Since there are two equally logical derivations, a verse is required to teach the halakha: The verse states: “And he shall take a pan full of coals of fire from upon the altar from before the Lord” (Leviticus 16:12). The description of the altar being “from before the Lord” suggests it is not entirely before the Lord. Which altar is only partially before the Lord, but not all of it is before the Lord, i.e., part of it lies directly parallel to the Sanctuary, but part of it does not? You must say that this is the outer altar. Only the western side of it lies parallel to the entrance to the Sanctuary. In contrast, the inner altar is entirely within the Sanctuary and so is considered entirely before the Lord.

And it is necessary to write “from upon the altar” and it is necessary to write “from before God” because if the Merciful One had written only “from upon the altar” I would have said: What altar is the verse referring to? The inner altar. Therefore, the Merciful One writes “from before God.” And if the Merciful One had written only “from before God,” I would have said it means specifically from the part of the altar that lies before God, i.e., from the northwestern corner, which lies directly parallel to the entrance of the Sanctuary.

The Gemara qualifies this: But this applies specifically when the fire has already taken hold of them and they have begun to burn. But if the fire has not yet taken hold of them, no, a separate arrangement is not made in order to burn them.

There are those who say a different version of this qualification: Both with regard to the limbs of valid offerings and of disqualified offerings, if the fire has already taken hold of them and they have begun to burn, yes, a separate arrangement is made to burn them, but if the fire did not take hold of them, no, a separate arrangement is not made in order to burn them.

Bar Kappara concluded: And this is done even on Shabbat. But surely, we already learned this in the mishna that cites Rabbi Meir as saying: On every other day, there were four arrangements of wood there, upon the altar. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Avin said: Bar Kappara’s teaching is needed only in order to teach the requirement to set up a fourth arrangement, even though it is only for limbs of disqualified offerings. As certain disqualifications apply only ab initio, if the offering is nevertheless brought upon the altar it should not then be removed. Bar Kappara teaches that Rabbi Meir’s ruling applies in the event that limbs of such an offering were not fully consumed.

The Gemara qualifies this: But this applies specifically when the fire has already taken hold of them and they have begun to burn. But if the fire has not yet taken hold of them, no, a separate arrangement is not made in order to burn them.

Bar Kappara concluded: And this is done even on Shabbat. But surely, we already learned this in the mishna that cites Rabbi Meir as saying: On this day, on Yom Kippur, there are five. This means that the arrangement for burning any remaining limbs is made also on Yom Kippur, despite the fact that all the Shabbat prohibitions apply.

NOTES

Only partially before the Lord – דְּאִי פְּנִימִי נַפְלָן. According to the position of the altar vis-à-vis the Sanctuary and the Holy of Holies. According to other versions of the text, the reference is not to the location but to the purpose: The offerings brought upon the inner altar are always burned entirely, and therefore this altar may be described as entirely for God. In contrast, offerings brought on the outer altar are sometimes eaten by the priesthood and those who brought the offerings. This altar is therefore only partially for God (Rabbi Byakim).

Even on Shabbat – מֵעָלֹה בְּשַׁבָּת. Bar Kappara’s statement concerning the Shabbat is actually an independent, novel ruling beyond the first ruling, as indicated by the inclusion of the word “and.” The novelty of the first ruling relates to the status of offerings that are initially invalid, as the Gemara continues to explain. The second ruling, however, provides an additional novel element to the laws of Shabbat: Burning even invalid offerings may override Shabbat (EzhaK Halakot).
The Gemara answers: Rav Aha bar Yaakov said: Nevertheless, bar Kappa’s teaching is necessary, for it could enter your mind to say that it applies only when Yom Kippur occurs after Shabbat, i.e., on Sunday. Perhaps only in such a case is a separate arrangement made, based on the accepted law that leftover fats of Shabbat offerings are sacrificed and burned on Yom Kippur. However, if Yom Kippur occurs in the middle of the week, then perhaps no, a separate arrangement is not made in order to burn them. Therefore, bar Kappa teaches us that Rabbi Meir’s ruling applies in all cases.

Rava said: Who is this that does not care about his flour, i.e., he does not truly care about what he says and speaks imprecisely? Did we not learn in the mishna: On every other day. This clearly implies that Rabbi Meir’s ruling applies equally to all days of the week. As such, Rav Aha bar Yaakov’s justification for bar Kappa’s teaching is already implied in Rabbi Meir’s words in the mishna. The Gemara comments: Indeed, it is difficult.8

The Gemara comments: Both Rava and bar Kappa hold that a separate arrangement is made even on Shabbat. This disagrees with the opinion of Rav Huna, who said: The beginning of the sacrificial service of the daily offering, i.e., its slaughter, the sprinkling of its blood, and its burning overrides Shabbat; the end of its service, i.e., the burning of its sacrificial parts, does not override Shabbat.9

The Gemara analyzes Rav Huna’s statement: Returning to the matter itself: Rav Huna said: The beginning of the sacrificial service of the daily offering overrides a halakha, whereas the end of its service does not override a halakha.

Previously, the Gemara assumed that Rav Huna was discussing the possibility that the sacrifice of the daily offering overrides Shabbat. The Gemara now clarifies if this was his intention: What is meant by saying that the end of its service does not override the halakha? Rav Hisda said: Although the end of its service does override Shabbat, it does not override the halakha that it should not be brought in a state of ritual impurity. This is true although the beginning of the sacrificial service of the daily offering may, if necessary, be brought in a state of ritual impurity. And Rabbi said: The end of its service overrides only the halakha that it should not be brought in a state of ritual impurity, but it does not override Shabbat.

Abaye said to Rabbi: It poses a difficulty to your opinion, and it poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Hisda. It is difficult to your opinion as follows: What is different about the prohibition of bringing an offering in a state of ritual impurity that the daily offering overrides it? Because it is written with regard to the daily offering “in its season” (Numbers 28:2), to emphasize that it should be brought under all circumstances, even if that means that it will be brought in a state of ritual impurity. But, by that logic, the daily offering should also override Shabbat. Because the term “in its season” emphasizes that it should be brought under all circumstances, this means even on Shabbat.10

And it is difficult to the opinion of Rav Hisda: What is different about Shabbat that the daily offering overrides it? Because it is written “in its season,” to emphasize that it should be brought under all circumstances, even on Shabbat. But by that logic, the daily offering should also override the prohibition of bringing an offering in a state of ritual impurity. Because the term “in its season” emphasizes that it should be brought under all circumstances, this means even in a state of ritual impurity.

Rabbi said to him: It is not difficult to my opinion and it does not pose a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Hisda. It is not difficult to my opinion, because I hold that the end of its sacrificial rite is like its beginning.

The Gemara answers: Rav Aha bar Yaakov said: Nevertheless, bar Kappa’s teaching is necessary, for it could enter your mind to say that it applies only when Yom Kippur occurs after Shabbat, i.e., on Sunday. Perhaps only in such a case is a separate arrangement made, based on the accepted law that leftover fats of Shabbat offerings are sacrificed and burned on Yom Kippur. However, if Yom Kippur occurs in the middle of the week, then perhaps no, a separate arrangement is not made in order to burn them. Therefore, bar Kappa teaches us that Rabbi Meir’s ruling applies in all cases.

Rava said: Who is this that does not care about his flour, i.e., he does not truly care about what he says and speaks imprecisely? Did we not learn in the mishna: On every other day. This clearly implies that Rabbi Meir’s ruling applies equally to all days of the week. As such, Rav Aha bar Yaakov’s justification for bar Kappa’s teaching is already implied in Rabbi Meir’s words in the mishna. The Gemara comments: Indeed, it is difficult.

The Gemara comments: Both Rava and bar Kappa hold that a separate arrangement is made even on Shabbat. This disagrees with the opinion of Rav Huna, who said: The beginning of the sacrificial service of the daily offering, i.e., its slaughter, the sprinkling of its blood, and its burning overrides Shabbat; the end of its service, i.e., the burning of its sacrificial parts, does not override Shabbat.

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Abaye said to Rabbi: It poses a difficulty to your opinion, and it poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Hisda. It is difficult to your opinion as follows: What is different about the prohibition of bringing an offering in a state of ritual impurity that the daily offering overrides it? Because it is written with regard to the daily offering “in its season” (Numbers 28:2), to emphasize that it should be brought under all circumstances, even if that means that it will be brought in a state of ritual impurity. But, by that logic, the daily offering should also override Shabbat. Because the term “in its season” emphasizes that it should be brought under all circumstances, this means even on Shabbat.

And it is difficult to the opinion of Rav Hisda: What is different about Shabbat that the daily offering overrides it? Because it is written “in its season,” to emphasize that it should be brought under all circumstances, even on Shabbat. But by that logic, the daily offering should also override the prohibition of bringing an offering in a state of ritual impurity. Because the term “in its season” emphasizes that it should be brought under all circumstances, this means even in a state of ritual impurity.

Rabbi said to him: It is not difficult to my opinion and it does not pose a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Hisda. It is not difficult to my opinion, because I hold that the end of its sacrificial rite is like its beginning.
HALAKHA

**Extinguishing the fire of the altar** – רבי יוסי בן נחמן: One who extinguishes the fire of the altar transgresses a negative commandment and receives lashes for doing so. He is similarly punished for extinguishing even a single coal or for removing a coal from the altar and then extinguishing it. But one does not receive lashes for extinguishing the fire for the incense coal pan or the candelabrum, even if he does so upon the top of the altar. This is because these fires are removed from their original designated purpose for other mitzvot. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rava in the second version of his dispute with Abaye (Rambam Sefer Avoda, Hilkhot Temidin UMusaf 2:6).

**NOTES**

Removed to fulfill its mitzva – רבי יוסי בן נחמן: With regard to the fulfillment of mitzvot in general, Rabbeinu Nissim says that even those who assert that one who performs a mitzva without intention does fulfill his obligation, even they admit that if one actively intends to perform a different mitzva, he does not fulfill his obligation. Some adduce proof for his claim from the principle laid out in this Gemara: Removing a coal from the altar’s fire for another mitzva breaks its association with the first mitzva, i.e., having a fire on the altar (Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch Chajes).

Therefore, with regard to overriding the prohibition to bring an offering in a state of ritual impurity, since the *beginning* of the sacrifice of the daily offering is *fit to override* the prohibition of offering it in a state of ritual impurity, so too, its *end also overrides* the prohibition. However, in the case of Shabbat, the *beginning* of a daily offering of the weekday is *not fit to override* Shabbat, since by definition it must be brought on its appropriate day. Therefore, its *end also does not override* Shabbat in the event that limbs remain from Friday’s daily offering.

And it is also *not difficult* to the opinion of Rav Hisda, because he *does not hold* that its end is *like its beginning*. Rather, he has the following reasoning: The prohibitions of Shabbat are not merely overridden in the case of a *communal* offerng, but they are actually *permitted*, such that there is no need to try to avoid performing the necessary labors when sacrificing it. Therefore, its *end also overrides* Shabbat.

However, in the case of the prohibition to bring an offering in a state of ritual impurity, which is *merely overridden* in the case of a communal offering, it is preferable to avoid doing so. Therefore, the *beginning* of its sacrifice, *i.e.*, its slaughter and the sprinkling of its blood, and its burning, *which is the essential* stage that provides *atonement*, *overrides* the prohibition and should be done even in a state of ritual impurity. However, its *end*, *i.e.*, the burning of the sacrificial parts, *which is not the essential* stage that provides *atonement,* *does not override* the prohibitions.

The Torah prohibits the fire on the altar to be extinguished: “A perpetual fire shall be kept burning on the altar, it shall not go out” (Leviticus 6:6). With regard to this prohibition, an amoraic dispute *was stated*: With regard to one who extinguishes the fire of the coals that are taken with the coal pan for the incense on Yom Kippur or the fire of the coals that are taken in order to light the candelabrum, Abaye said: He is liable. Rava said: He is not liable.

The Gemara elaborates on the dispute: In a case where one extinguished a coal while still standing upon the top of the altar, everyone agrees that he is liable. This is because the verse explicitly is referring to extinguishing a flame “upon the altar.” *When they disagree,* it is in a case where he brought the coals down to ground level and extinguished a coal there. Abaye said: He is liable, since it is still considered fire of the altar. Rava said: He is not liable, because once it has been removed from the altar it is considered removed and no longer part of the altar’s fire. Therefore, the prohibition does not apply to it.

The Gemara asks: But if so, with regard to this ruling that Rav Nahman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: One who takes down a coal from upon the altar and extinguishes it is liable, in accordance with whose opinion is he ruling? Could he possibly be ruling in accordance with the opinion of Abaye? Certainly not. In disputes between Abaye and Rava, the *halakha* follows Rava.

The Gemara explains: You can even say his ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rava by making the following distinction: *There,* in the ruling of Rav Nahman, the coal was *not removed to fulfill its mitzva.* Therefore, it is still considered to be part of the fire of the altar and the prohibition still applies. Whereas, *here,* in the dispute between Abaye and Rava, this is a case of coal that *was removed to fulfill its mitzva.* Therefore, it is associated with its mitzva and no longer considered the fire of the altar.
There are those who say a different version of the dispute:

In a case where he brought the coals down to the ground and extinguished a coal there, everyone agrees that he is not liable. When they disagree it is in a case where one extinguished a coal while still standing upon the top of the altar. Abaye said: He is liable, since it is still considered fire of the altar. Rava said: He is not liable, because once it has been removed from the altar it is considered removed and no longer part of the altar’s fire. Therefore, the prohibition does not apply to it.

The Gemara asks: But if so, with regard to this ruling that Rav Nahman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: He who takes down a coal from upon the altar and extinguishes it is liable, in accordance with whose opinion is his ruling? It would appear that it is neither in accordance with the opinion of Abaye, nor in accordance with the opinion of Rava. The Gemara explains: You can even say that his ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rava by making the following distinction: There, in the ruling of Rav Nahman, the coal was not removed to fulfill its mitzva; it is therefore still considered to be part of the fire of the altar and the prohibition applies. Whereas, here, in the dispute between Abaye and Rava, this is a case of coal that was removed to fulfill its mitzva, and it is therefore associated with its mitzva and no longer considered the fire of the altar.