*: With regard to **one who enters the land of the nations**, i.e., any territory outside Eretz Yisrael, not on foot, but **in a carriage, a crate, or a cupboard**,^H **Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi renders him ritually impure. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, renders him pure.**

במאי קמיפלגי? מר סבר: אהל זרוק –
לאו שמייה אהל, ומר סבר: אהל זרוק –
שמייה אהל.

The Gemara explains: **With regard to what do they disagree? One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that a moving tent is not called a tent.** The principle is that only something fixed can shield against ritual impurity, but if one is situated inside a portable vessel, the vessel contracts impurity and he becomes impure along with it. **And the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that a moving tent is called a tent**, and it shields the person inside from contracting ritual impurity.

והא דתנא, רבי יהודה אומר:
says:

And with regard to that which was taught in a *baraita*: Rabbi Yehuda

NOTES

Moving tent – אהל זרוק – Any wooden vessel with a volume larger than forty *se'a* does not contract ritual impurity. Instead, it acts as a barrier against impurity and has the status of a tent. Therefore, if a corpse is located within it, anything situated underneath it contracts ritual impurity. In this context, the dispute is whether or not a portable item can be considered a tent (*Tosafot*).

HALAKHA

One who enters the land of the nations in a carriage, a crate, or a cupboard – הנכנס לארץ העמים – One who enters a country outside of Eretz Yisrael in a carriage, crate, or cupboard is ritually impure. A moving tent is not called a tent, since the *halakha* is ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi when he disagrees with his colleagues (Rambam *Sefer Tahara, Hilkhot Tumat Met* 11:5).

Perek III
Daf 31 Amud a

מערבין לכהן טהור בתרומה טהורה
בקבר. היכי איזיל – בשידה תיבה
ומגדל.

One may establish an *eiruv* for a priest who is ritually pure with *teruma* that is ritually pure and resting on a grave, even though the location is impure and he cannot reach it. How does he go there? In a carriage, crate, or cupboard, which shield him from the ritual impurity.

והא כיון דאחתא איטמיא לה! בשלא
הוכשרה, או שגילושא במי פירות.

The Gemara asks: **Isn't it true that once the *eiruv* was placed directly on the grave, the *teruma* became defiled**, and ritually impure *teruma* is not fit to be eaten by anyone? The Gemara answers: We are dealing here with a case **where the *teruma* had not yet been rendered susceptible to ritual impurity**,^N as it had not yet come into contact with a liquid. Produce that has yet to come into contact with a liquid does not contract impurity. **Or we are dealing with bread that was kneaded with fruit juice**, which is not one of the seven liquids that render a food susceptible to ritual impurity.

והיכי מייתי לה? בפשוטי בלי עץ דלא
מקבלי טומאה.

The Gemara now asks: **How can he bring it from where it is resting on the grave in order to eat it?** The Gemara answers: **With flat wooden utensils that are not shaped as receptacles and therefore do not contract ritual impurity.**

והא קא מאהיל! דמייתי לה אחוריה.

The Gemara asks: **Doesn't the utensil cover the grave?** The Sages decreed that anyone who holds a utensil that is a handbreadth wide over a corpse or grave is ritually impure. The Gemara answers: **He may bring it on the edge^N of the utensil while holding the utensil sideways so that it does not form a cover that is a handbreadth wide over the grave.**

אי הכי מאי טעמא דרבנן? קסברי:
אסור לקנות בית באיסורי הנאה.

The Gemara asks: **If that is so**, and there is a way for the *teruma* to remain ritually pure and for the priest to access it, **what is the reason** the Sages disagreed with Rabbi Yehuda and did not allow an *eiruv* to be established for a priest on a grave? The Gemara answers: **They hold that it is prohibited to acquire a home with items from which benefit is prohibited.** It is prohibited to derive benefit from a grave. Since one acquires a place of residence for Shabbat by means of the *eiruv*, it would be as if the priest acquired a home for himself with something from which he may not derive benefit.

NOTES

Had not yet been rendered susceptible to ritual impurity – בשלא הוכשרה – The Torah states: “Of all food that may be eaten, that upon which water comes, shall be unclean” (Leviticus 11:34). Food that has not yet come into contact with water is not susceptible to ritual impurity. Therefore, even if it comes into contact with something that is ritually impure at any level of ritual impurity, the food itself does not become impure. The Sages had a tradition that the word water stated in the Torah in this context includes other liquids as well: Dew, wine, oil, blood, honey, and milk. Contact with any one of these liquids causes food to become susceptible to ritual impurity. However, dough kneaded with the juice of fruits other than olives or grapes does not become susceptible to ritual impurity.

He may bring it on the edge – דמייתי לה אחוריה – The Jerusalem Talmud explains that in this case one creates a hole in a carriage, crate, or cupboard and brings the *teruma* inside by means of thin wooden chips or poles. A wooden utensil that is less than a handbreadth wide does not contract impurity inside a tent. In addition, a wooden utensil that cannot serve as a receptacle does not contract impurity, even through contact with a ritually impure object.