

וְהָא נֹתֵר וּפְיִגּוּל לְאַחַר זְרִיקַת דָּמִים
וְהוּא.

אָמַר לִיה רַב הוּנָא בְרִיה דְרַב נָתַן:
בְּנֹתֵר שְׁל עוֹלָה. אָמַר לִיה: אִם כֵּן
לִיתֵינִי בְּבֶשֶׂר עוֹלָה!

לֹא מִיִּבְעֵי קֶאֱמַר: לֹא מִיִּבְעֵי בֶּשֶׂר
עוֹלָה דְאָסוּר. דְּהָא בְּקֶרְבַּן קָא מְתַפְּסִים,
נֹתֵר וּפְיִגּוּל דְּעוֹלָה אִיִּצְטְרִיכָא:

סְלִקָא דְעֵתְךָ אָמֵינָא: כְּאִסּוּר נֹתֵר,
כְּאִסּוּר פְּיִגּוּל, וְהוּא לִיה כְּמִתְפָּסִים
בְּדַבְרֵי הָאָסוּר, וְלֹא מִתְסַר, קָא מְשַׁמְעֵי
לוֹ.

מִיִּתְיָבִי: אִיִּהוּ אִיסּוּר הָאָמוּר בְּתוֹרָה –
אָמַר "הֲרִינִי שְׁלֹא אוֹכֵל בֶּשֶׂר וְשֹׁלֵא
אֶשְׁתֶּה יַיִן כִּיּוֹם שָׁמַת בּוֹ אָבִי" "כִּיּוֹם
שָׁמַת בּוֹ רַבּוֹ" "כִּיּוֹם שְׁנֵהֲרַג בּוֹ גְּדֻלָּה
בֶּן אַחִיקָם" "כִּיּוֹם שָׂרְאִיתִי יְרוּשָׁלַיִם
בְּחֻרְבָנָהּ," וְאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: וְהוּא שְׁנֵדוּר
בְּאוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם.

But *notar* and *piggul* are conditions that apply after the sprinkling of the blood,^N when the prohibition against misusing consecrated property, which the individual is attempting to extend to a permitted item, no longer applies. Since the vow takes effect, this proves that the individual is associating the object of his vow with the original forbidden status of the offering.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to him: It is possible to say that it is speaking here about *notar* of a burnt-offering.^B Since a burnt-offering may not be eaten even after its blood is sprinkled, the original prohibition against misusing consecrated property continues to apply to the meat of this offering. Rava said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan: If so, let it teach explicitly that the individual referred to the meat of a burnt-offering.

The Gemara responds: The *tanna* is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to state that if one associates the object of his vow with meat of a burnt-offering, it is forbidden, as he extends the status of an offering to the other item. However, if one extends the status of *notar* and *piggul* of a burnt-offering, it is necessary to say that the other item is forbidden.

It could enter your mind to say that the individual intended to declare the item forbidden like the prohibition of *notar* or like the prohibition of *piggul*, and this would be like one who associates the object of his vow with an item that is forbidden by the Torah rather than an item forbidden by means of a vow. Consequently, the item is not forbidden, as one can take a vow by associating the object of his vow with a forbidden item only if that item is itself prohibited due to a vow. The mishna therefore teaches us that his intention is to transfer the prohibition of the offering, and the vow takes effect.

The Gemara raises an objection^N based upon the following *baraita*: Which is the vow of prohibition [*issar*]^N mentioned in the Torah? It is a case where one said: I hereby declare that I will not eat meat and I will not drink wine today like the day his father died,^{BH} referring to the father of the individual making the vow, as there is a custom to fast on the anniversary of a parent's death, or: Like the day his teacher died, as one mourns his primary teacher like a father, or: Like the day Gedaliah, son of Ahikam, was killed (see Jeremiah, chapter 41),^N i.e., the Fast of Gedaliah, or: Like the day I saw Jerusalem in its state of destruction. And Shmuel said: And this is if he was obligated by a previous vow to abstain from meat and wine on that day that he refers to in his declaration.

BACKGROUND

Burnt-offering – עוֹלָה: A burnt-offering may be brought from male cattle, sheep, goats, or doves, and is totally consumed on the altar in the Temple. Private individuals generally bring this offering as a gift offering. However, there are times when it is sacrificed to atone for the willful non-fulfillment of a positive mitzva or for immoral or idolatrous thoughts, and there are certain situations in which individuals are required to bring a burnt-offering together with other offerings. Burnt-offerings are considered offerings of the most sacred order. They must be slaughtered in the northern portion of the Temple courtyard and their blood is sprinkled at the two opposite corners of the altar, i.e., the northeastern and southwestern corners, so that it touches all four sides. Afterward, the animal's hide is removed and given to the priests, and its limbs are separated. The remainder of the blood is then poured out at the base of the altar and the limbs are sacrificed on the altar.

כִּיּוֹם שָׁמַת בּוֹ אָבִי – Like the day his father died: The Rema writes that it is a mitzva to fast on the anniversary of the day one's parent died (*Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De'a* 402:12 in the comment of Rema). This was a widespread custom that was practiced in many communities (see *Shulhan Arukh, Orach Hayyim* 568:7–8). Although the obligation to fast on this day is not absolute, it was customary to treat it as stringently as a general fast day, more stringently than the Fast of Esther. However, in many communities, especially in recent generations, it has not been customary to fast on this day. Nevertheless, if one does so, it is considered as though he took a vow to this effect, and he must continue doing so unless the vow is dissolved. It is also considered meritorious to fast on the anniversary of the death of one's primary teacher (see *Mishna Berura* on *Shulhan Arukh, Orach Hayyim* 568:46).

NOTES

לְאַחַר זְרִיקַת דָּמִים – After the sprinkling of the blood – Most commentaries explain that Rava is attempting to prove that the intent of the individual taking the vow is to extend the original status of the offering. This is because in their present state, *notar* and *piggul* are considered inherently forbidden rather than forbidden by a vow. One may express a vow by extending a prohibition only if that prohibition stems from a vow; therefore, the prohibition in this case must be an extension of the meat's original status as an offering. This proves that the determining factor is the original status of the offering rather than its current status (see Rosh and Ran).

Conversely, it is explained in the Commentary on *Nedarim* that Rava is proving that the current status of the meat is the determining factor. This is because the original prohibited status of the meat as an offering has been nullified by the sprinkling of the blood. Consequently, the prohibition must be an extension of the current status of the meat as *notar* or *piggul*. See also the Meiri's extensive discussion of this issue.

The Gemara raises an objection [*meitivei*] – מִיִּתְיָבִי: The talmudic term *meitivei* is generally used in order to introduce an objection; however, at first glance, that does not seem to be the case in this context. Therefore, many commentaries explain that the term *meitivei* is not employed here to introduce an objection but rather to introduce a proof. This is a possible meaning of the word, as its root means reply. This would be one of many examples of unusual word usage in tractate *Nedarim* (Rabbi Avraham min HaHar; *Shita Mekubbetzet*). However, the Rosh explains that this term is employed in its usual fashion and introduces an objection to the statement of Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, who refuted Rava's proof that one associates the object of his offering with the original status of the offering.

Which is the vow of prohibition [*issar*] – אִיִּהוּ אִיסּוּר: It has been established that one can take a vow by associating the object of his vow with a forbidden item if that item is itself forbidden by a vow. However, it has been demonstrated only that one may associate the object of his vow with an item that is forbidden to all. Therefore, the *baraita* adds that one can also associate the object of his vow with an item forbidden by an *issar*, which is forbidden only to one person (*Rashba; Tosefot Rid; Meiri*).

כִּיּוֹם – Like the day Gedaliah, son of Ahikam, was killed – כִּיּוֹם שְׁנֵהֲרַג בּוֹ גְּדֻלָּה: This day is a public fast day and one is obligated to fast even if he does not take a vow to fast. Nevertheless, since the obligation to fast is by rabbinic law, if one takes a vow to abstain from meat and wine on that day, his vow is not considered a vow with regard to an item that is already forbidden, and it therefore takes effect. Consequently, if he then associates another day with that one, he is considered to be extending a prohibition that took effect due to a vow, and therefore the second vow takes effect as well (*Rashba; Ran*).

HALAKHA

כִּיּוֹם שָׁמַת בּוֹ אָבִי וְכוּ' – Like the day his father died, etc. – If one's father or teacher died, and he took a vow to fast on that date and then did so, and then years later he said on a different date: This day is incumbent upon me like the day my father or teacher died, it is prohibited for him to eat on that day. This is because he has associated it with a day when it is prohibited for him to eat due to a vow. This is in accordance with the *baraita* and the opinion of Shmuel (*Rambam Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nedarim* 3:5; *Shulhan Arukh Yoreh De'a* 204:1).

כְּחֵלֶת אַהֲרֹן – לִּכְתּוּבָתוֹ: Like the *halla* of Aaron or like his *teruma* – לִּכְתּוּבָתוֹ: If one says: This food is for me like the *halla* of Aaron or like his *teruma*, the food remains permitted, because he did not associate the food with an item whose prohibition came about by means of a vow (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a*, *Hilkhot Nedarim* 1:11).

הֵיכִי דְמִי? לֹא כְּגֹן דְקָאֵי בְחַד בְּשַׁבָּא דְמִית בֵּיה אַבּוּהּ. וְאִף עַל גַּב דְאֵיכָא טוּבָא חַד בְּשַׁבָּא דְהֵיתְרָא, וְקִתְנֵי אָסוּר. שְׁמַע מִינָהּ בְּעֵיקָר הוּא מִתְפִּיס!

The Gemara clarifies: **What are the circumstances? Is it not a case where, for example, it was Sunday,^N the same day of the week on which his father died? And although there were many permitted Sundays^N in the interim, nevertheless, when he said he would not eat meat or drink wine like the day of the week on which his father died, his intention was to the particular Sunday when his father died, when he had vowed to abstain from meat and wine, and therefore the *tanna* teaches that it is prohibited. Learn from this that he associates the object of his vow with the original halakhic status of the Sunday his father died, and not the status of the intervening Sundays. Similarly, in the case of peace-offerings following the sprinkling of the blood, he is referring to the original status of the meat before the sprinkling of the blood.**

דְשְׁמוּאֵל הָכִי אֵיתְמַר, אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: וְהוּא שְׁנִדּוּר וּבָא מְאוּתוֹ הַיּוֹם וְאֵילָן.

The Gemara responds that **this is how the comment of Shmuel was stated: Shmuel said: And this is if he was continuously obligated by a vow from that day forward** to abstain from meat and wine on the anniversary of his father's death. Consequently, when he associates another day with the day of his father's death, he expresses a vow based upon the current status of the day, and there is no proof with regard to the case of the meat of the peace-offering.

אָמַר רַבִּינָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: "כְּחֵלֶת אַהֲרֹן וְכְתּוּבָתוֹ" – מוֹתֵר. הָא "כְּתּוּבָתוֹ לְחַמֵּי תוּדָה" – אָסוּר.

The Gemara cites another attempted proof. **Ravina said: Come and hear that which was taught in the mishna (13b): If one declares an item to be like the *halla* of Aaron,^N i.e., the portion of dough given to the priests, or like his *teruma*,^{HN} the portion of agricultural produce given to priests, the item remains permitted.** Although these items are prohibited to non-priests as soon as they are designated, they are considered forbidden by the Torah rather than forbidden by a vow. The Gemara infers: **But if one declares an item to be like the *teruma* of the loaves of the thanks-offering, i.e., the four loaves of the thanks-offering that were eaten by the priests, the item is forbidden.**

NOTES

דְקָאֵי בְחַד בְּשַׁבָּא וכו' – Where for example it was Sunday, etc. – The Ran explains that the individual does not explicitly state that this day should be like the day on which his father died. Rather, the case is where the individual abstained from meat and wine on the day his father died, e.g., the first Sunday in the month of Nisan. He did not maintain that practice in the following years, but some years later, on the first Sunday in Nisan, he says: This day shall be like the first Sunday in Nisan. It is assumed that he was referring to the first Sunday in Nisan in the year his father died, and he is taking a vow to abstain from meat and wine on that day. However, it appears that *Tosafot* explain that the individual explicitly states that this day should be like the day his father died. The Gemara's point is that although his father's anniversary has passed several times since the year his father died, it is assumed that he meant to refer to the actual day his father died, when he had abstained from meat and wine, and not to the more recent anniversaries of that day.

כְּחֵלֶת אַהֲרֹן וכו' – Like the *halla* of Aaron, etc. – The commentaries ask why *teruma* and *halla* are considered inherently forbidden when it is a person who grants them their status by designated them as *teruma* or *halla*. Some explain that since produce and dough are originally forbidden to everyone until *teruma* and *halla* are separated for the priests, the separation of the *teruma* and *halla* actually cause a permitted, rather than forbidden, status to take effect: The *teruma* and *halla* become permitted to priests and the rest of the produce and dough are permitted to everyone. Consequently the *teruma* and *halla* cannot be said to be forbidden by means of a vow (*Tosafot*; *Rashba*; *Rosh*). Others explain that since the status of *halla* and *teruma* can be granted only to produce from which one is required to separate these gifts, they are considered inherently forbidden rather than forbidden by means of a vow (*Nimmukei Yosef*; see *Meiri*, citing *Rambam*). *Rabbi Avraham min HaHar* apparently explains that the prohibitive aspect of *halla* and *teruma* does not result from the individual's declaration, as he merely designates them for a priest and the prohibition to everyone else takes effect on its own.

חַד בְּשַׁבָּא דְהֵיתְרָא – Permitted Sundays – Most commentaries explain that although he abstained from meat and wine on the day his father died, there were other years in the interim when he did not abstain on the anniversary of that date. However, it is explained in the Commentary on *Nedarim* that this refers to other Sundays that are not on the anniversary of his father's death. Although there were many Sundays when he did eat meat and drink wine, it is understood that he is referring to the Sunday his father died, when he abstained from meat and wine.

לִּכְתּוּבָתוֹ – Or like his *teruma* – *Ravina's* inference is based on the fact that the mishna states: His *teruma*, rather than simply: *Teruma*. This formulation emphasizes that it refers only to the *teruma* of Aaron, which is either the *teruma gedola* or the *teruma* of the tithe, and not to other forms of *teruma* (see the Commentary on *Nedarim*).

וְהָאֵתְרוּמַת לַחֲמֵי תוֹדָה לְאַחַר זְרִיקַת דְּמַיִם הִיא.

Having made this inference, Ravina comments: **But the *teruma* of the loaves of the thanks-offering is designated only after the sprinkling of the blood.** Consequently, the individual must have made his vow after the sprinkling of the blood, when these loaves are permitted to priests. If the vow nevertheless takes effect, it must be because the individual is referring to the original forbidden status of the loaves before the sprinkling of the blood. This indicates that one has in mind the original status of the item rather than its current status.

אֵימָא: כְּתוּרַמַת הַלְשָׁבָה אָסוּר.

The Gemara refutes this: **Say that when the mishna specifies that if one said the food should be like the *teruma* of Aaron it remains permitted it thereby indicates that if he said it should be like the collection of the Temple treasury chamber,^H which is also called a *teruma* and is always forbidden, the food becomes forbidden.** However, one cannot infer from the mishna that if one declares the food to be like the *teruma* of the loaves of the thanks-offering the food becomes forbidden.

אֲבָל תְּרוּמַת לַחֲמֵי תוֹדָה מֵאֵי – מוֹתֵר? לִיתְנֵי לַחֲמֵי תוֹדָה, וְכָל שְׂכָן תְּרוּמָתוֹ! הֲאֵי קָא מְשַׁמַּע לָן: תְּרוּמַת לַחֲמֵי תוֹדָה – תְּרוּמָתוֹ הִיא.

The Gemara asks: **But according to this, if one said the food should be like the *teruma* of the loaves of the thanks-offering, what, does the food remain permitted?** If so, **let it teach** in the mishna that if one said the food should be like the *teruma* of the loaves of the thanks-offering it remains permitted even though the thanks-offering is forbidden by means of a vow, and one would know on his own that if he says the food should be like the *teruma* of Aaron, all the more so the food remains permitted. The Gemara responds: **It teaches us this: *Teruma* of the loaves of the thanks-offering is also referred to as his *teruma*^N and is therefore included in the mishna.**

וְאֵי בְּעֵית אֵימָא: תְּרוּמַת לַחֲמֵי תוֹדָה נִמְיָ קוּדָם זְרִיקַת דְּמַיִם הוּא, כְּגוֹן דְּאֶפְרָשִׁינְהוּ בְּלִישָׁה.

The Gemara offers an alternative response to Ravina's attempted proof from the case of the *teruma* of the loaves of the thanks-offering, that one has in mind the original status of an item when one expresses a vow. **And if you wish, say that the *teruma* of the loaves of the thanks-offering can also be designated before the sprinkling of the blood, for example, when he separated the *teruma* during the kneading of the dough.** Consequently, the case may be where one makes the vow before the sprinkling of the blood, when the loaves are forbidden to all, and that is the reason the vow takes effect.

וְכִי הָא דְאָמַר רַב טוּבִי בַר קִיסְנָא אָמַר שְׂמוּאֵל: לַחֲמֵי תוֹדָה שְׂאֵפְאָן בְּאַרְבַּע חֲלוֹת – יֵצֵא. וְהַכְּתִיב אַרְבַּעִים! לְמַצּוֹה.

And this is in accordance with that which Rav Tovi bar Kisna said that Shmuel said: If one baked the loaves of the thanks-offering^N as four loaves^H rather than the forty loaves that should ideally be baked, he has fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara asks: **Isn't it written that forty loaves must be brought with the thanks-offering, ten loaves of each of the four different types?** The Gemara answers: **One must bake forty loaves in order to fulfill the mitzva in the optimal fashion, but he has nevertheless fulfilled his obligation with four loaves, one of each type.**

וְהָא בְּעֵי לְמַשְׁקַל תְּרוּמָה! וְכִי תִימָא דְשִׁקִּיל חֲדָא רִיפְתָּא עַל כּוּלָּהּ – וְהִתְנַן: "אֶחָד מִכָּל קֶרֶבֶן" – שְׂלֵא יִטוּל מִקְרֶבֶן עַל חֲבִירוֹ! וְכִי תִימָא דְשִׁקִּיל פְּרוּסָה מִכָּל חֵד וְחֵד – וְהִתְנַן: "אֶחָד" – שְׂלֵא יִטוּל פְּרוּסָה!

The Gemara asks: **But he is required to take *teruma*, i.e., designate one loaf of each type to be given to the priests. And if you would say that he takes one loaf of bread of the four as *teruma* for all the others, but didn't we learn in a mishna (*Menahot* 77b) with regard to the verse "And of it he shall present one out of each offering for a gift to the Lord; it shall be the priest's" (Leviticus 7:14), that it indicates that he should not take from one offering, i.e., one type of loaf, for another? And if you would say that he takes a slice from each one of the four loaves and gives them to the priest, but didn't we learn in that mishna that the word one in the verse indicates that he may not take a slice^H but rather a complete loaf?**

HALAKHA

Like the collection of the Temple treasury chamber – **כְּתוּרַמַת הַלְשָׁבָה**: If one said that a certain item is forbidden to him like the collection of the Temple treasury chamber, it is forbidden to him. This is because he has extended the status of an item that is forbidden by means of a vow (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nedarim* 1:14).

If one baked the loaves of the thanks-offering as four loaves, etc. – **לַחֲמֵי תוֹדָה שְׂאֵפְאָן בְּאַרְבַּע חֲלוֹת וְכוּ'**: If one prepared the loaves of the thanks-offering as four loaves, one of each kind, he has fulfilled his obligation. *Teruma* for the priest must be separated from each of them while they are still in dough form. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Tovi bar Kisna, who maintains that baking forty loaves is the optimal way to fulfill the mitzva but is not absolutely necessary (Rambam *Sefer Avoda, Hilkhot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot* 9:22).

That he may not take a slice – שְׂלֵא יִטוּל פְּרוּסָה: When one separates the *teruma* from the loaves of the thanks-offering, he must take a complete loaf and not merely a slice (Rambam *Sefer Avoda, Hilkhot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot* 9:22).

BACKGROUND

The collection of the Temple treasury chamber – **תְּרוּמַת הַלְשָׁבָה**: The half-shekels donated annually by every adult male Jew were kept in a specific chamber in the Temple complex. Three times a year, a priest would enter this chamber with three containers and lift the money and place it in the containers. The money was used to purchase animals for communal offerings and other needs of the Temple.

NOTES

Teruma of the loaves of the thanks-offering is referred to as his *teruma* – **תְּרוּמַת לַחֲמֵי תוֹדָה תְּרוּמָתוֹ הִיא**: In other words, the expression: His *teruma*, is a general term that includes all types of *teruma* that belong to a priest (*Tosafot*).

The loaves of the thanks-offering – לַחֲמֵי תוֹדָה: The Torah (Leviticus 7:12–14) states that four types of bread are brought with the thanks-offering, including leavened bread and three types of *matza*: Wafers, loaves, and flour mixed with water and oil. One loaf of each type is given to a priest. The Sages taught that in order to do so, one should bake ten loaves of each type *ab initio* so that the amount one gives to the priest will be one-tenth.

NOTES

This meat is prohibited to me like the meat of a first-born – הָרִי עָלֵי כְּבֹדֹר: The male firstborn of cattle, sheep, or goats belonging to a Jew is sacred from birth and is given to a priest to be sacrificed on the altar in the Temple. Its meat is eaten by the priests and their families (Numbers 18:17–18). It is explained in the Commentary on *Nedarim* that the case here is one where a priest made the vow mentioned in the Gemara, as it is only for a priest that there is a practical difference between the meat of a firstborn animal before and after the sprinkling of the blood; for a non-priest, the meat is forbidden even after the sprinkling of the blood. However, according to the Rambam there is no difference between a priest and a non-priest in this regard. This is because the meat of a firstborn is considered forbidden by means of a vow before the sprinkling of the blood, and it is considered forbidden by the Torah after the sprinkling of the blood.

HALAKHA

This meat is prohibited to me like the meat of a first-born – הָרִי עָלֵי כְּבֹדֹר: If one says that a particular item should be like the meat of a firstborn animal to him, the item remains permitted. The reason for this is that a first-born animal is considered forbidden by the Torah rather than forbidden by means of a vow. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a Hilkhot Nedarim* 1:13).

אֵלֶּא דְאִפְרָשִׁינְהוּ בְּלִישָׁה, דְשִׁקִּיל חֲדָא מִחֲמִיץ, וְחֲדָא מִן חִלּוֹת, וְחֲדָא מִן רְקִיקִים, וְחֲדָא מִן רְבוּכָה.

Rather, it must be that he separated the *teruma* during the time of kneading. He took one piece of dough from the leavened bread, one from the loaves, one from the wafers, and one from the flour mixed with water and oil. After separating one tenth of each type of dough for the priest, he then baked the remainder into four loaves. Since it is possible to separate the *teruma* at the time of the kneading, before the sprinkling of the blood of the offering, it is possible that the case is one where he expressed the vow at this time. Consequently, there is no proof that one has in mind the original status of an offering rather than its current status when one expresses a vow after the sprinkling of the blood.

לִימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: "הָרִי עָלֵי כְּבֹדֹר" – רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אֹסֵר וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה מַתִּיר.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this question, whether one intends to extend the original or current status of an offering, is parallel to a dispute between *tanna'im*. If one says: This meat is prohibited to me like the meat of a firstborn,^{NH} Rabbi Ya'akov renders the meat forbidden and Rabbi Yehuda renders it permitted.

הִיכִי דְמִי? אִי נִימָא לְפָנֵי זְרִיקַת דְּמִים – מֵאֵי טַעֲמָא דְּמֵאן דְּשָׁרִי, וְאִי לְאַחַר זְרִיקַת דְּמִים – מֵאֵי טַעֲמָא דְּמֵאן דְּאָסֵר? אֵלֶּא לָאוּ

The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that he associates the object of his vow with the status of a firstborn animal before the sprinkling of the blood, when it is forbidden as a consecrated item, what is the rationale of the one who renders it permitted? And if he associates the object of his vow with the status of a firstborn animal after the sprinkling of the blood, when it belongs to the priest and is permitted to be eaten, what is the rationale of the one who renders it forbidden? Rather, is it not

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דְּמַחֲזִית בְּשַׁר כְּבֹדֹר, וּמַחֲזִית בְּשַׁר דְּהֶאֱיִן גְּבִיָּה, וְאָמַר "זֶה כְּבֹדֹר", וְתַנָּאֵי הִיא.

that he places the meat of a firstborn animal in one place and he places another piece of meat next to it, and he said: This second piece of meat is hereby like that meat of the firstborn animal,^H and it is a dispute between *tanna'im* about whether he is referring to the original forbidden status of the firstborn animal or its current permitted status?

HALAKHA

This meat is hereby like the meat of a firstborn animal to me – הָרִי עָלֵי כְּבֹדֹר: If one had a piece of meat from a firstborn animal and he said that another item should be like that meat, the following distinction applies: If the blood had not yet been sprinkled on the altar, the second item is forbidden, and if the blood of the firstborn animal had already been sprinkled on the altar, the second item is permitted. This is the ruling of the Rambam, but the Ra'avad points out that it is not in accordance with the straightforward reading of the Gemara here. Many

commentaries on the Rambam agree with this objection. It is suggested in the *Kesef Mishne* that the original version of the Rambam was different and stated that even if the blood had not yet been sprinkled, the second item is permitted. However, even the author of the *Kesef Mishne* concedes that Rabbi Avraham, son of the Rambam, did not possess this proposed version (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nedarim* 1:15 and see *Kesef Mishne* and *Lehem Mishne* there).