This issue is considered a detail of monetary law, and the

14:21: "You shall not eat of any thing that died of itself."

According to the 

ho

He was already sworn and obligated at Mount Sinai – 

swears not to eat any amount of food from a 

tereifa

the punishment incurred for breaking an oath. If one 

swears not to eat any amount of food from a neveila or a 
tereifa and eats less than an olive-bulk, he is liable with

and eats less than a full measure (Rambam

a'a, Hilkhot Shevuot

5:7, and in the comments of the

Gevurat Ari

and in the case of one who makes

An oath of testimony – תֶּרֶפוֹת. The laws of an oath of
testimony are mentioned in the Torah (Leviticus 5:1) and are
explored in depth in tractate Shevuot. If a litigant finds
witnesses who are capable of testifying on his behalf and has
them swear that they will testify, they must bring a
particular type of sin-offering if they do not then testify.
This issue is considered a detail of monetary law, and the
oath takes effect only with regard to one who is eligible
to give testimony.

To exclude a king – לִכְנָה. The Sages debate wheth-
er the freedom that a king has from testifying is a Torah
exemption to preserve his honor or a rabbinic exemption
relating to the kings of the northern kingdom of Israel,
who did not observe Torah law (see Tosif' Tom Rish-kippur-

pum; Gevat Aril). In practice, a king does not take the
oath of testimony.

The Gemara asks: If so, according to Reish Lakish there is a rab-
binic prohibition to eat a half-measure, one should not be able to
bring an offering for breaking an oath to eat a half-measure of
forbidden foods. Why, then, did we learn in a mishna otherwise: He
swore the following oath, an oath that I will not eat, and then ate
unslaughtered animal carcasses, tereifot, reptiles, or creeping ani-
mal proteins, he is liable to bring an offering for violating his oath. Rabbi
Shimon exempts him.

And we discussed it: Why should he be liable for breaking an oath?

He was already sworn and obligated at Mount Sinai, along with
the rest of the Jewish people, not to eat these things. According to
halakha, an oath does not take effect if it contradicts a previously
existing oath. The second oath to not eat has no effect in terms of
eating forbidden foods, so why should one be liable for breaking it?
Rav, and Shmuel, and Rabbi Yo'anan say with regard to this: Here
we are dealing with a case where one includes permitted foods with
forbidden foods. This means that had one sworn only not to eat
unslaughtered animal carcasses or tereifot and then ate them, he
would not be liable for breaking the oath because he was already
sworn not to eat those foods. However, if one swore not to eat all,
his oath takes effect on permitted foods. Consequently, if he eats any
food he is liable.

And Reish Lakish said: The only application of this mishna you will
find is in a case where one explicitly says that he will not eat a half-
measure, and this is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
They say that when one swears that he will not eat, he prohibits him-
self only from eating a whole measure of food. If he eats a half-
measure, he has not violated a prohibition. Therefore, in order for a
half-measure to be prohibited, he needs to specify this in his oath. Or,
you find it in the case of one who makes no specification at all of a
half-measure,
Rav Aha bar Ya’akov said: It comes to exclude one who plays with dice,16 whom the Sages disqualified from giving testimony. But surely one who plays with dice is eligible by Torah law to give testimony, and it is the Sages who disqualified him. Despite this, an oath of testimony does not apply to him by Torah law, even though the prohibition on his testifying is rabbinic.

The Gemara rejects this by distinguishing between the two cases: It is different there, in the case of testimony, where the verse states: “If he does not utter it, then shall he bear his iniquity’’ (Leviticus 5:1), i.e., a man who can testify but doesn’t do so should be punished. But this person cannot ever give testimony since the court will not accept his testimony. The Torah makes liability on an oath of testimony contingent on one’s ability to testify. Therefore, an oath of testimony would not apply to someone unable to testify. However, one who takes an oath not to eat is liable if he breaks that oath, notwithstanding the rabbinic prohibition against eating less than a measure of forbidden food. Consequently, this rejection does not stand, and the first explanation remains.

The Gemara’s initial assumption is that the mishna’s use of the word prohibited is referring to a transgression not punishable by karet. The Gemara asks: And anywhere that it teaches that transgressing is punishable by karet, does it never teach using the word prohibited? Was it not taught in a baraita: Although they said the word prohibited with all of the five Yom Kippur afflictions, they said that the punishment of karet applies only to one who eats, or drinks, or performs prohibited labor. This means that the word prohibit is used with transgressions punishable by karet as well. The Gemara rejects this. This is what the baraita is saying: When they said that those five activities are prohibited, they said that only with regard to a half-measure; but a full measure is punishable by karet. And although a violation is punishable by karet, it is punishable by karet only if one eats, or drinks, or performs prohibited labor; these alone are the cases where karet is incurred.

And if you wish, say instead that when it is taught in the mishna using the language of prohibited, it is referring to the other transgressions, which do not incur karet. As Rabba and Rav Yosef taught this in other books of Rav’s school, i.e., the Sifrei, the halakhic midrash on Numbers and Deuteronomy: From where is it derived that it is prohibited to engage in bathing, and in smearing oil on one’s body, and in wearing shoes, and in having relations on Yom Kippur? The verse states: “Shabbaton’’ (Leviticus 16:31), meaning resting and refraining from certain activities. Therefore, the word prohibited is used with these activities, but they are not punishable by karet.
Because it is fit to combine – a support. Rabbi Yohanan’s reasoning can be explained as follows: It is necessary to say that a half-measure of a forbidden food is itself prohibited. Otherwise, it could be said that one who eats a half-measure and then another half-measure has not eaten forbidden food, since each half measure was permitted. Tosafot Yeshanim claim that Rabbi Yohanan derives his ruling from the words “all fat” (Leviticus 7:23). According to Rabbi Yohanan, this verse prohibits a half-measure, and the reason given here is only an explanation of the mandate in the Torah.

Koy – יוב: There is uncertainty whether a koy is a wild beast, a domestic animal, a hybrid of both, or a species whose true nature has never been determined. Questions concerning the issue of uncertainty arise in the laws that differentiate between domestic and wild animals. For example, may its fat be eaten; must its blood be covered; and, consequently, may it be slaughtered on a Festival?

A mere support – אַסְמַכְתָא: Occasionally a halakhic midrash provides support for a rabbinic law rather than interpreting a verse in order to reveal a Torah law. In such a case, the midrash is called an asmikhta, a support. This term indicates that the law does not originate from the Torah.

A verse to include an uncertainty – כּוֹי: The Torah teaches straightforward halakha and does not address cases of uncertainty. Although there are legal principles that govern uncertain situations, the uncertainty arises in the interpretation of the Torah, not in the Torah itself, and the Torah does not resolve these questions. This issue relates to the following question: There is a principle that in cases of uncertainty pertaining to Torah law, the ruling is stringent. Is this principle a Torah law or rabbinic law?

Koy – יוב: An animal born to a domestic animal and a permitted wild beast is called a koy. Eating its fat is prohibited but is not punishable by lashes (Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De’a 80:6).

Koy – יוב: Many problems arise in trying to identify the koy. It is mentioned numerous times in the Mishna and the Gemara, not because it is a common animal, but rather because it is useful in discussions that explore the parameters and limits of the laws of domestic animals versus wild animals. As early as the mishnaic period, the Sages disagreed on the identification of the koy. Some maintain that it is a hybrid born to a deer or another kosher wild animal and a goat.

According to many researchers, the koy is identified as the water buffalo. There are allusions to this identification in some medieval rabbinic sources. Others reject this idea and claim that water buffalo did not live in Eretz Yisrael during the time of the Mishna, when the koy was first mentioned. Others maintain that the koy is the moufflon, a subspecies of wild sheep, though there are a number of opinions as to the specific subspecies of moufflon it may be. There is also uncertainty with regard to both the origin of the term koy and its proper vocalization.

Apropos the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, the Gemara deals with the matter itself: What is the law with regard to a half-measure? Rabbi Yohanan said: It is prohibited by Torah law. Reish Lakish said: It is permitted by Torah law. The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yohanan said it is prohibited by Torah law because it is fit to combine with another half-measure. If one continues to eat more, he will eat a whole measure, which is punishable by Torah law. Therefore, even when he eats the first half-measure he is eating forbidden food. Reish Lakish said it is permitted by Torah law. His reason is as follows: With regard to all forbidden foods, the Merciful One states: “Eat,” for example in the verse: “You shall eat neither fat nor blood” (Leviticus 3:17). Eating is defined as consuming a minimum of an olive-bulk, and there is no prohibition if one eats less than an olive-bulk.

Rabbi Yohanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from what was taught in a baraita with regard to the prohibition of forbidden fat: I have derived only that anything that is included in the punishment of karet is included in the prohibition. However, one might have thought that there is no prohibition to eat fat of a koy, or a half-measure of forbidden fat, since there is no punishment for those. Therefore, the verse states: “All fat” (Leviticus 7:23), indicating that there is a prohibition to eat any kind of fat, including fat of uncertain status and a half-measure of fat. Therefore, a half-measure of fat is prohibited by Torah law. Reish Lakish rejects this argument: This prohibition is rabbinic, and the verse brought as a proof is a mere support. It cannot be claimed that there is such a prohibition by Torah law.

The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable to say that the baraita cites only the verse as a support and not as a source to prove the prohibition. For if it could enter your mind that this teaching constitutes a prohibition by Torah law, there is uncertainty whether a koy is a wild beast or a domestic animal. Is a verse necessary to include an uncertainty? There is no doubt before God and therefore no purpose in writing a case of doubt in the Torah. Consequently, the baraita cites the verse only as a support. The Gemara answers: If that is the reason, there is no conclusive argument. The Sages of the baraita might have thought...
This explanation of this verse includes more than the previous ex-
planation. Regarding the prohibition of eating blood, there is
no distinction between a wild or domestic animal. Consequently,
if the koy is either a wild or a domestic animal, the Torah has no
need to specifically include it because it certainly belongs to a
category of animal whose blood is forbidden. This shows that
the koy is in a unique class, which is neither wild nor domestic
(Tosefot Rid).

I might have thought that one should sit in the sun – in the sun
and it is too hot for him, we do not say to him: Get up and
sit in the shade. Or, if one sits in the shade and it is too cold for
him, we do not say to him: Get up and sit in the sun. These are
also cases of affliction involving sitting and doing nothing. The
Gemara rejects this: It must be similar to the prohibition of labor.
Just as with regard to prohibited labor you did not distinguish
between situations, since the prohibition is independent of one's
personal circumstance, so too, you do not distinguish with regard
to affliction, which is not affected by one's circumstance.

It was taught in another baraita that as the verse states: "You shall
afflict your souls" (Leviticus 16:29). I might have thought that one
must sit in the sun or the cold and be uncomfortable; therefore,
the continuation of the verse states: "And you shall not do any
labor" (Leviticus 16:29). Just as prohibited labor is something that
incurs karet in other circumstances, like Shabbat, so too, affliction
relates to acts that in other circumstances incur karet. And what
is that circumstance? That is referring to piggul and notar, which
lead to karet if eaten, and which therefore may not be eaten on Yom Kippur.

Also the word all comes to include the koy – [Hebrew phrase].
It could have been thought that there is a positive
mitzva to actively cause affliction to oneself, rather than merely
suffer through abstinence from specific activities (Tosefet Yom
HaKippurim).

Afflict your souls – [Hebrew phrase]. Commentaries on the
Sifra explain that the main source of this teaching is the phrase
"your souls," which comes to include actions that afflict the soul
and whose avoidance causes loss. Therefore, this phrase must
refer to affliction through refraining from eating and drinking.
This is similar to the teaching of Rabbi Yishmael (Rav'adav; Rosh).
I will include piggul and notar. Tosafot Yom Haktiburim and the Maharash ask: What is the point of this discussion, as in any case eating these substances incurs the penalty of karet? It does not make sense to impose a second punishment of karet on top of that for eating the food on Yom Kippur. Some commentators suggest that the individual might nevertheless be liable to receive the additional punishment of lashes, which is imposed for most sins that incur karet. Alternatively, one who unwittingly eats these foods on Yom Kippur would have to bring two sin-offerings (Rav Shmuel Strashun).

In addition, a practical difference with regard to the nature of the sin is the measure that determines liability. If one eats an olive-bulk of piggul or notar, he is liable for transgressing the prohibition of eating those items. He is not liable for eating on Yom Kippur until he has consumed a date-bulk (Shabbat Yitshok).

Learning from the word afflict and the phrase you shall afflict – noting that the Torah first states “afflict your soul” (Leviticus 16:29) and then repeats five times the mitzva to afflict oneself on Yom Kippur (Leviticus 16:31, 23:27, 23:29, 23:32; Numbers 29:7). These repetitions emphasize that the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur extends to all types of food, whether the food is prohibited, non-sacred, or required eating (Tosafot Yom Haktiburim).
The Gemara explains: What is meant by: And if it is your wish to say? What flaw did the first proof have? The Gemara explains: And if you say the verse is discussing relations with those whom relations are forbidden, avoidance of which is also called affliction, and it is not discussing eating and drinking, the verse states: I will destroy that soul, meaning an affliction that can cause death. And what is that? That is refraining from eating and drinking.

The school of Rabbi Ishmael taught the following concerning the nature of Yom Kippur: The word affliction is stated here with regard to Yom Kippur, and the word affliction is stated further on in a different place, concerning the Jews in the desert: “And He afflicted you and caused you to hunger” (Deuteronony 8:3). Just as further on the meaning of affliction is hunger, so too, here, the meaning of the word affliction is hunger.

The Gemara asks: And let us derive it not from the verse that indicates affliction of hunger but from the verse where Laban warns Jacob: “If you shall afflict my daughters” (Genesis 31:30), which is referring not to hunger but to marital relations. The Gemara answers: We derive affliction commanded to the public on Yom Kippur from affliction relating to the public, i.e., the Jewish people in the desert, and we do not derive affliction of the public from affliction of an individual, as in the case of Jacob’s wives.

The Gemara continues to challenge the view of Rabbi Ishmael: And let us derive it from affliction stated with regard to Egypt, as it is written: “And He saw our affliction” (Deuteronomy 26:7). We say that this verse is referring to abstinence from conjugal relations. The Egyptians prevented the Jewish people from having relations. This affliction is an example of public affliction that is not abstention from eating or drinking. Rather, the prohibition to eat or drink on Yom Kippur should not be learned as stated previously, but as follows: We derive affliction by the hand of God from affliction by the hand of God, i.e., affliction caused directly by God or through His mitzvot; and we do not derive affliction by the hand of God from affliction by the hand of man.

§ Apropos the verse: “And He afflicted you and caused you to hunger, and fed you with manna” (Deuteronony 8:3), the Gemara expounds related verses. The Torah states: “Who feeds you manna in the desert which your fathers did not know, in order to afflict you” (Deuteronony 8:16). What affliction was there in eating the manna? Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi disagreed on the matter. One said: There is no comparison between one who has bread in his basket and one who does not have bread in his basket. The affliction in eating the manna is caused by the hand of God. Each day the people worried that they might not have any food to eat the next day. And one said: There is no comparison between one who sees the food and eats it and one who does not see the food and eats it. Though the manna could taste like anything, it always looked the same and did not look as it tasted. Being unable to see the food that they tasted was an affliction.

Rav Yosef said: From here there is an allusion to the idea that blind people eat but are not fully satisfied when they eat because they cannot see their food. Seeing the food contributes to the enjoyment of eating.

Rabbi Zeira said: What is the verse that alludes to this? “Better is the seeing of the eyes than the wandering of the desire” (Ecclesiastes 6:9). On the same verse, Reish Lakish said: The sight of a woman is better than the actual act of relations, as it is stated: “Better is the seeing of the eyes than the wandering of the desire.”

§ Apropos the dispute between Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi, the Gemara continues with another dispute they had with regard to the correct interpretation of a verse. It is stated: “Do not look upon the wine when it is red, when it gives its color in the cup, when it slides down smoothly” (Proverbs 23:31). Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi disagreed. One said: Whoever casts