

HALAKHA

If his wife miscarried he is not a nazirite – הפילה אשתו אינו נזיר: One who vowed to be a nazirite when a child is born to him is not a nazirite if his wife miscarried (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 1:17).

Gave birth again – חזרה וילדה: If one vowed to be a nazirite when he will have a child, and his wife miscarried, and she later became pregnant and gave birth again, he is a nazirite (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 9:13).

הפילה אשתו – אינו נזיר. רבי שמעון אומר: יאמר "אם היה בן קיימא – הרי אני נזיר חובה, ואם לאו – הרי אני נזיר נדבה".

חזרה וילדה – הרי זה נזיר. רבי שמעון אומר: יאמר "אם הראשון בן קיימא – הראשון חובה, וזו נדבה. ואם לאו – הראשון נדבה, וזו חובה".

גמ' האי מאי למימרא? משום סיפא: בת, טומטום, ואנדרוגיגוס – אינו נזיר. פשיטא! מהו דתימא: "לבשאבנה" הוא דקאמרו, קא משמע לן דלא.

"ואם אומר כשיהיה לי וילד" כו'. פשיטא! מהו דתימא: וילד דמיחשב ביני אינשי בעינין, קא משמע לן.

However, if his wife miscarried^N he is not a nazirite,^H since his wife did not give birth to a live child. Rabbi Shimon says:^N Since it is possible that the fetus was viable, in which case his vow of naziriteship takes effect, he should say the following: If this fetus was viable in terms of its development but died due to other causes, I am hereby an obligatory nazirite in fulfillment of my vow; and if it was not viable, I am hereby a voluntary nazirite. He then proceeds to observe naziriteship.

If, subsequent to this, his wife gave birth again,^H he is a nazirite, since the unattributed opinion in the mishna holds that the condition of his vow has now been fulfilled. Rabbi Shimon says, following his earlier ruling: He must now accept upon himself an additional naziriteship and he should say: If the first fetus was viable then my naziriteship for the first child was obligatory, and this naziriteship is voluntary; and if the first child was not viable, then the naziriteship for the first one was voluntary and this naziriteship is obligatory.

GEMARA With regard to the statement of the mishna that one who vowed to be a nazirite when a son is born to him is a nazirite when his son is born, the Gemara asks: What is the purpose of stating this ruling? Of course he is a nazirite. The Gemara answers: This *halakha* is stated due to the latter clause of that mishna, which states that if a daughter, a *tumtum*, or a hermaphrodite are born to him, he is not a nazirite. The Gemara questions this, too: Isn't that obvious, since he specified a son? The Gemara answers: It is necessary lest you say he did not literally mean a son, but rather he meant to say: When I will be built up^N by means of any child, including the types listed. The mishna therefore teaches us that this is not the case.

The mishna also taught: And if he said: When I have a child, then even if he has a daughter, a *tumtum*, or a hermaphrodite, his vow takes effect. The Gemara asks: Isn't it obvious that this is the case? The Gemara answers: It is necessary to state this lest you say that we require a child of the kind that is considered significant^N by people, and he meant to exclude these other types of children when he vowed. The mishna therefore teaches us that this is not so.

NOTES

If his wife miscarried – הפילה אשתו: Even though the word miscarried usually refers to the pregnancy terminating before reaching its full term, it is difficult to accept that this is the meaning here, as the father certainly did not have a miscarried child in mind when he vowed to be a nazirite on the condition that he would have a child. Additionally, Rabbi Shimon's uncertainty that the child might have been viable appears irrelevant if it was lost before the pregnancy reached its full term. Rather, it is more reasonable to explain that the woman gave birth to a child only to see the child die before it was thirty days old. In that case, it is unclear whether the baby died because it was not properly developed or due to external factors (Rabbeinu Azriel; Rabbeinu Peretz). The *Tosefta* (2:4) indicates likewise, as it states: If a son was born to him, and it is uncertain if it is viable. Other commentaries maintain that the case is that of a child that was stillborn and that was clearly fully developed, but it is not known whether it died in its mother's womb, in which case it is certainly not considered a child, or whether it died during birth (see Responsa of the Maharshdam, *Even HaEzer* 208; *Keren Ora*, following the opinion of *Tosafot*).

Rabbi Shimon says, etc. – רבי שמעון אומר וכו': Rabbi Shimon maintains that the *halakha* is ruled stringently in uncertain cases of naziriteship (Commentary on *Nazir*). The *Tosefta* (2:4) states that according to Rabbi Shimon a mistaken vow of naziriteship takes effect. According to the Rosh and Rabbeinu Peretz, Rabbi Shimon holds that one who vows intends to be held accountable in a situation of doubt.

When I will be built up – לבשאבנה: He may have used the word son [*ben*] in the sense of building [*binyan*], so that he means: When I build up my family by means of a child. If that was his intention, the naziriteship would take effect, as even one who has only a daughter can be considered built (*Tosafot*).

A child that is considered significant – ילד דמיחשב: This excludes a *tumtum* or a hermaphrodite. Since their gender and legal status are not clearly defined, they are not considered proper children (Rabbeinu Peretz). The Commentary on *Nazir* and *Tosafot* state that it may have been thought that even a daughter may not be considered a significant child in relation to a son, and all the more so a *tumtum* or a hermaphrodite.

And his wife miscarried and he separated an offering – והפילה אשתו והפריש קרבן – If one says: I am hereby a nazirite when I will have a son, and he separated his nazirite offerings, and then his wife miscarried, became pregnant again, and gave birth, it is uncertain whether all of the offerings he had separated are consecrated. One may not shear them or use them for work, but he is not liable to receive lashes if he does. This case remains unresolved by the Gemara and the ruling is therefore stringent (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 9:13).

“הפילה אשתו אינו נזיר.” מאן קתני לה? רבי יהודה דכרי הוא. S The mishna taught that if his wife miscarried he is not a nazirite, even though it may have been a viable child. The Gemara clarifies: According to whose opinion is this taught? The Gemara answers: It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to a heapⁿ of wheat. Rabbi Yehuda holds that if one vows to be a nazirite if a heap contains a certain amount of wheat and it is unclear whether or not his condition was fulfilled, the *halakha* is ruled leniently, and he is not a nazirite.

רבי שמעון אומר: לאמר “אם הייה בן קיימא הריני נזיר חובה ואם לאו הריני נזיר נדבה.” בעא מיניה רבי אבא מרב הונא: “הריני נזיר לבשתייה לי בן” והפילה אשתו, והפריש קרבן, ותזרה וילדה, מהו? The mishna further taught that Rabbi Shimon says that the individual should say: If this fetus was viable in terms of its development but died due to other causes, I am hereby an obligatory nazirite in fulfillment of my vow; and if it was not viable, I am hereby a voluntary nazirite. The Gemara relates that Rabbi Abba inquired of Rav Huna: If one said: I am hereby a nazirite when I will have a son, and his wife miscarried, and he separated an offering^{HN} for his naziriteship but did not sacrifice it, and his wife gave birth again to a son, what is the *halakha* with regard to the offering he separated?

אליבא דמאן? אי אליבא דרבי שמעון – מאי תיבעי ליה? הא אמר רבי שמעון: ספק נזירות להחמיר. ואלא אליבא דרבי יהודה, דאמר ספק נזירות להקל, מאי? קדוש או לא קדוש? The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Rabbi Abba pose his question? If he asked it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, what dilemma is he raising? Didn't Rabbi Shimon say: In a case of uncertainty with regard to naziriteship, the ruling is to be stringent? Here too, since the fetus might have been viable, he was required to separate the offerings after she miscarried, and he may not use those offerings for the naziriteship brought about by the later birth. Rather, one should say that the question was in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that in a case of uncertainty with regard to naziriteship, the ruling is to be lenient. The question is as follows: What is the *halakha* in such a situation? Are the offerings already considered consecrated and need not be consecrated again, or are they not consecrated and therefore he must consecrate them a second time?

NOTES

Rabbi Yehuda with regard to a heap – רבי יהודה דכרי: Rabbi Yehuda rules that if one said he will be a nazirite if a certain heap contains one hundred *kor* of wheat and it was stolen or lost before it could be examined, preventing him from checking whether the condition was fulfilled, he is not a nazirite. The reason is either because the *halakha* is ruled leniently in questions of naziriteship (Commentary on *Nazir*), or because he holds that people do not state conditions that may result in them being left in a state of uncertainty (Rabbeinu Peretz).

והפילה – אשתו והפריש קרבן: As explained below, this question is relevant only according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that one is not obligated to observe a term of naziriteship at all in the case of a still-born. The commentaries disagree with regard to why the animals he separated should be considered consecrated at all if he is not obligated to observe a term of naziriteship. Some commentaries claim that the case is one of a woman who miscarried and then gave birth to a child from the same pregnancy; e.g., if she gave birth to twins on the same day (Rosh; Rabbeinu Peretz). In such

a situation, it may be assumed that the first child was also viable, as it had reached its full term, but it died as a result of external factors. Consequently, even Rabbi Yehuda would agree that the uncertainty in this case is stronger than in that of a standard pregnancy.

The Rid, however, prefers a variant version of the text, which is also that of Rambam: He separated an offering and his wife miscarried, and she gave birth again. In this reading, he separated the offerings before his wife miscarried. According to the Rid, the question is whether he is required to consecrate the offering a second time since it is apparent that the first sanctity did not take effect, or whether the first consecration stands. The Meiri claims that even according to the approach of the Rid, the uncertainty applies only to another child from the same pregnancy. If the case is not specifically referring to two births from the same pregnancy, as explained by the Commentary on *Nazir*, the question might be whether the original consecration is viewed as erroneous and is entirely null, or whether the fact that it later turns out to have a purpose, as another child was born to him, means that it was not an erroneous consecration (*Mishne LaMelekh*).

Ben Reḥumi – בן רְחוּמִי: Some suggest that ben Reḥumi is not a name but the nickname of a Sage who asked a question concerning the concept of *rahimana lei*, I am as a good friend. There are other such nicknames in various places in the Talmud. However, aside from the fact that the name Reḥumi itself is the proper name of several Sages, the name Raḥum is also found in the Bible. One Sage named Reḥumi was a disciple of Abaye, and it is possible that ben Reḥumi was the son of Rav Reḥumi, and he is called: Son of Reḥumi [*ben Reḥumi*] since he was very young when he asked his question.

מאי נפקא מינה? לגיזתו ולעבוד בו.
תיקו.

בעא מיניה בן רחומי מאביי: "הריני נזיר
לכשיהא לי בן". ושמע חברו ואמר
"ועלי". מהו? אדיבוריה משמע, או
אגופיה משמע?

אם תמצוי לומר אגופיה משמע, אמר
"הריני נזיר לכשיהא לי בן". ושמע חברו
ואמר "ואני". מהו? אנפשיה קאמר, או
דילמא הכי קאמר: רחומנא לך בותיך?
אם תמצוי לומר כל באנפיה

The Gemara asks: **What difference is there?** In any case, he is certainly obligated to observe naziriteship now, and he must separate the offerings. The Gemara answers: The question is referring to the issue of **its shearing and its labor**. If they are considered consecrated from the initial consecration, it is prohibited to shear their wool and use them for labor, like any other consecrated animal. But if they are not yet consecrated, it is permitted to use them. No answer was found for this question, and the Gemara concludes that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

§ With regard to one who accepted naziriteship upon himself that would begin upon the birth of his son, the Sage **ben Reḥumi**^p inquired of Abaye: If one said: **I am hereby a nazirite when I will have a son, and another heard him and said: And it is incumbent upon me,**^h what is the *halakha* with regard to the second person? Is the implication of his statement a concurrence to the statement of the first one, which would mean that he too accepts naziriteship upon himself when the first has a son, or is the implication of his statement meant to be understood about himself, i.e., that he has vowed to be a nazirite when he has a son of his own?

The Gemara develops the question further: Even if you say that the phrase: And it is incumbent upon me, has the implication of meaning that it is to be understood about himself, what is the *halakha* if one said: **I am hereby a nazirite when^h I will have a son, and another heard him and said: And I?**ⁿ What is the meaning of the second person's statement? Is it to be understood that here too, **he is speaking of himself**, meaning: I shall be a nazirite when I will have a son of my own, or perhaps this is what he is saying: **I love you as you love yourself**; I would be as happy as you at the birth of your son, and I too will be a nazirite when you have a son. Ben Reḥumi continues: **If you say that anything** he says to another in front of him

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And another heard and said: And it is incumbent upon me, etc. – הרַיְנִי נְזִיר וְאָמַר וְעָלִי וכו' – If one says: I am hereby a nazirite when I have a son, and another heard and said: And I, the latter becomes a nazirite immediately. The Ra'avad raises a question as to the Rambam's source for this ruling. According to the *Kesef Mishne*, the Rambam has a variant text, which replaces the phrase: And it is incumbent upon me, with: And I. Additionally, he interprets the word *aggufeih* to mean: About itself, referring to the immediate, unconditional acceptance of naziriteship. The principle of the Rambam is that whenever the Gemara introduces a dilemma with the phrase: If you say, the assumption upon

which the dilemma is based is the decided *halakha*. In this case as well as the following cases, the Ra'avad holds that if both of them have sons he has no recourse but to observe two sets of naziriteship, one for the other's son and one for his own (Rambam *Sefer Hafl'd'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 2:5).

I am hereby a nazirite when, etc. – הַרְיֵנִי נְזִיר לְכַשְׂיָהּ וכו' – If one said to another: I am hereby a nazirite when I have a son, and the other heard him and said: And I, the latter is not a nazirite since he only meant that he loves him and wishes for him to have a son (Rambam *Sefer Hafl'd'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 2:6).

NOTES

And another heard and said: And I – וְאָמַר וְאָנִי – Most commentaries who accept this version of the text maintain that the difference between this question and the previous one is that the phrase: And it is incumbent upon me, indicates that he must also observe naziriteship when he has a son, whereas: And I, means: I too shall be like you and be a nazirite when you have a son (see Commentary on *Nazir* and *Rosh*). However, Rabbeinu Peretz questions this distinction and holds to the contrary, that saying: It is incumbent upon me, is more indicative of an acceptance of the first person's vow than saying: And I. He

prefers a variant text, which is that of many early commentaries, in which one says: I am hereby a nazirite when you have a son, and another heard and said: And I. The question is whether he meant that he too will be a nazirite when he has a son of his own, or that due to his affection for the other he vows a reciprocal naziriteship when the other will have a son. Rabbeinu Peretz states, citing *Tosafot*, that according to this version the next case is referring to a situation where the first person speaks to a third party, and the second one adds: And I. The Rambam explains similarly.

כסיפא ליה מילתא, אמר "הריני נזיר לכשיהא לפלוגי בן". ושמע חבירו ואמר "ואני". מהו? מי אמרינן שלא בפניו – אנפשיה קאמר, או דילמא הכי קאמר ליה: רחימנא ליה בוותיק? הניבעי.

מתני' "הריני נזיר, ונזיר בשיהיה לי בן" התחיל מונה את שלו, ואחר כך נולד לו בן – משלים את שלו, ואחר כך מונה את של בנו. "הריני נזיר בשיהיה לי בן, ונזיר" התחיל מונה את שלו, ואחר כך נולד לו בן – מניח את שלו ומונה את של בנו, ואחר כך משלים את שלו.

גמ' בעי רבא: אמר "הריני נזיר לאחר עשרים יום ומעכשיו מאה יום" מהו? בין דהלין מאה בעשרין לא שלמין – לא חילין, או דילמא בין דאית ליה גידול שער לבסוף – חילין?

should be understood in light of the fact that **the matter is embarrassing for him**, the second person is likely to mean that he will become a nazirite upon the birth of a child to the first person, as he will be embarrassed to seem indifferent about the birth of the child to the person standing before him, then the following question arises: If one said: **I am hereby a nazirite when so-and-so will have a son,^H and another heard and said: And I, what is the halakha? Do we say that since the second person did not vow in front of the subject of the first person's vow, he therefore speaks of himself** when he says: And I, meaning that he will be a nazirite when he has a son of his own? **Or perhaps this is what he is saying to him: I love him as you do, and I too will be a nazirite when he has a son.** As in the previous cases, no answer was found for this question, and **the dilemma remains unresolved.^N**

MISHNA In a case where one said: **I am hereby a nazirite now, and I will be a nazirite when I will have a son,^H and he began counting his own term of naziriteship, i.e., his first vow, and afterward in the middle of this naziriteship period a son was born to him, he first completes his own^N initial term of naziriteship and afterward he counts the term of naziriteship he vowed on the condition of the birth of his son.** However, if he reversed the order and said: **I am hereby a nazirite when I will have a son, and I am hereby a nazirite,^H and he began counting his own term of naziriteship and afterward, during this period, a son was born to him, he sets aside his own term of naziriteship and counts that which he vowed on condition of the birth of his son, and afterward he completes his own term of naziriteship.**

GEMARA In light of the ruling of the mishna, Rava asks: If one said: **I am hereby a nazirite for a standard term of thirty days and will begin observing it after twenty days,^H and I am also a nazirite from now for one hundred days, what is the halakha?** Should one say that **since these one hundred days of naziriteship are not completed within those first twenty days, it could be said that the one hundred days of naziriteship do not take effect^N at all until after he has completed the thirty-day naziriteship? Or perhaps, since he still has at least thirty days of hair growth^N at the end, as after the thirty-day term he could observe an additional eighty days, therefore the one hundred days of naziriteship take effect from now, and he counts twenty days, pauses to observe the other term of naziriteship for thirty days, shaves, and then completes the final eighty days of the long term of naziriteship.**

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לכשיהא לפלוגי בן – If one says: I am hereby a nazirite when so-and-so will have a son, and another heard him and said: And I, it is uncertain whether the second person has accepted naziriteship upon himself or whether he was merely expressing his equal affection for him. Since the *halakha* is to be lenient in uncertain cases of naziriteship, he is not a nazirite. According to the Ra'avad he remains in a state of uncertainty until he vows to observe two terms of naziriteship: One for the other's son and one for his own (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 2:7).

I am hereby a nazirite, and a nazirite when I will have a son – If one says: I am hereby a nazirite, and I will be a nazirite when I have a son, and then a son was born to him while he was counting his naziriteship, he completes the first term of naziriteship and afterward observes the term of naziriteship he vowed for the birth of his son (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 4:3).

I am hereby a nazirite when I will have a son, and I am hereby a nazirite – הריני נזיר בשיהיה לי בן ונזיר: If one says: I am hereby a nazirite when I will have a son and I am hereby a nazirite for a certain period of time, and a son was born to him during his term of naziriteship, he stops counting that term of naziriteship, observes the term of naziriteship for his son, and afterward completes the first term (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 4:3).

הריני נזיר לאחר – עשרים יום וכו': If one says: I am hereby a nazirite after twenty days, and then says: I am hereby a nazirite from now for one hundred days, he counts twenty days, pauses, and proceeds to observe the thirty days of his first vow of naziriteship. At the conclusion of those thirty days he shaves and brings the offerings. He then observes the remaining eighty days of the term of naziriteship he had started to observe, shaves, and brings the offerings. The *halakha* is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, based on the assumption of the question beginning: If you say, on the following page (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 4:6).

NOTES

The dilemma remains unresolved [*tiba'ei*] – הניבעי: This is equivalent to the more prevalent phrase: The dilemma shall stand [*teiku*]. The early commentaries point out that differences of this kind are characteristic of the style of this tractate, as well as tractate *Nedarim*, in contrast to other tractates.

He completes his own, etc. – משלים את שלו וכו' – The early commentaries suggest two basic explanations for this statement. Some commentaries even cite both interpretations, including different versions of each (see Rabbeinu Peretz and Rabbeinu Azriel). One explanation (Commentary on *Nazir*; Rosh) is that after completing his term he does not shave, since the term of naziriteship for his son took effect during the first term of naziriteship, and he then immediately observes the term of naziriteship for his son. Upon the completion of the second term of naziriteship he shaves and brings the offerings for both terms. Alternatively, he brings only one set of offerings, as the offerings are contingent on the shaving, and he has shaved only once (Rabbeinu Azriel). The other explanation is that he completes his own term of naziriteship, shaves, and brings the offerings, and afterward begins to count a second term of naziriteship for his son. The Commentary on *Nazir* attributes this interpretation to an individual called: The teacher, which may refer to Rashi. Many early commentaries agree with this second explanation, and the Jerusalem Talmud explains likewise.

Do not take effect – לא חילין: If this is the *halakha*, then one in this situation does not observe naziriteship at all during the first twenty days. He may drink wine and contract impurity from a corpse. After twenty days have passed he observes thirty days of naziriteship, shaves, and then observes a further term of one hundred days. *Tosafot* explain that although he said: From now, he meant only that he is vowing now, but it is clear from the content of his statement that he does not wish to start counting that term of naziriteship immediately. As for the difference between this *halakha* and the *halakha* of the mishna with regard to one whose term of naziriteship for his son came into effect while he was observing his own term of naziriteship, where everyone agrees that he starts his own term of naziriteship and stops it, the commentaries offer the following explanation: In the case of the mishna he does not know the precise date of his son's birth, so his own term of naziriteship begins immediately, as he might be able to complete it in time. Here, however, he knows ahead of time that twenty days are insufficient for a term of naziriteship, so it can be assumed that he did not intend for the term of naziriteship to begin immediately.

Since he has hair growth – בין דאית ליה גידול שער – Some commentaries explain that since he must shave at the completion of the thirty days of the second term of naziriteship, there is a need for sufficient time for another complete term of naziriteship in order for his hair to grow, so that he can shave again at the completion of the restarted term of naziriteship. This means that at least thirty days of the initial naziriteship must remain, because one cannot shave for hair growth of less than thirty days (*Tosafot*). Others explain that as in the case of the mishna, he shaves only once, at the conclusion of the final term of naziriteship. According to this explanation, the Gemara is not referring to actual hair growth, as his hair has already grown during the intervening term, but refers to a sufficiently long period of time for the growth to occur after the intervening term has ended (see *Shita Mekubbetzet* and Meiri).

וְתִבְעֵי לִיהַ נְזִירוֹת מוּעָטָה! חֲדָא מְגוּ
 חֲדָא קָא מִיבְעֵינָא לִיהַ;

The Gemara asks: **And let him raise this dilemma** with regard to a **short term of naziriteship**, when fewer than thirty days would remain if he suspended the first term of naziriteship in order to observe the other. The Gemara answers: **He raises one dilemma as a result of the other**. In other words, Rava's question was an outgrowth of a different inquiry, which in turn led to his question. The full discussion is as follows:

Perek II
 Daf 14 Amud a

HALAKHA

A short naziriteship, etc. – נְזִירוֹת מוּעָטָה וְכוּ': If one says: I am hereby a nazirite after twenty days and a nazirite from now, he observes a term of naziriteship of thirty days, shaves, and then observes a second term of thirty days for the naziriteship that was to commence after twenty days. This is because if he counts twenty and stops for the second term of naziriteship, only ten days would remain for the completion of his first term, and there must be at least thirty days between each shaving (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 4:7 and *Kesef Mishne* there).

I am hereby a nazirite after twenty, etc. – הֲרִינִי נְזִיר: If one said: I am hereby a nazirite after twenty days, and then said: I am a permanent nazirite from now, the naziriteship of his first vow does not take effect (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 4:8 and *Kesef Mishne* there).

אִם תִּמְצֵי לומר נְזִירוֹת מוּעָטָה, בֵּינָן
 דְּעֵשְׂרֵה יוֹמִין הוּא דִּיתְרִין – לֹא סָלִיק
 לִיהַ הַלֵּין עֵשְׂרֵה; וְדָאִי נְזִיר מֵאַה יוֹם.
 בֵּינָן דְּאִית לִיהַ תִּמְנִין יוֹמִין לְבִסּוּף –
 סָלִקִין לִיהַ, אוּ לֹא?

If you say that when he accepts naziriteship upon himself after twenty days, and then vows a short term of naziriteship^h of thirty days starting now, then since, if he pauses from his first term of naziriteship after twenty days, it is only ten days that are left over to complete after the second term of naziriteship, those ten should not be reckoned for him to complete a full term of naziriteship. Ten days are insufficient for hair growth. Therefore, he must observe a full thirty-day term of naziriteship after the second term of naziriteship, which means he is not a nazirite for the first twenty days. With that assumption in mind, the question arose: **Certainly if he vows to be a nazirite for one hundred days, since he has a further eighty days at the end, which is sufficient time for his hair to grow, do the first twenty days count for him as part of the one hundred days or not?**

וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לומר חֵיילִי, אָמַר "הֲרִינִי
 נְזִיר לְאַחַר עֵשְׂרִים יוֹם וּמֵעַבְשָׁיו נְזִיר
 עוֹלָם" מֵהוּ? מִי חֵיילִא עֲלִיהַ אוּ לֹא?

This inquiry leads to yet another question: **And if you say that the first days of naziriteship take effect,ⁿ and his term of naziriteship will be completed in the eighty days after the second term of naziriteship, then if he said: I am hereby a nazirite after twenty^h days, and from now I am a permanent nazirite, what is the halakha? Does the permanent naziriteship take effect for him during those twenty days or not?** Since permanent naziriteship is unlimited, he could not have intended to complete its days after the second term of naziriteship, and it is reasonable to assume that he intended for the permanent naziriteship to begin after the second term of naziriteship has been completed.

NOTES

וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לומר חֵיילִי – And if you say that they take effect: At this point the Gemara expands Rava's question: Even if the previous problem is resolved by saying that a term of naziriteship that cannot be completed before the second term of naziriteship starts should nevertheless commence at once, it is possible that this is so only because both terms of naziriteship are of limited duration. Moreover, since they can be completed consecutively, the first one takes immediate effect.

If, however, one of the terms of naziriteship is unlimited, this means that once he begins it the second term of naziriteship can never take effect, and even if it could take effect, he cannot shave at its conclusion (Rabbeinu Peretz). The Rosh explains that when there are two terms of naziriteship that last for a specific period of time, neither of them is viewed as an interruption of the other, whereas a permanent naziriteship represents an entirely different category.