This statement can be understood in several ways. The commentaries, Hullin 85a).

The author of an unattributed Sifra is Rabbi Yehuda—those cases. If the woman's intent is not to fulfill the mitzva but simply to tion involved. For example, it could be argued in the case of placing phylacteries on weekdays if they choose, they may don them don phylacteries on weekdays if they choose, they may don them and not by Rabbi Yehuda. However, the statement that an unattributed teaching is in accordance with his Sifra, the unattributed teaching is in accordance with his Sages permitted on Shabbat as well, as in rescuing phylacteries the Sages permitted. In tractate, the unattributed teaching is in accordance with his Sages permitted on Shabbat as well, as in rescuing phylacteries the Sages permitted.

NOTES
There is a difference between the assertion that an unattributed Sifra is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda and whether the phylacteries are new or old; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda prohibits carrying new phylacteries but permits carrying old ones. Apparently, one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that a person exerts himself to fashion an amulet that looks like phylacteries, and one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that a person does not exert himself for this purpose, and therefore something that has the appearance of phylacteries must be phylacteries.

Shin, yod, tzadi, yod, ayin, tzadi, beit, yod is a mnemonic for the statements that follow. The Gemara adds: And now that the father of Shmuel bar Rav Yitzhak has taught that these are deemed old phylacteries: Any that have straps that are permanently tied in the manner of phylacteries, and new phylacteries are those that have straps that are not tied, the conclusion is that everyone agrees that a person exerts himself to fashion an amulet similar to phylacteries or string-like ritual fringes. They disagree with regard to new phylacteries that are not tied properly and cannot be donned in a manner typical of a weekday. The reason is that tying a permanent knot on Shabbat is prohibited by Torah law. Therefore, these phylacteries may not be donned, and Rabbi Zeira’s opinion is accepted.

The Gemara asks a question with regard to Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion that new phylacteries may not be brought into town because they lack a permanent knot: Why must one tie the phylacteries with a knot? Let him simply tie a bow, which is not prohibited on Shabbat, and place the phylacteries on his head and arm in that manner. Rav Hisda said: That is to say that a bow is invalid for phylacteries, as a proper knot is required.

Abaye said: This is not the correct interpretation. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he said: A bow is a full-fledged knot, and it is prohibited to tie it on Shabbat by Torah law.
The Gemara asks: The reason that it is prohibited to tie a bow is that a bow is a full-fledged knot. If that were not so, one could tie the phylacteries with a bow. But didn’t Rav Yehuda, son of Rav Shmuel bar Shleitai, say in the name of Rav: The form of the permanent knot of phylacteries is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai; and Rav Nahman said: And their decorative side, the side of the knot where the shape of the letter appears, must face outward. Apparently, a bow does not suffice for phylacteries, as an actual knot is required.

The Gemara rejects this contention: It is referring to a case where one tied a bow similar in form to a permanent knot, without actually tying a permanent knot.

Rav Hisda said that Rav said: One who purchases a large quantity of phylacteries from one who is not an expert, i.e., a person who has not proven to be a reliable manufacturer of phylacteries, the purchaser examines two phylacteries of the arm and one of the head, or two of the head and one of the arm, to see if they are valid and the individual reliable. If the three phylacteries are found to be valid upon examination, the seller is considered an expert and the rest of the phylacteries are presumed valid as well.

The Gemara asks: Whichever way you look at it, this ruling is problematic: If the buyer purchased all of the phylacteries from one person, who acquired them from somebody else, let him examine three phylacteries of the arm or three of the head, in accordance with the principle that presumptive status is established after three instances.

If he purchased the phylacteries from two or three people, each and every one of the phylacteries should require examination. The presumptive status of one pair of phylacteries does not apply to the others, as they might have been produced by a different person. The Gemara answers: Actually, this refers to a case where the buyer bought the phylacteries from one person, and we require that the seller prove himself to be an expert with regard to both the phylactery of the arm and the phylactery of the head.

The Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t Rabba bar Shmuel teach that with regard to phylacteries one examines three of the arm and three of the head? What, is it not that he examines either three phylacteries of the arm or three of the head? The Gemara rejects this explanation: No, it means that he examines three phylacteries in total, among them phylacteries of the arm and among them phylacteries of the head, as stated by Rav Hisda in the name of Rav.

The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rav Kahana teach that with regard to phylacteries one examines two of the arm and two of the head? This statement certainly contradicts Rav’s opinion. The Gemara explains: In accordance with whose opinion is this halakha? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: Presumptive status is established by two times. Although most Sages maintain that it takes three instances to establish a presumptive status, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi rules that two cases suffice. Consequently, in the case of phylacteries, it is sufficient to examine two.

Their decorative side must face outward - רוחבすることは_nav אפקס. This statement has been explained in several ways. Some commentators state that it refers to the raised letter shin on the phylactery of the head, which should not be contained inside the phylactery box, but must be visible on the outside, as taught by Rashi. Other authorities explain that this means the shin must be raised rather than carved into the phylactery. Yet other commentators maintain that the reference is to the halakha that the parchments must be written on the better quality side of the hide (Me’iri).

The establishment of a presumptive status - הרוב资源优势. This dispute regarding the laws of a presumptive status appears in several places in the Talmud. The Rabbis maintain that something that recurs three times has a presumptive status, i.e., it forms an established status quo. An example of this is the halakha of an ox that gored three times, at which point its owner is considered forewarned and must pay full damages if the animal causes further harm. By contrast, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that a simple repetition is enough to create a presumptive status. In this context, three consecutive examinations that reveal valid phylacteries are enough to establish a reliable presumptive status that all of the phylacteries are valid. This status can only be annulled by evidence to the contrary.
The Gemara asks: If this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, say the other clause of that same baraita as follows: And he must likewise examine the second bundle of phylacteries, and likewise the third bundle. And if it is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion, is he of the opinion that a third examination is necessary? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not require a third examination to establish a presumptive status, as he maintains that the examination of two bundles suffices.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes with regard to bundles, as one buys them from two or three different people. It can be assumed that the various bundles of phylacteries were not all manufactured by the same person. Consequently, the validity of one bundle does not establish a presumption with regard to another. The Gemara asks: If so, even the fourth bundle must be examined as well, and even the fifth as well. If the bundles were bought from different manufacturers, every one of them requires examination, not only the third.

The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so; this is how one must proceed. And the reason that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi teaches three bundles rather than four or five is to exclude the third bundle from its presumptive status. By stating that the third bundle must be examined, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi indicates that in this case two examinations do not establish a presumption; rather, all of the bundles must be checked. And actually, even the fourth and fifth bundles require examination as well.

It was stated in the mishna that if one finds phylacteries tied in bundles or in wrapped piles, he sits there and waits with them until dark and then brings them in. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of bundles in this context, and what is meant by wrapped piles? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The same types of objects are called bundles, and they are also called wrapped piles, i.e., both contain more than one pair of phylacteries. Bundles consist of many pairs of phylacteries arranged in pairs [zuwei] of a head phylactery with an arm phylactery, whereas wrapped piles indicates that many phylacteries are wrapped together in no particular arrangement.

We learned in the mishna that one sits there and waits with them until dark and then brings them in. The Gemara asks: And why must he do that? Let him bring them in pair by pair. Rav Yitzhak, son of Rav Yehuda, said: This matter was explained to me personally by my father as follows: Any instance where there are few enough phylacteries that were he to bring them in pair by pair he would finish before sunset, he brings them in pair by pair. But if not, i.e., if there are so many pairs of phylacteries that were he to bring them in one pair at a time he would not bring them all in before sunset, he waits there with all of them until dark and then brings them in.

It was stated in the mishna that in a time of danger one covers the phylacteries and proceeds on his way. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a different baraita: And in a time of danger he carries them less than four cubits at a time? The Gemara answers that Rav said: It is not difficult. In this mishna, which states that the finder covers the phylacteries, it is referring to the danger posed by gentiles, where the gentle authorities decreed against donning phylacteries and the finder is afraid to be seen carrying them. However, in that baraita, which teaches that one may carry them less than four cubits at a time, it is dealing with the danger posed by bandits [listim]. In that case he is afraid to remain there until dark, but he is not worried about taking the phylacteries with him. Consequently, he may carry them less than four cubits at a time.
Abaye said to him: In what manner did you establish our mishna as dealing with the danger posed by gentiles? Say the latter clause of the mishna as follows: Rabbi Shimmon says that one gives them to another and the other passes them to another. In that case, all the more so will the matter be conspicuous, and they should fear the decree issued by the gentiles.

The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and is teaching the following: In what case is this statement that the finder covers the phylacteries said? It is where the concern is danger posed by gentiles. However, where the concern is danger posed by bandits, one carries them less than four cubits at a time. In that case Rabbi Shimon disagrees, maintaining that it is preferable that many people carry the phylacteries.

It is stated in the mishna that Rabbi Shimmon says: One gives them to another and the other passes them to another. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? One Sage, the first tanna, holds that having one person carrying the phylacteries less than four cubits at a time is preferable, as if you say that the finder gives them to another, and the other passes them to another, Shabbat desecration will be noticeable, thereby demeaning Shabbat's character as a sacred day of rest.

And the other Sage, Rabbi Shimmon, holds that the solution that one gives the phylacteries to another is preferable, as if you say that the finder carries them less than four cubits at a time, sometimes it is not in his thoughts and will unwittingly come to carry the phylacteries four cubits in the public domain. That is unlikely if there are numerous people together.

It was stated in the mishna: And the same is true with regard to one's son. The Gemara is surprised: What is his son doing there, in the field necessitating his retrieval in this way? The school of Menashe taught: It is referring to a case where his mother gave birth to him in a field, and he must be brought to town.

And what may be inferred from the mishna's ruling that the baby is passed from one person to the next, even if it requires a hundred people? This teaches that although it is difficult for the child to be passed from hand to hand, even so, this method of transporting him is preferable to his being carried by one person less than four cubits at a time.

It was stated in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: A person gives a barrel to another, and the other may pass it to another, and in that way they may take it even beyond the Shabbat limit. The Gemara asks: And is Rabbi Yehuda not of the opinion of that which we learned in a mishna: The distance that an animal and vessels may be taken is like the distance that the feet of the owners may go with regard to Shabbat limits?

Reish Lakish said in the name of Levi the Elder: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where one pours the water from one barrel to another barrel so that only the water, rather than the barrel itself, is taken beyond the limit. And Rabbi Yehuda follows his usual reasoning, as he said: Water has no substance, i.e., it is not significant enough for its transfer beyond the Shabbat limit to be prohibited.

As we learned in a mishna that discusses a dispute on this issue: If one person adds flour for dough while another adds the water, the Rabbis say that the dough may only be taken as far as both owners are permitted to go, whereas Rabbi Yehuda exempts water from any limit due to the fact that it has no substance.
The book rolled from his hand – יוא אל ד ה ש ש י ו – לא thresholds.

A sacred book on a threshold – אִיסְ וּ׳ָּר

Threshold – חָבִית לְגַבֵּי מַיִם

The book rolled from his hand – וֹ

And what, then, is the meaning of the Rabbis’ statement in the mishna: ‘This may not go farther than the feet of the owners may go, which apparently refers to the barrel?’ It means: That which is in this barrel may not go farther than the feet of the owners may go.

The Gemara rejects this explanation. Say that you heard Rabbi Yehuda express his opinion that water has no substance in a case where it is absorbed in dough; but in a case where it is in its pure, unadulterated state did you hear him say so? Now, if with regard to water in a pot of cooked food Rabbi Yehuda said that it is not nullified, would it be nullified when it is in its pure, unadulterated state? That is clearly not the case, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: Water and salt are nullified in dough, as they are absorbed into it and are not independently discernible. However, they are not nullified in a pot of cooked food, because the water and salt are discernible in its gravy.

Rather, Rava rejected this explanation and said: Here, we are dealing with a barrel that belonged to a particular individual who acquired residence at the start of Shabbat in a specific location, and water that did not remain in one place, i.e., spring or river water, and that does not belong to any individual who acquired residence. In that case, the barrel is nullified relative to the water, since the barrel is designated to hold the water.

As we learned in a mishna: One who carries out a living person on a bed from one domain to another on Shabbat is exempt even for carrying out the bed, due to the fact that the bed is secondary to the person. He is exempt for carrying out the living person because a living being carries itself, i.e., the person being carried lightens the load and thereby assists those bearing him.

Similarly, one who carries out an amount of food, less than the measure that determines liability for carrying out food on Shabbat, in a vessel is exempt, even for carrying out the vessel, due to the fact that the vessel is secondary to the food inside it. By the same reasoning, the barrel should be nullified relative to the water it contains.

Rav Yosef raised an objection from the following baraita. Rabbi Yehuda says: If members of a caravan camped in a field wish to drink, one person gives a barrel to another, and the other passes it to another. By inference: In a caravan, yes, it is permitted to do so due to exigent circumstances; however, in a case that is not a caravan, no, it is prohibited. Rather, Rav Yosef said: When we learned the case in the mishna as well, we learned it with regard to a caravan. The Sages were lenient in the case of a caravan due to the lack of water.

Abaye said that this explanation is unnecessary: In a caravan, even if the barrel acquired residence and the water acquired residence, it is permitted to move them. If one is not in a caravan, if the barrel acquired residence and the water did not acquire residence, it is prohibited to move them.

Rav Ashi said: Here, we are dealing with an ownerless barrel and ownerless water, neither of which acquired residence as they do not belong to anyone. And who is the tanna about whom it says in the mishna that they said to Rabbi Yehuda that it may not go farther than the feet of its owners may go? It is Rabbi Yoĥanan ben Nuri, who, consistent with his approach, said that ownerless objects acquire residence where they were located when Shabbat began, and it is prohibited to move them beyond their limit. And what is the meaning of the statement: ‘This may not go farther than the feet of its owners may go, as it has no owner? It means that the barrel and water may not go farther than vessels that have owners, i.e., they may not be moved beyond their limit.

One who was reading a sacred book in scroll form on Shabbat on an elevated, wide threshold, and the book rolled from his hand into the public domain, he may roll it back to himself, since one of its ends remains in his hand.
If he was reading on top the roof, which is a full-fledged private domain, and the book rolled from his hand, as long as the edge of the book did not reach within ten handbreadths above the public domain, the book is still in its own domain, and he may roll it back to himself. However, once the book has reached within ten handbreadths above the public domain, it is prohibited to roll the book back to oneself. In that case, he may only turn it over onto the side with writing, so that the writing of the book will be facedown and not exposed and degraded.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the scroll is removed only a needle breadth from the ground, he rolls it back to himself. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if the scroll is on the ground itself, he rolls it back to himself, as you have nothing that was instituted as a rabbinic decree to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest that stands as an impediment before the rescue of sacred writings.

GEMARA The Gemara questions the first clause of the mishna: What are the circumstances of this threshold? If you say it is referring to a threshold that is a private domain, and there is a public domain before it, and the mishna teaches that we do not issue a decree lest the entire scroll fall from one’s hand and he come to bring it from a public to a private domain.

Who is the tanna of the mishna? It is Rabbi Shimon, who said: Anything that is prohibited on Shabbat and its prohibition is not by Torah law, but rather is due to a rabbinic decree issued to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest stands as an impediment before the rescue of sacred writings. But if it is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, say the latter clause of the mishna as follows: Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the scroll is removed only a needle breadth from the ground, he rolls it back to himself; and Rabbi Shimon says: Even if the scroll is on the ground itself, he rolls it back to himself.

Is it possible that the tanna cited in the first clause of the mishna is Rabbi Shimon, while it is explicitly stated that the last clause represents the opinion of Rabbi Shimon,⁴ and yet its middle clause reflects the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? Rav Yehuda said: Yes, that is the correct, albeit unconventional, explanation. The first and last clauses are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, while the middle clause of the mishna reflects the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabba said that the mishna may be understood differently. Here, we are dealing with a threshold that is trodden upon by the public, and due to the potential degradation of the sacred writings the Sages permitted one to violate the rabbinic decree.⁵ It would be disgraceful if people were to trample over sacred writings.

Abaye raised an objection to his explanation: It was taught that if the scroll rolled within four cubits, he rolls it back to himself; if it rolled beyond four cubits, he turns it over onto its writing. And if you say we are dealing with a threshold that is trodden on by the public, what difference is there to me whether it remained within four cubits and what difference is there to me if it rolled beyond four cubits? Since the prohibition is a rabbinic decree, not a Torah prohibition, why isn’t one permitted to move the scroll in both cases to prevent the degradation of the sacred writings?

Rather, Abaye said: Here, we are dealing with a threshold that is a karmelit, as the threshold is four handbreadths wide but is less than ten handbreadths high. Furthermore, on one side of the karmelit there is a private domain, and a public domain passes before it.

NOTES
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Sacred writings and other scrolls – אֱכַלְכּוּת הַלּוּקָם סִפְרוֹת שָׁרוּ חָכָם. Although this question appears often in the Talmud, it bears a different meaning in this context. The question is usually raised in a case where two statements are quoted without attribution. Here, Rabbi Shimon is explicitly cited as the author of the last clause of the mishna. The Ritva explains that the difficulty here stems from the fact that Rabbi Shimon’s name is omitted from the first clause.

Sacred writings and other scrolls – אֱכַלְכּוּת הַלּוּקָם. Tosafot ask: If the concern is that one might carry, why is there a difference between sacred writings and other scrolls? Apparently, the Sages were lenient only with regard to sacred writings, as they distinguished between carrying four cubits and less than four cubits (Ritva).