

LANGUAGE

Your tent [*kilakh*] – קיליך: *Kila* is Aramaic for tent, which is sometimes used to describe a temporary structure made of woven sheets. Here the intent is: Return to your tent or place of lodging.

NOTES

He dissolved the vow for himself – שרא לנפשיה: Some commentaries have explained that this does not mean that Rav Sehora actually dissolved it himself. Rather, upon discovering an opening for himself, he went to a different halakhic authority to dissolve the vow for him (Rashba). The reason he did not go to Rav Nahman is that he was embarrassed to return to him with this opening (see Meiri). Other commentaries explain that in a case where a Torah scholar discovers an opening other than regret, he may dissolve the vow himself. This is because the vow was not made with knowledge of this point, so it was never actually valid (see Rashba).

משתבח ליה רבא לרב נחמן ברב סחורה
דאדם גדול הוא. אמר לו: כשיבא לידך –
הביאהו לידי. הוה ליה נדרא למישרא.
אתא לקמיה דרב נחמן.

Rava praised his student Rav Sehora to Rav Nahman by saying that he is a great man. Rav Nahman said to him: When Rav Sehora comes to you, bring him to me. Rav Sehora had a vow that he wanted to dissolve, so Rava sent Rav Sehora to Rav Nahman. He came before Rav Nahman.

אמר ליה: נדרת אדעתא דהכי? אמר
ליה: אין. אדעתא דהכי? אין. כמה זימנין
איקפד רב נחמן. אמר ליה: זיל לקילעך.

Rav Nahman, who wanted to dissolve the vow, said to him: Did you vow with such a matter in mind? He said to him: Yes, so Rav Nahman did not dissolve the vow. He then asked again: Did you vow with such a matter in mind, and suggested another possibility. He said to him: Yes. This happened several times, and every time Rav Nahman attempted to broach an opening, Rav Sehora replied that he had that in mind when he made the vow. Rav Nahman became upset with him because it appeared that Rav Sehora was making it unnecessarily difficult for him to dissolve the vow. Rav Nahman said to him: Go to your tent [*kilakh*]¹ because I do not want to talk to you.

נפק רב סחורה ופתח פיתחא לנפשיה:
רבי אומר: איזה היא דרך ישרה שיבור
לו האדם – כל שהיא תפארת לעושיה
ותפארת לו מן האדם. והשתא דאיקפד
רב נחמן אדעתא דהכי – לא נדרי. ושרא
לנפשיה.

Rav Sehora went out and made the following opening for himself that would enable the dissolution of his vow, based on a mishna in tractate *Avot* (2:1): Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: What is the proper path that a person should choose? He should choose any path that is considered a glory to the one who does it and a glory from his fellow men. Rav Sehora then reasoned that now that Rav Nahman became upset at him, he would not have made the vow with knowledge of this fact, since he would not receive glory from his fellow men, and based on this he dissolved the vow for himself.^N

רבי שמעון ברבי הוה ליה נדרא למישרא.
אתא לקמיהו דרבנן. אמרי ליה: נדרת
אדעתא דהכי? אמר: אין. אדעתא דהכי?
אין. כמה זימנין.

The Gemara relates a similar incident: Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, had a vow to dissolve. He came before the Sages for dissolution. They said to him: Did you vow with the knowledge of this particular fact? He said: Yes. They proposed another possibility: Did you vow with the knowledge of this other particular fact? He said to them: Yes. This happened several times,

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NOTES

From shade to sun, etc. – לשימשא וכו': The Commentary on *Nedarim* explains that the Sages moved from place to place due to their agitation at not being able to dissolve the vow. Others explain that the Sages studied in a building that was only partially roofed. During the early morning and late afternoon, when the heat of the sun was not strong, they sat in the open area, while in the middle of the day they sat in the covered section. In this way, the Sages spent all day on this issue, moving from the open area exposed to the sun, where they sat in the early morning, to the shade of the enclosed area in the middle of the day, and then back to the area exposed to the sun in the late afternoon (Maharsha).

והוּוּ מַצְטַעְרֵי רַבָּנָן מְשִׁימְשָׁא לְטוּלָא
וּמְטוּלָא לְשִׁימְשָׁא.

and the Sages were troubled by the fact that they could not dissolve the vow. They spent an extended period of time attempting to do so. During this time, they moved from a location with light from the sun to one with shade, and then moved again from the shade back to the sun.^N

(לִישְׁנָא אַחֲרָא: אַדְעֵתָא דְהַכִּי – אֵין,
כַּמְּה זִימְנִין. וְהוּוּ מַצְטַעְרֵי רַבָּנָן מְשִׁימְשָׁא
לְטוּלָא וּמְטוּלָא לְשִׁימְשָׁא).

The Gemara cites another version of the incident: They asked him: Did you vow with knowledge of this particular fact when you vowed? He said to them: Yes. This occurred several times and the Sages were troubled with this problem for an extended period of time, during which they moved from the sun to the shade and from the shade to the sun, but they did not find a solution.

אָמַר לִיה בְּטָנִית בְּרִיה דְאַבָּא שְׂאוּל בֶּן
בְּטָנִית: מִי נִדְרַתְּ אַדְעֵתָא דְמַצְטַעְרֵי רַבָּנָן
מְטוּלָא לְשִׁימְשָׁא וּמְשִׁימְשָׁא לְטוּלָא?
אָמַר: לֹא, וְשָׂרִיחָא.

Botnit, son of Abba Shaul^f ben Botnit, said to him: Would you have vowed with the knowledge that the Sages would be troubled even to the point of going from shade to sun and from sun to shade? He said: No, and they dissolved it.

PERSONALITIES

Botnit, son of Abba Shaul – בְּטָנִית בְּרִיה דְאַבָּא שְׂאוּל – Based on the names of the Sages with which he associated, it appears that Abba Shaul ben Botnit was active in Jerusalem about a generation before the destruction of the Temple. Consequently, it is difficult to say that the son of Abba Shaul lived at the end of the tannaitic period and interacted with Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda

HaNasi, in the incident related in the Gemara, particularly since this narrative is mentioned in the Jerusalem Talmud as having occurred with a different Sage. As a result, some are of the opinion that the Sage Botnit mentioned here was not actually his son but a later descendant of Abba Shaul, son of Botnit.

Lauderer's tool – אוכלא דקצרי: According to geonic tradition, this tool is a perforated vessel similar to a large colander. It was used to sprinkle water on clothing that needed ironing, as well as to steam and perfume clothing.



Roman colander dating back to the third century

NOTES

We do not broach dissolution with him using a new situation – אין פותחין לו בגולד: The reason that dissolution is not broached using a new situation is because at the time of the vow one does not consider a situation that does not presently exist and for which there is little chance that it will occur. Consequently, a distinction can be made between a new situation that is common, which can be used as an opening, because one might in practice consider such a possibility, and a situation that is uncommon, which may not be used as an opening (Ra'avad).

The wife of Abaye, etc. – דביתהו דאביי וכו': The issue being discussed here is whether an opening that is based on the very fulfillment of the vow itself can serve as an opening. Rav Yosef held that this type of vow qualifies as a vow of exhortation, because if Abaye had known at the outset that his wife would defy his words, he would not have taken a vow to try to force his wife to agree to his position.

And married her to her relative – ואינסבא לקריבה: This daughter was Abaye's adopted daughter. She had already reached majority, so she herself could have chosen whom to marry. However, Abaye's wife arranged for her to marry her relative (*Tosafot Yeshanim*).

LANGUAGE

Heretics [appikurei] – אפיקורי: This word is derived from the name of the Greek philosopher Epicurus, who denied divine intervention of any kind. Those who followed his philosophy were called by the plural form of the Aramaic version of his name, *appikurei*. However, because the Aramaic root *peh, kuf, reish* also means to be insolent and to act irresponsibly, the word was extended to refer to all non-believers who are scornful of the mitzvot of the Torah and do not honor the Sages. In this passage as well, the term refers to irresponsible and insolent people who are contemptuous of Torah scholars.

רבי ישמעאל בר רבי יוסי הוה ליה נדרא למישרא, אתא לקמייהו דרבנן. אמרו ליה: נדרת אדעתא דהבי? אמר להו: אין. נדרתא אדעתא דהבי? אמר להו: אין. כמה זימנין. פיון דחזא ההוא קצרא דמצטערי רבנן – מחייה באוכלא דקצרי. אמר: אדעתא דמחי לי קצרא – לא נדרי ושריה לנפשיה.

The Gemara relates another incident: **Rabbi Yishmael bar Rabbi Yosei had a vow to dissolve. He came before the Sages. They said to him: Did you vow with knowledge of this particular fact? He said to them: Yes. They asked again: Did you vow with knowledge of this other fact? He said to them: Yes. This occurred several times. When a certain launderer saw that the Sages were troubled because Rabbi Yishmael caused them difficulty in successfully dissolving his vow, he hit Rabbi Yishmael with a launderer's tool^b that he had in his hand. Rabbi Yishmael said: Had I known that the launderer would hit me due to my vow I would not have vowed, and he dissolved it.**

אמר ליה רב אחא מדיפתא לרבינא: האי נולד הוא, דלא מסיק אדעתא דמחי ליה קצרא, ותנינא: אין פותחין לו בגולד! אמר ליה: האי לאו נולד הוא, דשכיחי אפיקורי דמצערי רבנן.

Rav Aha of Difti said to Ravina: This is a case of a new situation, which is not included among those matters that he could have considered at the time of the vow, because it would not enter his mind that the launderer would hit him. And we already learned: We do not broach dissolution with a person using a new situation^{nh} that did not exist at the time of the vow. Ravina said to him: This is not a new situation that he could not have thought of previously, since it is common to find heretics [appikurei]^l who deny fundamental Torah principles and who trouble the Sages. Although he would not have considered the possibility that this launderer would attack him, he may have considered the possibility that some heretic would. Therefore, it was permitted to broach dissolution in this manner.

דביתהו דאביי הוה לה ההיא ברתא. הוא אמר "לקריבאי" היא אמרה לקריבה, אמר לה: תיתסרא הנאתי עלך אי עברת אדעתא ומינסבת לה לקריבך. אזלת, ועברת על דעתיה, ואינסבא לקריבה. אתא לקמיה דרב יוסף, אמר ליה: אילו הוה ידעת דעברת על דעתך ומנסבא לה לקריבה מי אדרתה? אמר: לא, ושרייה רב יוסף.

The wife of Abayeⁿ had a certain daughter. Abaye said: She should get married to my relative. His wife said that she should get married to her relative. He said to his wife: Benefit from me should be forbidden to you, if you defy my will and marry her to your relative. She went and defied his will and married her to her relative.ⁿ Abaye came before Rav Yosef. Rav Yosef said to him: If you had known that she would ultimately defy your will and marry her to her relative, would you have made the vow? He said: No. And Rav Yosef dissolved the vow for him because Abaye did not think that his wife would actually defy him, and he intended the vow only to serve as a threat.

ומי שרי כי האי גוונא? אין, והתנינא: מעשה באדם אחד שהדיר את אשתו מלילות לרגל, ועברה על דעתו ועלתה לרגל. ובא לפני רבי יוסי, אמר לו: ואילו היית יודע שעוברת על דעתך ועולה לרגל כלום הדרתה? אמר לו: לא, והתירו רבי יוסי.

The Gemara asks: **And is it dissolved in a case like this, where the vow was dependent on the daughter not marrying the wife's relative? The Gemara answers: Yes, and it is taught in the Tosefta (5:1): There was an incident involving one man who vowed, prohibiting his wife from benefiting from him if she were to ascend to Jerusalem for the pilgrimage Festival, and she defied his will^h and ascended to Jerusalem for the pilgrimage Festival. And when he came before Rabbi Yosei to request dissolution, Rabbi Yosei said to him: And had you known that she would defy your will and ascend to Jerusalem on the pilgrimage Festival, would you have vowed at all? He said to him: No, and Rabbi Yosei dissolved it. This incident indicates that it is permitted to dissolve a vow with such an opening.**

HALAKHA

An opening based on a new situation – פתיחה בגולד: One may not dissolve a vow using as an opening a new situation that did not exist at the time that the vow was made, unless it is a situation that commonly occurs. This ruling follows the opinion of *Tosafot*, the *Ra'avad*, and the *Rambam*.

Some say that the *Rambam* disagrees (*Kesef Mishne*). Others claim that the *Rambam* agrees that a frequently occurring situation may be used (*Smag; Lehem Mishne*), e.g., one who vows not to enter a house that subsequently becomes a synagogue or one who vows not to benefit from an individual who subsequently becomes an outstanding Torah scholar.

The *Rema* holds that even death is not considered a common situation, but poverty is common and would be permitted to use as an opening (*Beit Yosef*). Pregnancy is also considered a

common situation that may be used to dissolve a vow (*Rambam Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Shevuot* 6:12 and *Haggahot Maimoniyot* there; *Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De'a* 228:12).

And she defied his will, etc. – ועברה על דעתו וכו': An opening to dissolve a vow may be made even based on the vow itself. For example, if one vows not to benefit from another if that person performs a particular act, and that person indeed performs the act, he is asked: Had you known that he would contravene your words, would you have made the vow? If he says no, the vow is dissolved. This ruling is in accordance with the opinion of *Rabbi Yosei* and the halakhic decision of *Rav Yosef* (*Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De'a* 228:7).

כל נדר שאני עתיד – Any vow that I take in the future, etc. – לידור וכו'. If one explicitly says: Any vow that I take in the future is void, he invalidates any vow that is taken later. If one has in mind that his vows will be void but does not express this verbally, his stipulation is not effective, since unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters. Some hold that even if one whispers the stipulation, it is not effective (*Shakh*, citing Rabbeinu Yeruham), while others hold that if one can hear the stipulation himself, it is effective (*Bah*).

The Rema, citing the Mahari Weil, writes that although everyone is accustomed to saying *Kol Nidrei* on Yom Kippur, it should not be relied upon to consider a vow as void without a request for dissolution to a halakhic authority, except for exigent circumstances (*Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De'a* 211:1).

מתני' רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר: אף הרוצה להדיר את חבירו שיאכל אצלו, יאמר לו 'כל נדר שאני עתיד לידור הוא בטל', ובלבד שיהא זכור בשעת הנדר.

גמ' ובין דאמר 'כל נדר שאני עתיד לידור יהא בטל' לא שמע ליה ולא אתי בהדיה!

MISHNA Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov says: Even one who wants to take a vow prohibiting another from benefiting from him, but only in order that he should eat with him, not intending to take an actual vow, should say to him at the outset: **Any vow that I take in the future^H is void.** And this statement is effective, provided that he remembers at the time of the vow that his intent at the beginning of the year was to render it void.

GEMARA With regard to Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov's proposal, the Gemara asks: **And since he said: Any vow that I take in the future should be void,** the one being invited will not listen to him and will not come to eat with him, since he already knows that the vow is not valid. That being the case, why would the first individual take a vow at all?

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יאמר כל נדר – Say: Any vow that I take in the future, etc. – ששאני עתיד לידור וכו'. If one stipulates: All vows that I make in the future until a specific time shall be void, and he then makes a vow within the specified time, the *halakha* is that if he remembers his stipulation when making the vow, his vow is upheld, since by taking the vow it is assumed that he has now decided that he wants it to take effect. If he does not remember the stipulation at the time of the vow, the initial stipulation dissolves the vow. Some say that the stipulation is not effective in dissolving the vow unless he does remember it while making the vow and declares that he relies on the stipulation. The *Taz* maintains that the latter opinion should be given considered, while others disagree (*Rambam Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nedarim* 2:4; *Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De'a* 211:2).

חסורי מיחסר, והכי קתני: הרוצה שיאכל אצלו חבירו ומסרב בו, ומדירו – נדרי ירוזין הוא. והרוצה שלא יתקיימו נדריו כל השנה – יעמוד בראש השנה, ויאמר: כל נדר שאני עתיד לידור – יהא בטל. ובלבד שיהא זכור בשעת הנדר.

אי זכור – עקריה לתנאיה וקניינים ליה לנדריה! אמר אבוי, תני: ובלבד שלא יהא זכור בשעת הנדר.

The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and is teaching like this: In the case of one who wants another to eat with him, and he urges him to do so and makes a vow with regard to him, this vow is included in the category of vows of exhortation, which do not require dissolution. And in addition, one who desires that his vows not be upheld for the entire year should stand up on Rosh HaShana^N and say: **Any vow that I take in the future^H should be void.** And this statement is effective, provided that he remembers at the time of the vow that his intent at the beginning of the year was to render it void.

The Gemara asks: **If he remembers** at the time of the vow that his intent at the beginning of the year was to render it void but still makes the vow, then **he has uprooted his stipulation^N** that all his vows are void and has upheld his vow. Why, then, does it state that the vows are void in this case? **Abaye said: Teach: And this is statement is effective, provided that he does not remember at the time of the vow** that his intention at the beginning of the year was to render it void.

NOTES

Should stand up on Rosh HaShana – יעמוד בראש השנה: Many commentaries, including Rabbeinu Tam in *Sefer HaYashar*, explain that this Gemara is the source for reciting *Kol Nidrei*, which includes a cancelation of future vows, on Yom Kippur. Although the Gemara is referring to Rosh HaShana as the day on which one should render future vows void, not Yom Kippur, Yom Kippur is preferred because the entire community attends synagogue on that day. Furthermore, the Rid explains that since it is a day of atonement and absolution from sin, it is proper to attend to all religious matters that need to be addressed, including rendering vows void. *Tosafot* offer another reason for *Kol Nidrei* to be read on Yom Kippur, that in the Bible Yom Kippur is called Rosh HaShana (see Ezekiel 40:1).

Concerning the custom of *Kol Nidrei* itself, there are a number of opinions. Most of the *ge'onim* abolished this custom, consistent with their opinion that prior rendering of vows as void should never be done. Rav Hai Gaon proposed that only a formulation asking for forgiveness for violating a vow inadvertently or purposefully should be recited by the congregation. Other authorities accepted this custom, but many followed the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam and his father that the proper formulation for rendering vows as void is: From this Yom Kippur until next Yom Kippur that should arrive in a good time. Since

this formulation focuses on future vows, it involves a stipulation for the future, which is similar to the case of the Gemara here. This is done in the presence of the entire community in order to publicize the matter (see Rabbi Natan bar Yosef). Others hold that the formulation: From last Yom Kippur to this Yom Kippur, may be used since they believe this ceremony involves the dissolution of the vows of the entire congregation from the previous year, similar to the present-day custom to perform dissolution of vows during the month of Elul or on the eve of Rosh HaShana.

אי זכור – עקריה לתנאיה – It has been asked: Why not say the opposite, that if he remembers, he takes the vow knowing that it will not take effect, as it has already been rendered void? The Rashba answers that this is essentially the *halakha* but it can be relied upon only in the case of a Torah scholar. The *halakha* is more stringent for an ignorant person because he might not have mentally dissolved it, and therefore the text of the mishna should be changed. However, the Ran holds that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters, so even his recollection of the stipulation does not have the force to invalidate what he actually says. Consequently, it stands to reason that he actually intended the vow to be valid.

Actually, say as we said, etc. – **לְעוֹלָם כְּדִאֲמַרְיָן וְכוּ'** – *Tosafot* and the Rosh conclude that Rava agrees with Abaye, but since the wording of the mishna does not fit Abaye's explanation precisely, Rava proposes a different solution that is more appropriate to the language: Provided that he remembers. The Ritva notes that the Rambam rules according to both Abaye and Rava, indicating that he also understood the discussion in this way.

He did not say... in accordance with the initial intention, etc. – **לֹא אָמַר עַל דַּעַת הָרֵאשׁוֹנָה וְכוּ'** – Since he remembers that he made some kind of stipulation and yet he still took a vow not remembering if it is the type included in his prior declaration, he now intends to keep the vow without regard for the stipulation (*Tosafot*).

Do the Rabbis disagree, etc. – **פְּלִיגֵי רַבְנָן עֲלֵיהּ וְכוּ'**: It is difficult to understand why these vows are any different from vows of exhortation, which do not require dissolution. Some suggest that vows of exhortation refer only to those used in business negotiations and not those used when inviting someone. This is because in negotiations it is known from the beginning that one will not insist on his original demand, so there is no intent to fulfill what is stated in the vow (Ran). Another reason is that in business negotiations there is a discernible financial loss. Therefore, one dissolves the vow in his heart at the outset. However, with regard to minor matters, such as an invitation to eat at someone's house, there is no intention to dissolve the vow (Rosh).

HALAKHA

עַל – I am vowing in accordance with the initial intention – נֹדֵר: In the case of one who stipulates that his vows be dissolved until a specific time and forgets what his vow was about, if he declares at the time of the vow that he does so in accordance with his initial intention and later remembers the details of his stipulation, the condition is upheld and the vow is void. If he does not say so, then the condition is nullified and the vow is upheld, in accordance with Rava's opinion (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a*, *Hilkhot Nedarim* 2:5; *Shulhan Arukh*, *Yoreh De'a* 211:3).

Rava said: Actually, say as we saidⁿ initially, that he does remember his stipulation at the time of the vow. **With what are we dealing here?** It is a case where he stipulated a condition on Rosh HaShana rendering void vows that he would make later in the year, but he did not know with regard to which vows he made the stipulation, and now he makes a vow. **If he remembers at the time of the vow and says: I am vowing in accordance with the initial intention,**ⁿ when I stipulated that all vows should be void, his vow has no substance. However, if he did not say: **I am vowing in accordance with the initial intention,**ⁿ then he has uprooted his stipulation and upheld his vow.

The Gemara relates that Rav Huna bar Hinnana intended to teach this topic at the Festival lecture,^b so that everyone would learn this manner of rendering vows void on Rosh HaShana. **Rava said to him:** The *tanna* of the mishna conceals it and does not say it explicitly, despite the fact that it is studied by Torah scholars, in order that the public not treat vows lightly, and you teach it publicly at the Festival lecture?

§ A dilemma was raised before the scholars: **Do the Rabbis disagreeⁿ with Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov in the mishna or not? And if you say that they disagree with him, is the halakha in accordance with his opinion or not?** The Gemara suggests a proof: **Come and hear, as we learned in a mishna (63b): One who says to another:**

BACKGROUND

Lecture [*pirka*] – **פִּירְקָא**: The word *pirka* is the title given to the public lecture of a Sage in which he teaches the community how to perform the *halakha* in actual practice. As a rule, these lectures were given close to one of the Festivals and the Sage would explain the *halakhot* related to the Festival. These lectures, which were intended for the entire community and not only for

Torah scholars, were different from the standard lectures given by the Sages in their academies. It was customary that, as a courtesy, students would not ask questions of the Sage during these lectures as they often did during regular lectures, since they were given before the entire community.

Perek III

Daf 24 Amud a

”קוֹנָם שְׂאִינִי נִהְיָה לְךָ אִם אֵי אֶתָּה נוֹטֵל לְבַנְךָ בּוֹר שֶׁל חִישִׁין וְשִׁתֵּי חֲבִיּוֹת שֶׁל יַיִן” – הַרִי זֶה יָכוֹל לְהַתִּיר אֶת נֹדְרוֹ שֶׁלֹּא עַל פִּי חֲכָם. שְׂיָכוֹל לֹמַר לוֹ: כְּלוּם אֶמְרַתְּ אֶלָּא בְּשִׁבִיל כְּבוֹדִי – זֶה הוּא כְּבוֹדִי.

Benefiting from you is *konam* for meⁿ if you do not take from me for your son a *kor* of wheat and two barrels of wine as a gift, this other individual can dissolve his vow without the involvement of a halakhic authority. This is because he can say to the one who vowed: **Did you say your vow for any reason other than due to my honor, in order to convince me to accept a gift for my son? This is my honor, that I refrain from accepting the gift.**

HALAKHA

קוֹנָם שְׂאִינִי נִהְיָה – Benefiting from you is *konam* for me, etc. – לְךָ וְכוּ': If one takes a vow with regard to another and says to him: Benefiting from you is *konam* for me unless you take such and such an item from me, the other may dissolve his vow without making a request to a halakhic authority for dissolution by saying: Your intent was to honor me, and it is my honor that I do not take it.

If he said to the other: Benefiting from me is *konam* for you if you do not give me such and such an item, and he subsequently wants to annul his vow, he can say: It is as though I received it, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Meir. The Rema writes that early authorities dispute whether he can do so with regard to nullifying an action as well,

such as where he says: My possessions are *konam* for you if you go to a certain place, and he went. Some hold that he cannot nullify an action that already occurred and therefore cannot say: It is as though you did not go (Ran, citing Rashba). However, others say that he can nullify an action as well (*Beit Yosef*, citing Ran and *Terumat HaDeshen*; Rabbi Levi ibn Hāviv).

The *Shakh*, citing the Ran, claims that all the aforementioned cases that do not require dissolution occur only when one speaks in general terms. But if the one taking the vow specifically says that he wishes to be honored by his friend accepting the gift, then it is considered a binding vow even if the other says: This is my honor not to accept it (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a*, *Hilkhot Nedarim* 8:1, 14; *Shulhan Arukh*, *Yoreh De'a* 232:20).