

הָרִי זֶה סוּפְגֵת אֶת הָאֲרָבָעִים. הַפֵּר לָהּ בְּעֵלָהּ, וְהִיא לֹא יְדָעָה שֶׁהִפֵּר לָהּ, הֵיטֵתָה שׂוֹתָהּ יַיִן וּמִיִּטְמָאָה לְמִתִּים – אֵינָה סוּפְגֵת אֶת הָאֲרָבָעִים.

וְאִי אָמַרְתָּ מִפֶּר לְמִתְעַנָּה וְאִין מִפֶּר לְשִׂאִין מִתְעַנָּה, דְּלִמָּא מִן יַיִן דְּאִית לָהּ צִעְרָא – הִפֵּר לָהּ, מִן חֲרָצֵן וּמִן זֶג – לֹא הִפֵּר לָהּ, דְּהָא לֹא אִית לָהּ צִעְרָא, וְתִסְפּוּג אֶת הָאֲרָבָעִים!

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: אִין נְזִירוֹת לְחֻצְאִין.

אָמַר לִיה אַבְי: הָא קִרְבָּן לְחֻצְאִין נְזִירוֹת אֵיבָא? אָלָא אָמַר אַבְי: אִין נְזִירוֹת לְחֻצְאִין, וְאִין קִרְבָּן לְחֻצְאִין.

she incurs [sofeget]¹ the forty lashes,^h the penalty for one who transgresses a Torah prohibition, as she violated the terms of her nazirite vow. If her husband nullified the vow for her,^h but she did not know that he nullified it for her, and she drank wine or became impure through contact with the dead, she does not incur the forty lashes. She did not commit a transgression, as her nazirite vow was nullified.

And if you say that the husband can nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would cause her to deprive herself, but he cannot nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would not cause her to deprive herself, the same reasoning should apply to a nazirite vow: Perhaps the husband nullified for her the vow that rendered wine forbidden to her, as she suffers pain when she refrains from drinking it. But as for her vow that rendered grape seeds and grape skins forbidden to her, he did not nullify it for her, as she suffers no pain when she abstains from them. And since even grape seeds and grape skins are forbidden to a nazirite, if the woman ate of them, she should receive the forty lashes, even if her husband nullified her vow.

Rav Yosef said: Here it is different, as naziriteship cannot take effect partially.^{NH} Since one cannot be a nazirite and accept only some of the prohibitions of naziriteship, the husband's nullification cancels the entire vow. In the case of an ordinary vow, on the other hand, the husband can nullify only the part that causes his wife suffering.

Abaye said to him: The wording of your statement suggests that naziriteship cannot take effect partially, but that an offering is brought for partial observance of naziriteship.^N Rather, Abaye said that one should say as follows: Naziriteship cannot take effect partially, and no offering is brought for partial observance of naziriteship.^H

LANGUAGE

Incurs [sofeget] – סוּפְגֵת: From the Greek σπόγγος, *spongos*, sponge, from which developed the word *safag*, in the sense of absorbing liquids. Its meaning subsequently expanded to include anything that could be received and absorbed, such as money and even the lashes of a whip.

HALAKHA

Incurs the forty lashes – סוּפְגֵת אֶת הָאֲרָבָעִים: If a woman who took a vow of naziriteship drank wine or became impure through contact with a corpse, then even if her father or husband heard her vow and nullified it on that same day, she is liable by Torah law for her prior violation of the vow before its nullification, and she receives lashes if she drank wine or brings an offering if she became impure (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a*, *Hilkhot Nedarim* 12:19).

If her husband nullified the vow for her – הִפֵּר לָהּ בְּעֵלָהּ: If a woman took a vow and her father or husband had nullified it, but without knowing of the nullification she willfully violated the vow, she is exempt from punishment according to Torah law, as she performed a permitted act. However, by rabbinic law she is liable to receive lashes for rebelliousness, as she acted with the intention of transgressing (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a*, *Hilkhot Nedarim* 12:18).

Naziriteship cannot take effect partially – אִין נְזִירוֹת לְחֻצְאִין: If one takes a vow of naziriteship, but only with respect to abstaining from eating grape seeds, or only with respect to abstaining from cutting his hair or the like, he is a full-fledged nazirite and is subject to all the prohibitions that apply to a nazirite (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a*, *Hilkhot Nezirut* 1:9).

No offering is brought for partial observance of naziriteship – אִין קִרְבָּן לְחֻצְאִין: If one said that he is obligated to bring the offerings of a partial nazirite, he must bring all the offerings of a nazirite, as there is no partial naziriteship (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a*, *Hilkhot Nezirut* 8:18).

NOTES

Naziriteship cannot take effect partially – אִין נְזִירוֹת לְחֻצְאִין: The *tanna'im* disagree with regard to one who accepts upon himself only some of the prohibitions of naziriteship. Some say that despite accepting only some of the prohibitions, he is a full-fledged nazirite, while others maintain he is not a nazirite at all. All agree, however, that he is not a partial nazirite.

The Maharit contends that the prohibitions of naziriteship are not viewed as prohibitions that are defined by the one who took the vow; rather, they are prohibitions that the Torah applied to a person of a particular status, similar to those that concern only a priest or a king. Therefore, once a vow of naziriteship goes into effect, all the obligations of a nazirite perform apply. The same is true with respect to the nullification of the vow: Since it removes from the woman the status of a nazirite, all relevant prohibitions cease to apply (see *Nidrei Issar*).

But that an offering is brought for partial observance of naziriteship – הָא קִרְבָּן לְחֻצְאִין נְזִירוֹת: Abaye infers this from the fact that Rav Yosef did not state his ruling in the more general manner of: There is no partial naziriteship (Ran; see *Tosafot*). The Rid explains that Rav Yosef should have specified that no offering is brought for partial naziriteship, as this is the main reason why naziriteship cannot take effect partially.

As for the meaning of an offering for partial naziriteship, some commentaries explain it in a similar manner to naziriteship taking effect partially. In other words, if a person took a vow of naziriteship prohibiting him from partaking of only certain items, e.g., wine but not grape seeds, or if he said: I am a partial nazirite, he does not bring an offering for such a vow (Commentary on *Nedarim*; Rabbi Yitzhak Tzarfati). The Rosh and others maintain that the Gemara is referring to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite and observed her vow for a period of time, and then her husband heard of her vow and nullified it. In that case, she is not obligated to bring an offering for her time as a nazirite.

מִתִּיבִי: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁנִּדְרָה בְּנִזְרָה וְהִפְרִישָׁה
בְּהִמָּתָהּ, וְאַחֵר כִּךְ הִפְרָ לָהּ בְּעֵלָהּ –
מִבִּיאָה חֲטָאת הָעוֹף, וְאֵינָה מִבִּיאָה עוֹלֹת
הָעוֹף. וְאֵי אָמַרְתָּ אִין קָרְבָן לְחֻצֵי נְזִירוֹת –
אִמָּאי מִבִּיאָה חֲטָאת הָעוֹף?

וְאֵלֹא מָאי – יֵשׁ קָרְבָן לְחֻצֵי נְזִירוֹת?
שְׁלֹשׁ בְּהֵמוֹת בְּעֵי לְאִתּוּנִי, חֲטָאת עוֹלָה
וְשְׁלָמִים! אֵלֹא, לְעוֹלָם אִין קָרְבָן לְחֻצֵי
נְזִירוֹת. וְחֲטָאת הָעוֹף דְּמִתְעָא – מְשוּם
דְּחֲטָאת עַל הַסֶּפֶק.

אִיתִיבִיָּה: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁנִּדְרָה בְּנִזְרָה וְנִטְמָאת,
וְאַחֵר כִּךְ הִפְרָ לָהּ בְּעֵלָהּ – מִבִּיאָה חֲטָאת
הָעוֹף, וְאִין מִבִּיאָה עוֹלֹת הָעוֹף. וְאֵי אָמַרְתָּ
מִפְּרָ לְמִתְעָנָה וְאִין מִפְּרָ לְשִׂאִין מִתְעָנָה.

The Gemara raises an objection from the following statement: With regard to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite^{NH} and she designated her animal for her nazirite offering,^N and afterward her husband nullified her vow for her, she must bring a bird sin-offering but she does not bring a bird burnt-offering. And if you say that no offering is brought for partial observance of naziriteship, why must she bring a bird sin-offering?

The Gemara rejects this argument: But rather, what will you say? That an offering is brought for partial observance of naziriteship? If so, she should be required to bring three animals^N as offerings, a sin-offering, a burnt-offering, and a peace-offering, in accordance with the *halakha* governing a nazirite who has completed the period of his vow. Rather, say as follows: Actually, no offering is brought for partial observance of naziriteship, and as for the bird sin-offering that she must bring, this is because a bird sin-offering can be brought in a case of uncertainty.^N She must therefore bring a sin-offering for the partial naziriteship that she observed.

Rav Asi raised an objection against the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from the following *baraita*: With regard to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite and she became ritually impure^H through contact with the dead, and afterward her husband nullified her vow for her, she must bring a bird sin-offering but does not bring a bird burnt-offering. And if you say that the husband can nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would cause her to deprive herself, but he cannot nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would not cause her to deprive herself, the same reasoning should apply here:

NOTES

הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁנִּדְרָה בְּנִזְרָה – A woman who vowed to be a nazirite – According to many early authorities, this refers to a woman who contracted impurity after taking her vow of naziriteship (*Tosafot*; Rashba; Ran). The Rid even had a text that included the phrase: And she became impure.

קָרְבָנוֹת נִזִיר – The offerings of a nazirite – The Torah (Numbers, chapter 6) states that a nazirite who became impure during his period of naziriteship must then bring a sheep as a guilt-offering; a bird, i.e., a turtledove or young pigeon, as a sin-offering; and another bird as a burnt-offering. Upon the completion of his naziriteship in purity, the nazirite must bring a male sheep for a burnt-offering, a ewe as a sin-offering, and a ram as a peace-offering, as well as a meal-offering of unleavened bread and wafers.

שְׁלֹשׁ בְּהֵמוֹת – She should be required to bring three animals – According to the early authorities who maintain that the Gemara concerns a woman who became impure after taking her vow of naziriteship, the unstated premise of this statement is that this would be her obligation if she was pure, as an impure nazirite brings a sheep and two birds (see *Tosafot*).

Because a sin-offering can be brought in a case of uncertainty – **מְשוּם דְּחֲטָאת עַל הַסֶּפֶק**: For example, a woman after childbirth brings a bird sin-offering even if the birth is in doubt, e.g., in the case of a miscarriage, which might not be an actual child but merely an emission of blood. Since a sin-offering can be brought in a case of uncertainty, she may take it to the Temple without committing the transgression of bringing unconsecrated animals to the Sanctuary.

As for the reason why a nazirite brings this sin-offering, the Gemara explains that it serves to atone for abstention from wine during the days one observed naziriteship. The Ran states that since a sin-offering can be brought in a case of uncertainty, the *halakha* is to be lenient and allow her to bring it for partial naziriteship. The Rid, who maintains that the *baraita* is referring to a woman who became impure, explains that the sin-offering is to atone for her wrongful impurity, in accordance with the verse with regard to an impure nazirite: “For his sin regarding a soul” (Numbers 6:11).

HALAKHA

הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁנִּדְרָה – A woman who vowed to be a nazirite, etc. – A woman took a vow of naziriteship and designated her offerings, and afterward her husband nullified her vow. In such a case, if the animals belonged to her husband, they are no longer consecrated, as one cannot consecrate something that does not belong to him. If they were exclusively hers and the husband had no rights to them, the animal set aside for a sin-offering must be left to die, the burnt-offering is sacrificed, while the peace-offering is sacrificed but may be eaten for only one day and does not require the bread that usually accompanies that offering. The *halakha* is in accordance with the mishna in tractate *Nazir* (24a) rather than the *baraita* here (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a*, *Hilkhot Nezirut* 9:9).

A woman who vowed to be a nazirite and she became ritually impure – **הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁנִּדְרָה בְּנִזְרָה וְנִטְמָאת**: The Radbaz maintains that if a woman who vowed to be a nazirite contracted ritual impurity during her term of naziriteship, and afterward her husband heard of her vow and nullified it, she must bring the offerings of impurity, as stated in the mishna in tractate *Nazir* (24a). The Meiri rules that she brings only a bird for a sin-offering, as there are no offerings for partial naziriteship (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a*, *Hilkhot Nezirut* 9:11).

דלמא מיין דאית לה צערא – הפר לה, מטומאת מת דלית לה צערא – לא הפר לה!

אמרי: מטומאת מת נמי אית לה צערא, דכתיב "והחי יתן אל לבו" ותניא, היה רבי מאיר אומר: מאי דכתיב "והחי יתן אל לבו"? דיקפוד – יספדון ליה, דיבבון – יבבון ליה, דיקבר – יקברוניה.

מתני' קונם שאני נהנה לבריות – אינו יכול להפר, ויכולה היא ליהנות בלקט שכחה ובפאה.

קונם כהנים לויים נהנים לי – וטלו על ברחו. כהנים אלו ולויים אלו נהנים לי – וטלו אחרים.

Perhaps the husband nullified for her the vow that rendered wine forbidden to her, as she suffers pain when she refrains from drinking it. But as for her vow that impurity imparted by the dead is forbidden to her, he did not nullify it for her, as she suffers no pain by not becoming impure through contact with the dead. Why, then, does she not bring the offerings that must be brought by a nazirite who became ritually impure through contact with the dead? This implies that since the husband can nullify a vow with regard to a matter that would cause her to deprive herself, he can also nullify a vow with regard to a matter that would not cause her to deprive herself.

The Gemara rejects this argument: The Sages say in response that a woman who vows that impurity imparted by the dead is forbidden to her also suffers pain^{NH} as a result. How so? As it is written: "And the living shall lay it to his heart" (Ecclesiastes 7:2),^N and it is taught in a *baraita* that Rabbi Meir would say: What is the meaning of that which is written: "And the living shall lay it to his heart"? This means that one who eulogizes others when they die will in turn be eulogized when he himself dies; one who weeps for others will be wept for when he himself passes away; and one who buries others will himself be buried upon his passing. A woman who cannot participate in the funerals of others because she is barred from contracting impurity through contact with a corpse is distressed by the thought that she will receive similar treatment when she dies. Therefore, her vow involves affliction and can be nullified by her husband. The conclusion is that this case does not present a difficulty for Rabbi Yoḥanan.

MISHNA If a woman vowed: The property of other people is *konam* for me, and for that reason I will not benefit^H from it, her husband cannot nullify^N her vow, but nevertheless, if she is poor, she may benefit from the agricultural gifts that must be left for the poor: Gleanings, i.e., isolated stalks that fell during the harvest; forgotten sheaves; and produce of the corners [*pe'a*]^B of the field that the owner is obligated to leave for the poor. Enjoyment of these gifts is not considered as benefit derived from people, as these gifts are not given voluntarily out of the kindness of the donors, but in the performance of a mitzva.

If one said: I will not let priests and Levites benefit from me, as that is *konam*^H for me, they can take the priestly and Levitical gifts from him against his will. If, however, he said: I will not let these specific priests and these specific Levites benefit from me, as that is *konam* for me, they are taken by others.

BACKGROUND

Gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and produce of the corners [*pe'a*] – לקט שכחה ובפאה – The gift of gleanings is one of the obligatory agricultural gifts to the poor. The Torah prohibits the owner of a field from gleaning individual stalks that fell during the harvest (Leviticus 19:9). If fewer than three stalks fall in one place, they are deemed gleanings and considered the property of the poor. It is prohibited for the owner of the field to take them for his personal use.

A forgotten sheaf, another agricultural gift to the poor, refers to a sheaf forgotten by a farmer in the field while harvesting his grain. He may not return to collect it, as it must be instead left for the poor (Deuteronomy 24:19).

The gift of *pe'a* is based on the verses "And when you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not wholly reap the corner of your field, neither shall you gather the gleanings of your harvest. And you shall not glean your vineyard, neither shall you gather the fallen fruit of your vineyard; you shall leave them for the poor and for the stranger: I am the Lord your God" (Leviticus 19:9–10). Although the Torah did not specify a minimum number of stalks that are to be left in the corner of one's field, the Sages stipulated that it must be at least one-sixtieth of the crop. As legally *pe'a* is the property of all poor people, the owner of the property is not allowed to give it to specific poor people whom he seeks to aid.

NOTES

The Sages say, impurity imparted by the dead is forbidden to her also suffers pain – אקרוי מטומאת מת נמי אית לה צערא: The early authorities ask: Why doesn't the Gemara answer as Rav Yosef replied earlier, that naziriteship cannot take effect partially? One answer is that there is a difference between the two cases, as one cannot be a nazirite from wine but not from grape seeds, whereas there is a type of naziriteship that does not involve impurity, such as that of Samson (see *Nazir* 4a). Therefore, it might have been thought that the husband cannot nullify his wife's vow of naziriteship with respect to impurity (*Tosafot*; Rosh; Rabbi Avraham min HaHar; Ran). The Ritva, as well as the Ran in his second interpretation, maintains that the Gemara could have responded that naziriteship cannot take effect partially, but it wanted to teach us the novel *halakha* that a woman suffers from not being able to go to a house of mourning, and therefore her husband can nullify her vow. According to the *Shita Mekubbetzet*, the Gemara did not answer that naziriteship cannot take effect partially because this depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis with regard to whether one who vowed from only one prohibition of naziriteship is a nazirite at all. The Gemara therefore preferred a resolution that is acceptable according to all opinions.

And the living shall lay it to his heart – והחי יתן אל לבו: The first part of this verse states: "It is better to go to the house of mourning than to go to the house of feasting." The second part of the verse is taken to mean that the living should take care to attend to the mourning of others, as, if he fails to do so he in turn will not be cared for. Consequently, one who fails to participate in the funerals of others suffers as a result.

Her husband cannot nullify – אינו יכול להפר: Although Shmuel ruled that if a woman prohibits herself from benefiting from one person her husband can nullify her vow, and it would follow all the more so if she vowed to prohibit herself from benefiting from all people, nevertheless, the Gemara already said that the entire chapter is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, whereas Shmuel spoke in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that such vows are considered vows of affliction. The Rosh claims that even according to Rabbi Yosei's opinion that this is not a vow of affliction, the husband may nevertheless nullify it as a vow that adversely affects the marriage relationship.

HALAKHA

A woman who vows that impurity imparted by the dead is forbidden to her also suffers pain – מטומאת מת נמי אית לה צערא: If a woman vows not to visit a house of mourning, this is a vow of affliction, which her husband can nullify (Rabbeinu Yeruḥam). The *Tur* (*Yoreh De'a* 235) disagrees (*Shulḥan Arukh*, *Yoreh De'a* 234:62; see *Shulḥan Arukh*, *Yoreh De'a* 235:3 and *Even HaEzer* 74:5).

The property of other people is *konam* for me, and for that reason I will not benefit – קונם שאני נהנה לבריות: If a woman vows: The property of other people is *konam* for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, some say this is a vow of affliction. The Rambam and others, who rule in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, maintain that it is a vow that adversely affects the marriage relationship. Either way, the husband can nullify the vow (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a*, *Hilkhot Nedarim* 12:8; *Shulḥan Arukh*, *Yoreh De'a* 234:64).

Priests...*konam*, etc. – קונם כהנים וכו': If one prohibited priests or Levites from benefiting from his property, they may come and take the gifts that are due them against his will. If he said: These priests, or: These Levites, the gifts must be collected by other priests or Levites (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a*, *Hilkhot Nedarim* 7:1; *Shulḥan Arukh*, *Yoreh De'a* 227:3).

NOTES

Say the latter clause, she may benefit – אימא סיפא יכולה – ליהנות: The Ran explains that the proof is from the fact that she may take gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe'a, as these gifts belong to the poor, and from the fact that if she could use her husband's property she would not be considered poor. This is possibly the difference between the opinions of Ulla and Rav Nahman. The Ran adds that according to Ulla the mishna is referring to a woman whose husband is poor. Other commentaries state that the Gemara infers from the word: And, as in the phrase: And she may benefit, that this is a new halakha, not a continuation of the previous statement. According to this opinion, we can say that Rava reads: She may, without the word and, as he maintains it is a single issue (Rid; Meiri).

And the mishna states: What is the reason – ומה טעם קאמר: This is problematic, as in an earlier mishna (79a) everyone agrees that if she prohibited to herself the fruits of the only storekeeper with whom her husband conducts his business, he can nullify her vow. The vow here, which concerns all people, including her husband, is certainly more restrictive than that one. The Rashba and the Ran explain that the ruling of that mishna refers to the winter season, when there are no gleanings, forgotten sheaves, or pe'a, and it would not apply to a situation where she has access to these gifts.

HALAKHA

A husband is not included in her reference to people – בעל: If a woman vowed not to derive benefit from people and her husband did not nullify her vow, it is permitted for her to benefit from her husband as long as they are married. If they divorce, her vow applies to him as well, and she may benefit only from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe'a (Rambam Sefer Hafia'a, Hilkhot Nedarim 12:8; Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De'a 234:65).

גמ' אלמא אפשר דמתזונה מדיליה, מבקל דבעל לאו בכלל בריות הוא. אימא סיפא: יכולה ליהנות בלקט שכחה ופאה. אבל מדבעל – לא אכלה, אלמא בעל בכלל בריות הוא!

אמר עולא: לעולם לאו בכלל בריות הוא, ועוד אין יכול להפר – מפני שיכולה ליהנות בלקט שכחה ופאה.

רבא אמר: לעולם בעל בכלל בריות הוא, ומה טעם קאמר, מה טעם אין יכול להפר – מפני שיכולה ליהנות בלקט שכחה ופאה.

רב נחמן אמר: לעולם בעל לאו בכלל בריות הוא, והכי קתני: נתגרשה – יכולה ליהנות בלקט שכחה ופאה.

GEMARA The mishna teaches that if a woman vowed not to derive benefit from people, her husband cannot nullify her vow. The Gemara infers from this halakha: Apparently, this is because the woman can be sustained from his, i.e., her husband's, property, without having to take from others. This proves by inference that in this context a husband is not included in her reference to people, as, although she mentioned people in her vow, she did not mean to prohibit herself from deriving benefit from her husband. The Gemara asks: But say the latter clause of that same part of the mishna, which states: But she may benefit^N from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe'a. This implies that she may derive benefit from the gifts given to the poor, but she may not eat from property belonging to her husband. Apparently, a husband is in fact included in her reference to people, and she may not benefit from him either.

Ulla said: Actually, a husband is not included in her reference to people, and there is no contradiction. Rather, the mishna provides two reasons why he cannot nullify his wife's vow. The first reason, which is merely implied by the mishna, is that she can be sustained by her husband. And furthermore there is the stated reason, that he cannot nullify the vow because she may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe'a.

Rava said the opposite: Actually, a husband is included in her reference to people, and therefore his wife may not benefit from him. And when the mishna states the halakha, it employs the style known as: What is the reason,^N and it should be understood as follows: What is the reason that the husband cannot nullify his wife's vow? Because she may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe'a.

Rav Nahman said: Actually, a husband is not included in her reference to people,^H and her vow not to derive benefit from all people does not include him, which is why he cannot nullify it. And this is what the mishna is teaching: The husband cannot nullify his wife's vow, because even if she becomes divorced and can no longer derive benefit from her husband, as he is now included in her reference to people, she may still benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe'a.

Perek XI
Daf 84 Amud a

איתיביה רבא לרב נחמן: ובעל לאו בכלל בריות הוא? והתנן: "נטולה אני מן היהודים" – יפר חלקו, ותהא משמשתו, ותהא נטולה מן היהודים.

Rava raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Nahman: And is a husband not included in her reference to people?^N But didn't we learn otherwise in a mishna (90b): If a woman said: I am removed from the Jews, i.e., the benefit of intercourse with me is prohibited to all Jews, her husband must nullify his part, i.e., the part that affects him. She would be permitted to him, and she may engage in intercourse with him, but she is removed from all other Jews, so that if he divorces her, she is forbidden to all.

NOTES

Included in her reference to people – בכלל בריות הוא: If it is explained that by using the word people the wife means everyone including her husband, the same should apply to the word Jews. Conversely, if the term people means anyone apart from her husband, then when she says the word Jews she likewise has only other Jews in mind.