If he was reading on top the roof, which is a full-fledged private domain, and the book rolled from his hand, as long as the edge of the book did not reach within ten handbreadths above the public domain, the book is still in its own domain, and he may roll it back to himself. However, once the book has reached within ten handbreadths above the public domain, it is prohibited to roll the book back to himself. In that case, he may only turn it over onto the side with writing, so that the writing of the book will be facedown and not exposed and degraded.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the scroll is removed only a needle breadth from the ground, he rolls it back to himself. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if the scroll is on the ground itself, he rolls it back to himself, as you have nothing that was instituted as a rabbinic decree to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest that stands as an impediment before the rescue of sacred writings.

GEMARA The Gemara questions the first clause of the mishna: What are the circumstances of this threshold? If you say it is referring to a threshold that is a private domain, and there is a public domain before it, and the mishna teaches that we do not issue a decree lest the entire scroll fall from one’s hand and he come to bring it from a public to a private domain.

who is the tanna of the mishna? It is Rabbi Shimon, who said: Anything that is prohibited on Shabbat and its prohibition is not by Torah law, but rather is due to a rabbinic decree issued to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest stands as an impediment before the rescue of sacred writings. But if it is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, say the last clause of the mishna as follows: Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the scroll is removed only a needle breadth from the ground, he rolls it back to himself; and Rabbi Shimon says: Even if the scroll is on the ground itself, he rolls it back to himself.

Is it possible that the tanna cited in the first clause of the mishna is Rabbi Shimon, as claimed above, while it is explicitly stated that the last clause represents the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and yet its middle clause reflects the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? Rav Yehuda said: Yes, that is the correct, albeit unconventional, explanation. The first and last clauses are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, while the middle clause of the mishna reflects the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabba said that the mishna may be understood differently. Here, we are dealing with a threshold that is trodden upon by the public, and due to the potential degradation of the sacred writings the Sages permitted one to violate the rabbinic decree. It would be disgraceful if people were to trample over sacred writings.

Abaye raised an objection to his explanation: It was taught that if the scroll rolled within four cubits, he rolls it back to himself; if it rolled beyond four cubits, he turns it over onto its writing. And if you say we are dealing with a threshold that is trodden on by the public, what difference is there to me whether it remained within four cubits and what difference is there to me if it rolled beyond four cubits? Since the prohibition is a rabbinic decree, not a Torah prohibition, why isn’t one permitted to move the scroll in both cases to prevent the degradation of the sacred writings?

Rather, Abaye said: Here, we are dealing with a threshold that is a karmelit, as the threshold is four handbreadths wide but is less than ten handbreadths high. Furthermore, on one side of the karmelit there is a private domain, and a public domain passes before it.
He carried it...above his head – מֹרֵא בְּרֹאשׁ רַגַּג. One who carries an object four cubits in the public domain by carrying it above his head is liable, in accordance with Rava’s opinion (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 12:4).

An extended threshold – פּוֹרֵא בְּרֹאשׁ רַגַּג: With regard to one who is reading a scroll while sitting on a threshold and one end of it rolls out of his hand, if the other end remains in his hand he may roll it back to himself even if it rolled beyond four cubits. This ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoĥanan, as Abaye’s answer with regard to a long threshold is rejected due to the fact that the Sages do not distinguish between different cases in the application of their decrees. The second resolution is based on the opinion of Ben Azzai, which is not accepted as halakha (Vilna Gaon). However, this ruling applies only to sacred writings, not to other scrolls (Rema, based on the Rashba). Other later commentators rule leniently in all cases involving scrolls (Nehar Shalom; Vilna Gaon; Shulĥan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 352:1).

One does not throw sacred writings – יפ דב צח אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָ ָןד מוֹדֶר בֶּן עַזַּאי. It is prohibited to throw the sacred writings that are in the Bible, and that prohibition applies to other sacred books as well (Shulĥan Arukh, Yoreh De‘a 302:1).

Turn the sheet facedown – לֵירּ רַבָּ ַן: A scribe is not permitted to turn the parchment of a Torah scroll facedown onto its writing. Instead, he spreads a cloth over it. It is also prohibited to turn over other sacred writings (Bah; Shulĥan Arukh, Yoreh De‘a 277).

The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with an extended threshold. Consequently, in the meantime, while he is carrying the scroll along the length of the threshold, he will remember not to bring it into the private domain.

And if you wish, say instead: Actually, it is referring to a threshold that is not extended; however, ordinarily one peruses sacred writings and then puts them in their place. Consequently, there is no concern that he might pass directly from the public to the private domain, as he will pause on the threshold to read the scroll. The Gemara asks: According to this explanation too, let us be concerned lest he pause to peruse the scroll in the public domain, and subsequently carry it directly into the private domain without pausing in the karmelit.

The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is the opinion of Ben Azzai, who said that walking is considered like standing. Consequently, one who passes through the karmelit is considered to have paused and stood there. Therefore, the object was not transferred directly from the public domain to the private domain, as he paused in the karmelit. The Gemara asks: But what of the concern lest he throw the scrolls inside, rather than carry them by hand, as Rabbi Yoĥanan said: Ben Azzai concedes that one who throws an object from the public domain to a private domain by way of an exempt zone is liable?

The Gemara answers that Rav Aĥa bar Ahava said: That is to say that one does not throw sacred writings, as this is demeaning to them. Consequently, there is no concern that one might throw the scrolls rather than carry them by hand.

It was stated in the mishna: If one was reading on top of the roof, which is a full-fledged private domain, and the scroll rolled from his hand, as long as the edge of the scroll did not reach ten handbreadths above the public domain, he may roll it back to himself. However, once the scroll reached within ten handbreadths above the public domain, it is prohibited to roll it back. In that case, he should turn it over, so that the writing of the scroll will be facedown and not be exposed and degraded. The Gemara asks: And is it permitted to do so? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that with regard to writers of scrolls, phylacteries, and mezuzot who interrupt their work, the Sages did not permit them to turn the sheet of parchment facedown lest it become soiled? Rather, one spreads a cloth over it in a respectful manner.
The Gemara answers: There, with regard to scribes, it is possible to cover the parchment respectfully; here, it is not possible to do so. And if he does not turn the scroll over, it will be more degrading to the sacred writings. Consequently, although this is not an ideal solution, it is preferable to turn it over rather than leave the scroll exposed.

The mishna states: Once the scroll has reached within ten handbreadths above the public domain, it is prohibited to roll it back to oneself, and one turns it over onto the writing. The Gemara asks: But why is this prohibited? Since the scroll did not come to rest in the public domain, rolling it back to oneself should not be prohibited. Rava said: This teaching is referring to an inclined wall. Although the scroll did not reach the ground, it came to rest within the confines of the public domain.

Abaye said to him: In what manner did you establish that the mishna is referring to the case of an inclined wall? Say the latter clause of the mishna as follows: Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the scroll is removed only a needle breadth from the ground, he rolls it back to himself. But didn’t the scroll come to rest in the public domain? It shouldn’t matter whether or not the scroll is in contact with the ground.

The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and is teaching the following: In what case is this statement said? It is said in the case of an inclined wall. However,

**Perek X**

**Daf 98 Amud b**

__HALAKHA__

**Placement within three handbreadths – הַלָּכָה:** For an object to be considered at rest with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat, it must rest atop a surface. This requirement applies even if it is hanging within three handbreadths of the ground, in accordance with the opinion of Rava (Rambam, Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 13:6). An inclined wall – מַשָּׁרָה עוֹצָר: If one end of a scroll rolls off a roof and rests on the incline of a wall ten handbreadths above the ground, it is permitted to roll it back. If it is less than ten handbreadths off the ground, one must turn it facedown (Shulchan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 352:2).

**NOTES**

Let us say he stated his halakha in accordance with one of the _tanna’im_ – תנה’א תנה’א עֲרֵבֵי רַכְּתָב מְשֹׁיָר: This expression bears an unusual meaning in this context. In this case, it is clear that this matter is indeed a tannaitic dispute. However, according to the first presentation of the issue, Rava’s opinion is a minority opinion contrary to the majority opinion. After the Gemara implements several corrections, Rava’s statement is taken to mean that there is no dispute in the mishna, as the Rabbis did not disagree with Rabbi Yehuda with regard to this principle (Ritva).

Rather, the Gemara rejects the previous explanation in favor of the following one: The mishna is all in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, and it is incomplete and is teaching the following: In what case is this statement that once the end of the scroll is within ten handbreadths of the ground it may not be rolled back said? It was said in the case of an inclined wall. But with regard to a wall that is not inclined, even if the end of the scroll is less than three handbreadths from the ground, one may roll it back to himself, as Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the scroll is removed only a needle breadth from the ground, he rolls it back to himself.
Two ledges – סמך לשון. The Gemara does not explain why the ruling with regard to two ledges is more stringent than the ruling with regard to one ledge. The Rambam and other commentators explain that in this case one domain renders the other prohibited. If the lower and upper ledges are each four by four handbreadths in size, each owner of a ledge retains his own domain, provided that the two ledges are not too close to each other (see Ge’on Yo’akov). However, if the lower ledge is four by four handbreadths, while the upper one is smaller, the entire domain of the wall up to the sky belongs to the owner of the lower ledge, and the upper ledge may not be used (Rashba). The Rambam rules differently, but it is unclear whether he does so due to a different reading of the text, or because he does not distinguish between these cases.

The Gemara clarifies: This ledge, to where does it protrude? If you say that the ledge protrudes into a public domain, one should be prohibited to place an object on it, as we should be concerned lest the object fall and he will forget and come to bring it in from the public domain to a private domain. Rather, it must be that the ledge protrudes into a private domain; but if so, it is obvious that it is permitted to place objects on it and to remove them.

Abaye said: Actually, the mishna is dealing with a case where it protrudes into a public domain, and what is the meaning of that which it teaches: One may place objects upon it! This refers to fragile utensils, which would break instantly if they fell. Consequently, there is no concern that one might then bring them out from the public domain.

The Gemara comments: That was also taught in a baraita: With regard to a ledge in front of a window that protrudes into a public domain, one may place on it bowls, cups, small cups [kitoniyot], and saucers. All of these utensils are made of fragile glass or earthenware, which supports Abaye’s opinion.

The baraita continues: And one may use this ledge along the entire length of the wall, if the ledge spans its length, whether in close proximity to the window or removed from it, until the lower ten handbreadths of the wall, but not if the ledge is lower than that. And if there is one other ledge below it but still ten handbreadths above the ground, one may use the lower ledge along the entire length of the wall, but with regard to the upper ledge, one may use it only opposite his window.

The Gemara asks: This upper ledge, what are its circumstances? If it is not four handbreadths deep, although it is an exempt domain with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat, which means it does not pose a problem in itself, one should nonetheless not be permitted to use it even opposite his window, as anything placed on this narrow ledge is likely to fall. Consequently, it is as though he has thrown the object directly to the ground. And if it is four handbreadths deep, let him use the ledge along the entire length of the ledge along the wall.

Abaye said: We are dealing with a case where the lower ledge is four handbreadths deep and the upper ledge is not four handbreadths deep, but the windowsill on the inside completes it to form a surface four handbreadths deep. Accordingly, one may use the part of the upper ledge opposite the window, as it is considered an extension of the window, but the parts to this side or to that side of the window are prohibited, as they are less than four handbreadths deep.

**HALAKHA**

A ledge in front of a window – סמך לשון: One may place fragile utensils on a window ledge four by four handbreadths in size (Rashi). According to the Rambam, one may do so even if the ledge is less than four by four handbreadths, provided that it protrudes from a wall ten handbreadths above the public domain, as stated in the mishna, in accordance with Abaye’s explanation (Shuflan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 353:2).

Two ledges – סמך לשון: With regard to two window ledges owned by different people on the same wall, if the upper ledge is four by four handbreadths, the lower ledge serves to render the use of the upper ledge prohibited to its owner, even if it is smaller than four by four handbreadths (Magen Avraham, Orah Hayyim 353:2, based on the Maggid Mishne on Rambam Sifrei Zemanim, Hilchos Shabbat 154). However, if both ledges are smaller than four by four handbreadths in size, both may be used. If the lower ledge is four by four handbreadths and the upper one is less than four by four handbreadths, one may use only the section of the upper one that is opposite his window, as stated by Abaye (Shuflan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 353:2).
MISHNA A person may stand in a private domain and move objects that are in a public domain, as there is no concern that he might mistakenly bring them into the private domain. Similarly, one may stand in a public domain and move objects in a private domain, provided that he does not carry them beyond four cubits in the public domain, which is prohibited on Shabbat.6

However, a person may not stand in a private domain and urinate into a public domain, nor may one stand in a public domain and urinate into a private domain. And likewise, one may not spit in such a manner that the spittle passes from a private domain to a public domain or vice versa.6

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even once a person’s spittle is gathered in his mouth, he may not walk four cubits in the public domain until he spits it out, for he would be carrying the accumulated spittle in his mouth, which is akin to carrying any other object.

GEMARA Rav Hinnana bar Shelamiya would teach this mishna to Hiyya bar Rav before Rav as follows: A person may not stand in a private domain and move objects that are in a public domain. Rav said to him: Have you abandoned the majority opinion of the Rabbis7 and followed the solitary dissenting opinion of Rabbi Meir, who is stringent in this regard?

Have you abandoned the Rabbis8 – replying: The Rova explains that Rav Hinnana bar Shelamiya sought to be more stringent than the basic halakha of the mishna. Rav replied that this stringency itself is a matter of dispute between tanna’im, and the halakha is not in accordance with the stringent ruling.