

אָמַר רַבָּא: וְהוּא דְּכִי רְהִיט לְעִיקְרוּ מְטִי.
אָמַר לִיָּה אַבְיִי: וְהָא חֲשֻׁכָּה לֹא קָתַנְי!

חֲשֻׁכָּה לְבֵיתוֹ, אָבֵל לְעִיקְרוּ שְׁל אֵילָן מְצִי
אֲזִיל. אֵיבָא דְאַמְרֵי, אָמַר רַבָּא: חֲשֻׁכָּה
לֹא – כִּי מִסְגֵּי קְלִי קְלִי, אָבֵל רְהִיט – מְטִי.

רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף הָיוּ קָא אֲזִיל בְּאוּרְחָא.
אָמַר לִיָּה רַבָּה לְרַב יוֹסֵף: תְּהֵא שְׁבִיתָנֵנוּ
תּוֹתֵי דִיקְלָא דְסָבִיל אַחוּהָ, וְאַמְרֵי לָהּ:
תּוֹתֵי דִיקְלָא דְפָרִיק מְרִיָּה מִבְּרַגְא.

יָדַע לִיָּה מַר? אָמַר לִיָּה: לֹא יָדַעְנָא לִיָּה.
אָמַר לִיָּה: סְמוּךְ עָלַי. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי
אוֹמַר: אִם הָיוּ שְׁנַיִם, אֶחָד מִבְּרֵי וְאֶחָד
שְׂאִינוּ מִבְּרֵי – זֶה שְׂאִינוּ מִבְּרֵי מוֹסֵר
שְׁבִיתָתוֹ לְמִבְּרֵי, זֶה שְׂמִבְּרֵי אוֹמַר "תְּהֵא
שְׁבִיתָנֵנוּ בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי".

וְלֹא הֵיא, לֹא תַנָּא לִיָּה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אֶלָּא
כִּי הֵיבֵי דְלִיקְבֵּל לָהּ מִיָּנְיָה, מִשּׁוּם דְּרַבִּי
יוֹסֵי נִמְוָקוּ עִמּוֹ.

”אִם אֵינוּ מִבְּרֵי אוֹ שְׂאִינוּ בְּקִי וְכוּ”.

הֲנֵי אֶלְפִים אָמַר הֵיכָן כְּתִיב? דְּתַנְיָא:
”שָׁבוּ אִישׁ תַּחְתּוֹ” – אֵילוּ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת,
”אֵל יֵצֵא אִישׁ מִמְּקוֹמוֹ” – אֵילוּ אֶלְפִים
אַמָּה.

Rava said: This *halakha* applies only in a case where, were he to run to the trunkⁿ of the tree he could reach it before the onset of Shabbat. Abaye said to him: But doesn't the mishna state: And it grew dark while he was traveling, indicating that he is farther away than that?

The Gemara answers: The mishna means that it grew dark while he was traveling so that he can no longer return to his house before nightfall; however, he is able to go to the trunk of the tree before Shabbat. Some state a different version of the previous statement. Rava said: The mishna means that it grew dark while he was traveling, so that were he to walk very slowly he could not reach his house; however, if he runs, he can still arriveⁿ before Shabbat.

Rabba and Rav Yosef were going together along the way. Rabba said to Rav Yosef: Our residence will be beneath the palm that carries its brother, the one with another palm tree leaning on it. And some say he said to him: Our residence will be beneath the palm that spared its owner from the land tax [*karga*],^l the palm which yielded enough dates for its owner to pay his entire land tax.

Rabba asked: Does the Master know of that tree? Rav Yosef said to him: No, I do not know of it. He said to him: Then rely on me, as it was taught in a *baraita* that Rabbi Yosei says: If two people were walking together, one of whom is familiar with a particular location in the distance, and one is not familiar with it, the one who is not familiar with it entrusts his right to designate his residence to the one who is familiar with it, and the one who is familiar with it says: My residence is in such-and-such place.

The Gemara comments: But it is not so; that is not the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rabba only taught it as if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei so that Rav Yosef would accept it from him, due to the fact that Rabbi Yosei's reasoning accompanies his rulings,ⁿ Since the *halakha* is usually in accordance with Rav Yosei's opinion, Rav Yosef would be less likely to raise doubts with regard to the ruling.

We learned in the mishna: If one is not familiar with a tree or any other noticeable landmark, or if he is not an expert in the *halakha*, unaware that residence can be established from a distance, and he said: My residence is at my current location, his presence at his current location acquires for him the right to walk two thousand cubits in each direction.

The Gemara raises a fundamental question: These two thousand cubits, where are they written in the Torah?ⁿ The Gemara answers that it is as it was taught in a *baraita*: “Remain every man in his place” (Exodus 16:29); these are the four cubits, which constitute the minimum Shabbat limit, e.g., for one who ventured beyond his prescribed limit. “Let no man go out of his place” (Exodus 16:29); these are the two thousand cubits of the Shabbat limit for one who remains in his place. Unless otherwise specified, the measure of one's place is two thousand cubits.

NOTES

Where, were he to run to the trunk of the tree – דְּכִי רְהִיט לְעִיקְרוּ: One who establishes his *eiruv* with his feet only acquires his residence when he actually arrives in that place. Consequently, although the Sages were lenient with him and did not require his presence in the location when he establishes the *eiruv*, he must nevertheless arrive there by nightfall, or at least be in a position to do so.

Rabbi Yosei's reasoning accompanies his rulings – רַבִּי יוֹסֵי נִמְוָקוּ: It is reasonable to rule in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei despite the fact that several Sages disagree with him, as several authorities accept Rabbi Yosei's opinion as the *halakha*,

even when he is opposed by more than one of his colleagues. Since Rabba knew that this was clearly the *halakha*, he cited it in the name of the well-known Sage, so that his statement would be accepted. In our versions of the *Tosefta*, however, the opinion is explicitly ascribed to Rabbi Yosei.

These two thousand cubits, where are they written – אֶלְפִים הֵיכָן כְּתִיב: Even according to the majority of commentaries, who maintain that the two thousand cubit limit is rabbinic in origin, it still may be asked: On what did the Sages base their determination of this measurement? (Ritva).

HALAKHA

However, if he runs, he can still arrive – כִּי רְהִיט מְטִי: One can only establish residence in a distant location if he is capable of reaching it by nightfall, even if he can only do so by running. If he can reach the location by running, he need not actually run, but may proceed slowly. However, if one cannot reach it even by running, he does not establish it as his residence. This is in accordance with the second version of Rava's statement (*Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim* 409:11).

LANGUAGE

Land tax [*karga*] – כְּרָגָא: From the ancient Persian *charak, xaray*, meaning land tax.

NOTES


Place from place – מקום ממקום: The essence of the derivation is a verbal analogy between the term place in the verse: “Remain every man in his place,” (Exodus 16:29) and the term place is the passage about the city of refuge (Exodus 21:13). The final proof is cited from the parallel between the cities of refuge and the Levite cities, whose limit of two thousand cubits is explicitly stated in the Torah. This is indeed how this *halakha* is derived in the Jerusalem Talmud.

The opinion of Rabbi Hanina ben Antigenos – שיטת רבי חנינא בן אנטיגנוס: In the Jerusalem Talmud it states that Rabbi Hanina ben Antigenos disagrees only with regard to the Shabbat limit of an individual. However, with regard to the Shabbat limit of cities, he agrees that they gain the corners, as was the case with the boundaries of the Levite cities.

BACKGROUND

Two thousand cubits – אלפים אמה: There are different opinions with regard to the measurement of the two thousand cubit limit. According to the Rabbis, the two thousand cubits form a square, while Rabbi Hanina ben Antigenos maintains that they are circular. Some say that the two thousand cubits form a square, but since there is no indication of how to place the square, the authorities permitted to proceed to the edge of a circle whose diameter is the diagonal of a square whose sides are each two thousand cubits.

The diagonal shown in the diagram can be calculated by using the Pythagorean theorem. According to the theorem, the sum of the areas of the two squares on the legs (the right sides of the triangle) equals the area of the square on the hypotenuse (the longest side of a right triangle). Therefore, in our case the calculation is as follows: $2000^2 + 2000^2 = 8,000,000$, $\sqrt{8,000,000} = \sim 2828.427$.



Different ways to measure the two-thousand-cubit limit

מָנָא לָן? אָמַר רַב חֲסֵדָא: לְמַדְנֵי מְקוּמָא מְקוּמָא, וּמְקוּמָא מְנִיָּסָה, וּנְיָסָה מְנִיָּסָה, וּנְיָסָה מְגָבּוּל, וּגְבּוּל מְגָבּוּל, וּגְבּוּל מְחוּץ, וְחוּץ מְחוּץ. דְּכִתְיִב: “וּמִדֹּוֹתֵם מְחוּץ לְעִיר אֶת פְּאֵת קַדְמָהּ אֲלֵפִים בְּאַמָּה וָאוּ”.

The Gemara asks: **From where do we derive that this is the measure of one’s place?** Rav Hisda said: **We derive this by means of a verbal analogy between the term place written here:** “Let no man go out of his place,” and **from the term place^N written with regard to an unwitting murderer:** “Then I will appoint you a place to where he shall flee” (Exodus 21:13). This last verse mentions both place and fleeing, **and the term place is derived from the term fleeing.** **And the term fleeing is derived from the term fleeing,** written in a different verse with regard to the unwitting murderer: “But if the slayer shall at any time come outside the border of the city of his refuge, whither he has fled” (Numbers 35:26). **And the term fleeing is derived from the term border,** which appears in the same verse. **And the term border is derived from the term border,** as it states there: “And the avenger of blood find him outside [*mihutz*] the borders of the city of his refuge” (Numbers 35:27). Since this verse mentions both the term border and the term outside, the term **border is derived from the term outside.** **And the term outside is derived from the term outside, as it is written** with regard to the Levite cities, which also served as cities of refuge: “**And you shall measure from outside [*mihutz*] the city on the east side two thousand cubits,** and on the south side two thousand cubits, and on the west side two thousand cubits, and on the north side two thousand cubits” (Numbers 35:5). From this chain of identical terms, the meaning of the term place stated in connection with Shabbat is derived from the two thousand cubits mentioned with regard to the Levite cities.

וְיַלְפֵי “מְקוּר הָעִיר וְחוּצָה אֶלֶף אַמָּה!” דְּנֵן “חוּץ” מְחוּץ” וְאֵין דְּנֵן “חוּץ” מְחוּצָה.”

The Gemara asks: **But let us derive** instead by means of a verbal analogy between the term outside in the verse: “Outside the borders of the city of refuge,” and the term outside in the verse: “**From the wall of the city outward [*vahutza*] a thousand cubits**” (Numbers 35:4), that the Shabbat limit measures only a thousand cubits. The Gemara answers: **One derives the meaning of the term outside [*hutz*] by means of a verbal analogy from another instance of the term outside [*hutz*], but one does not derive the meaning of the term outside from the term outward [*hutza*].**

וּמֵאֵי נִפְקָא מִיְנָה? הָא תַנָּא דְּבִי רַבִּי יִשְׁמַעֵאל: “וְשָׁב הַכֹּהֵן” וּבָא הַכֹּהֵן – זֶה הוּא שִׁיבָה זֶה הוּא בִיאָה!

The Gemara raises a difficulty: **What is significant about the difference between the two terms? Didn’t the school of Rabbi Yishmael teach a verbal analogy with regard to leprosy of houses between the verse: “And the priest shall return [*veshav*]” (Leviticus 14:39) and the verse: “And the priest shall come [*uva*]” (Leviticus 14:44), from which it is derived that this is the *halakha* with regard to returning, i.e., it is after seven days; this is the same *halakha* with regard to coming; it is after seven days. Obviously, the less pronounced difference of one letter between *hutz* and *hutza*, should not prevent the teaching of a verbal analogy.**

הֲנֵי מִיְלֵי – הֵיכָא דְלִיכָא מִיְדֵי דְדָמֵי לִיה, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְאִיכָא מִיְדֵי דְדָמֵי לִיה – מִדְּמֵי לִיה יִלְפִינָן.

Gemara rejects this argument: **This applies only when there are no terms that are identical to it however, where there are terms that are identical to it, we derive the verbal analogy from terms identical to it,** rather than from the terms that are not precisely identical.

“אֲלֵפִים אַמָּה עֵגוּלוֹת.” וְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶן אֲנִטִיגְנוֹס מַה נִפְשָׁךְ, אִי אֵית לִיה גְזִירָה שְׁוֶה – פִּיאוֹת כְּתִיבָן, אִי לִית לִיה גְזִירָה שְׁוֶה – אֲלֵפִים אַמָּה מְנָא לִיה?

The *tanna'im* of the mishna disagree whether the two-thousand-cubit limit granted to a person in every direction is measured as a circle or as a square tablet.⁸ The Gemara poses a question: With regard to the opinion of Rabbi Hanina ben Antigenos that the limit is measured as a circle, **no matter what you say, it is difficult. If he is of the opinion that there is a verbal analogy from the verse written with regard to the Levite cities it is difficult, because sides is the term written, indicating squared boundaries. And if he is not of the opinion that there is a verbal analogy, from where does he derive that the Shabbat limit is two thousand cubits?**

לְעוֹלָם אֵית לִיה גְזִירָה שְׁוֶה, וְשָׂאֵי הֵכָא דְאָמַר קָרָא: “זֶה יְהִי לָהֶם מִגְרָשֵׁי הָעָרִים” – לָזֶה אֶתָּה נוֹתֵן פִּיאוֹת, וְאִי אֶתָּה נוֹתֵן פִּיאוֹת לְשׁוֹבְתֵי שַׁבָּת.

The Gemara answers: **Actually, he is of the opinion that there is a verbal analogy, but here, with regard to the Levite cities, it is different, as the verse says: “This shall be to them the open space of the cities” (Numbers 35:5), from which it is inferred: To this, the open space of the city, you should provide sides and square it, but you do not provide sides to those resting on Shabbat.** Instead, those who establish Shabbat residence are provided with a circular, two-thousand-cubit limit.⁹

ורבנן? תני, רב חנניה אומר: כזה יהו כל שובתי שבת.

The Gemara asks: **And how do the Rabbis understand the emphasis placed on the word this in the verse?** The Gemara answers: **As it was taught in a baraita that Rav Ḥananya says: Like this measure shall be the calculations of measures for all those who rest on Shabbat, i.e., square.**

אמר רבי אחא בר יעקב: המעביר ארבע אמות ברשות הרבים – אינו חייב עד שמעביר הן ואלכסון.

Rav Aḥa bar Ya'akov said: **One who carries an object four cubits in the public domain is only liable if he carries it four cubits with their diagonal.**^N The four cubits mentioned in many places is only the basic measure by which the distance beyond which it is prohibited to carry is calculated. However, in practice, a person is liable only if he carries the object the length of the diagonal of a square with four-cubit sides.

אמר רב פפא, בדיק לן רבא, עמוד ברשות הרבים גבוה עשרה ורוחב ארבעה, צריך הן ואלכסון, או לא? ואמרין ליה: לאו היינו דרב חנניה? דתניא, רב חנניה אומר: כזה יהו כל שובתי שבת.

Rav Pappa said that Rava once tested us by asking:^N With regard to a pillar in the public domain, ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, must the width be four handbreadths with their diagonal in order to be regarded a private domain, or not?^H And we said to him: Is this not that which was taught by Rav Ḥananya? As it was taught in a baraita: Rav Ḥananya says: Like this measure shall be that of all those who rest on Shabbat, indicating that the diagonal is the determining measure for the halakhot of rest on Shabbat.

”וזה הוא שאמרו העני מערב ברגליו. אמר רבי מאיר: אנו אין לנו אלא עני וכו”.

We learned in the mishna: **And this is the meaning of that which the Sages said: A pauper can establish an eiruv with his feet, i.e., one who does not have the bread required to establish an eiruv may walk anywhere within his Shabbat limit and acquire residence. We have this leniency in effect only for a pauper, who does not have food for two meals. However, one who has bread may only establish residence with bread.** Rabbi Yehuda says: This leniency is in effect for both a pauper and a wealthy person.

אמר רב נחמן: מחלוקת ב”מקומי”, דרבי מאיר סבר: עיקר עירוב בפת,

Rav Naḥman said: This dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda is with regard to a case where the person said: My residence is in my current location. As Rabbi Meir maintains: **The primary ordinance and establishment of eiruv is with bread.**

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עני הוא דאקילו רבנן עילויה, אבל עשיר – לא.

Therefore, it is only with regard to a pauper, who does not have food for two meals, that the Sages were lenient and permitted him to establish residence merely by saying: My residence is in my current location. However, with regard to a wealthy person in his own house who has bread, no, they did not permit him to do so.

ורבי יהודה סבר: עיקר עירוב ברגל, אחד עני ואחד עשיר. אבל “במקום פלוני” – דברי הכל: עני – אין, עשיר – לא.

And Rabbi Yehuda maintains: **The primary ordinance of eiruv is by foot, i.e., by going and stating that he is establishing his residence in that location, and therefore it applies to both a pauper and a wealthy person. However, with regard a case when the person said: My residence is in such-and-such place, and he is not there, everyone, both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, agrees that for a pauper on the road on a Shabbat eve, yes, an eiruv may be established in that manner; however, for a wealthy person, no, an eiruv may not be established in that manner.**^{NH}

NOTES

They with their diagonal – הן ואלכסון: There are three opinions among the commentaries with regard to this basic issue. Rashi, Tosafot, and the Rashba explain that this additional diagonal depends on the direction in which one wishes to proceed. In other words, one may only walk two thousand cubits to the east or west, but to the northeast he may advance up to a little over two thousand eight hundred cubits. He adds that the same principle applies to all measures. Rabbeinu Tam and other commentaries contend that the calculation is based on the measurement with its diagonal in every direction, and that all the established measurements refer to the basic length, without the diagonal. Yet other commentaries maintain that one is only liable by Torah law for the measurement with its diagonal, but proceeding beyond the basic measure is prohibited by rabbinic law. Alternatively, they distinguished between the cases mentioned in this context, e.g., four cubits, and the other halakhot of Shabbat.

Rava tested us – בדיק לן רבא: In other words, Rava tested us with regard to the ostensibly fixed measures of the Torah, e.g., four cubits, whether or not the diagonal should be added to them as well (Ritva).

HALAKHA

They with their diagonal – הן ואלכסון: One who carried an object four cubits in the public domain is only liable if he transfers it the length of the diagonal of a four cubit square, which is 5.6 cubits. It is permitted to carry it less than that distance (Rav Shimshon of Saens; Tosafot; Rosh; Rashba; Ra'avad). Some authorities state that it is only permitted to carry within a circle of a four-cubit radius. If one walked any further, he is exempt from punishment or from bringing a sin-offering, but it is prohibited to do so (Rambam, according to the Maggid Mishne; Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 349:2).

NOTES

A pauper and a wealthy person – עני ועשיר: The pauper mentioned in this context is not necessarily a person in dire financial straits. Rather, anyone traveling who intends to establish his residence in a location he has determined for himself is considered a pauper in terms of this halakha, as it can be assumed that he does not have with him all that he requires for a meal. The reverse is also true. One who is at home on Shabbat evening but establishes an eiruv in order to go the next day is considered a wealthy person. The proof is from the inhabitants of Siḥin mentioned in the baraita. Although they were going to receive charity, they were still considered wealthy with regard to the eiruv (Rashba).

HALAKHA

My residence in such-and-such place – שבייתי במקום פלוני: If one says, my residence is in such-and-such place, without going there or placing an eiruv there, it is only valid if he was on the road on Shabbat eve. It is not effective for one who remains at home, as per the opinion of Rabbi Naḥman, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the explanation of the Rashba (Vilna Gaon; Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 409:13).

NOTES

This is what they said – וְזוּ הָיָא שְׂאָמְרוּ: In addition to the words of the disputants, the mishna in this context includes two teachings apparently transmitted by the *tanna'im* but not part of their own statements: And this is what they said, a pauper can establish an *eiruv* by foot, and: They only said that one can establish an *eiruv* with bread in order to be lenient with a wealthy person. These two clauses do not appear to reflect the same opinion, but are traditions or parts of traditions cited by each of the disputants. Indeed, the two opposing explanations of the dispute explain these clauses differently.

They said that one establishes an *eiruv* with bread only to be lenient – לֹא אָמְרוּ מְעַרְבִין בְּפֶת אֶלָּא לְהַקֵּל: The early commentaries ask: According to the opinion of Rabbi Hīṣḏa, that a person may sit in his house and say: My *eiruv* is in such-and-such place, what is the leniency of establishing an *eiruv* with bread? They answer that it remains a leniency for one who is not familiar with the place and therefore cannot establish his residence there. However, sending a messenger to place his meal there is also effective (See *Tosafot*; *Rashba*).

HALAKHA

An *eiruv* by foot – עִירוּב בְּרֶגֶל: If one arrived in a certain place, whether he was on the road or returning to his house in the evening, he may establish residence in that location. It is effective even if he did not explicitly state his intention, but merely had it in mind, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as explained by Rav Naḥman (*Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Ḥayyim* 409:7).

Sending an *eiruv* – שְׁלִיחַת עִירוּב: A person may establish an *eiruv* for himself by means of a messenger, provided that the messenger is not a deaf-mute, an imbecile, a minor, or one who rejects the concept of an *eiruv* (*Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Ḥayyim* 409:8).

BACKGROUND

The village of Aroma – כִּפּוּר אֲרוּמָה: Aroma, or Roma as it is called in other sources, was a small village in the vicinity of Tzippori, probably on the site of the modern town of Rameh.

וְזוּ הָיָא שְׂאָמְרוּ: מֵאֵן קָתְנִי לָהּ – רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְאֵהֵיִיא קָאֵי – אִי אֵינּוּ מְכִיר אוּ שְׂאִינּוּ בְּקֵי בְּהִלְכָּהּ. וְלֹא אָמְרוּ מְעַרְבִין בְּפֶת אֶלָּא לְהַקֵּל מֵאֵן קָתְנִי לָהּ – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

וְרַב חֲסֵדָא אָמַר: מְחִלּוּקַת בְּמִקּוּם פְּלוּגִי, דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: עָנִי – אֵין, עֲשִׂיר – לֹא. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: אֶחָד עָנִי וְאֶחָד עֲשִׂיר. אֲבָל “בְּמִקּוּמִי” – דְּבָרֵי הַכֹּל: אֶחָד עָנִי וְאֶחָד עֲשִׂיר, דְּעִיקּוּר עִירוּב בְּרֶגֶל.

“וְזוּ הָיָא שְׂאָמְרוּ” מֵאֵן קָתְנִי לָהּ – רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְאֵהֵיִיא קָאֵי – אֵהֵא: “מֵי שְׂבָא בְּדֶרֶךְ וְחֲשֻׁכָּהּ.” וְלֹא אָמְרוּ מְעַרְבִין בְּפֶת אֶלָּא לְהַקֵּל – מֵאֵן קָתְנִי לָהּ – דְּבָרֵי הַכֹּל.

תְּנִינָא כְּוֹתִינָה דְּרַב נַחֲמָן: אֶחָד עָנִי וְאֶחָד עֲשִׂיר מְעַרְבִין בְּרֶגֶל, וְיֵצֵא עֲשִׂיר חוּץ לְתַחוּם וְיֵאמַר “שְׁבִיתִי בְּמִקּוּמִי” – לְפִי שְׂלֵא אָמְרוּ מְעַרְבִין בְּרֶגֶל אֶלָּא לְמֵי שְׂבָא בְּדֶרֶךְ וְחֲשֻׁכָּהּ, דְּבָרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אָמַר: אֶחָד עָנִי וְאֶחָד עֲשִׂיר מְעַרְבִין בְּרֶגֶל, וְיֵצֵא עֲשִׂיר חוּץ לְתַחוּם וְיֵאמַר “תְּהֵא שְׁבִיתִי בְּמִקּוּמִי,” וְזֶה הוּא עִיקְרוֹ שֶׁל עִירוּב. וְהַתִּירוּ חֲכָמִים לְבַעַל הַבַּיִת לְשַׁלַּח עִירוּבוֹ בְּיַד עַבְדּוֹ, בְּיַד בְּנוֹ, בְּיַד שְׁלֹחֵהוּ בְּשִׁבְלֵי לְהַקֵּל עָלָיו.

אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: מַעֲשֵׂה בְּאֲנָשֵׁי בֵּית מִמְלָא וּבְאֲנָשֵׁי בֵּית גּוּרְיוֹן בְּאֲרוּמָא, שְׁהִיּוּ מְחַלְקִין גְּרוּגְרוֹת וְצִימוּקִין לְעֵנִיִּים בְּשָׁנֵי בְּצוּרָת, וּבְאֵין עָנִי כִּפּוּר שִׁיחִין וְעֵנִי כִּפּוּר חֲנִנְיָהּ וּמוֹחֲשִׁיכִין עַל הַתַּחוּם, לְמַחֲרַת מְשִׁכִּימִין וּבְאֵין.

And as for the mishna’s statement: **And this is what** the Sages meant when **they said**ⁿ that a pauper can establish an *eiruv* with his feet, **who**, which Sage, **is teaching it?** It is **Rabbi Meir**. **And to which** clause of the mishna **is it referring?** It refers to the previous statement: If he is **not familiar** with a tree or any other noticeable landmark, **or if he is not an expert in the halakha**, and therefore is unaware that a residence can be established from a distance, and said: My residence is in my current location, he acquires two thousand cubits in each direction. **And** as for the statement in the continuation of the mishna: **The Sages said that one establishes an *eiruv* with bread only to be lenientⁿ with the wealthy person, who**, which Sage, **is teaching it?** It is **Rabbi Yehuda**, who maintains that the option of establishing an *eiruv* by foot is available to the wealthy as well.

Rav Hīṣḏa, however, disagreed with Rav Naḥman and **said**: The **dispute** between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna is with regard to a person who said: My residence is **in such-and-such place**, in which case the his residence is neither acquired by foot nor with bread. **As Rabbi Meir maintains: A pauper, yes**, he establishes residence with an *eiruv* in that manner; however, **a wealthy person, no**, he does not. **And Rabbi Yehuda maintains: Both a pauper and a wealthy person** may establish an *eiruv* in that manner. **However**, in a case where one said: My residence is **in my present location, everyone**, both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, **agrees** that an *eiruv* of this kind is effective **both for a pauper and for a wealthy person**, as everyone agrees agree that **the primary ordinance of *eiruv* is by foot**.

And as for the mishna’s statement: **And this is what** the Sages meant when **they said** that a pauper can establish an *eiruv* by foot, **who is teaching it?** It is **Rabbi Meir**. **And to which** clause of the mishna **is it referring?** It is referring to this clause: **One who was coming along the way** on Shabbat eve, **and it grew dark** while he was traveling. According to Rabbi Yehuda, he could have established an *eiruv* even if he was in his house. And as for the statement in the continuation of the mishna: **The Sages said that one establishes an *eiruv* with bread only in order to be lenient with the wealthy person, who is teaching it?** **Everyone agrees** with this *halakha*, and it is taught according to both opinions.

The Gemara comments: *A baraita was taught in accordance with* the opinion of Rav Naḥman, who said that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda is with regard to one who said: My residence is in my present location. It was stated in the *baraita*: **Both a pauper and a wealthy person establish an *eiruv* with bread; however a wealthy person may not go out beyond the Shabbat limit and say: My residence is in my present location**, because the Sages said that **one can establish an *eiruv* by foot only in the case of a person who was coming along the way and it grew dark while he was traveling**. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says: **Both a pauper and a wealthy person establish an *eiruv* by foot**. **And a wealthy person will go out beyond the Shabbat limit and say: My residence is in my present location**. **And this is the primary ordinance of *eiruv***.^h However, the Sages permitted a homeowner to send his *eiruv* in the hand of his servant, or in the hand of his son, or in the hand of his agent, in order to be lenient with him, so that he need not exert himself and go out and establish an *eiruv* by foot.^h This *baraita* presents the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda as it was delineated by Rav Naḥman.

The *baraita* continues. Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving the members of the household of the Memel family and members of the household of Guryon family in the village of Aroma,⁸ who were distributing dried figs and raisins to the paupers in years of famine, and the paupers of the village of Siḥin and the paupers of the village of Hananya would come to the edge of the Shabbat limit at nightfall, which was also within the Shabbat limit of Aroma, and then go home. **The following day they would rise early and go** to receive their figs and raisins. Apparently, one can establish an *eiruv* by foot, if he says: My residence is in my present location.

The formulation of the mishna is also precise – מתניתין נמי דיקא – If the mishna can be explained only according to Rabbi Naḥman's opinion, how can Rabbi Ḥisda rule against an explicit mishna? The answer is that Rabbi Ḥisda maintains that the other inhabitants of the town cannot be included in an *eiruv* unless they declare their intentions. Consequently, for one who declares that he is establishing a residence for himself it is a valid *eiruv*, but not for the others (Ritva).

Was in the habit of coming from his home in Artibbena – דאָתי מאַרטיבנא: Rabbeinu Ḥananel explains that he would go to Pumbedita to hear Rabbi Yosef's homily every Shabbat. Therefore, it is clear that he did not walk the day before. Rather, he spent Friday night in his own home, and walked to Artibbena the following day.

אמר רב אשי: מתניתין נמי דיקא, דקתני: מי שיצא לילך לעיר שמערבין לה, והחזירו חברו – הוא מותר לילך, וכל בני העיר אסורין, דברי רבי יהודה.

Rav Ashi said: The formulation of the mishna is also precise,^N in accordance with Rav Naḥman's explanation, as it teaches: If on a Shabbat eve one set out to go to a city for which an *eiruv* is established enabling him to go there on Shabbat, and another person caused him to return home, he himself is permitted to go to that city on Shabbat, and for all the other residents of the town it is prohibited to go there. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

והוינן בה: מאי שנא איהו ומאי שנא אינהו? ואמר רב הונא: הכא במאי עסקינן – בגון שיש לו שני בתים, ושני תחומי שבת ביניהן.

And we discussed this mishna and raised a difficulty: What is different about him and what is different about them? Why is he permitted to proceed to the other town while it is prohibited for the other residents to do so? And Rav Huna said: We are dealing here with a case where he has two houses, one in each city, and there is the distance of two Shabbat limits, four thousand cubits, between them.

איהו פיון דנפקא ליה לאורחא – הוה ליה עני,

With regard to him, since he set out on his way, his legal status is that of a pauper, as he did not intend to return to his first house, but to continue to his other house. Therefore, he can establish residence at the end of his Shabbat limit by verbal means alone.

והנך עשירים ניהו. אלמא: כל "במקום פלוני" עני – אין, עשיר – לא. שמע מינה.

And the legal status of these other inhabitants of his city, is that of wealthy people, as they are in their houses and have food. Consequently they can only establish residence at the end of their Shabbat limit by depositing food there prior the onset of Shabbat. Apparently, everything stated with regard to one who says: My residence is in such-and-such place; to a pauper, yes, it applies to a wealthy person, no, it does not apply. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from this that this is the case.

מתני ליה רב חייא בר אשי לחייא בר רב קמייה דרב: אחד עני ואחד עשיר. אמר ליה רב: סיים בה נמי. הלכה כרבי יהודה.

Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi was teaching the mishna to Ḥiyya bar Rav before Rav. He stated that this leniency applies both to a pauper and to a wealthy person. Rav said to him: Conclude your statement also: The *halakha* is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

רבה בר רב חנן הוה רגיל דאָתי מאַרטיבנא לְפומבדיתא.

The Gemara relates: Rabba bar Rav Ḥanan was in the habit of coming from his home in Artibbena^N to Pumbedita on Shabbat.

Perek IV

Daf 52 Amud a

אמר: "תהא שבייתתי בצזינטא". אמר ליה אביי: מאי דעתך – רבי מאיר ורבי יהודה – הלכה כרבי יהודה, ואמר רב חסדא: מחלוקת "במקום פלוני",

He would declare on Shabbat eve: My residence is in Tzinta, a settlement located between the Shabbat limits of the two places. Abaye said to him: What is your opinion that led you to act in that manner? Is it because in a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, the *halakha* is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and Rav Ḥisda said: The dispute between these two Sages is in a case where the person said: My residence is in such-and-such place, and you rely on Rabbi Yehuda and establish residence at a place between the two cities even though you are still at home?

והא רב נחמן ותנא כוותיה! אמר ליה: הדרני בי.

But didn't Rav Naḥman explain the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda differently, and furthermore, a *baraita* was taught in accordance with his opinion. Rabba bar Rav Ḥanan said to him: I retract my opinion and will no longer do so.

אמר רמי בר חמא: הרי אמרו שבת יש לו ארבע אמות, הנותן את עירובו יש לו ארבע אמות או לא?

Rami bar Ḥama said: The Sages have said that one who establishes residence by foot has four cubits at that location, and another two thousand cubits beyond. However, with regard to one who deposits his *eiruv* in a certain place, there is a dilemma whether he has four cubits from the site of his *eiruv*, or not.