Based on Rav Hisda’s statement, if he slaughtered them outside the Temple before the doors of the Sanctuary were opened he is exempt. What is the reason? Lacking the opening of the doors is comparable to lacking an action. Therefore, the offering was not yet fit to be sacrificed in the Temple, and when he slaughtered it outside, despite doing so with the intention that it is a sacrificial offering, he is not considered to have violated the prohibition against sacrificing an offering outside the Temple.

Rav Hisda stated above that since the Yom Kippur goats could be used for the additional offerings, one is liable for slaughtering them outside the Temple. The Gemara asks: Does Rav Hisda accept the principle: Since a particular situation could come to be in the future, it is viewed as though it existed already in the present? And didn’t Rav Hisda say: If one slaughtered a Paschal lamb outside the Temple during the rest of the days of the year other than Passover eve, if he slaughtered it for its own sake, i.e., as a Paschal lamb, he is exempt, since at that time it is not fit to be sacrificed as a Paschal lamb. If he sacrificed it not for its own sake but rather as a peace-offering, he is liable. A Paschal lamb that is slaughtered as a peace-offering on any day of the year other than Passover eve is considered a valid peace-offering. Therefore, it has the status of an offering that is fit to be sacrificed in the Temple, and he is liable for sacrificing it outside the Temple.

The Gemara comments: The reason he is liable is because he specifically slaughtered it not for its own sake. However, if he slaughtered it without specifying what offering he had in mind, it is considered to have been slaughtered for its own sake and he is exempt. But why is he exempt? Let us say: Since it is fit to be sacrificed within the Temple not for its own sake, i.e., as a peace-offering, it should be considered as though he slaughtered it as a peace-offering outside the Temple, and he should be liable.

The Gemara responds: How can these cases be compared? There, with regard to the Paschal lamb, it requires explicit uprooting from the status of a Paschal lamb in order to be considered a peace-offering. Therefore, if he did not specify his intent, it is still considered a Paschal lamb, which is not fit to be sacrificed. These Yom Kippur goats do not require uprooting from their previous status. The Yom Kippur goats have the status of a sin-offering and the goats sacrificed as part of the additional offerings of the day are also considered sin-offerings. Therefore, one who slaughters them outside the Temple is liable, as they are fit to be sacrificed at that time as sin-offerings, even without the principle: Since, etc.

Rabba bar Shimi taught these two halakhot, cited above in the name of Rav Hisda, in the name of Rabba, and he found a difficulty between one statement of Rabba and another statement of Rabba. And he resolved the apparent contradiction as we resolved it.

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yirmeya said that Rabbi Yohanan said: If one slaughtered a Paschal lamb outside the Temple during the rest of the days of the year, whether he slaughtered it for its own sake, as a Paschal lamb, or not for its own sake, as a peace-offering, he is exempt.

Rav Dimi said: I said this halakha before Rabbi Yirmeya and asked him: Granted, when he slaughters it outside the Temple for its own sake he is exempt, because it is not fit to be brought as a Paschal lamb at that time, and one is liable for slaughtering an offering outside the Temple only if it was fit to be sacrificed in the Temple. However, if he slaughters it not for its own sake, why is he exempt? Isn’t it fit to be sacrificed not for its own sake as a peace-offering inside the Temple?
HALAKHA

A preffered statement from the Rambam: An offering lacking time that was slaughtered outside the Temple – דִּכְפָּה: One who slaughters an offering that is lacking time outside the Temple is exempt, whether it was lacking time of its own accord or due to its owners. Examples of the latter case are the sin-offerings of a zav, zava and a woman after childbirth, or the sin-offering and guilt-offering of a leper, that are slaughtered before their appropriate times. However, one who slaughters the burnt-offerings of these individuals, or the peace-offering of a nazirite, outside the Temple before the appropriate time, is liable. Since these offerings are not essential parts of the purification process, they are considered fit to be sacrificed even before the purification process (Rambam Sefer Avoda, Hilkhot Malaseh HaKorbanot 18).

NOTES

Sin-offering and guilt-offering – שֶׁפֶךְ וַאֵשָּׁם: Both the sin-offering and guilt-offering are brought to atone for a transgression. However, there are several differences between them, including the sins for which one brings these offerings. A sin-offering is brought for the unwitting violation of a prohibition that carries the punishment of karet. A guilt-offering is brought for a few specific transgressions, such as certain cases of theft, and misusing consecrated property. They also differ with respect to the procedures used when they are sacrificed. The blood of the sin-offering is sprinkled on the four corners of the altar, but that of a guilt-offering is sprinkled on two corners of the altar and allowed to run down its four sides. Furthermore, a sin-offering that is sacrificed with the intent that it serve as a different offering is invalid. Conversely, a guilt-offering that is sacrificed with the intent that it serve as a different offering is nevertheless valid, although the one who brought it does not fulfill his obligation to bring a guilt-offering and must bring another one.

And Rabbi Yirmeya said to me in response: Uprooting an offering’s designation outside the Temple is not called uprooting. Since he slaughtered it outside, the status of the offering does not change from that of a Paschal lamb to that of a peace-offering, despite his intention to this effect.

When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said a different version of the statement that Rabbi Yirmeya said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one slaughtered a Paschal lamb outside the Temple during the rest of the days of the year, whether he slaughtered it for its own sake or not for its own sake, he is liable.

The Gemara expresses surprise: Is he liable even if he slaughtered it for its own sake? Didn’t we learn in a mishna in tractate Zevahim that one is exempt for sacrificing an offering that was not yet fit for sacrifice because it was lacking time? This is so whether it itself was lacking time, such as if it was less than eight days old, or it was lacking time due to its owners.

The Gemara explains: And what is an offering that is lacking time due to its owners? A zav, a zava, a woman after childbirth, and a leper, who sacrificed their offerings before the appropriate time. A zav, a zava, and a leper bring their offerings after counting seven days; a woman after childbirth brings hers when her purification period is complete.

Any of these people who sacrificed their sin-offering and, in the case of lepers, their guilt-offering outside the Temple are exempt. Since they would not fulfill their obligations to bring these offerings if they would sacrifice them in the Temple, and the offerings are unfit to be brought as voluntary offerings, because sin-offerings and guilt-offerings are not brought as voluntary offerings, one who slaughters them outside the Temple is not liable. However, if they sacrifice their burnt-offerings and peace-offerings outside the Temple, they are liable. This is because these offerings could be valid as voluntary offerings if they were sacrificed in the Temple.

And Rav Ḥiliyya bar Tovi said: They only taught that one is exempt for the guilt-offering when it is slaughtered for its own sake, but if it is slaughtered not for its own sake, he is liable, because a guilt-offering slaughtered in the Temple not for its own sake is valid.

The Gemara considers this: If he slaughtered it for its own sake, in any event he is exempt. Why? Let us say: Since they are fit to be sacrificed inside the Temple not for their own sake, he should be liable for sacrificing them outside. The Gemara responds: How can these cases be compared? There, the guilt-offering requires explicit uprooting of its designation in order to be valid. Here, a Paschal lamb during the rest of the days of the year is considered a peace-offering, even if its status is not explicitly uprooted.

The Gemara continues to discuss the case of a Paschal lamb that was slaughtered outside the Temple during the rest of the year, and not for its own sake. Rav Ashi taught: He is liable, as we stated. Rav Yirmeya of Difti taught: He is exempt. Rav Yirmeya held that a Paschal lamb during the rest of the days of the year requires uprooting of its previous designation, and uprooting an offering’s designation outside the Temple is not called uprooting. And this halakha disagrees with the statement of Rav Ḥiliyya bar Tovi, who held that uprooting an offering’s designation outside the Temple is considered an effective uprooting of that designation.

The Master said: If he slaughtered the two Yom Kippur goats outside the Temple after he drew lots to determine which of them is to be sacrificed to God and which is sent to Azazel, he is liable for slaughtering the one designated for God, and exempt for the one designated to be sent to Azazel.

The Sages taught in a baraita based upon the verses: “Any man of the house of Israel who shall slaughter a bull, or a lamb, or a goat in the camp, or who slaughters it outside the camp, and has not brought it to the entrance to the Tent of Meeting to present it as an offering to the Lord before the tabernacle of the Lord, blood shall be imputed to that man; he has shed blood; and that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:3–4).
If it would have mentioned just the word offering, I would derive that one is liable even for slaughtering animals consecrated for Temple maintenance outside the Temple, which are also called offering, as it is stated: “And we have brought the Lord’s offering” (Leviticus 17:4), to teach that with regard to any animal fit to be sacrificed within the entrance to the Tent of Meeting or the Temple, one is liable for slaughtering it outside the Temple. Conversely, with regard to any animal that is not fit to be sacrificed within the entrance to the Tent of Meeting, one is not liable for slaughtering it outside the Temple.

Furthermore: I might exclude these animals consecrated for Temple maintenance, which are not fit to be sacrificed within the entrance to the Tent of Meeting because they are blemished, and I will not exclude the heifer of a purification offering and the scapegoat, which are fit to come to the entrance to the Tent of Meeting. Therefore, the verse states “to the Lord” to indicate that one is liable only for those animals that are designated exclusively for God as offerings. These, the heifer of a purification offering and the scapegoat, are excluded, as they are not designated exclusively for God as sacrificial offerings but are used for some other purpose.

The Gemara asks about this halachic midrash: Does the expression “to the Lord” come to exclude? The Gemara raises a contradiction based upon the verse: “When a bull, or a lambs, or a goat, is born it shall be seven days under its mother; but from the eighth day on it comes to be sacrificed” (Leviticus 23:27). An offering by fire to the Lord: These are offerings by fire, which are sacrificed on the altar and which may not be sacrificed before their proper time.

From where do we derive that he may not consecrate an animal when it is lacking time, i.e., before the eighth day? The verse states: An offering, which indicates that it should not be designated as an offering before the eighth day. The expression: To the Lord comes to include the scapegoat, which is also brought for the sake of God. In other words, the expression: To the Lord, not only does not exclude the scapegoat from the category of offerings, but specifically includes it in this category.

Rava said that this can be resolved as follows: There the expression is understood in the context of the verse and here it is understood in the context of the verse. There, with regard to consecrated animals slaughtered outside the Temple, where the phrase: To the entrance, in that same verse comes to include other offerings, the phrase: To the Lord necessarily comes to exclude. Conversely, here, with regard to consecrating animals before the proper time, where the phrase: Offering by fire comes to exclude, the phrase: To the Lord comes to include.

Once the contradiction has been reconciled, the Gemara challenges the reasoning of the argument. The reason the scapegoat may not be consecrated before it is eight days old is because the Merciful One specifically included it among the other offerings. But had it not included it I would have said: The scapegoat may be consecrated even when it is lacking time. However, this is difficult: Isn’t it true that the lottery establishes as the goat that is sacrificed to God, only one that is fit to be sacrificed to God? Since it is not known in advance which goat will be designated for this purpose, both goats must be eight days old and thereby fit to be sacrificed to God.
Yitz Yeshanim Sages who had this name. The Rambam (Prohibitions concerning blemished animals – 5:17) explains that the Gemara seeks a proof that not only is a blemished animal disqualified, but one would be flogged for consecrating a blemished animal as the scapegoat. It is explained in Neum Yehuda that the source is necessary to disqualify the goat even if the blemish is temporary.

**HALAKHA**

Disqualifying factors for the scapegoat – ına נָּשָׁה אֵין. A blemish disqualifies the scapegoat, even if the blemish is merely temporary. Similarly, a goat that is not yet eight days old is not valid for use as the scapegoat (Rambam Sefer Avoda, Hilkhot Avodat Yom HaKippurim 5:17).

Prohibitions concerning blemished animals – みなק להכירה הכהנים—but not the priests: One who slaughters a blemished animal as an offering is liable to be flogged. Similarly, one who sprinkles its blood and burns its sacrificial parts on the altar is flogged (Rambam Sefer Avoda, Hilkhot Assurei Mitzvot 1:4).

**NOTES**

A case where the scapegoat became blemished – ımı מָעָא. The goat become blemished after the lottery. If it had had a blemish prior to the lottery it would not have been used at all, since both goats have to be fit for use as a sacrificial offering. However, because the goat sent to Azazel is not actually an offering, one might have thought that a blemish that develops after the lottery is insignificant (Sisht Yitzhak).

From where do you say that the scapegoat is disqualified by a blemish? Tosafot Yeshanim and other commentators express surprise at this question, considering that Ravina himself explains that the case of a scapegoat lacking time is one where the original scapegoat became blemished and was therefore redeemed for another. Clearly, this posts that a blemished scapegoat is disqualified. Why is an additional source needed to make the case? Tosafot Yeshanim answer that without this proof we would have interpreted the verse with regard to the goat lacking time in a different way. The author of Sisht Yitzhak explains that the Gemara seeks a proof that not only is a blemished animal disqualified, but one would be flogged for consecrating a blemished animal as the scapegoat. It is explained in Neum Yehuda that the source is necessary to disqualify the goat even if the blemish is temporary.

Rav Yosef said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is the opinion of Hanan the Egyptian, as it was taught in a baraita that Hanan the Egyptian says: Even if the goat sacrificed to God has already been slaughtered and its blood has been collected in the cup, if the scapegoat dies, he brings another goat as a counterpart and pairs it with the goat that has already been slaughtered. Since in this case the priest need not draw new lots and the second goat is immediately designated to be sent to Azazel, it was necessary to teach that this goat must not be lacking time.

The Gemara presents a challenge with regard to this answer. Say that you heard Hanan the Egyptian say that he does not hold that if the scapegoat dies, the blood of the other goat is rejected. Did you also hear him say that he does not require a new lottery for the second goat? Perhaps he meant that one brings two new goats and draws lots, and whichever is designated to be sent to Azazel is the counterpart to the goat that was already slaughtered.

The Gemara presents another explanation of why it was necessary for the Torah to indicate that the scapegoat must not be lacking time. Rather, Rav Yosef said: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as it was taught in a baraita. If one of the goats dies, he brings another goat in its place without a lottery; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Therefore, if the scapegoat would die, another goat would be designated as the scapegoat without a lottery; and it was necessary for the Torah to indicate that this goat had to be eight days old.

Ravina said that it is possible to answer according to all opinions. The derivation was necessary in a case where the scapegoat became blemished after the lottery and they redeemed it with another. In that situation, all agree that the new scapegoat does not need to be designated through a lottery, because the status of the original scapegoat was transferred to its replacement.

The Gemara asks: From where do you say that the scapegoat is disqualified by a blemish? A blemish disqualifies only a sacrificial offering, and the scapegoat is not a sacrificial offering. The Gemara answers: As it was taught in a baraita based upon the verse: “Blind, or broken, or maimed, or having a growth, or scurvy, or scabbed, you shall not offer these to the Lord, nor make an offering by fire of them upon the altar to the Lord” (Leviticus 22:22), the phrase: Nor make an offering by fire of them, these are the fats of blemished animals, which may not be sacrificed on the altar.

I have only derived that it is prohibited to sacrifice all the fats of a blemished animal; from where do I derive that it is prohibited to sacrifice some of them? The verse states “of them,” which indicates that the prohibition applies even to some of them. “The altar”; this is referring to the prohibition against sprinkling the blood of blemished animals.” The phrase to “the Lord” comes to include the scapegoat, which is also disqualified by a blemish.

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to write that a blemished scapegoat is disqualified and it is necessary to write that a scapegoat may not be lacking time. Since if the Merciful One had written only that a scapegoat is disqualified if it is lacking time, one might have said that this is because its time has not yet come and therefore it is unable to become consecrated. However, with regard to a blemished animal whose time has already arrived, say that it is not disqualified. And conversely, if the Merciful One had written only that a blemished scapegoat is disqualified, one might have said that this is because it is considered abhorrent to sacrifice a blemished animal as an offering. However, with regard to a goat that is lacking time, which is not abhorrent, say that it is not disqualified. It is therefore necessary for the Torah to include the scapegoat in both disqualifications.