

שְׂאִינוּ נוֹקֵם וְנוֹטֵר בְּנֶחֱשׁ – אֵינוּ תִלְמִיד חָכָם. – וְהִכְתִּיב: “לֹא תִקֹּם וְלֹא תִטּוֹר” – הֵהוּא בְּמִמּוֹן הוּא דְכִתְיָב. דְּתִנָּא: אֵיזוּ הֵיא נְקִימָה וְאֵיזוּ הֵיא נְטִירָה? נְקִימָה, אָמַר לוֹ: הַשְּׂאִילִנִי מִגְּלָךְ, – אָמַר לוֹ: לֹא. לְמַחַר אָמַר לוֹ הוּא: הַשְּׂאִילִנִי קְרוּדוּמְךָ! אָמַר לוֹ: אֵינִי מִשְׂאִילֶךָ, כְּדֹרֵךְ שְׂלֵא הַשְּׂאִלְתַּנִּי – זוּ הֵיא נְקִימָה.

וְאֵיזוּ הֵיא נְטִירָה? אָמַר לוֹ: הַשְּׂאִילִנִי קְרוּדוּמְךָ! אָמַר לֵיהּ: לֹא. לְמַחַר אָמַר לוֹ: הַשְּׂאִילִנִי חִלּוּקְךָ! אָמַר לוֹ: הִילְךְ, אֵינִי כְמוֹתְךָ, שְׂלֵא הַשְּׂאִלְתַּנִּי – זוּ הֵיא נְטִירָה.

וְצַעֲרָא דְגּוּפָא לֹא? וְהָא תִנָּא: הַמַּעֲלָבִין וְאֵינָן עוֹלָבִין, שׁוֹמְעִין חֶרְפָתָן וְאֵינָן מְשִׁיבִין, עוֹשִׂין מֵאֲהָבָה וְשִׂמְחִין בְּיִסּוּרֵין – עֲלִיָהֶן הַכְּתוּב אוֹמֵר: “וְאוֹהָבֵיו כְּצֶאֱת הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ בְּגִבּוֹרָתוֹ!”

who does not avenge himself and bear a grudge like a snake^{HN} when insulted is not considered a Torah scholar at all, as it is important to uphold the honor of Torah and its students by reacting harshly to insults. The Gemara asks: **But isn't it written explicitly in the Torah: “You shall not take vengeance nor bear any grudge against the children of your people” (Leviticus 19:18)?** The Gemara responds: **That prohibition is written with regard to monetary matters and not personal insults, as it was taught in a baraita: What is revenge and what is bearing a grudge? Revenge^H is illustrated by the following example: One said to his fellow: Lend me your sickle, and he said: No. The next day he, the one who had refused to lend the sickle, said to the other person: Lend me your ax. If he said to him: I will not lend to you, just as you did not lend to me, that is revenge.**

And what is bearing a grudge?^H **If one said to his fellow: Lend me your ax, and he said: No, and the next day he, the one who had refused to lend the ax, said to the other man: Lend me your robe; if the first one said to him: Here it is, as I am not like you, who would not lend to me, that is bearing a grudge.** Although he does not respond to his friend's inconsiderate behavior in kind, he still makes it known to his friend that he resents his inconsiderate behavior. This *baraita* shows that the prohibition relates only to monetary matters, such as borrowing and lending.

The Gemara asks: **But does the prohibition against vengeance really not relate also to matters of personal anguish suffered by someone? Wasn't it taught in a baraita: Those who are insulted but do not respond, who act out of love for God, and who remain happy in their suffering, about them the verse states: “They that love Him be as the sun when it goes forth in its might” (Judges 5:31).**^N This *baraita* shows that one should forgive personal insults as well as wrongs in monetary matters.

HALAKHA

Who does not avenge himself and bear a grudge like a snake – שְׂאִינוּ נוֹקֵם וְנוֹטֵר בְּנֶחֱשׁ: It is befitting a Torah scholar to forgive one who insults him in private. However, if he was insulted publicly, he should avenge the insult and bear a grudge like a snake for the sake of the Torah's honor (Rambam *Sefer HaMadda, Hilkhot Talmud Torah* 7:13).

Revenge – נְקִימָה: One who takes revenge against his fellow violates a negative mitzva. Revenge is defined as a case where one is wronged by another and he then retaliates in kind for the injustice; for example, if one person did not want to lend another an object, and the second person in return does not lend something to the first (Rambam *Sefer HaMadda, Hilkhot Deot* 7:7).

Bearing a grudge – נְטִירָה: One who bears a grudge of hatred against one's fellow violates a negative mitzva. Bearing a grudge is defined as a case where one maintains hatred toward his fellow and reminds him that he had once acted inappropriately toward him; e.g., if one's fellow refused to lend him an object, and the second person then reminds the first of this when he lends something to him (Rambam *Sefer HaMadda, Hilkhot Deot* 7:8).

NOTES

Who does not avenge himself and bear a grudge like a snake – שְׂאִינוּ נוֹקֵם וְנוֹטֵר בְּנֶחֱשׁ: Some commentaries explain the comparison to a snake as follows: A snake does not attack its victim out in the open but waits for the appropriate time to do so. Similarly, the Torah scholar, while he is permitted to retain a grudge against one who has insulted him, should not act on his feelings but should wait until the perpetrator is punished by divine providence, when he will see his anguish avenged (*Me'iri*). Others explain that just as a snake does not benefit from biting his victim, a Torah scholar too should not derive personal pleasure from taking revenge (*Iyyei HaYam*).



Rattlesnake preparing to attack, with drops of venom on its teeth

Those who are insulted...who hear themselves being shamed – הַמַּעֲלָבִין...שׁוֹמְעִין חֶרְפָתָן: Some commentaries interpret the difference between these two terms as follows: Being insulted refers to hearing an insult directly from the offender, while hearing oneself being shamed refers to one overhearing something disparaging that was not addressed to him personally (Rabbi Yoshiya Pinto).

They that love Him be as the sun when it goes forth in its might – וְאוֹהָבֵיו כְּצֶאֱת הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ בְּגִבּוֹרָתוֹ: This choice of expression may be based on the story of the moon complaining at having to share the sky with sun (see *Hullin* 60b), whereupon the moon was diminished in brightness. In contrast, since the sun heard itself being insulted but did not react, it was rewarded by having its original brightness maintained. This accounts for the metaphor of the bright, rising sun in this context (*Me'iri*).

Whoever forgoes his reckonings with others for injustices done to him – כָּל הַמַּעֲבִיר עַל מְדוּתוֹ – It is a worthy attribute to forgive insults, and if one forgoes his reckonings with others for injustices done to him, the heavenly court in turn forgoes punishment for all his sins (Rambam *Sefer HaMadda, Hilkhot Deot* 7:7).

The priests may not extend the third finger or the thumb – אֵין מוֹצִיאִין לֹא שְׁלִישׁ וְלֹא גוֹדֵל: At the time of a lottery each priest extends one or two fingers. If one of them extends three, all three are counted. However, one may not extend a thumb, due to concern for cheaters (Rambam *Sefer Avoda, Hilkhot Temidin UMusafin* 4:3). The Rambam had a variant text of this Gemara, as is found in some manuscripts of the Talmud, which reads *shalosh*, three, instead of *shalish*, third finger (*Lehem Mishne*). With regard to counting the three fingers, the Rambam is apparently basing his opinion on this Gemara together with the Jerusalem Talmud, which has a different explanation of the extension of multiple fingers (*Lehem Mishne*).

לְעוֹלָם דְּנָקִיט לִיהַ בְּלִיבֵיהּ. וְהָאֵמֵר רָבָא: כָּל הַמַּעֲבִיר עַל מְדוּתוֹ – מַעֲבִירִין לוֹ עַל כָּל פְּשָׁעָיו! דְּמַפְיִסוּ לִיהַ וּמַפְיִיס.

”וּמָה הֵן מוֹצִיאִין אַחַת אוֹ שְׁתַּיִם” וְכוּ. הֲשִׁתָּא שְׁתַּיִם מוֹצִיאִין, אַחַת מִבְּעֵיא?!?

אָמַר רַב חֲסֵדָא: לֹא קִשְׁיָא; כָּאֵן – בְּבָרִיא, כָּאֵן בְּחוֹלָה. וְהִתְנַּא: אַחַת – מוֹצִיאִין, שְׁתַּיִם – אֵין מוֹצִיאִין. בְּמָה דְּבָרִים אָמְרוּרִים – בְּבָרִיא, אֲבָל בְּחוֹלָה – אֲפִילוּ שְׁתַּיִם מוֹצִיאִין, וְהִתְחִידִין מוֹצִיאִין שְׁתַּיִם, וְאֵין מוֹנִין לָהֶן אֲלֵא אַחַת.

וְאֵין מוֹנִין לוֹ אֲלֵא אַחַת? וְהִתְנַּא: אֵין מוֹצִיאִין לֹא שְׁלִישׁ וְלֹא גוֹדֵל מִפְּנֵי הַרְמָאִים, וְאֵם הוֹצִיא שְׁלִישׁ – מוֹנִין לוֹ. גוֹדֵל – אֵין מוֹנִין לוֹ, וְלֹא עוֹד [אֲלֵא] שְׁלוּקָה מִן הַמְמוֹנָה בְּפִקִיעַ!

מֵאֵי מוֹנִין לוֹ – נִמֵי אַחַת.

The Gemara responds that the prohibition against taking vengeance and bearing a grudge indeed applies to cases of personal anguish; however, **actually**, the scholar may **keep resentment in his heart**,^N though he should not act on it or remind the other person of his insulting behavior. The Gemara asks: **But didn't Rava say:** With regard to **whoever forgoes his reckonings** with others for injustices done to him,^H the heavenly court in turn **forgoes** punishment **for all his sins**? The Gemara answers: Indeed, even a scholar who is insulted must forgive insults, but that is only in cases where his antagonist **has sought to appease** him, in which case he should allow himself to **be appeased** toward him. However, if no apology has been offered, the scholar should not forgive him, in order to uphold the honor of the Torah.

§ The mishna describes that the lottery between competing priests is conducted by the priests extending their fingers for a count.^N And the mishna elaborated: **And what fingers do they extend** for the lottery? They may extend **one or two** fingers, and the priests do not extend a thumb in the Temple. The Gemara asks: **Now** that the mishna states that the priest may extend **two** fingers, is it **necessary** to state that they may also extend **one** finger?

Rav Hisda said: This is **not difficult**. **Here**, when the mishna speaks of extending one finger, it is referring to a **healthy person**, who has no difficulty extending just one finger without extending a second one. **There**, when the mishna mentions two fingers, it is referring to a **sick person**, for whom it is difficult to extend a single finger at a time.^N **And so it was taught** in a *baraita*: **They may extend one** finger, but **they may not extend two**. **In what case is this statement said?** It is said in reference to a **healthy person**; however, a **sick person** may **extend even two** fingers. **And** the sick priests who sit or lie **alone**, separately from the other priests, **extend two** fingers, but their two fingers are **counted only as one**.

The Gemara asks: **And** are the sick priest's two fingers really **counted as only one**? **Wasn't it taught** in a *baraita*: The priests may **not extend the third** finger, i.e., the middle finger, or the **thumb**,^{NH} together with the index finger, **due to concern for cheaters**. One who sees that the count is approaching him might intentionally extend or withdraw an extra finger so that the lottery will fall on him. **But if he does extend the third** finger it is **counted for him**. This is because the third finger cannot be stretched very far from the index finger, so that it is easily recognizable that both fingers are from the same person, and this is not taken as an attempt to cheat. If he extends his **thumb**, however, it is **not counted for him**, and **moreover** he is punished with **lashes** administered by the **person in charge of the pakia**.^N The implication of the *baraita* is that when the third finger is extended along with the index finger, both fingers are counted.

The Gemara answers: **What** does the *baraita* mean when it says that if the priest extended his middle finger along with his index finger, **it is counted for him**? It also means, as stated earlier, that the two fingers are counted as **one**.

NOTES

The scholar may keep resentment in his heart – דְּנָקִיט לִיהַ: The scholar keeps his hatred in his heart, hoping that God will avenge him (*Me'iri*; Ritva). Rashi explains that the scholar does not protest when someone else avenges the scholar's honor. Rashi's point clarifies the criticism voiced earlier by the Gemara against Saul for waiving his honor, because he stopped others from avenging his honor against those who had disparaged him, as described in I Samuel 11:12–13 (Rabbi Yoshiya Pinto).

The lottery in the Temple – מַעֲשֵׂה הַפִּיִּים בְּמִקְדָּשׁ – The *Tosefta* and the commentaries describe the lottery procedure. The priests stood in a circle and the appointee removed one priest's

turban to show that the count started from him. He picked a large number, and some say a different person suggested the number, to prevent the appointee fixing the lottery for the benefit of a friend. The appointee then began counting fingers. The priest on whom the last number fell won the lottery.

A healthy and a sick person – בְּבָרִיא בְּחוֹלָה: The Rambam reverses the two cases and states that a healthy person extends two fingers and a sick person extends only one.

The priests may not extend... the thumb – גוֹדֵל... אֵין מוֹצִיאִין: The reason they may not extend his thumb is that it is easy to

extend and withdraw, and a priest following the count can thereby put out or retract his thumb to manipulate the final result (Rambam).

The person in charge of the pakia – הַמְמוֹנָה בְּפִקִיעַ: According to the Jerusalem Talmud, this appointee was in charge of tearing strips off the worn-out priestly garments to make them into wicks, in accordance with the original understanding of Abaye recorded in this Gemara. Some commentaries write that this officer performed both tasks, producing the strips of garments to be used as both wicks and whips. This resolves the contradiction between the Gemara here and the Jerusalem Talmud (*ge'onim*; *Peirush Kadmon*).

Whip [matraka] – מַטְרָקָא: From the Arabic مِطْرَاقَة, *miṭraqah*, meaning a staff or strap used to strike.

Worn-out priestly garments – בְּלָאֵי בְגָדֵי כֹהֲנִים – The worn-out trousers and belts of the priests are made into wicks for the Celebration of Drawing Water, and their tunics were made into wicks for the candelabrum (Rambam *Sefer Avoda, Hilkhhot Kelei HaMikdash* 8:6; see *Kesef Mishne*, who explains the distinction).

Rabbi Tzadok – רַבִּי צְדוֹק: The reference is apparently to Rabbi Tzadok the priest, who, in his later years, was one of the greatest Sages of Israel at the time of the destruction of the Temple. It is said that he fasted frequently over the period of forty years prior to the destruction of the Temple as a plea that the Temple not be destroyed. The leader of that generation, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, held him in such high regard that he requested of the emperor Vespasian to procure a special doctor to care for him, since he had become so emaciated by his fasts. Several sources attest to his expertise in engineering and mathematics.

Rabbi Tzadok's son, Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Tzadok, was one of the great scholars of the subsequent generation, respected in the house of the *Nasi* of the Sanhedrin. Rabbi Elazar often cites customs of his father's house and of the house of the *Nasi*.

However, some say that the Rabbi Tzadok mentioned here lived much earlier than the Rabbi Tzadok known from the time of the Temple.

Convulsing – מִפְרָפֵר: The father meant that the knife should be removed from his son's heart to prevent it from becoming impure, even though that would hasten his death (Ritva).

מאי פקיע? אמר רב: מדרא. מאי מדרא? אמר רב פפא: מטראקא דטייעי דפסיק רישיה.

The *baraita* mentions lashes administered by the person in charge of the *pakia*. What is a *pakia*? Rav said: It is a *madra*. However, the meaning of that term also became unclear over time, so the Gemara asks: What is a *madra*? Rav Pappa said: It is a whip [matraka]¹ used by the Arabs, the end of which is split into several strands. That is the *pakia* mentioned above, which was used for punishing the priests.

אמר אביי: מריש היה אמינא, הא דתנן: "בן ביבאי ממונה על הפקיע" – אמינא פתילתא. כדתנן: מבולאי מכנסי הכהנים ומהמייניהן מהן היו מפקיעין, ובהן היו מדליקין. כיון דשמענא להא דתנא: ולא עוד אלא שאלה מן הממונה בפקיע – אמינא: מאי פקיע – נגדא.

Apropos this discussion, Abaye said: At first I would say as follows: When we learned in a mishna that ben Beivai was in charge of the *pakia*, I would say that it means that he was in charge of producing wicks, as we learned in another mishna: They would tear [mafkia] strips from the priests' worn-out trousers and belts² and make wicks out of them, with which they lit the lamps for the Celebration of Drawing Water. But once I heard that which is taught in the previously cited *baraita*: And moreover, he is punished with lashes administered by the person in charge of the *pakia*, I now say: What is a *pakia*? It is lashes. Ben Beivai was in charge of corporal punishment in the Temple.

"מעשה שהיו שניהן שוין ורצין ועולין בפקיע" – תנו רבנן: מעשה בשני כהנים שהיו שניהן שוין ורצין ועולין בפקיע, קדם אחד מהן לתוך ארבע אמות של חבירו – נטל סכין ותקע לו בלבו.

It was taught in the mishna: An incident occurred where both of the priests were equal as they were running and ascending on the ramp, and one of them shoved the other and he fell and his leg was broken. The Sages taught in the *Tosefta*: An incident occurred where there were two priests who were equal as they were running and ascending the ramp. One of them reached the four cubits before his colleague, who then, out of anger, took a knife and stabbed him in the heart.

עמד רבי צדוק על מעלות האולם, ואמר: אחינו בית ישראל, שמעו! הרי הוא אומר: "כי ימצא חלל באדמה ויצאו זקניו ושופטיה", אנו על מי להביא עגלה ערופה? על העיר או על העורות? געו כל העם בבבאי.

The *Tosefta* continues: Rabbi Tzadok³ then stood up on the steps of the Entrance Hall of the Sanctuary and said: Hear this, my brothers of the house of Israel. The verse states: "If one be found slain in the land... and it be not known who had smitten him; then your Elders and your judges shall come forth and they shall measure... and it shall be that the city which is nearest to the slain man... shall take a heifer" (Deuteronomy 21:1-3). And the Elders of that city took that heifer and broke its neck in a ritual of atonement. But what of us, in our situation? Upon whom is the obligation to bring the heifer whose neck is broken? Does the obligation fall on the city, Jerusalem, so that its Sages must bring the calf, or does the obligation fall upon the Temple courtyards, so that the priests must bring it? At that point the entire assembly of people burst into tears.

בא אביו של תינוק ומצאו כשהוא מפרפר. אמר: הרי הוא כפרתכם, ועדיין בני מפרפר, ולא נטמאה סכין. ללמדך שקשה עליהם טהרת כלים יותר משפיכות דמים. וכן הוא אומר: "וגם דם נקי שפך מנשה [הרבה מאד] עד אשר מלא [את] ירושלים פה לפה".

The father of the boy, i.e., the young priest who was stabbed, came and found that he was still convulsing. He said: May my son's death be an atonement for you. But my son is still convulsing⁴ and has not yet died, and as such, the knife, which is in his body, has not become ritually impure through contact with a corpse. If you remove it promptly, it will still be pure for future use. The *Tosefta* comments: This incident comes to teach you that the ritual purity of utensils was of more concern to them than the shedding of blood. Even the boy's father voiced more concern over the purity of the knife than over the death of his child. And similarly, it says: "Furthermore, Manasseh spilled innocent blood very much, till he had filled Jerusalem from one end to another" (II Kings 21:16), which shows that in his day as well people paid little attention to bloodshed.

הי מעשה קדים? אילימא דשפיכות דמים – השתא אשפיכות דמים לא תקינו פייסא, אנשברה רגלו תקינו? אלא דנשברה רגלו קדים.

The Gemara asks: Which incident came first, the one about the broken leg reported in the mishna or the one about the slain priest in the *Tosefta*? If we say that the incident of bloodshed came first, this raises a problem: Now, if in response to a case of bloodshed they did not establish a lottery but continued with the running competition, can it be that in response to an incident of a priest's leg being broken they did establish a lottery? Rather, we must say that the case in which the priest's leg was broken in the course of the race came first, and as the mishna states, the establishment of the lottery was in response to that incident.

NOTES

A random event – אֶקְרָאִי: The Sages believed that it was not merely losing the race that caused the attack, but that there was some previous enmity between the two priests that led to it (*Siah Yitzhak*).

וּכְיוֹן דְּתַקְיֵנוּ פִּיִּסָּא – אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת
מֵאֵי עֲבִידְתֵּיהוּ? אֶלָּא, לְעוֹלָם
דְּשָׁפִיכוֹת דְּמִים קָדִים. וּמַעֲיַקְרָא
סְבוּר: אֶקְרָאִי בְּעֶלְמָא הוּא, כִּיּוֹן
דְּחָזוּ אֶפִּילוּ מִמִּילָא אֶתּוּ לִידֵי סַכְנָה –
תַּקְיֵנוּ רַבְּנֵי פִּיִּסָּא.

עָמַד רַבִּי צְדוֹק עַל מַעְלוֹת הָאוֹלָם
וְאָמַר: אַחֲיֵינוּ בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל שָׁמְעוּ הֲרֵי
הוּא אוֹמֵר "כִּי יִמָּצֵא חָלָל בְּאַדְמָה"
אֲנִן עַל מִי לְהַבִּיא עַל הָעִיר אוֹ עַל
הָעוֹרוֹת. וְיִרוּשָׁלַיִם בֵּת אֶתּוּי עֲגָלָה
עָרוּפָה הִיא? וְהִתְנַיָּא: עֲשֶׂרָה דְּבָרִים
נֶאֱמָרוּ בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם, וְזוֹ אַחַת מֵהֶן:

The Gemara asks: If the running competition was abolished immediately after the incident of the broken leg and a lottery was instituted to replace it, **once they established the lottery, what were they doing** still running to within the four cubits in the incident that led to the priest's murder? Rather, actually, it is necessary to return to the approach suggested earlier, **that the case involving bloodshed came first. Initially, the Sages thought that it was merely a random, i.e., isolated, event,**ⁿ and because it was extremely unlikely for a murder to happen again they did not abolish the competition due to that incident. Then, **once they saw that in any event the priests were coming to danger**, as one of them was pushed and broke his leg, **the Sages established a lottery.**

The Gemara returns to the incident of the slain priest and discusses several details of it. It was related that **Rabbi Tzadok stood up on the steps of the Entrance Hall of the Sanctuary and said: Hear this, my brothers of the house of Israel.** The verse states: **"If one be found slain in the land, etc."** But what of us, in our situation? **Upon whom** is the obligation to bring the heifer whose neck is broken? Does the obligation fall **upon the city**, Jerusalem, or does the obligation fall **upon the Temple courtyards**? The Gemara asks: **Is Jerusalem subject to bringing a heifer whose neck is broken? Wasn't it taught in a baraita: Ten things were said about Jerusalem to distinguish it from all other cities in Eretz Yisrael, and this is one of them:**

Perek II
Daf 23 Amud b

HALAKHA

Jerusalem does not bring a heifer whose neck is broken – אינה מביאה עגלה ערופה: If a corpse is found near Jerusalem and the assailant is unknown, the city of Jerusalem is not required to bring a heifer whose neck is broken. This is because the city was not apportioned to any of the tribes, as the Gemara teaches here and in tractate *Bava Kamma* (Rambam *Sefer Avoda, Hilkhot Beit HaBehira* 4:14; *Kesef Mishneh*).

NOTES

And furthermore it is written that the heifer whose neck is broken is brought when it be not known who had smitten him – ועוד לא נודע מי הכהו כתיב: This is the main question of the Gemara: The ritual of the heifer whose neck is broken is not applicable at all here, where the identity of the murderer is known. The first question, on the other hand, is not a very compelling one, as the question of whether or not Jerusalem was apportioned among the tribes is a matter of dispute, as discussed previously (*daf* 12a; *Ritva*).

To increase weeping – להרבות בבכיה: Rabbi Tzadok did not mean to imply that that *halakha* of the heifer whose neck is broken applied here but to point out a logical argument to the people: In the case of the heifer whose neck is broken, the culprit is unknown, and yet the residents of the nearest town must gain atonement for the killing; all the more so when a deliberate murder takes place right in the Temple, those in charge must take responsibility for what has happened (*Ritva*).

It was bloodshed that had become trivialized – שפיכות דמים: The description of Manasseh's violence took place during the First Temple, and the episode under discussion happened in the Second Temple. Nevertheless, through his callousness Manasseh desensitized the people of Jerusalem to murder and is therefore blamed for the lax attitudes toward killing in later times (*Ritva*).

אינה מביאה עגלה ערופה. ועוד:
"לא נודע מי הכהו" כתיב – והא
נודע מי הכהו. אלא כדי להרבות
בבכיה.

בא אביו של תינוק ומצאו בשוהוא
מפרפר, אמר: הרי הוא בפרתכם
ועדיין בני קיים [כו'] ללמדך שקשה
עליהם טהרת כלים יותר משפיכות
דמים, איבעיא להו: שפיכות דמים
הוא דול, אבל טהרת כלים בדקיימא
קיימא, או דילמא שפיכות דמים
בדקיימא קיימא אבל טהרת כלים
היא דחמירא?

תא שמע: מדקא נסיב לה תלמודא
"וגם דם נקי שפך מנשה" – שמע
מיננה: שפיכות דמים הוא דול,
וטהרת כלים בדקיימא קיימא.

Jerusalem does not bring a heifer whose neck is broken.^h The reason for this is that the *halakha* of the heifer whose neck is broken applies only to land that was apportioned to a specific tribe of the Jewish people. Jerusalem alone was not divided among the tribes, but was shared equally by the entire nation. **And furthermore, it is written** that the heifer whose neck is broken is brought when **"it be not known who had smitten him,"**ⁿ and here, in the case of the slain priest, **it was well known who had smitten him.** Rather, one must conclude that Rabbi Tzadok invoked the *halakha* of the heifer whose neck is broken not because it actually applied in this case but only in **order** to arouse the people's grief and **to increase weeping.**ⁿ

In relating the above incident the *Tosefta* said: **The father of the boy came and found that he was still convulsing. He said: May my son's death be an atonement for you. But my son is still alive, etc.** This incident comes to teach you that **the ritual purity of utensils was of more concern to them than the shedding of blood. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Should one conclude from this comment that bloodshed had become trivialized in their eyes but their concern for purity of utensils remained where it was originally, meaning that while they cared less than they should have about murder, they did not exaggerate the importance of purity of utensils; or perhaps their concern for bloodshed remained where it was originally, but their concern for purity of vessels had become too strict, to the extent that its importance was exaggerated beyond concern for human life?**

The Gemara answers: **Come and hear an answer to the dilemma: Since the Tosefta adduces a biblical teaching from the verse, "Furthermore, Manasseh spilled innocent blood," conclude from this that it was bloodshed that had become trivialized,**ⁿ and the importance of **purity of utensils remained where it had been.**

Similar to the change of garments performed on Yom Kippur, that he remove his sacred garments and put on non-sacred garments – שְׂפוּשֵׁט בְּגָדֵי – קוּדֵשׁ וְלוּבֵשׁ בְּגָדֵי חוּל: The comparison to Yom Kippur as explained here is not without flaws, as Rashi's lengthy explanation suggests. The wording implies that on Yom Kippur there is a change from sacred garments to non-sacred garments. Rabbeinu Hananel explains the Gemara's point differently: It is referring to the end of Yom Kippur, when the day's services are complete and the High Priest changes from his sacred garments to his personal clothes.

Removal of the ashes and carrying them out – הַרְמָה וְהוֹצֵאָה: There are several different opinions in the commentaries with regard to these two activities, both according to the view of Rabbi Eliezer and that of the first *tanna*, based on an analysis of the approaches of Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish as well as on the Jerusalem Talmud's version of the debate. According to the Rambam, the conclusion is that garments of lesser quality are worn for both removal of the ashes from the altar and for carrying them out of the camp. Others maintain that the removal of the ashes is a bona fide service and calls for the regular priestly garments, while clothes of lesser quality are used when the ashes are carried out of the camp. There is yet another approach that holds that both acts are performed in garments of lesser quality, but that carrying out the ashes was performed in garments of even more inferior quality than those worn to remove the ashes from the altar (*Me'iri*; see *Siah Yitzhak*).

HALAKHA

Clothes worn by the priest during removal of the ashes – בְּגָדִים שְׂפוּשֵׁט בְּשַׁעַת תְּרוּמַת הַדָּשָׁן: The priest who removes the ashes from the altar does not wear his regular priestly garments but wears those of slightly lesser quality (Rambam *Sefer Avoda, Hilkhot Temidin UMusafin* 2:10). Commentaries on the Rambam discuss this assertion, since the Gemara, when calling for garments of inferior quality, is dealing with carrying the ashes out of the camp, not removing them from the altar (see *Kesef Mishne, Lehem Mishne*, and *Mishne LaMelekh*).

תָּנוּ רַבָּנָן: "וּפְשֹׁט... וְלוּבֵשׁ בְּגָדִים אֲחֵרִים וְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַדָּשָׁן" – שׂוֹמְעֵי כְּדָרְךָ יוֹם הַכַּפּוּרִים, שְׂפוּשֵׁט בְּגָדֵי קוּדֵשׁ וְלוּבֵשׁ בְּגָדֵי חוּל.

The Gemara returns to the mitzva of removing the ashes from the altar and associated issues. **The Sages taught in a baraita:** The Torah states, after describing the removal of the ashes: **"And he shall put off his garments, and put on other garments, and carry the ashes out of the camp to a clean place"** (Leviticus 6:4). I might understand from here that this change of garments is a mitzva to change into a different kind of garment, **similar to the change of garments performed on Yom Kippur**, when the High Priest changes back and forth from gold clothes to white clothes. Here, too, the Torah requires **that he remove his sacred garments and put on non-sacred garments.**^N

תְּלִמּוּד לֹא מֵר: "וּפְשֹׁט אֶת בְּגָדָיו וְלוּבֵשׁ בְּגָדִים אֲחֵרִים" – מִקִּישׁ בְּגָדִים שְׂפוּשֵׁט לְבָגִים שְׂפוּשֵׁט, מֵה לְהֵלֵךְ בְּגָדֵי קוּדֵשׁ – אֶף כֵּן בְּגָדֵי קוּדֵשׁ.

The *baraita* continues: To teach us otherwise, **the verse states:** **"And he shall put off his garments, and put on other garments,"** thereby juxtaposing the garments he puts on to the garments he takes off. This indicates that **just as there**, the garments he removes, i.e., those in which he had performed the mitzva of removal of the ashes, are **sacred garments, so too here**, the clothes he puts on to take the ashes out of the camp are **sacred garments.**^H

אִם כֵּן מֵה תְּלִמּוּד לֹא מֵר "אֲחֵרִים" – פְּחֻתֵי מֵה. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אָמַר: "אֲחֵרִים וְהוֹצִיא" – לִימּוּד עַל הַכַּפּוּרִים בְּעֵלֵי מוֹמֵי שְׂבָשְׁרֵי הַדָּשָׁן.

If so, what is the meaning when **the verse states: Other garments**, which implies that the second set of garments is different from the first? It means they are **of lower quality than** the first set of garments. **Rabbi Eliezer says** a different interpretation of the words: **Other garments.** The verse states: **"And put on other garments, and carry the ashes out of the camp,"** in which the Hebrew juxtaposes the words "other" and "carry out." This **teaches that priests with physical blemishes**, who are considered others in that they are not eligible to perform sacred tasks, **are eligible to carry out the ashes.**

אָמַר מֵר: "אֲחֵרִים" – פְּחֻתֵי מֵה, כְּדִתְנָא דְבִי רַבִּי יִשְׁמַעֵאל. דְּתַנָּא דְבִי רַבִּי יִשְׁמַעֵאל: בְּגָדִים שְׂבָשְׁל בְּהֵן קִדְרָה לְרַבּוֹ – לֹא יִמְזוּג בְּהֵן כּוּס לְרַבּוֹ.

The Gemara now explains the *baraita* in detail. **The Master said** in the *baraita*: The words: **Other garments**, teach that they are to be **of lower quality than** the garments worn during the removal of the ashes. This is **in accordance with what was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael, as it was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: Clothes worn by a servant as he was cooking food for his master** that became soiled in the process **should not** be worn by him when **he pours a cup for his master**, which is a task that calls for the servant to present a dignified appearance. Similarly, one who performs the dirtying task of carrying out the ashes should not wear the same fine clothes worn to perform other services.

אָמַר רִישׁ לְקִישׁ: כְּמַחְלֻקַת בְּהוֹצֵאָה – כֵּן מַחְלֻקַת בְּהַרְמָה. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מַחְלֻקַת בְּהוֹצֵאָה, אֲבָל בְּהַרְמָה – דְּבִרֵי הַכֹּל עֲבוּדָה הִיא.

The *baraita* taught that Rabbi Eliezer derived from the word *other* that blemished priests are eligible for the task of carrying out the ashes, while the first *tanna* derived a different teaching from those words. The Gemara clarifies the scope of the dispute between the first *tanna* and Rabbi Eliezer. **Reish Lakish said: Just as there is a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the first tanna with regard to carrying the ashes out of the camp, so too, there is a dispute with regard to the removal of the ashes from the altar.**^N Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the removal of the ashes may also be performed by blemished priests, while the first *tanna* disagrees. **But Rabbi Yohanan said:** The dispute is only with regard to carrying the ashes out of the camp, **but all agree that the removal of the ashes is a bona fide Temple service** that cannot be performed by blemished priests.

מֵאֵי טַעְמָא דְרִישׁ לְקִישׁ? אָמַר לָךְ: אֵי סְלִיקָא דְעַתְדָּךְ עֲבוּדָה הִיא – יֵשׁ לָךְ עֲבוּדָה שְׂבָשְׁרָה בְּשֵׁנֵי בָלִים?

The Gemara explains: **What is the reason behind the opinion of Reish Lakish?** Reish Lakish could have said to you: **If it enters your mind that the removal of the ashes is a bona fide Temple service**, you are faced with the following difficulty: **Do you have any Temple service that may be performed with only two garments** rather than the full set of four vestments worn by the priests? In the Torah's description of the garments worn to remove the ashes it says: **"And the priest shall put on his linen garment, and his linen trousers shall he put on his flesh"** (Leviticus 6:3).

Conform to his exact size – **כְּמִדָּתוֹ**: A priest's sacred garments must fit him precisely and should not be too short nor too long (Rambam *Sefer Avoda, Hilkhot Kelei HaMikdash* 8:4).

The trousers precede the other garments – **מְכַנְסִים**: When a priest dons his sacred vestments he begins by putting his trousers on, before the other garments (Rambam *Sefer Avoda, Hilkhot Kelei HaMikdash* 10:1).

ורבי יוחנן: גלי רחמנא בבתונת ומכנסים – והוא הדין למצנפת ואבנט.

ומאי שנא הני? – "מדו בד" "מדו" – כמדתו, "מכנסי בד" – לכדתניא: מנין שלא יהא דבר קודם למכנסים – שנאמר: "ומכנסי בד ילבש על בשרו".

וריש לקיש: 'מדו' כמדתו – מדאפקיה רחמנא בלשון 'מדו'. שלא יהא דבר קודם למכנסים מ'על בשרו' נפקא.

נימא בתנאי: "על בשרו" מה תלמוד לומר "ילבש" – להביא מצנפת ואבנט להרמה, דברי רבי יהודה.

רבי דוסא אומר: לרבות בגדי בהן גדול ביום הכפורים, שבשירין לכהן הדיוט.

אמר רבי: שתי תשובות בדבר; חדא: דאבנטו של כהן גדול לא זה הוא אבנטו של כהן הדיוט, ועוד: בגדים שנשתמשות בהן קדושה חמורה תשתמש בהן קדושה קלה? אלא, מה תלמוד לומר "ילבש" –

And what is the explanation for **Rabbi Yoḥanan's** opinion? In fact, the priest is required to wear all four priestly garments. **The Merciful One** reveals in the Torah that the priest must wear **the tunic and the trousers** like any other service so that one would not think that taking out the ashes may be performed in regular, non-sacred clothes. Once the Torah has made this point and mentioned these two specific garments, **the same is true** for the other two garments as well, i.e., **the mitre and the belt**.

The Gemara asks: If the Torah requires all four garments and mentions the tunic and trousers only as examples, **what is different about these two** that the Torah mentioned them in particular? The Gemara answers that these two particular garments were mentioned in order to teach certain *halakhot*. The Torah refers to the tunic as **"his linen garment,"** with the words **"his garment"** [*middo*], indicating that the tunic must conform to **his exact size**^H [*middato*] and should fit the priest perfectly. As for the words **"linen trousers,"** they come to teach **that which was taught** in a *baraita*: **From where** is it derived **that** as the priest gets dressed **no garment should precede the trousers? As it is stated: "And his linen trousers shall he put on his flesh,"** which implies that the trousers should be donned when the priest has nothing but his flesh, i.e., when he has no other garments on him yet.^H

The Gemara asks: **And** with regard to **Reish Lakish**, who maintains that these two garments are mentioned because they are the only two that the priest wears when removing the ashes, from where does he derive these two *halakhot*? The Gemara answers: The *halakha* that **his linen garment**, i.e., the tunic, must be **according to his size** is derived the fact that **the Merciful One uses the expression "his garment,"** i.e., his fitted garment, in the Torah, rather than calling it by its usual name, tunic. And the *halakha* that **no garment should precede the trousers** when the priest dresses is derived from the fact that the Torah added the phrase **"on his flesh."**

Let us say that the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish is **parallel to** a dispute between *tanna'im*. As it was taught in a *baraita* that the Torah states: "And the priest shall put on his linen garment, and his linen trousers shall he put on his flesh" (Leviticus 6:3). The words "shall he put on" seem superfluous, since these same words were already stated earlier in the verse. Therefore, the Torah could have sufficed with saying: "And linen trousers **on his flesh.**" **What is the meaning when the verse states: "Shall he put on"?** This extra expression comes to **include** the donning of the **mitre and the belt**, which are not mentioned here explicitly, for the **removal** of the ash; this is the statement of **Rabbi Yehuda**.

Rabbi Dosa says: The extra expression comes to **include** the permissibility of the **High Priest's clothes** that he wears on **Yom Kippur**, which are linen garments identical to those of the common priest, to teach that **they are acceptable** to be used afterward by **common priests** in their service. In other words, the expression teaches that the High Priest's garments need not be permanently retired from service after Yom Kippur, unlike the opinion of another Sage, as will be explained below.

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: **There are two refutations** against Rabbi Dosa's interpretation: **One** is that **the belt of the High Priest** that he wears on Yom Kippur is made only of linen and **is not identical to the belt of the common priest**, which, in Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi's opinion, is made of wool and linen. Therefore, it is impossible for the High Priest's Yom Kippur garments to be used by a common priest. **And furthermore**, with regard to **garments that you used to perform the services of the most severe sanctity**, i.e., the services performed by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, can it be that **you will then use them to perform services of lesser sanctity** by a common priest? **Instead** of this, a different interpretation must be said. **What**, then, is the meaning when **the verse states** the superfluous words **"shall he put on"?**