

NOTES

Only partially before the Lord – שְׂמֵקֶצְתוּ לִפְנֵי ה' – According to the present text of the Gemara, the reference is to the position of the altar vis-à-vis the Sanctuary and the Holy of Holies. According to other versions of the text, the reference is not to the location but to the purpose: The offerings brought upon the inner altar are always burned entirely, and therefore this altar may be described as entirely for God. In contrast, offerings brought on the outer altar are sometimes eaten by the priesthood and those who brought the offerings. This altar is therefore only partially for God (Rabbi Elyakim).

תְּלֻמוּד לומר: "וּלְקַח מִלֵּא הַמִּזְבֵּחַ הַגָּדֹל אֵשׁ מֵעַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ מִלִּפְנֵי ה'", "אֵיזוֹהוּ מִזְבֵּחַ שְׂמֵקֶצְתוּ לִפְנֵי ה' וְאֵין כּוֹלּוֹ לִפְנֵי ה' – הוּא אוֹמֵר זֶה מִזְבֵּחַ הַחִיצוֹן.

Since there are two equally logical derivations, a verse is required to teach the *halakha*: **The verse states: "And he shall take a pan full of coals of fire from upon the altar from before the Lord"** (Leviticus 16:12). The description of the altar being "from before the Lord" suggests it is not entirely before the Lord. **Which altar is only partially before the Lord,<sup>n</sup> but not all of it is before the Lord, i.e., part of it lies directly parallel to the Sanctuary, but part of it does not? You must say that this is the outer altar.** Only the western side of it lies parallel to the entrance to the Sanctuary. In contrast, the inner altar is entirely within the Sanctuary and so is considered entirely before the Lord.

וְאֵי צִטְרוֹךְ לְמִיכְתָּב "מֵעַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ" וְאֵי צִטְרוֹךְ לְמִיכְתָּב "מִלִּפְנֵי ה'"; דְּאֵי כְּתָב רַחֲמֵנָא "מֵעַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ" – הוּא אֲמִינָא: מֵאֵי מִזְבֵּחַ – מִזְבֵּחַ פְּנִימִי, כְּתָב רַחֲמֵנָא "מִלִּפְנֵי ה'" – וְאֵי כְּתָב רַחֲמֵנָא "מִלִּפְנֵי ה'" – הוּא אֲמִינָא: דְּקָא מִלִּפְנֵי ה'.

And it is necessary to write "from upon the altar" and it is necessary to write "from before God" because if the Merciful One had written only "from upon the altar" I would have said: What altar is the verse referring to? The inner altar. Therefore, the Merciful One writes "from before God." And if the Merciful One had written only "from before God," I would have said it means specifically from the part of the altar that lies before God, i.e., from the northwestern corner, which lies directly parallel to the entrance of the Sanctuary;

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Even on Shabbat – וְאֵפִילוּ בַשַּׁבָּת – Bar Kappara's statement concerning the Shabbat is actually an independent, novel ruling beyond the first ruling, as indicated by the inclusion of the word "and." The novelty of the first ruling relates to the status of offerings that are initially invalid, as the Gemara continues to explain. The second ruling, however, provides an additional novel element to the laws of Shabbat: Burning even invalid offerings may override Shabbat (*Eshkol HaKofer*).

אֲבָל מֵהֵאֵי גִיסָא וּמֵהֵאֵי גִיסָא אֵימָא לָא – צְרִיכָא.

but from this side or from that side of the altar, both of which are not directly in front of the Sanctuary's entrance, I would say that no, the fire may not be taken from there. Therefore, it is necessary to write both terms in order to teach this *halakha*.

אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר מִשּׁוּם בַּר קַפְרָא, אוֹמֵר הִיא הָיְתָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר: אֵיבְרֵי עוֹלָה שְׁנֵיתוֹתָיו – עוֹשָׂה לָהֶן מַעְרְכָה בְּפָנֵי עֲצָמָה וְסוּדְרָן, וְאֵפִילוּ בַשַּׁבָּת.

Rabbi Elazar said in the name of bar Kappara: Rabbi Meir would say: With regard to limbs of a burnt-offering that remained on the altar from the previous night and which were not fully consumed, one should make a separate arrangement of wood for them and arrange them upon it to be burned. And this is done even on Shabbat.<sup>n</sup>

מֵאֵי קָא מְשַׁמַּע לֵן? תַּנְינָא: בְּכָל יוֹם הֵי שָׁם אַרְבַּע מַעְרְכוֹת! אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבִין: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לְפִסְוִלִין.

What is bar Kappara teaching us when he informs us that Rabbi Meir requires a separate arrangement to be made? Surely, we already learned this in the mishna that cites Rabbi Meir as saying: On every other day, there were four arrangements of wood there, upon the altar. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Avin said: Bar Kappara's teaching is needed only in order to teach the requirement to set up a fourth arrangement, even though it is only for limbs of disqualified offerings. As certain disqualifications apply only *ab initio*, if the offering is nevertheless brought upon the altar it should not then be removed. Bar Kappara teaches that Rabbi Meir's ruling applies in the event that limbs of such an offering were not fully consumed.

וְדוֹקָא שְׂמֵשְׁלָה בְּהֵן הָאוּר, אֲבָל לֹא מִשְׁלָה בְּהֵן הָאוּר – לֹא.

The Gemara qualifies this: But this applies specifically when the fire has already taken hold of them and they have begun to burn. But if the fire has not yet taken hold of them, no, a separate arrangement is not made in order to burn them.

אֵיכָא דְאָמְרִי: אַחַד בְּשׂוּרִין וְאַחַד פְּסוּלִין, אֵי מִשְׁלָה בְּהֵן הָאוּר – אֵין, וְאֵי לֹא – לֹא.

There are those who say a different version of this qualification: Both with regard to the limbs of valid offerings and of disqualified offerings, if the fire has already taken hold of them and they have begun to burn, yes, a separate arrangement is made to burn them, but if the fire did not take hold of them, no, a separate arrangement is not made in order to burn them.

"וְאֵפִילוּ בַשַּׁבָּת". תַּנְינָא: וְהַיּוֹם חֲמִשָּׁה!

Bar Kappara concluded: And this is done even on Shabbat. But surely, we already learned this in the mishna that cites Rabbi Meir as saying: But on this day, on Yom Kippur, there are five. This means that the arrangement for burning any remaining limbs is made also on Yom Kippur, despite the fact that all the Shabbat prohibitions apply.

דָּלָא תַּיִשׁ – That does not care about his flour – לְקַמְחֵיהּ: There are several different explanations of this aphorism. Some suggest that the individual in question is not concerned with the flour he eats. He wastes the energy he gains from eating by not thoroughly using it for the study of Torah (*Arukh*). Others explain that he pays no attention to whether he eats flour or barley, meaning he is careless in his speech (Rabbi Elyakim). Finally, a different version of the text reads *likame*, in front of him, rather than *lekimhei*, his flour. According to this, the intention is that he does not notice even an obvious difficulty (*ge'onim*; Rabbi Elyakim).

It is difficult [*kashya*] – קָשְׁיָא: The commentators point out that the term *kashya* suggests there is a strong question but that there may be a solution to it, as opposed to the term *teyuvta*, it is a refutation, which indicates a position is indefensible. The Ritva suggests that despite the simple reading of: On every other day, as applying even to Shabbat, one could have interpreted it as referring only to weekdays. This is apparently how Rav Huna and Rabba understood it.

Some commentators understand the word *kashya* as referring all the way back to the first question, which tried to justify the need for bar Kappara's statement. Since all the subsequent stages of reasoning have now been refuted, the original question remains (*Kashot Meyushav*).

Rabba – רַבָּא: In the standard Vilna edition of the Gemara, the Sage who disagreed with Rav H̄isda is rendered as Rabba. His name appears here in parentheses to suggest that this attribution is incorrect, and indeed the *Mesoret HaShas* changes the text to Rabba. Rabba was active in the same generation as Rav H̄isda, and was in fact one of his disciples. Rava, however, was active only in the following generation. The change from Rava to Rabba applies also to the next lines in the Gemara, in which Abaye, in the following generation, began to analyze the opinions of Rabba and Rav H̄isda.

בְּמוֹעֵדוֹ וְאֶפִּילוּ – In its season, even on Shabbat – בְּשַׁבָּת: *Tosafot Yeshanim* comment that this law is not derived from the cited text but from an explicit verse: "This is the burnt-offering of every Shabbat, beside the continual burnt-offering and its libation" (Numbers 28:10). It is clear from that verse that burnt-offerings are sacrificed on Shabbat. They explain that the words "in its time" are required to serve a verbal analogy on a different issue. However, *Siah Yitzhak* notes that from the analysis of *Tosafot* on tractate *Shabbat*, it seems that there is tannaitic dispute concerning which of these verses is the source of this *halakha*.

אָמַר רַב אֶחָא בְּרַיָּא יַעֲקֹב: אֵיצְטְרִיךְ, סְלִקָא דַּעְתְךָ אֲמִינָא: הֲנֵי מִיְלֵי – הִיכָא דְחַל יוֹם הַכַּפּוּרִים לְהִיּוֹת אַחֵר הַשַּׁבָּת, דְחַלְבֵי שַׁבָּת קָרְבָן בְּיוֹם הַכַּפּוּרִים. אָבֵל בְּאַמְצַע שַׁבָּת – לֹא. קָא מְשַׁמַּע לָן.

אָמַר רַבָּא: מֵאֵן הָאֵי דְלֹא תַּיִשׁ לְקַמְחֵיהּ? הָאֵ בְּכָל יוֹם תַּנְּנִי קְשִׁיָּא.

וּפְלִיגָא דְרַב הוּנָא, דְאָמַר: תַּחֲלִיתוֹ – דוּחָה, סוּפוֹ – אֵינוֹ דוּחָה.

גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: תַּמִּיד, תַּחֲלִיתוֹ – דוּחָה, סוּפוֹ – אֵינוֹ דוּחָה.

מֵאֵי אֵינוֹ דוּחָה? רַב חֲסִדָא אָמַר: דוּחָה אֵת הַשַּׁבָּת וְאֵינוֹ דוּחָה אֵת הַטּוּמְאָה, (וְרַבָּא) אָמַר: דוּחָה אֵת הַטּוּמְאָה וְאֵינוֹ דוּחָה אֵת הַשַּׁבָּת.

אָמַר לִיה אַבְיִי (לְרַבָּא): לְדִידְךָ קְשִׁיָּא, וְלְרַב חֲסִדָא קְשִׁיָּא. לְדִידְךָ קְשִׁיָּא: מֵאֵי שְׁנָא טוּמְאָה – דְכַתִּיב "בְּמוֹעֵדוֹ" וְאֶפִּילוּ בְּטוּמְאָה, שַׁבָּת נָמִי – "בְּמוֹעֵדוֹ" וְאֶפִּילוּ בְּשַׁבָּת!

וְלְרַב חֲסִדָא קְשִׁיָּא: מֵאֵי שְׁנָא שַׁבָּת דְכַתִּיב "בְּמוֹעֵדוֹ" אֶפִּילוּ בְּשַׁבָּת, טוּמְאָה נָמִי: "בְּמוֹעֵדוֹ" וְאֶפִּילוּ בְּטוּמְאָה!

אָמַר לִיה: לֹא לְדִידִי קְשִׁיָּא, וְלֹא לְרַב חֲסִדָא קְשִׁיָּא. לְדִידִי לֹא קְשִׁיָּא: סוּפוֹ – בְּתַחֲלִיתוֹ.

The Gemara answers: Rav Aḥa bar Ya'akov said: Nevertheless, bar Kappara's teaching is necessary, for it could enter your mind that this applies only when Yom Kippur occurs after Shabbat, i.e., on Sunday. Perhaps only in such a case is a separate arrangement made, based on the accepted law that leftover fats of Shabbat offerings are sacrificed and burned on Yom Kippur. However, if Yom Kippur occurs in the middle of the week, then perhaps no, a separate arrangement is not made in order to burn them. Therefore, bar Kappara teaches us that Rabbi Meir's ruling applies in all cases.

Rava said: Who is this that does not care about his flour,<sup>N</sup> i.e., he does not truly care about what he says and speaks imprecisely? Did we not learn in the mishna: On every other day. This clearly implies that Rabbi Meir's ruling applies equally to all days of the week. As such, Rav Aḥa bar Ya'akov's justification for bar Kappara's teaching is already implied in Rabbi Meir's words in the mishna. The Gemara comments: Indeed, it is difficult.<sup>N</sup>

The Gemara comments: Both Rava and bar Kappara hold that a separate arrangement is made even on Shabbat. This disagrees with the opinion of Rav Huna, who said: The beginning of the sacrificial service of the daily offering, i.e., its slaughter, the sprinkling of its blood, and its burning overrides Shabbat; the end of its service, i.e., the burning of its sacrificial parts, does not override Shabbat.<sup>H</sup>

The Gemara analyzes Rav Huna's statement: Returning to the matter itself: Rav Huna said: The beginning of the sacrificial service of the daily offering overrides a *halakha*, whereas the end of its service does not override a *halakha*.

Previously, the Gemara assumed that Rav Huna was discussing the possibility that the sacrifice of the daily offering overrides Shabbat. The Gemara now clarifies if this was his intention: What is meant by saying that the end of its service does not override the *halakha*? Rav H̄isda said: Although the end of its service does override Shabbat, it does not override the *halakha* that it should not be brought in a state of ritual impurity. This is true although the beginning of the sacrificial service of the daily offering may, if necessary, be brought in a state of ritual impurity. And Rabba<sup>N</sup> said: The end of its service overrides only the *halakha* that it should not be brought in a state of ritual impurity, but it does not override Shabbat.

Abaye said to Rabba: It poses a difficulty to your opinion, and it poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav H̄isda. It is difficult to your opinion as follows: What is different about the prohibition of bringing an offering in a state of ritual impurity that the daily offering overrides it? Because it is written with regard to the daily offering "in its season" (Numbers 28:2), to emphasize that it should be brought under all circumstances, even if that means that it will be brought in a state of ritual impurity. But, by that logic, the daily offering should also override Shabbat. Because the term "in its season" emphasizes that it should be brought under all circumstances, this means even on Shabbat.<sup>N</sup>

And it is difficult to the opinion of Rav H̄isda: What is different about Shabbat that the daily offering overrides it? Because it is written "in its season," to emphasize that it should be brought under all circumstances, even on Shabbat. But by that logic, the daily offering should also override the prohibition of bringing an offering in a state of ritual impurity. Because the term "in its season" emphasizes that it should be brought under all circumstances, this means even in a state of ritual impurity.

Rabba said to him: It is not difficult to my opinion and it does not pose a difficulty to the opinion of Rav H̄isda. It is not difficult to my opinion, because I hold that the end of its sacrificial rite is like its beginning.

#### HALAKHA

תַּחֲלִיתוֹ – The beginning overrides, the end does not override – דוּחָה, סוּפוֹ אֵינוֹ דוּחָה: The burning of the limbs of the daily offering overrides the prohibition to sacrifice it in a state of impurity,

but does not override the prohibitions of Shabbat. Therefore, the limbs of the Friday offering must be burned on that day, as the beginning stages of the daily offering overrides Shabbat but

the end stages don't override it. This ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba (*Kesef Mishne* and *Lehem Mishne*, Rambam *Sefer Avoda, Hilkhot Temidin UMusafin* 1:7).

HALAKHA

**Extinguishing the fire of the altar** – כִּיבוי אֵשׁ מִזְבֵּחַ: One who extinguishes the fire of the altar transgresses a negative commandment and receives lashes for doing so. He is similarly punished for extinguishing even a single coal or for removing a coal from the altar and then extinguishing it. But one does not receive lashes for extinguishing the fire for the incense coal pan or the candelabrum, even if he does so upon the top of the altar. This is because these fires are removed from their original designated purpose for other mitzvot. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rava in the second version of his dispute with Abaye (Rambam *Sefer Avoda*, *Hilkhot Temidin UMusafin* 2:6).

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**Removed to fulfill its mitzva** – אֵינְתִיקָה לְמִצְוָתָהּ: With regard to the fulfillment of mitzvot in general, Rabbeinu Nissim says that even those who assert that one who performs a mitzva without intention does fulfill his obligation, even they admit that if one actively intends to perform a different mitzva, he does not fulfill his obligation. Some adduce proof for his claim from the principle laid out in this Gemara: Removing a coal from the altar's fire for another mitzva breaks its association with the first mitzva, i.e., having a fire on the altar (Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch Chajes).

טוּמְאָה דְתַחֲלִיתוֹ בְּרַ מִידְחָא טוּמְאָה הוּא – סוּפוֹ נְמִי דְחִי, שְׁבַת דְתַחֲלִיתוֹ לְאוֹ בְּרַ מִידְחָא שְׁבַת הוּא – סוּפוֹ נְמִי לְאוֹ דְחִי.

לְרַב חֲסֵדָא לְאוֹ קְשִׁיָּא; סוּפוֹ כְּתַחֲלִיתוֹ (תַּחֲלִיתוֹ) לֵית לֵיהּ, שְׁבַת דְהוֹתֵרָה הִיא בְּצִיבּוֹר – סוּפוֹ נְמִי דְחִי.

טוּמְאָה, דְדַחוּיָהּ הִיא בְּצִיבּוֹר, תַּחֲלִיתוֹ דְעִינְקָא בְּפִרְהָ – דְחִי, סוּפוֹ דְלְאוֹ עִינְקָא בְּפִרְהָ – לְאוֹ דְחִי.

אֵינְתִימַר, הַמְכַבֵּה אֵשׁ מִחֲתָתָהּ וּמִנֹּרָה, אֲבִי אָמַר: חַיִּיב, רַבָּא אָמַר: פְּטוּר.

דְּכַבֵּייהּ בְּרֵאשׁוֹ שֶׁל מִזְבֵּחַ – דְּכוּלֵי עֲלֵמָא לֹא פְּלִיגִי דְחַיִּיב. בִּי פְּלִיגִי – דְּאֲחֲתִיָּהּ אֲאַרְעָא וְכַבֵּייהּ. אֲבִי אָמַר: חַיִּיב, אֵשׁ הַמְזֻבָּח הוּא. רַבָּא אָמַר: פְּטוּר, בֵּינָן דְנִתְקָה – נִתְקָה.

אֵלָא הָא דְאָמַר רַב נַחֲמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בְּרַ אַבּוּהּ: הַמּוֹרִיד גַּחֲלֵת מֵעַל גְּבִי הַמְזֻבָּח וְכִיבָהּ – חַיִּיב. כַּמָּאן – כַּאֲבִי?

אֲפִילוּ תִימָא כְּרַבָּא, הַתָּם לֹא אֵינְתִיקָה לְמִצְוָתָהּ, הֲכָא אֵינְתִיקָה לְמִצְוָתָהּ.

Therefore, with regard to overriding the prohibition to bring an offering in a state of **ritual impurity**, since the **beginning** of the sacrifice of the daily offering is fit to override the prohibition of offering it in a state of **ritual impurity**, so too, **its end also overrides** the prohibition. However, in the case of **Shabbat**, the **beginning** of a daily offering of the weekday is **not fit to override** Shabbat, since by definition it must be brought on its appropriate day. Therefore, **its end also does not override** Shabbat in the event that limbs remain from Friday's daily offering.

And it is also **not difficult to the opinion of Rav Hisda**, because **he does not hold that its end is like its beginning**. Rather, he has the following reasoning: The prohibitions of **Shabbat** are not merely overridden in the case of a **communal offering**, but they are actually **permitted**, such that there is no need to try to avoid performing the necessary labors when sacrificing it. Therefore, **its end also overrides** Shabbat.

However, in the case of the prohibition to bring an offering in a state of **ritual impurity**, which is merely **overridden** in the case of a **communal offering**, it is preferable to avoid doing so. Therefore, **the beginning** of its sacrifice, i.e., its slaughter and the sprinkling of its blood, and its burning, which is the **essential** stage that provides **atonement**, **overrides** the prohibition and should be done even in a state of ritual impurity. However, **its end**, i.e., the burning of the sacrificial parts, which is **not the essential** stage that provides **atonement**, **does not override** the prohibitions.

The Torah prohibits the fire on the altar to be extinguished: “A perpetual fire shall be kept burning on the altar, it shall not go out” (Leviticus 6:6). With regard to this prohibition, an amoraic dispute was stated: With regard to **one who extinguishes the fire** of the coals that are taken with the **coal pan** for the incense on Yom Kippur or the fire of the coals that are taken in order to light the **candelabrum**, **Abaye said: He is liable. Rava said: He is not liable.**<sup>h</sup>

The Gemara elaborates on the dispute: In a case where **one extinguished** a coal while still standing upon the top of the altar, everyone agrees that **he is liable**. This is because the verse explicitly is referring to extinguishing a flame “upon the altar.” **When they disagree**, it is in a case where he brought the coals down to ground level and extinguished a coal there. **Abaye said: He is liable**, since it is still considered **fire of the altar**. **Rava said: He is not liable**, because **once it has been removed** from the altar it is considered **removed** and no longer part of the altar's fire. Therefore, the prohibition does not apply to it.

The Gemara asks: **But** if so, with regard to **this ruling that Rav Nahman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: One who takes down a coal from upon the altar and extinguishes it is liable, in accordance with whose opinion is he ruling?** Could he possibly be ruling in accordance with the opinion of **Abaye**? Certainly not. In disputes between **Abaye** and **Rava**, the *halakha* follows **Rava**.

The Gemara explains: **You can even say** his ruling is in accordance with the opinion of **Rava** by making the following distinction: **There**, in the ruling of **Rav Nahman**, the coal was **not removed to fulfill its mitzva**. Therefore, it is still considered to be part of the fire of the altar and the prohibition still applies. Whereas, **here**, in the dispute between **Abaye** and **Rava**, this is a case of coal that was **removed to fulfill its mitzva**.<sup>n</sup> Therefore, it is associated with its mitzva and no longer considered the fire of the altar.

איכא דאמרי: There are those who say a different version of the dispute:

דאחתייה אארעא וכבייה – דכולי עלמא לא פליגי דפטור, כי פליגי – דכבייה בראשו של מזבח. אביי אמר: חייב, אש המזבח הוא. רבא אמר: פטור, כיון דנתקה – נתקה.

In a case where he brought the coals down to the ground and extinguished a coal there, everyone agrees that he is not liable. When they disagree it is in a case where one extinguished a coal while still standing upon the top of the altar. Abaye said: He is liable, since it is still considered fire of the altar. Rava said: He is not liable, because once it has been removed from the altar it is considered removed and no longer part of the altar's fire. Therefore, the prohibition does not apply to it.

אלא הא דאמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה: המוריד גחלת מעל גבי המזבח וכבה – חייב, כמאן? לא כאביי ולא כרבא! התם לא אינתיק למצותה, הכא אינתיק למצותה.

The Gemara asks: But if so, with regard to this ruling that Rav Nahman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: He who takes down a coal from upon the altar and extinguishes it is liable, in accordance with whose opinion is his ruling? It would appear that it is neither in accordance with the opinion of Abaye, nor in accordance with the opinion of Rava. The Gemara explains: You can even say that his ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rava by making the following distinction: There, in the ruling of Rav Nahman, the coal was not removed to fulfill its mitzva; it is therefore still considered to be part of the fire of the altar and the prohibition applies. Whereas, here, in the dispute between Abaye and Rava, this is a case of coal that was removed to fulfill its mitzva, and it is therefore associated with its mitzva and no longer considered the fire of the altar.

הדרן עלך טרף בקלפי