

איתמר: ביאת כהן גדול באלמנה, רבי יוחנן ורבי אלעזר: חד אמר: אינה פוטרת צרתה, וחד אמר פוטרת צרתה.

§ On the same subject, it was stated with regard to the case of a High Priest who engaged in intercourse with a widow who was his yevama requiring levirate marriage that the *amora'im* Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar disputed the matter. One said that intercourse does not exempt her rival wife who had also been married to the High Priest's brother, since the act was prohibited, and one said that it does exempt her rival wife, because although intercourse was forbidden, it is nevertheless a valid enactment of levirate marriage, and so her rival wife is thereby exempt.

Perek II

Daf 21 Amud a

HALAKHA

A High Priest who engaged in intercourse with a widow from marriage – ביאת כהן גדול ביבמתו – אֵלְמָנָה: If a High Priest engaged in intercourse with his yevama who had been widowed from marriage, her rival wife is not thereby exempt, as a positive mitzva does not override both a negative and a positive mitzva together, as the Gemara states here (Rambam *Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Yibbum VaHalitza* 6:11).

באלמנה מן הנשואין כולי עלמא לא פליגי דלא פטרה, דאין עשה דוחה לא תעשה ועשה. כי פליגי – באלמנה מן הארוסין. מאן דאמר פוטרת, אתי עשה ודחי את לא תעשה, ומאן דאמר אינה פוטרת – לא אתי עשה ודחי את לא תעשה, כיון דאפשר בחליצה.

As for a widow from marriage,^h everyone agrees that this does not exempt the rival wife, as a positive mitzva does not override a prohibition and a positive mitzva together. When they disagree, it is in the case of a widow from betrothal. The one who said that it exempts the rival wife holds that the positive mitzva of levirate marriage comes and overrides the prohibition against a High Priest marrying a widow. And the one who said that it does not exempt the rival wife held that a positive mitzva does not come and override a prohibition, since it is possible to perform *halitza*.

מיתבי: ואם בעלו – קנו! תיובתא.

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion that the rival wife would not be exempt, from the previously cited *baraita*: If one of those yevamin engaged in intercourse, he acquired her as a wife. This shows that the act of levirate marriage is valid, even when prohibited. If so, in the case of the High Priest and a widow as well, her rival wife should be exempt. This is a conclusive refutation, and that opinion is rejected.

לימא תיהוי נמי תיובתא דריש לקיש! אמר לך ריש לקיש: כי אמינא אנא – היכא דמקיימי מצוה, אבל הכא, חליצה במקום ייבום לאו מצוה היא.

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that this is also a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish and therefore reject his principle? The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish could have said to you: When I say that in every place that you find a positive mitzva and a prohibition applying to the same matter, if you can fulfill both of them together without transgressing the prohibition, this is best, and the positive mitzva does not override the prohibition, this is applicable only when the mitzva is fulfilled properly; but here, *halitza* in place of levirate marriage is not considered a proper fulfillment of the mitzva.ⁿ

אמר רבא: רמו לשניות מן התורה מנין? שנאמר "כי את כל התועבות האל עשו אנשי הארץ". "האל" קשות, מכלל דאיכא רבות, ומאי ניהו – שניות.

§ Rava said: Where is the prohibition against secondary forbidden relationships hinted at in the Torah? As it is stated at the end of the portion discussing forbidden incestuous relations: "For all these abominations have the men of the land done" (Leviticus 18:27). "These" must be understood to mean the harsh ones, i.e., the severe transgressions. This proves by inference that there are also lesser transgressions that are, as it were, soft ones. And what are those soft ones? They are secondary forbidden relationships.

ומאי משמע ד"האל" לישנא דקשה הוא? דכתיב "ואת אילי הארץ לקח".

The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that the word "these" [*ha'el*] is an expression meaning harsh? As it is written: "And the mighty [*eilei*] of the land he took away" (Ezekiel 17:13). The similarity of these words implies that "these" also has connotations of mighty or harsh.

NOTES

חליצה – *Halitza* in place of levirate marriage is not a mitzva – במקום ייבום לאו מצוה: In the *Yosef Lekah* it is explained that *halitza* is a less than ideal option; it is valid but not preferred. Therefore, the positive mitzva of *halitza* is not considered perfect performance of the mitzva. The *Me'a Kesita* explains that the positive mitzva of levirate marriage is similar to a mitzva whose lack of fulfillment can be

rectified by fulfillment of another mitzva, i.e., *halitza*. This is similar to the idea that the positive mitzva of returning a lost item rectifies the prohibition against theft. Therefore, *halitza* is equivalent in importance to levirate marriage, but only when levirate marriage is not possible. Consequently, it is not considered a mitzva when levirate marriage is possible.

עונשין – עונשין – The punishment for using dishonest measures – **של מדות**: The punishment for deception in weights and measures is harsher than the punishment for transgressing the prohibition against forbidden relationships, based on the opinion of Rabbi Levi (Rambam *Sefer Nezikim, Hilkhot Geneiva* 7:12; *Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat* 231:19).

BACKGROUND

עונשין – עונשין: A *kefifa* was generally made from palm leaves and was used for carrying various items. It occasionally served to hold animal feed. These baskets would have handles attached to them after they were woven.



Basket with handles that were added after the initial weaving

לִמָּא פְּלִינָא דְרַבִּי לִוִּי, דְאָמַר רַבִּי לִוִּי: קָשָׁה עוֹנְשֵׁין שְׁל מְדוֹת יוֹתֵר מִעוֹנְשֵׁין שְׁל עֲרִיּוֹת, שְׂוִיָּה נְאָמַר בְּהֵן "אֵל" וְזֶה נְאָמַר בְּהֵן "אֵלָה". "אֵל" – קָשָׁה: "וְאֵלָה" – קָשָׁה מִ"אֵל".

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that this statement contradicts the opinion of Rabbi Levi? As Rabbi Levi said: **The harshness of the punishment for using dishonest measures⁴ is more than the punishment for transgressing the prohibition of forbidden relationships, as with regard to this, forbidden relations, it is stated only: "These [el],"** whereas with regard to that, dishonest measures, it is stated: **"These [eleh]"** with an additional letter *heh* as a suffix: "For all that do these [*eleh*] things, even all that do unrighteously, are an abomination unto the Lord your God" (Deuteronomy 25:16). This implies that the word *eleh* indicates harshness and not the word *el*. The Gemara answers: This does not contradict his opinion. The word *el* has the connotation of harsh, but *eleh* has the connotation of even harsher than *el*.

גַּבֵּי עֲרִיּוֹת נִמְוִי, הָא קָתִיב "אֵלָה". הֵהוּא לְמַעוֹטֵי מְדוֹת מִכְּבָרָת.

The Gemara asks: **With regard to forbidden relationships the word *eleh* is also written:** "For whosoever shall do any of these [*eleh*] abominations, even the souls that do them shall be cut off from among their people" (Leviticus 18:29). If so, why is the punishment for using dishonest measures considered harsher? The Gemara answers: **That** expression meaning these [*eleh*] in the context of forbidden relations does not emphasize their severity; rather, it comes to **exclude** one who uses deception in measures from the penalty of *karet*.

אֵלָא, מַאי חוֹמְרִייהוּ? הֲנִי אֶפְשָׁר בְּתִשְׁבּוּבָה, הֲנִי – לָא אֶפְשָׁר בְּתִשְׁבּוּבָה.

The Gemara asks: **Rather, in what way is deception in measurements more severe than forbidden relations?** The Gemara answers: **Those** who engage in forbidden relations have the **possibility of repentance.**⁵ If one engaged in relations with a forbidden relative he can rectify the sin through repentance. In the case of **those** who deceive the public with dishonest measures, it is **not possible to repent** fully because, having deceived the general public, they have no way of returning the money. Whereas generally a thief can return stolen property to its rightful owner, one who used dishonest measures with multiple customers has no way to track them all down in order to return the money.

רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר מִהֵכָא: "וְאִזְן וְחָקַר תִּקְוֶן מִשְׁלִים הַרְבֵּה" וְאָמַר עוּלָא אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: קוּדָם שְׂבָא שְׁלֵמָה הֵיטָה תוֹרָה דְּוִזְמָה לְכַפִּיפָה שְׂאִין לָהּ אֲזִינִים, עַד שְׂבָא שְׁלֵמָה וְעֵשָׂה לָהּ אֲזִינִים.

Rav Yehuda said that the prohibition of secondary forbidden relationships is learned from here: As it says with regard to King Solomon: "He weighed [*izzen*] and sought out,⁶ and set in order many proverbs" (Ecclesiastes 12:9), and Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: **Before Solomon came, the Torah was like a basket [*kefifa*]⁷ without handles [*oznayim*], until Solomon came and made handles for it.** By means of his explanation and proverbs he enabled each person to understand and take hold of the Torah, fulfill its mitzvot, and distance himself from transgressions.

רַבִּי אוֹשְׁיָא אָמַר מִהֵכָא: "פְּרַעְהוּ אֵל תַּעֲבֵר בּוֹ שְׂטֵה מִעָלָיו וְעֵבֹר".

Rabbi Oshaya said that the prohibition of secondary forbidden relationships is learned from here: **"Avoid it, pass not by it; turn from it, and pass on"** (Proverbs 4:15). One must distance oneself from any prohibited act and not pass near a place of forbidden objects or situations.

NOTES

הֲנִי אֶפְשָׁר בְּתִשְׁבּוּבָה – Those have the possibility of repentance – In the *Tosafot Yeshanim* it is written that full repentance for such people is possible only if their forbidden union has not produced a *mamzer*. However, if a *mamzer* has been born, this is considered a situation described by the verse: "That which is crooked cannot be made straight" (Ecclesiastes 1:15). However, the *Tosefot HaRosh* and the Meiri explain that even if a *mamzer* is born, repentance is still possible. If, on the other hand, one deceived others about measurements, full repentance is possible only if he returns that which was stolen. Since it is impossible to return the stolen money if he deceived the general public, because the sinner does not know from whom he stole, complete repentance is impossible.

וְאִזְן וְחָקַר – He weighed and sought out – The Rivan explains that the verses were interpreted as stating that King Solomon made safeguards around the Torah, as it says: "The words of the wise are as goads... and more than them, my son, beware" (Ecclesiastes 12:11–12). That is, one must be additionally cautious beyond the words of the Torah themselves.

It would seem from this Gemara that King Solomon instituted the decree against secondary forbidden relationships (see *Tosafot; Tosafot Yeshanim*). Alternatively, the author of *Ramat Shmuel* explains that the Gemara here does not propose that it was Solomon who instituted this decree, but that when they made a safeguard around the words of the Torah the Sages acted in accordance with the principle that Solomon laid down.

NOTES

Mistake [beduta] – בְּדוּתָא: This term appears in several places in the Talmud, usually in the context of a complete rejection of statements attributed to later *amora'im*, e.g., Rav Ashi. There are two versions of the Gemara text. According to the first version, the statement is erroneous and unfounded. In other words, Rav Ashi could never have issued this statement, and it must have been attributed to him erroneously. According to a variant reading found in several sources the word is: External [*berota*]. According to this reading, when the Sages wanted to suggest that a certain opinion was without basis, they would do so in a respectful manner, saying: It is external, indicating that it is an outside opinion and should not be introduced into the study hall (*Arukh*).

Establish a safeguard for My prized possession – עֲשׂוּ מִשְׁמֶרֶת לְמִשְׁמֶרְתִּי: The author of the *Sefer Halakhot Gedolot* explains that although the Sages learned from this verse that they should make safeguards around the entire Torah, the verse itself is referring to the *halakhot* of forbidden relations. For this reason they made more safeguards around the *halakhot* of forbidden relationships than any others. This is a fulfillment of the mitzva of: "You shall be sacred" (Leviticus 19:2), which the Sages interpreted to mean: Separate yourselves from forbidden relationships.

BACKGROUND

Mere support – אֶסְמְכֶתָא בְּעֵלְמָא: Sometimes the Gemara states that a verse cited as the basis for a *halakha* is merely an allusion to the *halakha* rather than its actual source. In such cases, the verse is called a support for the *halakha*. Since *halakhot* of this kind are not actually derived from the biblical text, which serves instead as a mnemonic device, they are generally rabbinic decrees. This is indicated in the Talmud by the phrase: The law is rabbinic, and the verse is a mere support.

Secondary forbidden relationships – שְׁנֵיּוֹת: See diagram following this chapter, p. 160.

אָמַר רַב אֲשִׁי: מִשַּׁל דְּרַבִּי אוֹשְׁעִיָּא לְמָה הִדְבֵּר דּוּמָה – לְאַדָּם מְשִׁמֵּר פְּרִדָּס, מְשִׁמְרוּ מִבַּחוּץ – כּוּלּוּ מִשְׁתִּמְרוּ, מְשִׁמְרוּ מִבְּפָנִים – שְׁלִפְנֵי מִשְׁתִּמְרוּ, שְׁלֵא חֲרִיּוּ – אִינוּ מִשְׁתִּמְרוּ. וְהָא דְרַב אֲשִׁי בְּדוּתָא הֵיא: הֵתָם, שְׁלִפְנֵי מִיָּהָא מִשְׁתִּמְרוּ, הֵכָא, אִי לָאו שְׁנֵיּוֹת – פְּגַע בְּעֵרוּהָ גּוּפָה.

רַב כַּהֲנָא אָמַר מִהֵכָא: "וּשְׁמֶרְתָּ אֶת מִשְׁמֶרְתִּי" – עֲשׂוּ מִשְׁמֶרֶת לְמִשְׁמֶרְתִּי.

אָמַר לֵיה אַבְי רַב יוֹסֵף: הָא – דְּאוֹרֵייתָא, הֵיא דְּאוֹרֵייתָא וּפִירְשׁוּ רַבְנֵי. כָּל הַתּוֹרָה נִמְי פִּירְשׁוּ רַבְנֵי! אֵלָּא: מִדְּרַבְנֵי, וּקְרָא – אֶסְמְכֶתָא בְּעֵלְמָא.

תְּנוּ רַבְנֵי: מַה הֵם שְׁנֵיּוֹת? אִם אָמוּ, וְאִם אָבִיו, וְאִשְׁתּוֹ אָבִיו, וְאִשְׁתּוֹ אָבִי אָמוּ, וְאִשְׁתּוֹ אֲחִי הָאָב מִן הָאֵם, וְאִשְׁתּוֹ אֲחִי הָאֵם מִן הָאָב, וְכֵלֶת בְּתוּ. וּמוֹתֵר אָדָם בְּאִשְׁתּוֹ חֲמוּ וּבְאִשְׁתּוֹ חוֹרְגוּ, וְאִסּוּר בְּבֵת חוֹרְגוּ. וְחוֹרְגוּ מוֹתֵר בְּאִשְׁתּוֹ וּבֵתוּ.

Rav Ashi said a parable: To what is this matter, the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya, comparable? It is comparable to a man guarding an orchard; if he guards it from the outside, all of it is guarded. But if he guards it from the inside, only that which is in front of him that he can see is guarded, while that which is behind him is unguarded. The Gemara comments: And this parable of Rav Ashi is a mistake [*beduta*]^N and is not accurate. There, in his metaphor, that which is in front of him at least is guarded; here, in the case of forbidden relationships, were it not for the rabbinic decree against secondary forbidden relationships one would eventually encounter and transgress the biblically forbidden relationship itself. Guarding from the outside is not only preferable, it is essential.

Rav Kahana said that the prohibition of secondary forbidden relationships is alluded to from here, in the verse stated at the conclusion of the verses discussing the *halakhot* of forbidden relationships: "Therefore shall you protect [*ushmartem*] My prized possession [*mishmarti*], that you do not any of these abominable customs" (Leviticus 18:30). This means: Establish a safeguard [*mishmeret*] for My prized possession.^N

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: If the prohibition against secondary forbidden relationships is learned from here then it would be by Torah law, yet the prohibition against secondary forbidden relationships is by rabbinic law. He answered him: The requirement to add an additional safeguard itself is in fact by Torah law, and the Sages interpreted and defined where and when to apply this law. Abaye objected: But isn't all of the Torah also interpreted by the Sages and yet has the force of Torah law? In that case, why are these laws considered to be rabbinic? Rather, the prohibition of secondary forbidden relationships was decreed by rabbinic law, and the verse is a mere support^B but does not indicate a Torah law.

S The Sages taught in a *baraita*: What are the secondary forbidden relationships^B that were prohibited? His mother's mother, and his father's mother, and his father's father's wife,^H and his mother's father's wife, and the wife of his father's maternal half brother, and the wife of his mother's paternal half brother,^H and his son's daughter-in-law,^H and his daughter's daughter-in-law.^H A man is permitted to take his father-in-law's former wife,^H provided she is not the mother of his wife, and his stepson's wife,^H if the stepson died or divorced her. And he is prohibited from marrying the daughter of his stepson.^H And it is permitted for one's stepson to marry the stepfather's wife or daughter.^H

HALAKHA

His mother's mother, and his father's mother, and his father's father's wife – אָם אָמוּ, וְאִם אָבִיו, וְאִשְׁתּוֹ אָבִי אָמוּ: One's mother's mother and one's father's mother and their mothers going back all generations, as well as the wife of his father's father and the wives of his fathers going back all generations are forbidden as secondary forbidden relationships by rabbinic law (Rambam *Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut* 1:6; *Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 15:2, 4–6).

His mother's father's wife and his uncles' wives – אִשְׁתּוֹ אָבִי אָמוּ וּנְשֵׁי דְרַבִּי: His mother's father's wife is prohibited as a secondary forbidden relationship, as are the wife of his father's maternal or paternal half brother. This prohibition applies only to these women themselves and not to their progenitors or descendants in accordance with the opinion of Ze'eiri (Rambam *Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut* 1:6; *Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 15:7–9, 18).

His son's daughter-in-law – כֵּלֶת בְּתוּ: The daughter-in-law of one's son is prohibited as a secondary forbidden relationship, as is his son's son's daughter-in-law, and daughters-in-law of all later generations (Rambam *Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut* 1:6; *Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 15:19).

His daughter's daughter-in-law – כֵּלֶת בְּתוּ: The daughter-in-law of one's daughter is prohibited as a forbidden secondary relationship, but this prohibition applies only to her alone and not to her descendants (Rambam *Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut* 1:6; *Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 15:20).

His father-in-law's wife – אִשְׁתּוֹ חֲמוּ: One's father-in-law's wife who is not his wife's mother is permitted to him (Rif), based on the conclusion in the Gemara. Some hold that she is forbidden to him (*Sefer Halakhot Gedolot; Tosafot*) and follow the Jerusalem Talmud, which prohibits a relationship with her because it appears like a prohibition. Due to this dispute, marriage to her

should not be allowed *ab initio*, but if he takes her in marriage he need not divorce her (*Be'er Heitev on Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 15:24).

His stepson's wife – אִשְׁתּוֹ חוֹרְגוּ: One is permitted to marry the former wife of his stepson (*Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 15:21).

The daughter of his stepson – בֵּת חוֹרְגוּ: It is prohibited by Torah law to marry one's stepson's daughter, i.e., the daughter of his wife's son (*Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 15:13).

It is permitted for one's stepson to marry the stepfather's... daughter – חוֹרְגוּ מוֹתֵר...וּבֵתוּ: A woman is permitted to marry her stepbrother, the son of her mother's husband by another woman. So too, a man is permitted to marry the daughter of his mother's husband by another woman, even if they grew up together in the same household, as is stated explicitly in *Sota* 43b (*Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 15:11).

Secondary forbidden relations that have a conclusion – שְׁנִיּוֹת – שְׁיֵשׁ לָהֶם הַפְסֵק: The four women listed by Rav and Ze’iri: The wife of one’s mother’s paternal half brother, the wife of one’s father’s maternal half brother, the wife of one’s mother’s father, and one’s daughter’s daughter-in-law, while forbidden as secondary relations, see an end to their prohibition, as it applies to them alone and not to their descendants. There are other secondary forbidden relations that have a conclusion, but only those listed in the *baraita* were mentioned (*Yam shel Shlomo*; Rambam *Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut* 1:6; *Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 15:18, 20).

וְאִשְׁתּוֹ חוֹרְגוֹ אוֹמֵרֶת לוֹ: אֲנִי מוֹתֶרֶת לָךְ, וּבִתִּי אִסוּרָה לָךְ.

Due to these rabbinic decrees concerning stepsons, unusual situations might arise. For example: **And his stepson’s wife says to him, i.e., her husband’s stepfather, I am permitted to you, but my daughter is forbidden to you, since she is your stepson’s daughter.**

בֵּת חוֹרְגוֹ – דְּאוֹרְיִיתָא הִיא, דְּכִתְבִּי “אֵת בֵּת בְּנֵהּ וְאֵת בֵּת בִּתְהָ”! מְשׁוּם דְּקִבְעֵי לְמִיתְנֵי סִיפָא: אִשְׁתּוֹ חוֹרְגוֹ אוֹמֵרֶת לוֹ: אֲנִי מוֹתֶרֶת לָךְ וּבִתִּי אִסוּרָה לָךְ, וְאִף עַל גַּב דְּבִתִּי אִסוּרָה לָךְ מְדְאוֹרְיִיתָא – בְּדִידֵי לָא גְזוּר בֵּיהּ רַבְּנָן, תְּנָא רִישָׁא נְמִי בֵּת חוֹרְגוֹ.

The Gemara challenges that which is stated in the *baraita*: **His stepson’s daughter is not a secondary relation by rabbinic law. She is forbidden by Torah law, since the daughter of his stepson is the daughter of his wife’s son, as it is written:** “You shall not take her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter” (Leviticus 18:17). The Gemara answers: This case was included **because the baraita wanted to teach the latter clause, which states: His stepson’s wife says to him: I am permitted to you, but my daughter is forbidden to you. And although my daughter is forbidden to you by Torah law, nevertheless the Sages did not issue a decree forbidding me.** Therefore, the case of his stepson’s daughter was also taught in the first clause, even though she is forbidden by Torah law and is not a secondary relation.

אִי הֲכִי, אִשְׁתּוֹ חֲמִיו נְמִי תִּמְמָא: אֲנִי מוֹתֶרֶת לָךְ וּבִתִּי אִסוּרָה לָךְ, דְּהָוִיא אַחוּת אִשְׁתּוֹ! הֵא – פְּסִיקָא לִיהּ, הֵא – לָא פְּסִיקָא לִיהּ.

The Gemara raises an objection: **If so, that the baraita wished to teach this peculiarity, then why did it not teach: His father-in-law’s wife also says: I am permitted to you and my daughter is forbidden to you, as she is his wife’s sister.** The Gemara answers: **This matter is conclusive for him.** In other words, his stepson’s wife is forever permitted and his stepson’s daughter is always forbidden to him. But as for the matter of his father-in-law’s wife’s daughter, **this is not conclusive for him.** This ruling is not final and might change, since if his wife dies her sister is permitted to him.

אָמַר רַב: אַרְבַּע נְשִׁים יֵשׁ לְהֵן הַפְּסֵק. נִקְיֵט רַב בִּידֵיהּ תְּלַת: אִשְׁתּוֹ אַחֵי הָאִם מִן הָאָב, וְאִשְׁתּוֹ אַחֵי הָאָב מִן הָאִם, וּבִלְתּוֹ. וּזְעִירֵי מוֹסִיף אֵף אִשְׁתּוֹ אָבִי אִמּוֹ. אָמַר רַב נַחֲמָן בַּר יִצְחָק, וְסִימְנֵךְ: דְּעִילָאֵי דְרַב.

Rav said that he received a tradition with regard to secondary forbidden relationships that **four women have a conclusion;**^h i.e., the prohibition does not continue to later generations but applies only to those women who were mentioned explicitly. **Rav held three of them in his hand;** he knew with certainty three of the four categories. They were: **The wife of his mother’s paternal half brother, and the wife of his father’s maternal half brother, and his daughter-in-law. And Ze’iri adds: Also the wife of his mother’s father.** Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said: **And your mnemonic** for remembering who said what is as follows: Ze’iri adds an extra generation **on top** of the prohibitions of Rav,ⁿ i.e., the wife of his mother’s father, which Rav did not mention.

וְרַב, מֵאֵי טַעְמָא לָא חֲשִׁיב לִיהּ? מִיַּחְלָפָא לִיהּ בְּאִשְׁתּוֹ אָבִי אָבִיו.

The Gemara asks: **And what is the reason that Rav did not reckon this category mentioned by Ze’iri to be among those who have a conclusion?** The Gemara answers: In his opinion, this category might be mistakenly **switched with** the category of **the wife of his father’s father**, which does not have a conclusion. With regard to the wife of his father, the prohibition applies equally to the wife of all ancestors in the father’s line. Therefore, according to Rav, the Sages also included the ancestors of the mother’s father’s wife as secondary forbidden relationships.

וּזְעִירֵי: לְהֵתָם שְׂכִיחַ וְאִזְוִיל, לְהֵכָא – לָא שְׂכִיחַ וְאִזְוִיל.

The Gemara asks: **And why is Ze’iri not concerned that the two categories will become confused?** The Gemara answers: **He is often found there, in his father’s father’s home, and goes there frequently, but here, to his mother’s household, he is not commonly found to go.** Since he goes to his father’s home frequently, he knows that his father’s relatives are forbidden to him, and he will not confuse them with his mother’s relatives.

בְּלִתּוֹ Among the women enumerated by Rav is his daughter-in-law.

NOTES

On top of Rav – עִילָאֵי דְרַב: The mnemonic refers to the names of the Rabbis: The word *rav* means large and the word *ze’ir* means small. Normally a small item is placed on top of a larger one.

HALAKHA

His daughter-in-law and his son's daughter-in-law – **בְּנֵי בְּנוֹ וְכִלְתֵּי בְּנוֹ**: One's son's wife is forbidden to him by Torah law, and his son's son's wife is forbidden by rabbinic law. This prohibition has no conclusion (Rambam *Sefer Nashim, Hilkhhot Ishut* 1:6; *Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 15:19).

The wife of a mother's brother – **אִשְׁתֵּי אָחִי הָאֵם**: The wife of one's mother's maternal or paternal brother is forbidden by rabbinic law, as per the conclusion of the Gemara's discussion according to the statement of Rav Yehuda bar Sheila (Rambam *Sefer Nashim, Hilkhhot Ishut* 1:6; *Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 15:9, 18).

BACKGROUND

Chaldean – **בְּלָדָאֵי**: The term Chaldean is a synonym for Chasdean, one of the names for the Babylonian people. This term is used in the Bible as a synonym for stargazers or astrologers, as in the following verse: "Then the king commanded to call the magicians, and the enchanters, and the sorcerers, and the Chaldeans, to tell the king his dreams" (Daniel 2:2).

Some Sages prohibited consulting astrologers to discern the future, based on the Torah injunction: "You shall be wholehearted with the Lord your God" (Deuteronomy 18:13). Nevertheless, many people did consult with them. Although the Sages accepted the belief that astrologers had certain powers to foretell the future, they advised that astrologers should be neither consulted nor overly trusted.

NOTES

For example, the daughters-in-law of the house of bar Tzитай – **בְּנוֹן בְּלִתָּה דְּבִי בַר צִיטַי**: The *Arukh* explains that Tzитай was an important man in his generation, and for this reason all his daughters-in-law would boast of their family connection to him, including his son's daughters-in-law and his daughter's daughters-in-law.

דְּאוּרֵייתָא הִיא, דְּכַתִּיב "עֲרוֹת בְּלִתְךָ לֹא תִגְלֶה!" אִימָא: כִּלְתֵּי בְּנוֹ. וְכִלְתֵּי בְּנוֹ יֵשׁ לָהּ הַפְּסִק? וְהָא תִנְיָא: כִּלְתֵּי – עֲרוּה, כִּלְתֵּי בְּנוֹ – שְׁנֵי, וְכֵן אִתָּה אֹמֵר בְּבְנוֹ, וְכֵן בְּנוֹ, עַד סוֹף כָּל הַדּוֹרוֹת! אֲלָא אִימָא: כִּלְתֵּי בְּתוּ.

דְּאָמַר רַב הִסְדָּא: הָא מִלְּתָא מִגְּבָרָא רַבָּה שְׁמִיעַ לִי, וּמְנוּ – רַבִּי אָמִי: לֹא אָסְרוּ כִּלְתֵּי אֲלָא מִפְּנֵי כִּלְתֵּי. וְאָמְרוּ לִי בְּלָדָאֵי: מִלְּפָנָא הָיִית.

אָמִינָא: אִי גְבָרָא רַבָּה הָיִינָא – אָסְבְּרָא מִדְּעֵתִי, אִי מְקִירֵי דְּרִדְקֵי הָיִינָא – אִשְׁוִילָה מִרְבֵּנֵי דְּאִתּוֹ לְבִי כְּנִישְׁתָּא. הֲשִׁתָּא סְבָרְתָּה מִדְּעֵתִי: לֹא אָסְרוּ כִּלְתֵּי בְּתוּ אֲלָא מִשּׁוּם כִּלְתֵּי בְּנוֹ.

אָמַר לִיָּה אֲבִי לְרַבָּא: אָסְבְּרָה לְךָ, כְּגוֹן כִּלְתֵּי דְּבִי בַר צִיטַי, רַב פְּפָא אָמַר: כְּגוֹן כִּלְתֵּי דְּבִי רַב פְּפָא בַר אָבָא. רַב אֲשִׁי אָמַר: כְּגוֹן כִּלְתֵּי דְּבִי מְרִי בַר אִיסַק.

אִיבְעִיא לְהוּ: אִשְׁתֵּי אָחִי הָאֵם מִן הָאֵם, מִהוּ? אִשְׁתֵּי אָחִי הָאָב מִן הָאֵם, וְאִשְׁתֵּי אָחִי הָאֵם מִן הָאָב, דְּאִיכָא צַד אָב – הוּא דְּגוֹרֵי רַבְּנָן, אֲבָל הִיכָא דְּלִיכָא צַד אָב לֹא גוֹרֵי בְּהוּ רַבְּנָן, אוּ דְּלִמָּא לֹא שְׁנָא?

The Gemara asks: Is this relationship not forbidden by Torah law? As it is written: "You shall not uncover the nakedness of your daughter-in-law" (Leviticus 18:15). The Gemara emends: Say instead his son's daughter-in-law.¹⁴ The Gemara asks: And does the prohibition against having a relationship with his son's daughter-in-law indeed have a conclusion? Isn't it taught in a *baraita*: His daughter-in-law is a forbidden relation by Torah law, his son's daughter-in-law is a secondary forbidden relation, and similarly, you say the daughter-in-law of his son and the daughter-in-law of his son's son until the end of all generations are secondary forbidden relationships. Rather, say instead that Rav was referring to his daughter's daughter-in-law.

As Rav Hisda said: I heard this matter from a great man, and who was that great man? It was Rabbi Ami,¹⁵ and he said: They prohibited a daughter-in-law only due to the daughter-in-law. Rav Hisda heard this in his youth but did not understand the meaning. The Chaldean astrologers¹⁶ said to me: You will be a teacher.

Rav Hisda further said: I said to myself: If the astrologers meant that I will become a great man and one who teaches the public, I will certainly be able to reason and understand this matter with my knowledge. If the astrologers meant that I will become the teacher of children, I will ask it of the Sages who come to the synagogue and in that way I will learn the meaning of Rabbi Ami's teaching. Now I understand the matter on my own. Rabbi Ami meant: They prohibited his daughter's daughter-in-law only due to his son's daughter-in-law, to avoid confusion between these daughters-in-law. The rabbinic decree prohibited one's daughter's daughter-in-law but did not extend to subsequent generations.

Various Sages proceeded to give contemporary examples of families where the halakhic status of the daughters-in-law of the sons and the daughters-in-law of the daughters could be confused with each other. Abaye said to Rava: I will explain to you with an example how one might become confused about these daughters-in-law. For example, this would be possible in the case of the daughter-in-law of the house of bar Tzитай,¹⁷ as there the children of the sons and the daughters of the same family lived together, and it was possible to confuse the halakhic status of the sons' daughters-in-law and the daughters' daughters-in-law. Rav Pappa said: For example, the daughter-in-law of the house of Rav Pappa bar Abba. Rav Ashi said: For example, the daughter-in-law of the house of Mari bar Isak.

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the *halakha* with regard to the wife of one's mother's maternal half brother?¹⁸ The Gemara presents the different sides of the question: Both the wife of one's father's maternal half brother and the wife of one's mother's paternal half brother contain some aspect of a father, and perhaps this is the reason that the Sages enacted a prohibition. That is, they were both forbidden rabbinically to avoid confusion with the case of the wife of one's father's paternal half brother, who is forbidden by Torah law. But in the case of the wife of one's mother's maternal half brother, where there is no aspect of a father whatsoever, perhaps the Sages did not make a decree? Or perhaps this case is no different?

PERSONALITIES

A great man... Rabbi Ami – **רַבִּי אָמִי**: Rabbi Ami was a well-known third-generation *amora* who lived in Eretz Yisrael at the end of the third century CE. He headed the yeshiva in Tiberias together with his colleague Rabbi Asi after the deaths of Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar. Rabbi Ami considered Rabbi Yohanan to be his primary teacher, although he also studied under Reish Lakish, Rabbi Elazar, Rabbi Oshaya, and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi.

During Rav Huna's lifetime Rabbi Ami deferred to his halakhic decisions, but after his death Rabbi Ami was considered the foremost authority. It may have been for this reason that he was known as a great man. In answer to one of the questions he received, he wrote: From me, Ami bar Natan, Torah emanates to all of Israel (*Gittin* 44a). Among those who sent him their queries were Rabbi Abbahu, Rav Nahman, and Rava.

Decree to prevent violation of a decree – גְּזֵרָה לְגִזְרָה: The reason that the Sages did not issue decrees to prevent violation of a decree is because although the Torah says that they must establish a fence around the mitzvot, they were not instructed to make a fence around that fence because, if that were to be done, it could continue ad infinitum. In some cases, however, the Gemara discusses a decree to prevent violation of another decree, and in those cases the Gemara explains that all the decrees were part of one original decree.

HALAKHA

His mother's mother and his father's mother – אִם אֶמֶת אָבִי: One's mother is forbidden by Torah law, and one's mother's mother is forbidden by rabbinic law. The Sages decreed that one's father's mother is forbidden as well (Rambam *Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut* 1:6; *Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 15:2, 4).

The wife of one's father's father and of one's mother's father – אִשְׁתְּ אָבִי הָאָבִי הָאָבִי: One's father's wife is forbidden by Torah law, and one's father's father's wife and one's mother's father's wife are forbidden as secondary relations by rabbinic law (*Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 15:5–7).

The wife of one's father's brother – אִשְׁתְּ אָחִי הָאָבִי: The wife of one's father's paternal half brother is forbidden by Torah law, and the wife of one's father's maternal half brother is forbidden by rabbinic law (*Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 15:18).

His stepdaughter and his stepson's wife – חוּרְגָתוֹ: One's stepdaughter is forbidden by Torah law, but one's stepson's wife is permitted (*Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 15:13, 21).

NOTES

Every female relative who is a forbidden relation, etc. – כָּל שְׂבִיבָה עֵרוּהוּכֹר: According to the Gemara's conclusion, this principle applies in only a few cases. The Gemara is not stating a principle with regard to all forbidden relations but only with regard to aunts. Since one's father's sisters and mother's sisters and the wife of one's father's paternal half brother are forbidden by Torah law, the Sages decreed that anyone who is called an aunt is also forbidden, to avoid confusion between them (Ritva).

אָמַר רַב סַפְרָא: הִיא גּוֹפֵה גְזֵרָה, וְאֵין יִקְוֶה וְנִגְזֹר גְזֵרָה לְגְזֵרָה? אָמַר רַבָּא: אֵטוּ כּוֹלְהוּ לָאוּ גְזֵרָה לְגְזֵרָה נִינְהוּ? אָמוּ – עֵרוּהוּ, אִם אָמוּ – שְׂנֵיָהּ, וְגִזְרוּ עַל אִם אָבִיו מִשּׁוּם אִם אָמוּ. וְטַעְמָא מַאי? כּוֹלְהוּ "דְּבִי אִמָּא רַבְתִּי" קְרוּ לֵיהּ.

אִשְׁתְּ אָבִיו – עֵרוּהוּ, אִשְׁתְּ אָבִי אָבִיו – שְׂנֵיָהּ, וְגִזְרוּ עַל אִשְׁתְּ אָבִי אָמוּ מִשּׁוּם אִשְׁתְּ אָבִי אָבִיו, וְטַעְמָא מַאי? כּוֹלְהוּ "דְּבִי אִמָּא רַבְתִּי" קְרוּ לֵיהּ.

אִשְׁתְּ אָחִי הָאָבִי מִן הָאָבִי – עֵרוּהוּ, אִשְׁתְּ אָחִי הָאָבִי מִן הָאָמִי – שְׂנֵיָהּ, וְגִזְרוּ עַל אִשְׁתְּ אָחִי הָאָבִי מִן הָאָבִי מִשּׁוּם אִשְׁתְּ אָחִי הָאָבִי מִן הָאָמִי – מִשּׁוּם דְּכּוֹלְהוּ "דְּבִי דוּדִי" קְרוּ לֵיהּ.

מַאי תָּא שְׂמַע: דְּכִי אֶתָּא רַב יְהוּדָה בְּרַ שֵׁילָא אָמַר: אָמְרִי בְּמַעְרְבָא: כָּל שְׂבִיבָה עֵרוּהוּ – בּוֹכֵר גִּזְרוּ עַל אִשְׁתּוֹ מִשּׁוּם שְׂנֵיָהּ.

וְאָמַר רַבָּא: וְכִלְלָא הוּא? חֲמוּתוֹ – עֵרוּהוּ, אִשְׁתְּ חֲמִיו מוּתֶרֶת. בֵּת חֲמוּתוֹ – עֵרוּהוּ, אִשְׁתְּ בֵּן חֲמוּתוֹ מוּתֶרֶת. בֵּת חֲמִיו – עֵרוּהוּ, אִשְׁתְּ בֵּן חֲמִיו – מוּתֶרֶת. חוּרְגָתוֹ – עֵרוּהוּ, אִשְׁתְּ חוּרְגוֹ – מוּתֶרֶת. בֵּת חוּרְגָתוֹ עֵרוּהוּ אִשְׁתְּ בֵּן חוּרְגוֹ מוּתֶרֶת.

וְהָא דְרַב יְהוּדָה בְּרַ שֵׁילָא לֹאִיתוּי מַאי? לָאוּ לֹאִיתוּי אִשְׁתְּ אָחִי הָאָבִי מִן הָאָבִי, דְּכָל שְׂבִיבָה עֵרוּהוּ – בּוֹכֵר גִּזְרוּ עַל אִשְׁתּוֹ מִשּׁוּם שְׂנֵיָהּ!

מַאי שְׂנָא הִנּוּ וּמַאי שְׂנָא הָאָבִי? הָא – בְּחַד קִידוּשֵׁין מְקָרֵב לֵהּ, הִנּוּ – עַד דְּאִיכָּא תְרִי קִידוּשֵׁין לֹא מְקָרֵב לֵהּ.

Rav Safra said: She herself, the wife of the mother's paternal half brother, is forbidden by rabbinic decree, and will we then proceed to issue a decree to prevent violation of a decree?²⁶ Rava said: Is that to say that all of these rabbinic decrees with regard to secondary relations are not decrees to prevent violation of a decree? For example, his mother is a forbidden relation by Torah law, and the Sages decreed that his mother's mother is a secondary forbidden relationship. And they decreed that his father's mother is also a secondary forbidden relationship due to his mother's mother.²⁷ And what is the reason? They are all called the house of the grandmother, and therefore people may confuse their halakhic status.

Rava continues: Similarly, his father's wife is a forbidden relation by Torah law, and the Sages decreed that his father's father's wife is a secondary forbidden relationship. And they decreed that his mother's father's wife is also a secondary forbidden relationship due to his father's father's wife.²⁸ And what is the reason? They are all called the house of the grandfather.

Also, the wife of his father's paternal half brother, his uncle, who is mentioned explicitly in the Torah (Leviticus 18:16), is a forbidden relation by Torah law, and the Sages decreed that the wife of his father's maternal half brother²⁹ is a secondary forbidden relationship. And they decreed that the wife of his mother's paternal half brother is also a secondary forbidden relationship due to the wife of his father's maternal half brother. And what is the reason? It is because they are all called the house of the uncle; it seems that in the realm of forbidden relations the Sages did issue decrees to prevent violation of a decree, and Rav Safra's claim is incorrect.

If so, then what is the *halakha* in this case of the wife of his mother's maternal half brother? Come and hear: As when Rav Yehuda bar Sheila came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: In the West, Eretz Yisrael, they say this principle: For every female relative who is a forbidden relation³⁰ by Torah law, the Sages decreed on the wife of the equivalent male relative due to her similarity to a secondary forbidden relationship.

And Rava said: Is this really an established principle? Isn't his mother-in-law a forbidden relation by Torah law, while his father-in-law's wife is permitted? Also, his mother-in-law's daughter is a forbidden relation by Torah law, as she is his wife's sister, yet his mother-in-law's son's wife is permitted. His father-in-law's daughter is a forbidden relation by Torah law, yet the wife of his father-in-law's son is permitted. His stepdaughter is a forbidden relation by Torah law, yet his stepson's wife³¹ is permitted. His stepdaughter's daughter, i.e., his wife's granddaughter, is a forbidden relation, yet the wife of his stepson's son is permitted.

The Gemara continues: If so, what did that statement of Rav Yehuda bar Sheila come to include? Since his principle is not true in every case, it must be intended to include a specific *halakha*. Does it not come to include the case of the wife of one's mother's maternal half brother, since for every female relative who is a forbidden relation by Torah law, such as his mother's maternal half sister, the Sages decreed on the wife of the equivalent male relative, in this case his mother's maternal half brother's wife, due to her similarity to a secondary relation.

The Gemara asks: What is different with regard to these cases, the wife of his father-in-law or the wife of his mother-in-law's son, who are permitted, and this case of the wife of a mother's maternal half brother, who is prohibited? The Gemara answers: This, the wife of a mother's maternal half brother, is related by a single act of betrothal. One's mother's brother is a blood relative, and his wife is therefore a secondary relation. In contrast, these other cases with regard to which the Sages did not issue a decree are related only when there are two acts of betrothal. For example, one's father-in-law is related to one through one's marriage to his own wife, and his father in law's wife is related to him through his father-in-law's marriage.

NOTES

The wife of a father's father's brother, etc. – אִשְׁתְּ אָחִי – אָבִי הָאָבִי וכו': The early commentaries ask why the Gemara did not similarly inquire about the sister of one's mother's mother, as she is an equally close relative. They answered that the Gemara did not ask about every possible case, but took these two cases as examples. These specific cases were used because the Gemara's question is based on the fact that one generation below them is a forbidden relation by Torah law.

HALAKHA

The wife of one's father's father's brother, etc. – אִשְׁתְּ אָחִי אָבִי אָבִי: The wife of one's father's father's paternal half brother is permitted as well as both the maternal and paternal half sisters of one's father's father, in accordance with the statement of Ameimar. This is the halakha according to She'iltot deRav Aḥai Gaon and Rabbeinu Ḥananel and is also the opinion of the Rambam and the Rif. There is an opinion that these relations are forbidden (Tur, citing Ri; Rosh on Yevamot 40b). The halakha is ruled in accordance with the first opinion (Shulḥan Arukh, Even HaEzer 15:18).

PERSONALITIES

Mar, son of Rabbana – מַר בְּרִיהַ דְּרַבְנָא: Mar, son of Rabbana, was also known as Mar, son of Ravina. He was one of the outstanding fourth-generation Babylonian amora'im and the son of Ravina I. He was renowned in the Talmud as an extremely God-fearing man, and others derived proper behavior for a God-fearing individual from his conduct. He was vigilant in avoiding excessive levity or any matter that lessened the appropriate deference to God. He was particularly careful in his choice of words in order to avoid any possibility of affronting his teachers. He studied primarily with Rav Nahman bar Yitzḥak as a disciple-colleague. The Talmud relates that he left halakic notes that served as the basis for discussion in subsequent generations.

שְׁלַח לֵיָהּ רַב מִשְׁרָשָׁיָא מִתּוֹסְפִינַי לְרַב פַּפִּי: יִלְמְדֵנוּ רַבֵּינוּ, אִשְׁתְּ אָחִי אָבִי הָאָבִי, וְאֶחָת אָבִי הָאָבִי, מֵהוּ? מִדְּלִמְטָה עָרוּהּ – לְמַעַלָּה נִמְי זָרוּ בֵּיהּ, אִו דְּלִמָּא, הָא אֵיתְפְּלִי דְרַתָּא?

תָּא שְׁמַע: "מֵה הֵן שְׁנִיּוֹת", וְלֹא קִחְשִׁיב לָהּ בְּהִדְוִיָּהּ.

תַּנָּא וְשִׁיר. מֵאִי שִׁיר דְהָאִי שִׁיר? שִׁיר שְׁנִיּוֹת דְבִי רַבִּי חֵיָא.

אֲמִימַר אֲכֶשֶׁר בְּאִשְׁתְּ אָחִי אָבִי אָבִי, וּבְאֶחָת אָבִי אָבִי. אָמַר לֵיהּ רַב הִלֵּל לְרַב אֲשִׁי: לְדִידִי חֲזִינָא לִי שְׁנִיּוֹת מַר בְּרִיהַ דְּרַבְנָא, וּכְתִיבֵן שִׁיתְסָרִי לְאִיסוּרָא. מֵאִי לָאו תַּמְנֵי דְמַתְנִיתָא וְשִׁית דְבִי רַבִּי חֵיָא, וְהֵנָּה תַרְתִּי – הָא שִׁיתְסָרִי!

וְלִטְעַמִּיךְ שִׁיתְסָרִי הָוִין, דְּהָא אִיכָא אִשְׁתְּ אָחִי הָאֵם מִן הָאֵם, דְּפִשְׁטִין לְאִיסוּרָא! הָא לֹא קִשְׁיָא.

S Rav Mesharshiyya from Tusneya sent a message to Rav Pappi: Let our Master teach us: What is the halakha with regard to the wife of a father's father's brotherⁿ and the sister of a father's father? Did the Sages prohibit these as secondary forbidden relations? The Gemara presents the different sides of the dilemma: Since one generation below is a forbidden relation, i.e., a father's sister and the wife of a father's paternal brother, who are both forbidden by Torah law, perhaps the Sages also decreed about the women one generation above. Or, perhaps the generations are separate and the women in the generation above are not considered to be forbidden relatives.

The Gemara attempts to answer: Come and hear from that baraita cited above, which taught: What are the secondary forbidden relationships that were prohibited? And these women, i.e., the wife of one's father's father's brother and the sister of his father's father were not reckoned among them. This implies that these women are permitted.

The Gemara replies that this is not conclusive. Perhaps the tanna of the baraita taught some examples and omitted other examples of secondary forbidden relations; i.e., perhaps the list is not exhaustive. The Gemara asks: What else did he omit that he omitted this? It cannot be that the tanna had an exhaustive list except for one case. He either left out more than one case or he included all possible cases. The Gemara answers: He omitted the list of secondary forbidden relationships that were enumerated by the school of Rabbi Ḥiyya, which is listed later. Therefore, this baraita is not conclusive, as the tanna left out many cases.

The Gemara states that Ameimar permitted the wife of one's father's father's brotherⁿ and the sister of one's father's father. Rav Hillel said to Rav Ashi, challenging Ameimar's statement: I myself saw a list of secondary forbidden relationships written by Mar, son of Rabbana,^p and it was written there that sixteen women were forbidden. What, is it not that these sixteen must be the eight cases listed in the baraita, and six from the school of Rabbi Ḥiyya, and these two cases of the wife of one's father's father's brother and one's father's father's sister, and this totals sixteen?

Rav Ashi defended Ameimar's opinion: And according to your reasoning, Rav Hillel, that these cases should be included, there are seventeen cases, as there is the additional case of the wife of a mother's maternal half brother, whose status was resolved earlier, concluding that she is forbidden. If it is as you say, then there should be seventeen cases. The Gemara answers on behalf of Rav Hillel: This is not difficult.

הֵנָּה תַרְתִּי דְדַמְיִין לְהַדְדִי – בְּחֻדָּא קִשְׁיַב לְהוּ, וְהָא שִׁיתְסָרִי. וְהָא מִכָּל מְקוֹם לְדִידִי חֲזִינָא לֵן דְּכְתִיבֵן לְאִיסוּרָא! אָמַר לֵיהּ: וְלִיטְעַמִּיךְ, אִי הוּא כְּתִיב לְהִיתְפְּרָא – מִי הוּוֹת סְמַכְתָּ עֲלֵיהּ? דְּמַר בְּרִיהַ דְּרַבְנָא – מִי חֲתִים עֲלֵיהּ? הִשְׁתָּא נִמְי דְּכְתִיב לְאִיסוּרָא – לָאו מַר בְּרִיהַ דְּרַבְנָא חֲתִים עֲלֵיהּ.

Those two, the wife of a father's father's brother and the sister of a father's father, are similar to each other and are counted as a single case, and so there are sixteen. The Gemara restates Rav Hillel's challenge to Ameimar's opinion: But in any case I myself saw them written as prohibited. Rav Ashi said to Rav Hillel: And according to your reasoning, if in the list it was written that they were permitted, would you have relied on that? Is the signature of Mar, son of Rabbana, signed on it? Although you saw the list, you don't know for certain who wrote it. Now too, that it is written that they are prohibited, the same holds true; the signature of Mar, son of Rabbana, is not signed on it, and so it cannot be relied upon to reject the opinion of Ameimar.

Perek II
Daf 22 Amud a