Forbidden crossbred livestock, an animal with a condition that will cause it to die within twelve months [terefa], an animal delivered through the abdominal wall, and an animal that is a tumtum or a hermaphrodite does not become sacred and do not render another animal sacred in their place.

Halakha
A bird used for sexual relations, and one set aside, etc. – Width, and what is the reason for this? A bird offering that was killed by pinching is not considered an unslaughtered carcass with respect to the halakhot of ritual impurity. This halakha applies only if the bird was fit for sacrifice, but if it was used for sexual relations with a human being, or set aside for idolatrous purposes, or was itself worshipped as an idol, or was given as payment to a prostitute, or was the price of a dog, or was a tumtum or a hermaphrodite, it is considered an unslaughtered carcass in all regards. Consequently, it renders one and the garments he is wearing ritual impure when it is eaten and reaches the individual’s throat.

Notes
They render garments ritual impure when they come into contact with his throat. A special halakha applies to the carcasses of a clean bird. Although it is impure, it does not impart ritual impurity via touching or carrying, as does the carcass of an animal, but only via eating. When a piece of the carcass enters one’s esophagus, he contracts ritual impurity that affects not only himself but also the clothes he is wearing at the time.
Substitution – הָתְמוּרָה
The halakha of substitution appears in Leviticus 22:10, and an entire tractate, Temura, deals with its details. The basic halakha of substitution is that while it is prohibited to replace a sanctified animal, i.e., one that has been consecrated as an offering, with another animal, and anyone who does so has transgressed a prohibition and is liable to be flogged, the animal designated as a substitute is nevertheless sanctified. However, the first animal still retains its own sanctity. Furthermore, although blemished animals cannot become sacred through initial consecration, they can become sacred through substitution. Nevertheless, a special biblical decree teaches that the animals listed in the Gemara do not become sacred through substitution.

And they do not render another animal sacred when it is made a substitute – והלך הרן והלך הרן. Rashi suggests several possibilities as to how these disqualified animals can become sanctified. The early authorities point out that one could simply say that they all became sacred as the offspring of offerings, but since not all Sages agree that the offspring of offerings are sanctified, it is preferable to find other explanations for their sanctification.

They did not let me learn – אל למד לי. In the Jerusalem Talmud, where this incident is recounted as well, it is discussed whether the reason they prevented him from studying there was because they did not want him to reveal matters best kept secret or because they thought him unworthy to be a disciple of their teacher (see Arukh Lehak). And Shmuel said: They do not become sacred by way of substitution, i.e., if one had an animal that had been designated as an offering, and he wished to substitute one of these animals for it, the substituted animal does not become sacred. And they themselves do not render another animal sacred when it is made a substitute for them. If one designated one of these animals as an offering and he wished to substitute another animal for it, it does not become sacred. The Gemara concludes: Learn from this that Rabbi Eliezer does not consider a hermaphrodite to be a proper male.

It is taught in the mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: If one had intercourse with a hermaphrodite, one is liable to be punished with stoning on his account as if one had relations with a male. It is taught on this matter in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: When I went to learn Torah from Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua, his students joined together against me like the roosters of Beit Bukya, highly aggressive animals that do not allow other creatures to remain among them, and they did not let me learn there. Therefore, I managed to learn only one thing in our mishna, which is that Rabbi Eliezer says: If one had intercourse with a hermaphrodite, one is liable to be punished with stoning on his account as if one had relations with a male.

And Shmuel said: They do not become sacred by way of substitution, i.e., if one had an animal that had been designated as an offering, and he wished to substitute one of these animals for it, the substituted animal does not become sacred. And they themselves do not render another animal sacred when it is made a substitute for them. If one designated one of these animals as an offering and he wished to substitute another animal for it, it does not become sacred. The Gemara concludes: Learn from this that Rabbi Eliezer does not consider a hermaphrodite to be a proper male.

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MISHNA There are women who are permitted to marry their husbands and forbidden to marry their yevamim, while others are permitted to marry their yevamin and forbidden to marry their husbands. Certain women are permitted both to these and to those, and others are forbidden to both these and to those.

The mishna elaborates: And these are cases of women who are permitted to marry their husbands and forbidden to marry them: In the case of a common priest who married a widow, and he has a brother who is the High Priest, the widow, who was permitted to marry her husband, is forbidden to marry yavam, as it is prohibited for the High Priest to marry a widow. The same is true in the case of a priest disqualified due to flawed lineage [halal], e.g., the son of a priest and a divorcée, who married a woman to marry a priest, and he has a brother who is a priest fit for service. That woman was permitted to marry the halal but is forbidden to his brother. Having engaged in intercourse with the halal, she is rendered a halala, a woman disqualified from marrying a priest.

Another example is the case of an Israelite of unflawed lineage who married an Israelite woman of similar lineage, and he has a brother who is a son born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [mamzer]; or a mamzer who married a daughter born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [mamzeret], and he has a brother who is an Israelite of unflawed lineage. A mamzer is permitted to marry a mamzeret, but neither is permitted to a Jew of unflawed lineage. In each of these cases, these women are permitted to marry their husbands and forbidden to marry their yevamin.

And these are cases of women who are permitted to marry their yevamin and forbidden to marry their husbands: For example, there is the case of a High Priest who betrothed a widow, and he has a brother who is a common priest, whom she is permitted to marry. This is true only if the High Priest merely betrothed her. However, if he consummated the marriage, he rendered her a halala forbidden to all priests, including her yavam. The additional cases are a priest fit for service who married a halala and he has a brother who is a halala; an Israelite of unflawed lineage who married a mamzeret, and he has a brother who is a mamzer; and a mamzer who married an Israelite woman of unflawed lineage, and he has a brother who is similar, an Israelite of unflawed lineage. All of these women are permitted to marry their husbands and forbidden to marry their yevamin.

And these are cases where women are forbidden both to these and to those: A High Priest who married a widow, and he has a brother who is a High Priest or a common priest; a priest fit for service who married a halala, and he has a brother who is a priest fit for service; an Israelite of unflawed lineage who married a mamzeret, and he has a brother who is similarly an Israelite of unflawed lineage, and he has a brother who is a mamzer. All of these women are forbidden both to these and to those. And all other women are permitted to marry their husbands and to marry their yevamin.

The halakhic ruling explains that although the marriage itself was improper, an obligation of levirate marriage exists nevertheless, and it is permitted for the yevamin to marry the women. This is true despite the fact that with regard to certain prohibitions the Gemara applies the following a fortiori inference: If she is forbidden to the man usually permitted to marry her, namely her husband, she is certainly also prohibited to her yavam, who as her husband’s brother is ordinarily forbidden to her. Furthermore, although her marriage was never supposed to serve reproductive purposes, as her husband was obligated to divorce her, the mitzva to establish offspring for one’s deceased brother still remains (Ritva; see Nimmuket Yo’sef).

And all other women – see in the Jerusalem Talmud, which is cited by several early authorities including the Rashba, it is pointed out that this statement is imprecise, as there are several other cases in which the woman is forbidden to the husband or yavam that are omitted by the mishna. The Gemara there infers a universal principle from this: Practical halakha cannot be derived from the generalizations of a mishna, as they are not always formulated precisely.

HALAKHA Permitted to their yevamin and forbidden to their husbands. This ruling explains that although the marriage itself was improper, an obligation of levirate marriage exists nevertheless, and it is permitted for the yevamin to marry the women. This is true despite the fact that with regard to certain prohibitions the Gemara applies the following a fortiori inference: If she is forbidden to the man usually permitted to marry her, namely her husband, she is certainly also prohibited to her yavam, who as her husband’s brother is ordinarily forbidden to her. Furthermore, although her marriage was never supposed to serve reproductive purposes, as her husband was obligated to divorce her, the mitzva to establish offspring for one’s deceased brother still remains (Ritva; see Nimmuket Yo’sef).

In the case where a woman was forbidden to her husband by dint of a prohibition, a prohibition stated as a positive mitzva, or because they are secondary relatives forbidden to each other by rabbinic law, but she is permitted to her yavam, they may perform levirate marriage (Rambam, Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Yibbum 6:13; Shulhan Arukh, Even Ha’ezir 14:2).
She does not have the right to receive payment for her marriage contract, etc. — ירמיהו קרא אוכל אלא alma Ḥakat: If a man marries a woman forbidden to him as a secondary relative, whether or not he was aware of this fact, she has no claim to the main sum of her marriage contract, meaning the primary commitment of two hundred dinars for a virgin or one hundred dinars for a bride who is not a virgin. She also has no claim to any of the additional stipulations in the marriage contract, clauses that obligate the husband to provide the wife with additional benefits in various circumstances. However, she does receive the additional sum of the marriage contract; a supplementary amount above the compulsory one hundred or two hundred dinars that the husband may have added voluntarily. She is not entitled to sustenance from her husband’s estate, even after his death. Furthermore, as an additional disincentive, she does not have to pay for his consumption of the produce of her property during their marriage (Rambam Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut 2.4:2; Shulhan Arukh, Even Ha’Ezer 116:4).

And the court forces him to divorce her — הָא וְרֵחָיו אוֹתָן. If a man married a woman forbidden to him, the court forces him to divorce her, even if she is prohibited only by rabbinic law, e.g., she is a secondary relative (Rambam Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut 2.4:2; Shulhan Arukh, Even Ha’Ezer 142:20).

A widow married to a High Priest, etc. — מַהַר שַׁלֹּם. In the case of one who married a woman forbidden to him by a Torah prohibition, if he was aware of the prohibition at the time of marriage, she receives her basic marriage contract and his addition to it, as well as all the conditions of the marriage contract, and she is sustained from his property after his death. If he did not know about the prohibited nature of the marriage, she does not receive her basic marriage contract or any of the conditions of the marriage contract, although she is entitled to the additional part. The Rambam rules that a woman who married a man forbidden to her by a positive mitzva is entitled to payment of her marriage contract, the additional sum, and her sustenance, as the transgression is a light one. He maintains that the mishna spoke only of prohibitions (Rambam Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut 2.4:4 and Koshc Mishneh there; Shulhan Arukh, Even Ha’Ezer 116:1).

Why does he specifically teach: Married — מַהַר שַׁלֹּם. Many commentators, including Rashbi, understand this question as referring to the first clause of the mishna. The Mahara, in his second edition, asks why the same difficulty is not raised concerning all of the other cases in the mishna that state: Married, instead of: Betrothed. He answers that with regard to other prohibitions there is no practical halachic difference whether he married or betrothed her, as the prohibition is created by the forbidden relationship. In the case of a High Priest, however, it does matter whether she is a virgin.

Let him teach that he betrothed — שָׁנָה. This and other related questions are posed by the Jerusalem Talmud as well. The primary answer given there is that the mishna’s generalizations are not precise, and therefore nothing can be inferred from the omission of particular examples.

But the entire chapter — מֵידַר שַׁלֹּם. According to Rashbi, this ruling is based on a biblical exposition. Rashba points out that the conclusion of the Gemara indicates otherwise, as stated by Rava: Although a positive mitzva does override a prohibition, the Sages decreed that they should not perform levirate marriage in this case, since only the first act of intercourse fulfills the mitzva of levirate marriage, and any additional cohabitation, which does not constitute a mitzva, is prohibited (Peri Eshel).

Furthermore, if a man marries a woman forbidden to him as a secondary relative, she does not have the right to receive payment for her marriage contract if divorced or widowed, nor is she entitled to payment from her husband for the produce of her property that he used, nor is she entitled to provisions for her sustenance from his estate, nor does she get back her worn clothes or other objects she brought with her to her marriage. And the lineage of the offspring is unlawful, and the court forces him to divorce her.

In contrast, a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcée or a yevama who performed halitza [halitza] married to a common priest, a manzerez or a Gibeonite woman married to an Israelite of unlawful lineage, and an Israelite woman of unlawful lineage married to a Gibeonite or to a manzerez all have the right to receive payment for their marriage contract, although it was prohibited for them to marry.

GEMARA

As an example of a woman who is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her yavam, the mishna cites the case of a widow married to a common priest whose brother was a High Priest. The Gemara asks: Why does the tanna specifically teach a case where the priest married the widow? Let him teach that he betrothed her, as even if she is widowed after betrothal she requires levirate marriage or halitza.

And if you would say: The reason that the tanna cited the case where they were married is that in this case there is a positive mitzva that the High Priest marry a virgin and also a prohibition to marry a widow, and therefore she is forbidden to him. However, if he betrothed her, the positive mitzva of levirate marriage comes and overrides the prohibition against marrying a widow. To counter this argument, the tanna states: But that cannot be the case, as the entire chapter discusses cases involving the positive mitzva of levirate marriage and prohibitions, and in all those cases, the positive mitzva does not come and override the prohibition, even in the absence of an additional positive mitzva.

The Gemara answers: The mishna could have cited a case where the priest betrothed the widow. Instead, the mishna cites a case where the priest married a widow, due to the fact that the tanna wants to teach in the latter clause of the mishna the case of a High Priest who married a widow who has a brother who is a common priest. That case is specifically if he married her, because he thereby rendered her a halala. However, if he betrothed her, she is permitted to his brother who is a common priest, as it is permitted for him to marry a widow. Therefore, the tanna also taught in the first clause the case where the priest married her.

Betrothed and married — מַהַר שַׁלֹּם. A Jewish wedding is divided into two distinct parts. Betrothal is the first stage of the marriage process. The bond created by betrothal is so strong that, after betrothal, the woman is forbidden to other men, and intercourse with another man is considered adultery and is punishable by death. Consequently, a betrothed woman requires a divorce before she can marry another man. Nevertheless, at this stage the betrothed couple may not yet cohabit as man and wife, and most of the couple’s mutual obligations do not yet apply.

The second stage of the marriage process follows the betrothal. Marriage is effected by having the bride and groom come under the wedding canopy, and this immediately confers both the privileges and the responsibilities associated with marriage upon the newlywed couple. After marriage, if one spouse dies, all the halakhot of mourning for a close relative apply to the surviving spouse. If a priest’s wife dies, he is permitted to render himself ritually impure to bury her. All the monetary rights and obligations applied to married couples take effect after marriage.

Today, betrothal and marriage are performed in quick succession as part of a single ceremony, but in talmudic times there was usually a year-long gap between the two.
The Gemara asks: But rather than teaching a case where she was married in the first clause due to the latter clause of the mishna, let him teach a case where she was betrothed in the first clause due to the middle clause, which speaks of a High Priest who betrothed a widow, and he has a brother who is a common priest. The Gemara concludes: Rather, the reason the tanna taught the case where the priest married the widow is due to the halakha that is its neighbor [but bukta], i.e., due to the fact that in the adjacent case he wants to teach the case of a halal who married a woman fit to marry a priest. There, the reason that the woman is forbidden to his brother is specifically that the halal married her, as he rendered her a halala by consummating the marriage. However, if the halal merely betrothed her, she is permitted to him. Due to that reason, the tanna teaches the case where the priest married the widow.

The Gemara asks: And why does the tanna specifically teach the case of a common priest who married a widow? Let him teach that the priest married a virgin. Since in any case she becomes a widow upon his death, what difference is there whether she was previously a widow?

And if you would say that this tanna holds that it is her status at the time of the first marriage that determines her status when she happens before the yavam for levirate marriage, and not her status at the time of her husband’s death, and therefore if she had been a virgin when she married she would have been permitted to enter into levirate marriage with a High Priest, that cannot be so, as the mishna cites the case: A halal who married a woman fit to marry a priest is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her yavam. And in that case, we do not say that the first marriage determines her status when she happens before him for levirate marriage, as the woman was fit to marry the brother when she married the halal and was rendered a halala only as a result of her marriage.

The Gemara answers: That fact, that the mishna cited a case where the priest married a widow, is certainly due to the latter clause of the mishna, i.e., due to the fact that the tanna wants to teach in the latter clause: A High Priest who married a widow, and he has a brother who is the High Priest or a common priest. In the case where the yavam is a common priest, the widow is forbidden to him specifically if the High Priest married a widow, as by consummating the marriage he rendered her a halala. However, had she been a virgin when the High Priest married her, he would not render her a halala, and when the High Priest dies she would be fit for his brother. It is due to that reason that the tanna teaches the case of a widow in the first clause as well.

Rav Pappa objects to the mishna: If it is so, that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, as when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael he reported that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that in the case of a second-generation Egyptian who married a first-generation Egyptian woman, her son is considered a second-generation Egyptian, as the child’s status in this matter is determined according to the mother, then let the tanna of the mishna also teach the following case:

The halakha that is its neighbor [but bukta] – בּוּקְתָא – is an Aramaic word, used in Hebrew as well, for a small house or a kind of shack. The source of the word is unclear and the Sages explained homiletically that it is an abbreviation of beʿakta, a narrow house. Here the word is used metaphorically. Two things in the same shack is referring to a pair of adjacent items, i.e., objects that are linked based on spatial proximity.
And if they married in the reverse manner – i.e., the third-generation convert married a second-generation Egyptian woman, and the second-generation man married an ordinary Jewish woman, they are permitted to their yevamin and forbidden to their husbands. Similarly, they are permitted both to these and to those if these sons married converts, for an Egyptian convert is permitted to marry a convert of a different nationality. And there is also a case in which they are forbidden to these and to those, namely if they married sexually underdeveloped women [ayloniot]. If an Egyptian married an aylonit, she is forbidden to him as a Jewish woman, and she is forbidden to his brother, a third-generation Egyptian convert who is permitted to marry a Jewish woman, because levirate marriage is prohibited with an aylonit. The fact that the mishna omits these cases appears to indicate that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan.

The Gemara answers: There is no proof from here with regard to the halakha, as the tanna of the mishna did not mention all possible examples. Rather, he taught certain cases and omitted others. The Gemara asks: What else did he omit that he omitted this? The tanna would not have omitted only one example. The Gemara answers: He omitted the case of a man with crushed testicles or with other wounds to his genitals. If the husband is such a man, the wife is forbidden to her husband and permitted to her yavam. If the yavam is such a man, the opposite is true.

The Gemara asks: If this mishna is determined to have taught certain cases and omitted others due to the omission of the case of a man with crushed testicles or other wounds to his genitals, this is not an omission, as in this mishna the tanna taught a principle that applies to all forbidden relationships for which one is liable for violating a prohibition. This category includes such a case, and therefore it was not omitted.

The Gemara answers: Is that to say that with regard to those relationships for which one is liable for violating a prohibition, he does not teach a principle and again teach them in detail? But this is not the case. He teaches the case of a common priest who married a widow and he had a brother who was a high priest, and the case of a halal who married a woman fit to marry a priest and he had a brother who was a priest fit for service, both of whom are forbidden as they are liable for violating a prohibition. Therefore, since the tanna did not specifically teach the case of the man with crushed testicles, this constitutes an omission.

The Gemara responds: That clause of the mishna is not merely a specification of the previous general halakha, as it was necessary for the tanna to mention these cases individually in order to teach us another halakha that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, as Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is not prohibited for daughters of priests who are fit to marry priests to marry men who are disqualified from the priesthood, although this marriage disqualifies them from subsequently marrying a priest.
The Gemara challenges that answer: But the mishna also teaches these cases: A halal who married a woman fit to marry a priest, and an Israelite of unlawful lineage who married an Israelite woman of unlawful lineage, and he has a brother who is a mamzer. These are specifications that do not teach additional halakhot. The Gemara answers: This too is not a case of the tanna going back and teaching additional examples of the same halakha without adding anything, as he teaches us something new through each of these two examples. The first example is referring to a prohibition that is not equally applicable to all, such as one concerning priests, and the second example is referring to a prohibition that is equally applicable to all, such as one involving a mamzer.

The Gemara further challenges the answer: But the mishna also teaches the case of an Israelite of unlawful lineage who married a mamzer and who has a brother who is an Israelite of similar lineage, and the example of a mamzer who married a mamzer and he has a brother who is an Israelite of unlawful lineage. Consequently, the tanna does in fact teach the same halakha several times with regard to a prohibition that is equally applicable to all. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from it that he taught and omitted certain cases and did not list all possible examples? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from it that this is the case, and there is no proof from here that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan.

The Gemara returns to a statement cited incidentally above, in order to discuss the matter itself: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is not prohibited for daughters of priests who are fit to marry priests to marry men who are disqualified from the priesthood, although this marriage would disqualify them from subsequently marrying a priest, and they may do so even ab initio. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following statement of the mishna supports his opinion: A halal who married a woman who is fit, and he has a brother who is a priest fit for service, this woman is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her yavam. What, is it not referring to a priestess, i.e., a priest’s daughter, who is appropriate to marry him? And what is the meaning of: Fit? This means that she is fit for the priesthood, and yet the mishna says she is permitted to her husband, the halal.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it is possible that the mishna is speaking of an Israelite woman. And what is the meaning of: Fit? It means that she is fit to enter the congregation of the Jewish people, through marriage. According to this explanation, there is no proof from the mishna about daughters of priests.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, consider the phrase: A halal who married a woman fit to marry a priest, and he has a brother who is also fit. Consistency demands that here too it means that the brother is fit to enter the congregation. Can it not therefore be deduced by inference that he, the deceased halal, was unfit to enter the congregation? But such an inference would be an error, as a halal is disqualified only from the priesthood. Rather, is it not referring to a priest, and from the fact that he must be a priest, she too must be a priestess? The Gemara rejects this claim: Are the cases comparable? This case, of the halal, is as it is, i.e., he is fit for the priesthood. And that case, of the woman, as it is as it is, i.e., she is fit to enter the congregation.

Ravin bar Nahman raised an objection against Rav’s ruling from the following beraita: the verse states about priests: “They may not take a woman who is a harlot [zona], or profaned [halala]” (Leviticus 21:7). The same verse says: “They also may not take a woman divorced from her husband.” This repetition of “they may not take” teaches us that the woman is also prohibited by means of the prohibition addressed to the man. Therefore, we can conclude that there is a prohibition for a daughter of a priest to marry a halal.
And is this derived from here – איה מקסה פֶּסֶס: Ramban asks: Even without the proof from the verses, there is another reason why it is prohibited for a woman to marry a man to whom she is forbidden, as there is a general prohibition: “You shall not put a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14), which means that it is prohibited to assist another person in the performance of a transgression. He answers that a marriage of this sort would constitute a violation of the general prohibition, but the Gemara is inquiring into whether there is also a specific prohibition with regard to these marriages. Other early authorities add that the prohibition: “You shall not put a stumbling block before the blind” is stated in general terms, and therefore lashes are not administered for it. Consequently, the Gemara sought a source for her liability to receive lashes for this transgression.

HALAKHA

The verse equates a woman to a man – הקדוש המקשה אישה: There is no difference between men and women with regard to punishments: If he is liable to lashes, she is too; and if he is exempt, so is she. The sole exception is the case of a designated maidservant, i.e., a woman who is half free and half slave and betrothed to a Hebrew slave. In this case, the woman is liable to receive lashes, but the man is required to bring a guilt-offering (Ramabam Sefer Redushi, Hilkhot Iivel 17:3).

Perek IX
Daf 85 Amud a

HALAKHA

The sons of Aaron and not the daughters of Aaron – ธNK איה: Only priests fit for service, including blamished ones, are included in the prohibition against contracting ritual impurity from a corpse. This prohibition does not apply to daughters of priests (Ramabam Sefer Shofetim, Hilkhot Eivel 216; Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 373:2).

Rava said: Ravin bar Nahman’s objection is not valid. All that the baraita teaches is that anywhere that a prohibition of sexual intercourse applies to him, i.e., to a man, the same prohibition applies to her, his female partner. And anywhere that a prohibition does not apply to him, the prohibition does not apply to her either. It does not, however, indicate that since it is prohibited for a priest to marry a halal it is also prohibited for the daughter of a priest to marry a halal.

The Gemara asks: But there is the prohibition for priests to contract ritual impurity from a corpse, which is a prohibition that is not equally applicable to all, as only priests are bound by this prohibition, and the reason that this command applies only to male priests is that the Merciful One writes: “ Speak to the priests the sons of Aaron, and say to them: None shall defile himself” (Leviticus 21:1), from which it is inferred: The sons of Aaron and not the daughters of Aaron. Therefore, were it not for this specific derivation, I would say that women from priestly families are also obligated to avoid becoming ritually impure. What is the reason for this? Is it not due to the principle that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, that women are equated to men with regard to all punishments in the Torah, including those that are not equally applicable to all?

The Gemara rejects this proof: No, that initial assumption, that the daughters of priests might be obligated to avoid ritual impurity, is not due to the halakha that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, but rather it is something that we learn through tradition from the words “they may not take.” This phrase teaches that women are included in the marital prohibitions of the priesthood, and we might therefore have thought that they are included in all halakhot pertaining to priests.