Are you raising a contradiction between the opinion of one person and that of another? In other words, a difficulty cannot be raised from the statement of one amora against those of another. One Sage, Shmuel, maintains that Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages disagree, and one other Sage, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, maintains that they do not disagree.

The Gemara analyzes the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi cited in the course of the previous discussion. With regard to the matter itself: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said that any place where Rabbi Yehuda says when, or in what case are these, in the mishna, he intends only to explain the earlier statement of the Rabbis, not to disagree with them. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The term when indicates that Rabbi Yehuda comes to explain, but the phrase in what case is this, indicates that he intends to disagree.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is the word when invariably a sign that Rabbi Yehuda merely seeks to explain? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: The following people are disqualified\(^\text{9}\) by the Sages from giving testimony, as they are people who commit transgressions for profit: One who plays with dice \([κυβεία]\) for money,\(^\text{10}\) and one who lends money at interest, and those who fly pigeons, i.e., people who arrange competitions between pigeons while placing wagers on which bird will fly faster. The reason for their disqualification is that those who play games of chance do not fully relinquish ownership of their gambling money, as they expect to win their bet. Consequently, one who accepts money in such circumstances has effectively taken something that the giver has not wholeheartedly handed over, and he is therefore like a robber, at least by rabbinic decree. The list of those disqualified from giving testimony includes merchants who trade in the produce of the Sabbatical Year, which may be eaten but may not be sold as an object of commerce.

Rabbi Yehuda said: When is this so? When he has no occupation other than this, but if he has a worthy occupation other than this, although he also earns money by these means, this person is qualified to give testimony. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that one who earns money by means of games of chance is not a criminal or a robber. Rather, the reason why these people are disqualified from giving testimony is because they are not occupied in the constructive development of the world. As they earn their money without effort, they do not care about the monetary losses of others. Consequently, if they have any other occupation, they are valid witnesses.

The Gemara resumes its difficulty: According to the above principle with regard to statements introduced with the term when, Rabbi Yehuda’s statement should be understood merely as an explanation of the previous opinion. However, a baraita was taught about the mishna: And the Rabbis say: Whether he has no occupation other than this, or whether he has a fitting occupation other than this, this person is disqualified from giving testimony. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda is disagreeing rather than explaining, even though he introduced his statement with the term when.

The Gemara answers: That opinion in the baraita, with regard to those disqualified from providing testimony, is not the opinion of the Rabbis of the mishna. Rather, it is that of Rabbi Yehuda, who maintained that Rabbi Tarfon said this opinion. The Rabbis of the mishna, however, agree with Rabbi Yehuda in this regard, and his statement serves to explain their position.

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\(^9\) disqualifie

\(^10\) qualified
As it was taught in a baraita with regard to naziriteship: Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Tarfon: In a case where two people accepted a bet, with each undertaking to become a nazirite if he lost the wager, and a doubt arose as to who won, neither one of them can possibly be a nazirite, as there is no acceptance of naziriteship without clear and definitive pronunciation. A vow of naziriteship is only binding if it was expressly pronounced, i.e., if it was clear from the outset that the person intended to become a nazirite.

Consequently, it can be inferred that since he is in doubt as to whether he is a nazirite or he is not a nazirite, he does not submit himself to and accept his vow of naziriteship. Here, too, Rabbi Yehuda disqualifies those who play games of chance from delivering testimony due to the fact that they are robbers. Since the player does not know whether he will win and acquire the money or whether he will lose and not acquire it, he does not fully transfer ownership of the money with which he plays to others, which means that the one who gains from these games receives money that was not wholeheartedly given to him. He is therefore likened to a robber, at least on the rabbinic level, which disqualifies him from giving testimony.
MISHNA

How does one participate in the joining of Shabbat boundaries? One who wishes to establish a joining of Shabbat boundaries for himself and others places a barrel of food in the location he designates as their place of residence, and says: This is for all the residents of my town, for anyone who wishes to go on Shabbat to a house of mourning or to a house of a wedding feast situated beyond the Shabbat limit. Anyone who accepted upon himself while it was still day, i.e., before the onset of Shabbat, that he will rely on the eiruv, is permitted to rely upon it; but if one did so only after nightfall, he is prohibited to rely upon it, as the principle is that one may not establish an eiruv after nightfall.

GEMARA

Rav Yosef said: One may establish a joining of Shabbat boundaries only for the purpose of a mitzva, i.e., to enable the fulfillment of a religious obligation, but not for an optional activity. The Gemara asks: What novel element is he teaching us by this? We explicitly learned this idea in the mishna from the phrase: For anyone who wishes to go on Shabbat to a house of mourning or to a house of a wedding feast. This mishna indicates that an eiruv may be established only for the purpose of a mitzva, e.g., in order to comfort mourners or to celebrate a wedding, but not for any other reason.

The Gemara answers: This teaching is necessary, lest you say that the mishna merely teaches the usual case. Generally, a group of people would establish an eiruv in order to walk beyond the Shabbat limit only for a special purpose, such as a wedding, but one might be permitted to establish an eiruv even for an optional activity as well. Rav Yosef therefore teaches us that an eiruv may indeed be established only for the purpose of a mitzva.

We learned in the mishna: Anyone who accepted upon himself while it was still day that he will rely upon the eiruv is permitted to rely upon it on Shabbat. The Gemara comments: Apparently, learn from here that there is no halachic principle of retroactive clarification. That is to say, there is no halachic assumption that an uncertain state of affairs can be retroactively clarified. A later statement or action cannot retroactively clarify one’s earlier intentions as though he had explicitly stated those intentions at the outset. For if there is a halachic principle of retroactive clarification, the eiruv should be effective even if one relied upon it only after nightfall, as it is retroactively revealed that he wanted the eiruv while it was still day.

Rav Ashi said: The mishna teaches: While it was still day. This phrase does not require one to make the decision to rely on the eiruv before Shabbat. Rather, the criterion for using the eiruv on Shabbat is whether they informed him or they did not inform him of the existence of the eiruv prior to Shabbat. In other words, if one knew about the eiruv while it was still day, he may rely on it, even if he decided to use it only after the onset of Shabbat, as the halachic principle of retroactive clarification is accepted. However, if one was unaware of the existence of the eiruv when it came into effect at the onset of Shabbat, the matter cannot be retroactively clarified.

Rav Asi said: A six-year-old child may go out by means of his mother’s eiruv. As he is subordinate to her, he is included in her eiruv and does not require his own eiruv. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: A child who needs his mother may go out by means of his mother’s eiruv, but one who does not need his mother may not go out by means of his mother’s eiruv.

And we also learned a similar halakha in a mishna with regard to a sakka: A child who does not need his mother is obligated in the mitzva of sakka by rabbinical law, so that he will be trained in the observance of mitzvot.
And we discussed this mishna and raised a question: But who is the child who does not need his mother? The Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: This is referring to any child who defecates and his mother does not wipe him. A child who can clean himself is considered sufficiently mature for the purposes of the halakha of sukkah.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Any child who wakes from sleep and does not call: Mother, is obligated in the mitzva of eiruv. The Gemara expresses surprise at this statement: Can it enter your mind that every child who cries: Mother is considered to be one who needs his mother? Much older children also call out to their mothers for assistance when they awaken. Rather, say that the halakha includes any child who wakes from sleep and does not persistently call: Mother, Mother. A minor who arises only when his mother comes is classified as one who needs his mother.

The Gemara continues. The Sages who discussed the mishna asked: And at what age is a child no longer considered to be in need of his mother? Such a child is one about four years old or about five years old, as some children become independent of their mothers earlier than others. This poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Asi, who maintains that even a six-year-old child is considered to be in need of his mother, and may go out by means of his mother’s eiruv.

Rav Yehoshua, son of Rav Idi, said in answer: When Rav Asi said that this child may go out by means of his mother’s eiruv, he was referring to a case where his father established an eiruv on his behalf to the north, and his mother prepared an eiruv on his behalf to the south, as even a six-year-old prefers the company of his mother to that of his father. However, Rav Asi agrees that if they did not both establish an eiruv for him he is not subordinate to his mother.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: A child who needs his mother may go out by means of his mother’s eiruv that she established for herself. Until what age may he do so? He can be up to the age of six. This baraita is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehoshua bar Rav Idi, who maintains that a six-year-old may go out by means of his mother’s eiruv only if she established an eiruv on his behalf as well? The Gemara concludes: This is indeed a conclusive refutation.

The Gemara comments: Let us say that this is also a refutation of the opinion of Rav Asi, as here it states: Until the age of six, which indicates that he can be up to, but not including, six years old, whereas Rav Asi maintains that even a six-year-old is included in this halakha. The Gemara states: Rav Asi can say to you that when the baraita states: Up to the age of six, it means up to and including six years old.

The Gemara comments: Let us say that this is also a refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yannai and Reish Lakish, who maintain that a child in need of his mother is one who is up to age four or five. The Gemara explains: This is not difficult. Here Rabbi Yannai and Reish Lakish are referring to a situation when the child’s father is in town. As the child can go out with his father, he is no longer in need of his mother, even though he is younger than six. In contrast, there the baraita is referring to a case when his father is not in town. The child therefore needs his mother until he reaches the age of six.
Our Sages taught in a baraita: A person may establish an eiruv on behalf of his minor son or daughter, and on behalf of his Canaanite servant or maidservant, either with their knowledge or without their knowledge. However, he may not establish an eiruv, neither on behalf of his Hebrew servant or maidservant, nor on behalf of his adult son or daughter, nor on behalf of his wife, except with their knowledge.

It was taught in another baraita: A person may establish an eiruv on behalf of his adult son or daughter, and on behalf of his Hebrew servant or maidservant, and on behalf of his wife, only with their knowledge. However, he may establish an eiruv on behalf of his Canaanite servant or maidservant, and on behalf of his minor son or daughter, either with their knowledge or without their knowledge, as their hand is like his hand, i.e., their status and the domain in which they are located are determined by his status and domain.

And all of those who established an eiruv for themselves, and at the same time their master established an eiruv for them in a different direction, they may go out by means of their master’s eiruv, except for a wife, because she can object by saying that she does not want her husband’s eiruv.

The Gemara begins its analysis of the baraitot by posing a question: A wife, in what way is she different from an adult son or daughter? Why can’t they object? They are also of age and under their own authority. Rabba said: The reference is not only to a wife; the tanna is speaking of a wife and all who are similar to her in this regard, such as a Hebrew servant or an adult son.

The Master said in the baraita: These people may go out by means of their master’s eiruv, except for a wife, because she can object. The Gemara infers: The reason is due to the fact that she objected, but if he established an eiruv and she did not specify her feelings about it one way or another, she may go out by means of her husband’s eiruv. The Gemara raises an objection: Doesn’t the first clause of the baraita state that he may establish an eiruv only with their knowledge? What, is this not referring to a case where he asked them whether or not they want this eiruv, and they said yes? It can be inferred from here that if his wife did not say anything, she may not use the eiruv.

The Gemara rejects this argument: No; what is the meaning of the phrase: Only with their knowledge? It means that they were silent and said nothing in protest. This comes to exclude a case where they said no. If, however, they did not object, they may go out by means of the eiruv of the head of the family.

The Gemara raises an objection: Wasn’t it taught in that same baraita: And with regard to all of those who established an eiruv for themselves, and their master established an eiruv for them in a different direction, they may go out by means of their master’s eiruv. And that is referring to a situation when they did not specify their feelings, as it does not state that they objected, and yet the baraita states: Except for a wife, who may not go out by means of her husband’s eiruv. The baraita clearly indicates that even if she did not object, the husband’s eiruv is ineffective for his wife.

Rava said: Since they established an eiruv in a different direction, you have no protest greater than this. They need not register any other objection, as their actions prove that they do not wish to be part of their master’s eiruv.”
Money and produce – פ עבודה

Money from the Talmudic period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount of money</th>
<th>Purchase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 sela</td>
<td>4 sela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 dinar</td>
<td>1 sela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24鎵</td>
<td>4 sela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48 pundeyon</td>
<td>48 or 96 loaves</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the Talmudic period can be bought with them, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka.

Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: Food for two meals is the size of a loaf bought with a pundeyon, which is one-forty-eighth of a sela, when four sel'ot of wheat are sold for a sela. Rabbi Shim'on says: Food for two meals is two of three parts of a loaf, when three loaves are prepared from a kav of wheat. In other words, the measure is two-thirds of a loaf the size of one-third of a kav.

Having discussed measures with regard to a loaf of bread, the mishna states that half of this loaf is the amount called a half-peras, a measure relevant for the halakhot of a leprous house.

Food for two meals with regard to an eiruv: As one must eat three meals on Shabbat, why is food for two meals enough with regard to an eiruv? Some commentaries explain that for the purpose of establishing a place of residence, one need only deposit food sufficient for him to eat on an ordinary weekday. In talmudic times, it was customary to eat only two meals on a weekday (Tosafot Yom Tov).

Intended to be lenient – הקטן בקקטן. In the Jerusalem Talmud, as well as in the Rambam and Rashbi elsewhere, it is explained that according to Rabbi Meir, one who eats the well-seasoned food typically eaten on Shabbat and has much food available will consume a large quantity of bread with his meal. Rabbi Yehuda, in contrast, claims that one eats less bread if he has an abundance of other foods.

When four sel'ot are sold for a sela – האבריאים באבריאים. Although the calculation would be easier had Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka said one sel'ot for a dinar, he preferred to cite a common example, as storeowners would generally purchase four sel'ot at once (Ge'on Ya'akov).

Disqualification of the body – הזרה_pri. According to Torah law, ritually impure food of any level of impurity cannot impart impurity to a person. In fact, one can become ritually impure only as a result of contact with a primary source of impurity or from impure utensils. However, an early rabbinic decree established that the consumption of ritually impure foods defiles one’s body. This level of impurity is not severe enough for him to impart impurity to other people, but he does defile any teruma with which he comes into contact. This teruma must subsequently be burned.

Farmers (ikaryata) – עלקרבנות. Rashbi explains that these farmers are herdsmen. He associates the word ikar with kar, one meaning of which is sheep (Rav Y'akov Emden). Some commentators understand ikaryata as a reference to a particular place (Aruki).

The measure for a joining of Shabbat boundaries – שרדך לינית. An eiruv of Shabbat boundaries must consist of food sufficient for two meals for each person included in the eiruv. The measure for two meals is an amount of bread equal in volume to six egg-bulks (Rambam, in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka; Yilma Gaon). Some authorities rule that the amount must be equal to the volume of at least eight egg-bulks (Rema). This measure applies to both an average person and a gluttonous one. However, an elderly or sick person requires less food (Shulhan Arukh, Orach hayyim 409:2).

Half for a leprous house – הזרהpri. If one enters a leprous house and remains there long enough to eat food equal in volume to that of three egg-bulks, which is half the amount of food required for two meals, his clothing contracts ritual impurity (Rambam, Sefer Taharah, Hilkhot Tumat Tzaraat 176).

Half of its half disqualifies the body – הזרהpri. Ritualy impure food in the amount of half a peras, equivalent in volume to approximately an egg-bulk and one half, imparts impurity to a person (Rambam, Sefer Taharah, Hilkhot Tumat Okhalin 4:1).
Rav Yosef said to Rav Yosef, son of Rava: Your father, in accordance with whose opinion does he hold, that of Rabbi Yehuda or Rabbi Meir? He replied: He holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Rav Yosef added: I too agree with the ruling of Rabbi Meir, because if the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, a difficulty would arise from the popular saying: There is always room for sweets. It is generally accepted that one dining on delicacies eats more, and therefore, the amount of food in Shabbat meals is greater than that of weekdays, as they include more sweet foods.

We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says that one measure is the amount of food for two meals, while Rabbi Shimon established a different amount. A Sage taught in the Tosefta: And their statements are close to being identical. The Gemara expresses surprise at this: Are they really identical? According to the opinion of Rabbi Yohanan there are four meals to a kav. He maintains that food for two meals is equivalent to a loaf that can be purchased with a pandeyon, which is one-forty-eighth of a se’a, when four se’a are bought for a sela. As there are twenty-four kav in four se’a, a loaf purchased with a pandeyon is half of a kav. This means that each meal is a quarter of a kav, or that there are four meals in a kav. In contrast, according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, there are nine meals to a kav. Rabbi Shimon maintains that food for two meals is two-thirds of a loaf equal in size to one-third of a kav. By this calculation, one meal is one-third of a loaf that itself is one-third of a kav in size, which amounts to nine meals in a kav.

Rav Hisda said in explanation of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka’s opinion: Deduct one-third for the grocer’s markup, as he takes one-third as profit. This adds one half to the total cost.

The Gemara asks: Even after allowing for this adjustment, it remains the case that according to this Sage, Rabbi Shimon, there are nine meals to a kav, whereas according to the other Sage, Rabbi Yohanan, although it suffices for more than four meals, there are only six meals to a kav. According to the measure of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, each meal is two-thirds of a quarter kav, i.e., one sixth of a kav, which still leaves a considerable discrepancy between their measures.

Rather, we must explain in accordance with that other statement of Rav Hisda, as he said: Deduct one half for the grocer’s markup. If the calculation is based on the assumption that the grocer takes half the sum as profit, the two measures are indeed close.

The Gemara asks: But it remains the case that according to this Sage, there are nine meals to a kav, whereas according to the other Sage, there are only eight meals to a kav, as each meal is one half of a quarter kav, or one-eighth of a kav. The Gemara answers: This is the meaning of that which was stated in the Tosefta: And their rulings are close to being identical. Although their measures are not exactly the same, there is no great difference between them.

The Gemara comments: Nonetheless, there is a contradiction between one statement of Rav Hisda and the other statement of Rav Hisda concerning the size of the grocer’s profit. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as in this case, the homeowner provides the wood for baking bread, and the grocer therefore marks up the price by one-third as compensation for his efforts. Whereas in that case, the homeowner does not provide the wood; the grocer is entitled to reimbursement for the cost of the wood in addition to the work of baking, and consequently he marks up the price by one half.

We learned in the mishna that the time it takes to eat half the loaf is the time it takes for the clothes of one who entered a leprous house to become ritually impure, and half of its half, of the loaf, is the amount of ritually impure food that disqualifies the body from eating teruma.