

Siankei – סיאנקי: The meaning of this word is unclear. Some say that it is a weight or coin equaling half a drachma, or 2.9 g of silver. Gold coins of this type are mentioned in other sources.

He should not spend more than one-fifth – אַל יבְּזֹבֵז – יותר מחומש: A person should not give away more than one-fifth of his property to charity, so that he not ultimately require the assistance of others as well. This principle is true while the donor is living. At the time of his death, he may donate as much charity as he desires, as the Gemara learns this from Mar Ukva's example (*Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De'a* 249:1, and in the comment of Rema).

He would wrap coins...and toss the money behind him – הָהָה צִייר זָוִי...וְשָׂדֵי לִיה לְאַחֲרֶיהָ – One of the higher levels of charity is giving in a way that the benefactor does not know the identity of the recipient, similar to the method employed by Rabbi Abba. However, this method is not as meritorious as giving anonymously, as it is better for the identity of the donor to remain unknown (*Rambam Sefer Zera'im, Hilkhot Mattenot Aniyyim* 10:10; *Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De'a* 249:9).

כי קא נחא נפשיה אמר: איתוי לי חושבנאי דצדקה. אשכח דהוה כתיב ביה שבעת אלפי דינרי סיאנקי. אמר: וודאי קלילי, ואורחא רחיקתא. קם בבזויה לפלגיה ממוניה. היכי עבד הכי? והאמר רבי אילעאי, באושא התקינו: המבזבז – אל יבזבז יותר מחומש! הני מילי – מחיים, שמא ירד מנכסיו, אבל לאתח מיתה – לית לן בה.

When Mar Ukva was dying, he said: Bring me my charity records. He found that it was written there that he had given seven thousand fine, *siankei*,¹ i.e., gold, dinars, to charity. He said: My provisions are light, and the way is far. This meager sum is insufficient for me to merit the World-to-Come. He got up and spent half of his remaining money on charity. The Gemara asks: How did he do this? But didn't Rabbi Ilai say: In Usha they instituted: One who spends money on charity, he should not spend more than one-fifth^h of his money for this purpose. The Gemara answers: This restriction on giving too much charity applies only while he is alive, because perhaps he will descend from his holdings and become destitute. Therefore, for his own financial security, he should never distribute more than one-fifth. But after death, we have no problem with it. One need not save money in his estate anymore.

רבי אבא הוה צייר זוי בסודריה ושדי ליה לאחוריה, וממצי נפשיה לבי עניי, ומצלי עיניה מרמאי.

The Gemara recounts more stories related to charity. Rabbi Abba would wrap coins in his scarf and toss the money behind him^h over his shoulder. And he would place himself at the homes of the poor without being seen, so the poor could receive the aid without being embarrassed. And he would incline his eyes just enough so he could safeguard the handouts from swindlers who might take the money dishonestly.

רבי חננא הוה ההוא עניא דהוה רגיל לשדורי ליה ארבעה זוי כל מעלי שבתא. יומא חד שדרינהו גיהליה ביד דביתיהו. אתאי אמרה ליה: לא צריך. מאי חזוית? שמעי דהוה קאמרי ליה: במה אתה סועד.

Rabbi Hanina knew a certain pauper and was accustomed to send to him four dinars on every Shabbat eve. One day he sent it in the hand of his wife. She came back home and said to him: The man does not need charity. Rabbi Hanina asked her: What did you see that prompted you to say this? She said to him: I heard them saying to him inside the house: With what do you normally dine:

Perek VI

Daf 68 Amud a

בטלי כסף או בטלי זהב? אמר: היינו דאמר רבי אלעזר: בואו ונחזיק טובה לרמאיין, שאלמלא הן היינו חוטאין בכל יום, שנאמר "וקרא עליך אל ה' והיה בך חטא".

Silver, i.e., white, tablecloths [*telei*]^{NL} or gold, i.e., colored, tablecloths? Clearly, then, they are not entitled to charity. Rabbi Hanina said: This is what Rabbi Elazar said: Come and let us appreciate the swindlers who ask for charity that they do not need, because were it not for them, who command our attention and receive our charity, we would be sinning every day in failing to properly support the truly poor, as it is stated: "Beware that there be not a base thought in your heart, saying: The seventh year, the year of release, is at hand; and your eye be evil against your needy brother, and you will not give him; and he cry to the Lord against you, and it be sin in you" (Deuteronomy 15:9). Because the swindlers take our money in the name of charity, we have an excuse of sorts for failing to fully meet the needs of the truly poor.

NOTES

Silver tablecloths, etc. – בטלי כסף וכו': Rabbeinu Hananel writes that the Gemara is referring to bowls of silver and gold, respectively. However, Rashi and *Tosafot* explain that the Gemara is describing tablecloths of a silvery white or a golden hue, based on a discussion elsewhere (*Bava Metzia* 78b). Others say that these articles are tablecloths embroidered with silver or gold threads.

In any case, a number of commentaries explored why Rabbi Hanina understood that his opulent beneficiaries were actually unworthy of charity, in contrast to Mar Ukva, who in a similar situation doubled his support. *Tosafot* indicate that under these circumstances, the poor should be required to sell their expensive items, because these items do not directly serve a person's body. This complements their opinion that the items in question are tablecloths and not bowls, because bowls and other eating utensils

serve the body more directly and need not be sold. According to others, they should have sold these utensils simply because they had a large quantity of them, allowing them to choose which ones they would use at a given meal. With such wealth, it is illegitimate to collect charity (*Shita Mekubbetzet; Ayelet Ahavim*).

The Meiri offers two additional explanations. One possibility is that this family was collecting from the charity fund, of which Rabbi Hanina was the administrator. Although an individual donor has an obligation to help a pauper maintain his previous standard, the communal fund does not need to provide extra support. Consequently, Rabbi Hanina understood that they should not be receiving public funds. Alternatively, the Meiri suggests that the family in question was not wealthy originally and was using the support of the charity to amass great wealth.

Tablecloths [*telei*] – טלי: The source of this word and its precise meaning are not clear. Some say that it is derived from the Greek *τῦλη*, *tulē*, meaning bedding, couch, cushion, or mattress. However, in this context it seems to be a kind of utensil or tablecloth used for a meal.

It is as if he engages in idol worship – כְּאִילוֹ עוֹבֵד עֲבוּדָה – זֶרָה: When one acknowledges that his wealth is given to him by God, he more readily gives of that wealth to charity. One who does not share his wealth demonstrates that he believes that his own strength and might are the source of everything he has. This negates God as the ultimate source and consequently is a kind of idolatry.

One who falsely crushes [mekape'ah] his leg – הַמְקַפֵּחַ אֶת שׁוֹקוֹ: *Talmidei Rabbeinu Yona* explain that this case is referring to someone who feigns a broken leg. This interpretation corresponds to the Gemara text here, which reads: *Mekape'ah*, meaning crushes or breaks.

By contrast, Rashi suggests that the person makes it appear as though he has a shortened leg. This explanation fits better with a version of the text that reads *mekapeh*, meaning that the individual raises his leg. Accordingly, he pretends that he cannot lower his leg to the ground. Others, citing the *ge'onim*, take the word *mekapeh* to denote thickening, as the person purports to have a swollen leg (*Shita Mekubbetzet*).

Finally, another version of the Gemara text reads *mekaveh*, indicating that the person uses a crutch or wooden leg to demonstrate disability (*Arukh*).

וְתַנּוּ רַבִּי חֵיִיָּא בַר רַב מְדִיפְתִי, רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קֶרְחָה אֹמֵר: כָּל הַמַּעֲלִים עֵינָיו מִן הַעֲדָקָה – כְּאִילוֹ עוֹבֵד עֲבוּדָה זָרָה. כְּתִיב הָכָא "הִשְׁמַר לְךָ פֶּן יְהִיָּה דָבָר עִם לְבָבְךָ בְּלִיעַל" וְגו' וְכִתִּיב הַתָּם "יֵצְאוּ אֲנָשִׁים בְּנֵי בְלִיעַל", מִה לְהִלָּן עֲבוּדָה זָרָה – אִף כֵּן אֵין עֲבוּדָה זָרָה.

תַּנּוּ רַבִּנּוּ: הַמְסַמָּא אֶת עֵינוֹ, וְהַמְצַבֵּה אֶת בְּטָנוֹ, וְהַמְקַפֵּחַ אֶת שׁוֹקוֹ – אֵינוֹ נִפְטָר מִן הָעוֹלָם עַד שְׂבִיבָא לֵידֵי כְּךָ. הַמְקַבֵּל צְדָקָה וְאֵין צְרִיךְ לְכַךְ – סוֹפוֹ אֵינוֹ נִפְטָר מִן הָעוֹלָם עַד שְׂבִיבָא לֵידֵי כְּךָ.

תַּנּוּ הַתָּם: אֵין מְחַיִּיבִין אוֹתוֹ לְמַכּוֹר אֶת בֵּיתוֹ וְאֶת כְּלֵי תְשׁוּמֵי שׁוֹ. וְלֹא? וְהַתְנָא: הִיא מִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בְּכָלֵי זָהָב – יִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בְּכָלֵי כֶסֶף, בְּכָלֵי כֶסֶף – יִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בְּכָלֵי נְחוֹשֶׁת!

אָמַר רַב זְבִיד: לֹא קָשִׁיָּא; הָא – בְּמַטָּה וְשׁוֹלְחָן, הָא – בְּכּוֹסוֹת וְקַעְרוֹת. מֵאֵי שְׂנָא כּוֹסוֹת וְקַעְרוֹת דְּלֹא – דְּאָמַר: מֵאִיסֵי לִי, מַטָּה וְשׁוֹלְחָן נִמְי אָמַר: לֹא מְקַבֵּל עֵילָוֵי! אָמַר רַבָּא בְּרִיה דְּרַבָּה: בְּמַחְרֵי שָׂה דְּכֶסֶף.

And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav of Difti taught: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: With regard to anyone who averts his eyes from the obligation to give charity,^h it is as if he engages in idol worship.ⁿ It is written here concerning charity: “Beware that there be not a base [*beliya'al*] thought in your heart...and you will not give him” (Deuteronomy 15:9), and it is written there concerning idolatry: “Certain base [*beliya'al*] fellows have gone out” (Deuteronomy 13:14). Just as there, in the latter verse, the word “base [*beliya'al*]” is referring to idol worship, so too here, this expression indicates a sin on the scale of idol worship.

The Gemara cites a *baraita* relating to swindlers who collect charity. The Sages taught: One who falsely blinds his eye,^h and one who bloats his stomach as if he were sick, and one who falsely crushes [*mekape'ah*] his leg,ⁿ in order to benefit dishonestly from charity, will not depart from the world before he comes to this same plight, and he will truly suffer from the ailment that he feigned. More generally, one who receives charity and does not need it, his end will be that he will not depart from the world before he comes to this state of actually needing charity.

§ We learned in a mishna elsewhere (*Pe'a* 8:8): Who is entitled to receive charity? Whoever has less than two hundred dinars. However, the administrators of the charities do not require him to sell his house and his accessories^h to reach the threshold of two hundred dinars. For the purposes of charity, his wealth is calculated based on cash alone. The Gemara asks: And do we not insist that he sell property? But isn't it taught in a *baraita*: If he was accustomed to use gold wares, he should now use silver wares. If he was accustomed to use silver wares, he should now use copper wares. This indicates that he is required to sell at least some of his possessions.

Rav Zevid said: This is not difficult. This source, which requires him to sell wares and lower his standard of living, speaks of a bed and a table, and that source, which does not require him to sell his accessories, speaks of his cups and plates. The Gemara asks: What is different about cups and plates, that he is not required to sell them? It is because he says: The cheaper ones are disgusting to me, and I cannot eat with them. The Gemara asks further: If so, with regard to a bed and a table he may also say: I do not accept these lesser wares upon myself, as they are uncomfortable for me. What is the difference between the furnishings and the dishes? Rava, son of Rabba, said: There is no difference; he need not sell furnishings either. The *baraita* requiring him to sell his property speaks of a silver comb on his table or another comparable novelty or decorative item. Such articles must be sold, but necessities, even luxurious or high quality ones, need not be sold.

HALAKHA

One who averts his eyes from the obligation to give charity – הַמַּעֲלִים עֵינָיו מִן הַעֲדָקָה: Anyone who averts his eyes from charity is called *beliya'al*, base, and he is likened to someone who worships idols. One should be extremely careful to give charity, for the pauper may die if one does not give him something immediately, and this form of neglect is tantamount to murder (Rambam *Sefer Zera'im, Hilkhot Mattenot Aniyyim* 10:3; *Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De'a* 247:1).

One who falsely blinds his eye – הַמְסַמָּא אֶת עֵינוֹ: One who does not need charity and deceives people in order to benefit from charity will actually require community assistance in his lifetime (Rambam *Sefer Zera'im, Hilkhot Mattenot Aniyyim* 10:19; *Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De'a* 255:2).

He is not required to sell his accessories – אֵינוֹ תַּיִב לְמַכּוֹר כְּלֵי:

תְשׁוּמֵי שׁוֹ: One who has a house and many furnishings but does not have two hundred dinars is permitted to receive assistance from charity. He is not required to sell his furnishings, even if they are made out of gold or silver. This is said with respect to eating utensils as well as clothing, linens, and similar items. But if one has other expensive utensils, he must sell them and not take charity. This ruling follows the opinion of Rava, son of Rabba.

Permission to retain one's expensive utensils applies only to one who receives charity from individuals. If he wishes to take from the community fund, he may not do so until he sells these items, in accordance with the opinions of Rav Pappa and Rava, son of Rabba, who do not appear to disagree with each other (Rif; Rambam *Sefer Zera'im, Hilkhot Mattenot Aniyyim* 9:14 and *Kesef Mishne* there; *Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De'a* 253:1).

רב פפא אמר: לא קשיא: כאן – קודם שביא לידי גיבוי, כאן – לאחר שביא לידי גיבוי.

מתני' יתומה שהשיאתה אמה או אחיה מדעתה, וכתבו לה במאה או בחמשים וזו – יכולה היא משתגדיל להוציא מידן מה שראוי להנותן לה.

רבי יהודה אומר: אם השיא את הבת הראשונה – ינתן לשניה בדרך שנתן לראשונה. וחכמים אומרים – פעמים שאדם עני והעשיר, או עשיר והעני, אלא: שמין את הנכסים ונותנין לה.

גמ' אמר שמואל: לפרנסה – שמין באב. מתביי: הבנות גיונות ומתפרנסות מנכסי אביהן. ביצד? אין אומרים: אילו אביה קיים כן וכך היה נותן לה, אלא שמין את הנכסים ונותנין לה. מאי לאו – פרנסת הבעל? אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק: לא, בפרנסת עצמה.

The Gemara offers an alternative resolution to the contradiction concerning the requirement to sell property. **Rav Pappa said: This is not difficult. Here,** the source that does not require him to sell property describes circumstances **before he comes to the point of collectingⁿ charity. There,** the source that requires him to sell property addresses a case that may arise **after he comes to the point of collecting** charity. If he has more than two hundred dinars and nevertheless collects charity, the court will reclaim from him the charity he has collected. In the event that he does not have enough cash to pay, he is required to sell his property of any type and downgrade to lesser items.

MISHNA With regard to a minor orphan girl whose mother or brothers married her off,^{HB} even with her consent to a small dowry, she retains her rights to a proper dowry. And thus, if they wrote for her a dowry of one hundred or of fifty dinars, she may, upon reaching majority, exact from her mother, or brothers, or their respective estates the sum of money that is fit to be given to her as a dowry, which is one-tenth of the family's estate. Even if she agreed to forgo part of this sum as a minor, she may collect it as an adult.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If the father married off the first daughter before he died, a dowry should be given to the second daughter in the same manner that he gave one to the first daughter. And the Rabbis say: There is no ready standard, since sometimes a person is poor and then becomes wealthy, or a person is wealthy and then becomes poor, so a family's allowance for dowries is subject to change. Rather, the court appraises the property and gives her the appropriate sum.

GEMARA Shmuel said: With respect to her support in the form of the dowry, the court evaluates what she should be given based on the circumstances of the father and gives her the amount that he would have given.^H The Gemara raises an objection: We have learned: The daughters are sustained and supported from the property of their father. How so? We do not speculate on the basis of his social standing and his previous experience and say: If her father were still alive, he would give her such and such amount. Rather, the court appraises the total worth of the property and gives her a portion of it, without a subjective estimate based on the father. The Gemara analyzes this *baraita*: What, is it not that the word support is referring to support for the husband, which is the dowry? The Gemara responds: Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said: No, it is referring to her own support^H and the food she receives. That allowance is calculated without considering the father's practices, but the question of the dowry is still unresolved.

NOTES

The point of collecting – גיבוי: There are several possible explanations for this phrase, which marks a point in time that differentiates between one who must sell his property and one who need not do so. According to Rashi, the phrase: Before he comes to the point of collecting, is referring to a pauper who has not yet collected the gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and corner produce, all of which are allocated to the poor. By sharp contrast, the term: After he comes to the point of collecting, describes a case in which someone above the poverty line partook of the aforementioned gifts for the poor without permission. The court collects payment from him and compels him to sell expensive items and accessories, if necessary, in order to replace the sums he took inappropriately.

Most commentaries reject Rashi's understanding and offer alternative explanations. The Rashba cites Rabbeinu Tam, who understands the distinction to be between being qualified to receive aid from the various gleanings declared ownerless for the poor, for which one is not required to sell his utensils, and being qualified to receive aid from charity funds, which are actively solicited by the charity administrators. He is ineligible

for the latter category of aid until he sells his expensive wares. According to this, the Gemara's term: Collecting, is referring to the collections done by the charity administrator on behalf of the poor. A variation on this approach explains that the phrase: Before he comes to the point of collecting, is referring to a stage at which the person is not widely known to need aid, and he is receiving financial help only from certain private benefactors rather than from the communal funds (Rabbeinu Hananel; Rif; Rid).

According to the Ritva, the difference between the two categories pertains only to when one received his expensive utensils. If he owned them before the charities began to collect for him he need not sell them, since he has become accustomed to using them. But if he acquired these utensils after he began to receive charity funds, he must sell them (see Rabbeinu Crescas Vidal and Rabbi Aharon HaLevi). The Rosh, citing Rabbeinu Tam, presents precisely the opposite opinion: One must sell his lavish items before collecting charity. However, once he has begun to collect charity, if he happens to come into possession of such articles, he need not sell them.

An orphan girl whose mother or brothers married her off – יתומה שהשיאתה אמה או אחיה: In the case of a minor orphan whose mother or brothers married her off, even if she consented to a small dowry, she is not limited to a reduced dowry given her at the time of her marriage. If they gave her a small sum of money for her dowry, she may collect the full amount from her father's estate when she reaches majority. Even if she was silent for a long period of time after becoming eligible, she may still subsequently claim the amount owed to her (*Tur; Maggid Mishne*, citing Rashba; Rambam *Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut* 20:12; *Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 113:7).

How much is given for a dowry to an orphan – כמה יתומה: If a minor girl is orphaned, the court assigns her a dowry from her father's estate based on its estimate of how much he would have given her. This is determined by considering a variety of factors: What is done among the late father's peers, the father's personal spending habits, and the father's social standing. This approach is in accordance with Shmuel's opinion. Similarly, if her father had married off a daughter during his lifetime, the amount of that dowry is considered in the court's assessment, in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, whose opinion was accepted by the Gemara.

The Rema, citing the *Tur*, writes that if the father had been wealthy and then became poor, or if he changed his spending habits, the amount is assessed based on his most recent disposition, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in the mishna. If the court cannot assess his intentions, they appraise the property and give her one-tenth as a dowry. This follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as Rava ruled that this is the accepted *halakha* (Rambam *Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut* 20:3; *Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 113:1).

Her own support – פרנסת עצמה: The court designates sustenance, clothing, and housing for an orphaned daughter in the same way that it does for a widow. Similarly, the court sells property for the daughters' sustenance and clothing without making a public announcement, just as the court would do to provide sustenance and clothing for a widow (see 100b). The difference is that, for a widow, the sums are determined according to her stature and that of her late husband, whereas support for daughters is determined based only on what they need (Rambam *Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut* 19:11; *Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 112:6).

BACKGROUND

An orphan girl whose mother or brothers married her off – יתומה שהשיאתה אמה או אחיה: A girl under the age of twelve can be married off by her father. If, however, her father is no longer alive, then by Torah law she may not be married while still a minor. Nevertheless, the Sages established that her mother or brothers may marry her off with her consent. The girl may annul this marriage before she reaches the age of twelve by performing an act of refusal, i.e., declaring that she does not want the marriage. In such cases, no bill of divorce is necessary. When a girl performs the act of refusal, the marriage is nullified retroactively, and she is considered never to have been married at all. Most of the *halakhot* of refusal are discussed in tractate *Yevamot*.

הא ניוזנות ומתפרנסות קתני, מאי לאו:
אחת פרנסת הבעל ואחת פרנסת עצמה?
לא, אידי ואידי בפרנסת עצמה, ולא
קשיא; הא – באכילה ובשתיה, והא –
בלבושא וכיסויא.

תנן, וחכמים אומרים: פעמים שאדם
עני והעשיר או עשיר והעני, אלא שמין
הנכסים ונותנין לה. מאי עני ומאי עשיר?
אי נימא עני – עני בנכסים, עשיר – עשיר
בנכסים. מכלל דתנא קמא סבר אפילו
עשיר והעני כדמעיקרא יהיבין לה, הא
לית ליה!

אלא לאו עני – עני בדעת, עשיר – עשיר
בדעת, וקתני שמין את הנכסים ונותנין לה
אלמא לא אזלינן בתר אומדנא, ותויבתא
דשמואל! הוא דאמר ברבי יהודה. דתנן,
רבי יהודה אומר: אם השיא בת הראשונה
ינתן לשניה בדרך שנתן לראשונה.

ונימא הלכה ברבי יהודה! אי אמר הלכה
ברבי יהודה הוה אמינא דוקא השיאה,
דגלי דעתיה, אבל לא השיאה לא, קא
משמע לן טעמא דרבי יהודה דאזלינן בתר
אומדנא, לא שנא השיאה ולא שנא לא
השיאה.

והאי דקתני השיאה להודיעך כון דרבנן,
דאף על גב דהשיאה וגלי דעתיה, לא
אזלינן בתר אומדנא.

אמר ליה רבא לרב חסדא: דרשינן משמך
הלכה ברבי יהודה. אמר ליה: יהא רעוא
כל בי הני מילי מעלייתא תדרשו משמאי.

The Gemara asks: **But** the cited source **teaches**: They are **sustained and supported**, which indicates two separate allowances. **What, is it not** that **one** term is referring to **support for the husband** in the form of the dowry and **one** term is referring to **her own support**? The Gemara answers: **No, this one and that one** both refer to **her own support** for her personal needs. And the use of two terms is **not difficult**, because **this** term, sustained, is referring to allowance for **eating and drinking**, and **that** term, supported, is referring to **clothing and other covering**.

We learned in the mishna: **And the Rabbis say: Sometimes a person is poor and becomes wealthy, or a person is wealthy and becomes poor**, and a family's allowance for dowries is subject to change. **Rather**, the court **appraises the property and gives her** the appropriate sum. The Gemara analyzes this opinion: **What is meant by the term poor, and what is meant by the term wealthy? If we say that poor is referring to one who is poor in property, and wealthy is referring to one who is wealthy in property, if so, by inference it seems that the first tanna holds that even if the father was wealthy and then became poor, we give the second daughter a dowry that is like the dowry that he provided originally to the first daughter. But how could we assign such a sum when he does not have enough in the estate?**

Rather, is it not that poor means poor in mindset, i.e., he spends his money thriftily as though he were poor, and that wealthy means wealthy in mindset, i.e., he spends money liberally as though he were wealthy? And nevertheless the mishna teaches that even if the father changes his approach to spending, the court **appraises the property and gives the dowry to her. Apparently, then, we do not follow the assessment of the father's intentions but rather give a fixed sum, and this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara dismisses the refutation: Shmuel has said his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as we learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: If the father married off the first daughter, a dowry should be given to the second in the same manner that he gave to the first. According to this opinion, the court does assess the father's tendencies in determining the dowry for the second daughter.**

The Gemara asks: **And let Shmuel say explicitly that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.** Why did he not do so? The Gemara responds: **If he had said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, I would have said that this is specifically when he marries off the first daughter, as he revealed his mind concerning the proper sum of a dowry, but if he did not marry her off before he died, then the court does not assess his disposition to determine the proper amount. Since, however, Shmuel did not merely say that he accepts the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, he teaches us that the reason behind Rabbi Yehuda's opinion is that we follow the assessment of what the father would have done. It is no different if he married a daughter off, and it is no different if he did not marry one off.**

And that which the mishna teaches in Rabbi Yehuda's opinion: He married off the first daughter, this is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the dissenting opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that although the father married the first daughter off and revealed his mind with respect to dowries, we still do not follow an assessment of how much the father would have given to the second daughter.

Rava said to Rav H̄isda: **We teach in your name that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in this matter. He said to him: May it be God's will that you will teach in my name all proper statements such as this.** Rav H̄isda agreed with the quote attributed to him.

The convention for calculating one-tenth of the estate – **בְּעִשׂוֹר נְכָסִים בְּיַד נוֹהֲגִים**: If a man dies and leaves several daughters, the first to marry receives one-tenth of the estate, the second receives one-tenth of the remaining property, and so forth. If they all get married during the same period, they take their dowries in the delineated manner, following the sequence of their weddings. However, in the latter case, after the initial distribution, they redistribute the property in such a way that each daughter receives the same amount, in accordance with the conclusion of the Gemara (Rambam *Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut* 20:4; *Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 113:4).

וְיָאָמַר רַבָּא הֲכִי? וְהִתְנַיָּא, רַבִּי אֹמֵר
בֵּת הַנְּיֻזְנֵת מִן הָאֲחִין נוֹטְלַת עִישׂוֹר
נְכָסִים, וְאִמְרַת רַבָּא: הַלְכְּתָא כְּרַבְּנֵי לָא
קְשִׁיָּא: הָא – דְאִמְרֵינָהּ, הָא – דְלָא
אִמְרֵינָהּ.

The Gemara asks: **And did Rava actually say this**, that the *halakha* follows Rabbi Yehuda? **But isn't it taught** in a *baraita*: **Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says**: With regard to an orphan daughter who is sustained from the inheritance held by her brothers, she takes one-tenth of the estate for her dowry. **And Rava said** with regard to that *baraita*: **The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi**. Evidently, Rava rejects Rabbi Yehuda's opinion concerning approximating the father's intent. The Gemara answers: **This is not difficult**. In this instance, Rava adopts Rabbi Yehuda's opinion because we assessed the father and understood his mindset. In that instance, Rava rules that she should be given one-tenth because we did not assess the father and his mindset could not be determined.

הֲכִי נִמְי מִסְתַּבְּרָא דְאִמְרַת רַב אֲדָא בַר
אֲהַבָּה מַעֲשָׂה וְנָתַן לָהּ רַבִּי אֶחָד מִשְׁנֵים
עָשָׂר בְּנִכְסִים, קְשִׁיָּין אֲהֲדָדִי, אֶלָּא לָאוּ
שָׁמַע מִינָהּ הָא דְאִמְרֵינָהּ הָא דְלָא
אִמְרֵינָהּ, שָׁמַע מִינָהּ.

The Gemara notes: **So too, it is reasonable**, as Rav Adda bar Ahava said: There was an incident, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi gave an orphan one-twelfth of her late father's property for her dowry. Ostensibly, these amoraic statements are difficult, as they contradict each other. Which portion of the estate did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi determine should be given for a dowry, one-tenth or one-twelfth? **Rather, isn't it correct to conclude from the discrepancy that the respective circumstances were different?** In this ruling, in which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi gave one-twelfth, it was because we assessed the father, and we knew that to be his intention. In that ruling, he ruled that she should receive the standard one-tenth because we didn't assess the father and could not determine his intentions. The Gemara accepts the proof: **Conclude from this** that the matter does depend on the ability to properly assess the father's intent.

גֹּפֵא אִמְרַת רַבִּי: בֵּת הַנְּיֻזְנֵת מִן הָאֲחִין
נוֹטְלַת עִישׂוֹר נְכָסִים. אֲמַרוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי:
לְדַבְּרֵיךְ, מִי שֵׁישׁ לוֹ עֶשֶׂר בָּנוֹת וְיָבֵן, אֵין
לוֹ לְבֵן בְּמִקוֹם בָּנוֹת כְּלוּם!

§ The Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself. **Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said**: With regard to an orphan daughter who is sustained from the inheritance held by her brothers, she takes one-tenth of the estate for her dowry. **They said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi**: According to your opinion, in the case of one who has ten daughters and a son, the son does not have anything where there are daughters, as each daughter receives one-tenth of the estate. What becomes of the son's biblically mandated inheritance?

אִמְרַת לְהֵן: כִּךְ אֲנִי אֹמֵר: רַאשׁוֹנָה
נוֹטְלַת עִישׂוֹר נְכָסִים, שְׁנִיָּהּ בְּמָה
שְׁשִׁיירָה, וְשְׁלִישִׁית בְּמָה שְׁשִׁיירָה,
וְחֹזְרוֹת וְחֹלְקוֹת בְּשׂוּהָ.

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to them: **This is what I say**: The first daughter to marry takes one-tenth of the estate; the second takes one-tenth of what the first left, rather than one-tenth of the original estate; and the third takes one-tenth of what the second left; and then they later redistribute the portions equally, so that each daughter receives the same amount. In this way, the son retains a portion of the inheritance.¹¹

Perek VI
Daf 68 Amud b

כָּל חֲדָא וְחֲדָא דְנִפְשָׁה שְׁקֵלָה! הֲכִי
קָאָמַר: אִם בָּאוּ בִּלְמַד לְהַנְשֵׂא כְּאַחַת –
חֹלְקוֹת בְּשׂוּהָ.

The Gemara asks: Why should they divide the portions equally? Since each and every daughter, in turn, takes her own dowry, each one receives that which she rightfully deserves. It is unreasonable to demand of them to redivide the dowries later. The Gemara answers: **This is what** Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said, i.e., meant: **If they all come to be married at the same time**, then they divide the portions equally. If, however, they marry at different times, then each daughter receives the appropriate percentage of the estate at the time of her marriage.

NOTES

Before they were married – עד שלא נישאו: A number of authorities understood from here that the halakha does not follow Rav, who is later cited in the Gemara as ruling that each daughter is sustained only until she is betrothed. Rather, the halakha follows the baraita cited here, and each daughter is sustained until she is actually married (see Rivash and Rabbeinu Crescas Vidal).

HALAKHA

They did not lose their support – לא איבדו פרנסתן: Daughters who marry do not lose their support, even if they mature before they are married. This follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. His opinion is accepted as authoritative in the Gemara (Rambam Sefer Nashim, Hilkhhot Ishut 20:13; Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer 113:7).

A mature daughter who did not protest – גדולה שלא מיחתה: With regard to a daughter who gets married when she reaches majority, whether she is a young woman or has matured, if she did not protest and claim her support, she has effectively waived and lost her support. This ruling is in accordance with the Gemara's conclusion (Rambam Sefer Nashim, Hilkhhot Ishut 20:13; Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer 113:7).

מסייע ליה לרב מתנה, דאמר רב מתנה: אם באו להנשא כולם כאחת – נוטלות עישור אחד. עישור אחד סלקא דעתך? אלא: נוטלות עישור כאחד.

תנו רבנן: הבנות, בין בגרו עד שלא נישאו ובין נישאו עד שלא בגרו – איבדו מזונותיהן, ולא איבדו פרנסתן, דברי רבי. רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר: אף איבדו פרנסתן. ביצד הן עושות? שוכרות להן בעלים ומוציאין להן פרנסתן.

אמר רב נחמן: אמר לי הונא: הלכתא פרבי איתביה רבא לרב נחמן: יתומה שהשיאתה אמה או אחיה מדעתה, וכתבו לה במאה או בחמשים וזו – יכולה היא משתגדיל להוציא מידם מה שראוי להנותן לה. טעמא – דקטנה, היא גדולה – ויתרה!

לא קשיא, הא – דמחאי, הא – דלא מחאי.

הכי נמי מסתברא, דאם בן קשיא דרבי אדרבי. דתנא, רבי אומר: בת המיוזנת מן האחין – נוטלת עישור נכסים. מיוזנת – אין, שאינה מיוזנת – לא!

אלא לאו שמע מינה: הא – דמחאי, הא – דלא מחאי, שמע מינה.

This conclusion supports the opinion of Rav Mattana, as Rav Mattana said: If they all come to be married at one time, they take one-tenth. The Gemara clarifies: Does it enter your mind that all the daughters should share just one-tenth of the property? Rather, Rav Mattana means that they each take one-tenth in one uniform measure, as in normal circumstances each one successively takes one-tenth of whatever property remains. However, because all the weddings take place within a short time span, the dowries are redistributed immediately after the weddings, so that they are all of equal value.

S The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to the daughters, whether they matured before they were married^N or were married before they matured, they lost their sustenance. Sustenance is provided from the inheritance only for single daughters who have not yet matured. However, they did not lose their support,^H i.e., their allotted provisions for a dowry, upon maturing. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: They lost even their support. If they matured before marrying, they lost their chance to collect their dowries from the estate. What do they do to avoid losing the dowries? They have no alternative other than to marry before maturing. They hire themselves husbands, i.e., they take pains to be sure that they are married, and then they appropriate their support, i.e., dowries, for themselves.

Rav Nahman said: Rav Huna told me that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and orphans may collect their dowries from the estate even when they marry after maturing. Rava raised an objection to Rav Nahman from the mishna: With regard to an orphan girl whose mother or brothers married her off with her consent and wrote for her a dowry of one hundred or of fifty dinars, she may, upon reaching majority, exact from them that which is fit to be given to her for her dowry. The Gemara infers: The reason that she may collect the balance of the dowry is that she married as a minor girl, but if she married as an adult woman, evidently she forgoes the balance. This would appear to follow the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who says that her rights to inherit the dowry are terminated when she matures, against the statement of Rav Nahman.

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi distinguishes between two instances of mature brides. In this case, because she protests, she may still collect the rest of her dowry. In that case, because she does not protest, she implicitly waives the balance of the dowry.^H

The Gemara notes: This, too, stands to reason, since if indeed Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi fails to differentiate between when she does and does not protest, it is difficult: One statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi contradicts another statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: An orphan daughter who is sustained by the brothers takes one-tenth of the estate for her dowry. The Gemara infers: If she is sustained when she is a minor, then yes, she receives inheritance for a dowry; if she is not sustained because she has reached majority, then no, she does not receive a dowry from the estate. Ostensibly, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi teaches that once she matures, she may not take one-tenth of the estate, which directly contradicts the first statement cited in his name.

The Gemara proposes a resolution to the contradiction: Rather, is it not correct to conclude from this that this ruling applies when she protests and that ruling applies when she does not protest? The Gemara confirms: Conclude from this that this is the resolution. If she matures before marrying, she collects the full dowry only if she insists upon it.

אמר ליה רבנא לרבא: אמר לן רב אדא בר אבהה משמך: בגרה אינה צריכה למחות. נישאת אינה צריכה למחות. בגרה ונישאת צריכה למחות.

מי אמר רבא הכי? והא איתביה רבא לרב נחמן יתומה, ושמך ליה: הא דמחי הא דלא מחי! לא קשיא: הא דקא מיתונא מינייהו, הא דלא קא מיתונא מינייהו.

אמר רב הונא אמר רבי: פרנסה אינה כתנאי בתובה. מאי אינה כתנאי בתובה? אי נמא דאילו פרנסה טרפא ממשעבדי, ותנאי בתובה לא טרפא ממשעבדי – מאי קא משמע לן? הא מעשים בכל יום מוציאין לפרנסה ואין מוציאין למוזנות!

ואלא, דאילו פרנסה גביא נמי ממשלטלי, ותנאי בתובה ממקרקעי גביא ממשלטלי לא גביא.

לרבי אידי ואידי מיגבא גביא, דתנאי: אחד נכסים שיש להן אחריות – ואחד נכסים שאין להן אחריות מוציאין למוזן האשה ולבנות, דברי רבי.

אלא מאי פרנסה אינה כתנאי בתובה – לכתנאי, האומר: אל יזוני בנותי מנכסיו – אין שומעין לו. אל יתפרנסו בנותי מנכסיו – שומעין לו. שהפרנסה אינה כתנאי בתובה.

Ravina said to Rava: Rav Adda bar Ahava said to us in your name: If she matured, she does not need to actively protest in order to receive her one-tenth of the estate. Similarly, if she became married, she does not need to protest. If she both matured and became married, then she needs to protest in order to receive her one-tenth.

The Gemara asks: Did Rava actually say this? But Rava raised an objection to Rav Nahman earlier concerning an orphan who was married, and Rav Nahman answered him that this ruling applies when she protested, and that other ruling applies when she did not protest. Evidently, then, she forfeits her share if she does not protest. The Gemara answers: It is not difficult. This ruling applies when she is sustained by them even after marriage,^h and consequently she is embarrassed to protest. In this case, silence does not indicate that she forgoes the dowry. That ruling, insisting that she voice a claim, applies when she is not sustained by them, and she has no reason not to protest.

§ Rav Huna said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Support is not treated like a stipulation in the marriage contract. The Gemara asks: What is meant by: Is not like a stipulation in the marriage contract? If we say that he is teaching: Whereas, with regard to support, she may seize her debt even from liened property that has been sold, and with regard to a stipulation in the marriage contract, she may not seize her debt from liened property that has been sold, what is he teaching us? But incidents that occur daily are proof enough that the court does appropriate money from liened property for paying support but does not appropriate for sustenance. He does not need to teach us that distinction.

But rather, there may be another explanation of Rav Huna's statement: Whereas with regard to support, she may also collect it from movable property of the estate, with regard to a stipulation in the marriage contract, she may collect for it only from real estate, but from movable property she may not collect for it.

The Gemara objects that this explanation is untenable: According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, from both this and that type of property, she may certainly collect for it, as it is taught in a *baraita*: Whether with respect to property that has a guarantee behind it, assuring that the seller will compensate the buyer if the property is repossessed, i.e., real estate, or whether with respect to property that does not have a guarantee, i.e., movable objects, the court appropriates the funds necessary for the sustenance of the wife and the daughters. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Since sustenance is a stipulation in the marriage contract, this approach does not explain how a stipulation is unlike support.

Rather, what is the meaning of the statement: Support is not treated like a stipulation in the marriage contract? This statement has implications with regard to that which is taught in a *baraita*: In the case of one who says in his will that his daughters should not be sustainedⁿ from his estate,^h one does not listen to him, as it is not his prerogative to abrogate this obligation. But if he says that his daughters should not be supported from his estate,^h one does listen to him, as the legal status of the dowry is not like that of a stipulation in the marriage contract. The responsibility to provide support is an ordinance that falls upon the father or his inheritors, and they may choose to reject the responsibility.

If she is sustained – אי מיתונא – With regard to a daughter who matures and the brothers subsequently cease giving her sustenance, which they are no longer obligated to provide, if she does not protest and appeal for continued support, she loses her support. But if the brothers continue to sustain her even as a mature woman, she retains her support even if she does not protest. This follows the conclusion of the Gemara (Rambam *Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut* 20:13; *Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 113:7).

His daughters should not be sustained from his estate – אל יזוני בנותי מנכסיו – If one declares upon his deathbed that his daughters should not be sustained by his estate, his instructions are not followed. However, if one makes such a stipulation when he becomes married, this is honored in the same manner as all other financial arrangements (Rambam *Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut* 19:13; *Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 112:10).

His daughters should not be supported from his estate – אל יתפרנסו בנותי מנכסיו – If one declares upon his deathbed that his daughters should not receive the support of the dowry from his estate, his instructions are followed, since this right is not among the guaranteed stipulations of the marriage contract. The *Tur*, citing Rav Hai Gaon, writes that if he stipulates this condition when he gets married, his instructions are not followed, as it is presumed that were he to have seen his daughters come of marriageable age, he would have compassion for them (Rambam *Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut* 20:10; *Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 113:10).

NOTES

One who says his daughters should not be sustained – text is the most reliable and correct one, despite its apparent conceptual difficulties. He explains that since continued food provisions are given her by virtue of a stipulation in her parents' marriage contract, it is within her father's rights to refuse this stipulation at the time that the parties are writing the marriage contract. Just like any other monetary condition, his terms are valid. This is certainly true after he passes away, when no personal obligations can apply to him. By contrast, his responsibility to provide a dowry has nothing to do with the marriage contract per se; it is a special rabbinic obligation instituted in the daughter's interests. He has no license to excuse himself from this responsibility, just as he may make no stipulations contrary to any of the mitzvot.

Although most early commentaries address this alternative text (see Rif), most reject it in favor of Rashi's version. Nevertheless, an aspect of this text is adopted in the *halakha* (see HALAKHA).

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