

תִּנְיָא נְמִי הָכִי: מִי שֶׁאָמַר "הֲרִינִי נְזִיר"
וְשָׁמַע חֲבִירוֹ, וְשָׁהָה כְּדֵי דְבֹר, וְאָמַר
"וְאֲנִי" – הוּא אָסוּר וְחֲבִירוֹ מוּתָר.
וְכַמָּה כְּדֵי דְבֹר – כְּדֵי שְׁאִילַת שְׁלוֹם
תְּלִמִיד לְרַב.

לִימָא מְסִיעָא לִיה: מִי שֶׁאָמַר "הֲרִינִי
נְזִיר" וְשָׁמַע חֲבִירוֹ וְאָמַר "וְאֲנִי" וְאֲנִי
וְתוֹ לָא. תִּנְיָא כִּי רֹבְלָא לִיחְשִׁיב
וְלִיזִיל!

וְלִיתְנִי חֵד וְלִשְׁמַעִינָן הֲנִי! הֲכָא נְמִי,
וּמְשׁוּם דְּקָתְנִי סִיפָא "הוּתֵר הָרֵאשׁוֹן
הוּתֵרוּ בּוֹלָן, הוּתֵר הָאֲחֵרוֹן – הָאֲחֵרוֹן
מוּתָר וְכוּלָן אֲסוּרִין". מְכַלְל דְּאִיכָא
אֲמַצְעֵי – וּמְשׁוּם הָכִי קָתְנִי "וְאֲנִי"
וְאֲנִי.

אִיבְעָא לְהוּ: חֵד בְּחֲבֵרִיהּ מִתְּפִיס, אִו
דְּלִמָּא בְּקַמָּא מִתְּפִיס? לְמַאי נְפָקָא
מִינָהּ – לְאֲתַפּוּסֵי וּמִיזִל. אִי אֲמַרְתָּ
חֵד בְּחֲבֵרִיהּ מִתְּפִיס – מִתְּפִסִּין וְאֲזִילִין
לְעוֹלָם. וְאִי אֲמַרְתָּ בְּקַמָּא מִתְּפִיס –
טְפִי מְכַדֵּי דְבֹר לָא מִתְּפִסִּין, מַאי?

תָּא שְׁמַע: "הֲרִינִי נְזִיר" וְשָׁמַע חֲבִירוֹ
וְאָמַר "וְאֲנִי" וְאֲנִי – וְתוֹ לָא מִיָּדִי.
שְׁמַע מִינָהּ: בְּקַמָּא הוּא דְּמִתְּפִיס. דְּאִי
סָלְקָא דְּעַתְדָּא חֵד בְּחֲבֵרִיהּ מִתְּפִיס –
לִיתְנִי טוּבָא "וְאֲנִי". תִּנְיָא כִּי רֹבְלָא
לִיחְשִׁיב וְלִיזִיל!

This is also taught in a *baraita*: In the case of one who said: **I am hereby a nazirite, and another heard him and waited the time required for speaking a short phrase and then said: And I, the first person is bound by his vow and the other is permitted, as too much time passed between their respective vows. And how much time is the time required for speaking? It is the time necessary for a student to inquire after the welfare of his rabbi.**

The Gemara suggests: **Shall we say that the mishna supports Reish Lakish's opinion? As it is taught: In the case of one who said: I am hereby a nazirite, and another heard him and said: And I, and a third person heard him and said: And I, they are all nazirites.** The mishna mentions: And I, twice **and no more**,^N which indicates that only two people can associate themselves with the vow of the first one. The reason for this must be because too much time has passed since the first person spoke. The Gemara rejects this argument: This is no proof, as **should the tanna have continued reckoning cases like a peddler, who announces his wares over and over again, by repeating: And I, and I, over and over again?**

The Gemara raises a difficulty: **But if the tanna wishes to be concise, let him teach only one example, and teach us these other cases of others who say: And I, by means of a single example.** The Gemara answers: **Indeed, this is in fact correct, but because the tanna teaches in the latter clause: If the vow of the first was dissolved by a halakhic authority then they are all dissolved, but if the vow of the last individual was dissolved by a halakhic authority then the vow of the last individual is dissolved and all the others remain bound by their vow, one may conclude by inference that there is a middle person between the first and the last. And due to that reason the tanna teaches: And I, and I, so that the case would include three people, but not because a fourth person is unable to associate himself with the vow of the first in the same manner.**

With regard to the same issue, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does each one take a vow by associating himself with the vow of the other,^N i.e., the individual who spoke immediately before him, or perhaps they all associate themselves with the vow of the first one? The Gemara asks: **What difference is there?** The Gemara answers that the difference is whether an unlimited number of people can continue to associate themselves with the vows. **If you say that each one associates himself with the vow of the other who spoke immediately before him, others can continue to associate themselves with these vows forever, provided that they each do so immediately after the previous individual. And if you say they all associate themselves with the vow of the first one, they may not associate themselves with the vow if more time has elapsed than the time required for speaking a short phrase since the vow of the first individual. What is the answer to this dilemma?**

The Gemara suggests: **Come and hear a proof from the mishna:** With regard to one who said: **I am hereby a nazirite, and another heard this vow and said: And I, and a third person added: And I, they are all nazirites.** The mishna mentions only two individuals who associated themselves with the initial vow, **and no more.** **Learn from this that they all associated themselves with the vow of the first one, as, if it should enter your mind that each one associates himself with the vow of the other who came immediately before, let the mishna teach: And I, many times.** The Gemara answers as before: This is no proof, as **should the tanna have continued reckoning cases like a peddler? It was enough for him to state: And I, twice.**

NOTES

And I, and I, and no more – וְאֲנִי וְאֲנִי וְתוֹ לָא – Some commentaries infer from here that only two people can associate themselves with someone's vow (Commentary on *Nazir*). As stated previously, others maintain that up to three people can do so (*Tosafot*). They explain the Gemara as follows: Had the mishna mentioned: And I, three times, this would not have taught anything novel. There is no reason to differentiate between the second and third person, since they all spoke within the time needed for speaking of the first person. However, had the mishna been taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda Nesia, it should have stated: And I, four times, as the fourth person responds slightly beyond the minimum time needed for speaking.

Some say that according to the explanation of Rabbeinu Tam the mishna should have stated: And I, five times, to stress that it is not necessary to respond within the time needed for speaking at all (*Tosefot HaRosh*; see Rabbeinu Peretz).

Does each one take a vow by associating himself with the vow of the other – חֵד בְּחֲבֵרִיהּ מִתְּפִיס – The early commentaries disagree as to whether the Gemara's question applies to the opinion of Reish Lakish (*Tosefot HaRosh*, based on Rabbeinu Tam), or whether it does not apply to his opinion (Commentary on *Nazir*), or if the Gemara is attempting to decide whether the *halakha* is in accordance with his opinion (Rid).

הוֹתֵר אֶמְצְעֵי וכו' – The middle one is dissolved, etc. – In a case where one vowed, and another heard him and added: And I, within the time needed for speaking, and a third also said: And I, within the time needed for speaking of the second, if the vow of the first individual was nullified then all their vows are nullified. If the vow of the last one was nullified then only his vow is nullified and those of the others are valid. If the vow of the second person was nullified, then his and the vow of the last one are dissolved, while the first individual remains bound by his vow (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a*, *Hilkhot Nedarim* 4:9; *Shulhan Arukh*, *Yoreh De'a* 229:3).

Each associates himself with the vow of the other individual – תֵּד בְּחִבְרִיהַ מִתְּפִיס – If one vowed to be a nazirite and another heard him and added: And I, within the time needed for speaking, and a third said the same statement within the time needed for speaking of the second, and likewise a fourth and a fifth, even as many as one hundred, they are all nazirites. This is in accordance with the conclusion of the Gemara that each individual associates himself with the vow of the other person (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a*, *Hilkhot Nezirut* 2:4 and *Hilkhot Nedarim* 3:3).

וְלִיִּתְּנִי חֵד, וְלִשְׁמַעֲנִינָּ בּוֹלְהוֹן! אִיִּדִי דְקִתְּנִי: הוֹתֵר הָרֵאשׁוֹן – הוֹתֵרוּ בּוֹלְךָ, הוֹתֵר הָאֲחֵרוֹן – הָאֲחֵרוֹן מוֹתֵר וְכוּלְךָ אֶסְוִרִין, מִכְּלָל דְאִיכָּא אֶמְצְעֵי – מִשּׁוּם הִכִּי קִתְּנִי וְאִנִּי "וְאִנִּי".

תָּא שְׁמַע: הוֹתֵר הָרֵאשׁוֹן – הוֹתֵרוּ בּוֹלְךָ, רֵאשׁוֹן הוּא דְשָׂרוּ, הָא אֶמְצְעֵי – לָא, שְׁמַע מִינָּה: בְּקַמָּא מִתְּפִסִּין.

אִימָא לָךְ: לְעוֹלָם חֵד בְּחִבְרִיהַ מִתְּפִיס, וְאִיִּדִי דְבַעֲי מִתְּנָא הוֹתֵרוּ בּוֹלְךָ, דְאִי תְּנָא אֶמְצְעֵי אִיכָּא רֵאשׁוֹן דְלֵא מִשְׁתְּרִי, מִשּׁוּם הִכִּי קִתְּנִי רֵאשׁוֹן.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הוֹתֵר הָאֲחֵרוֹן – הָאֲחֵרוֹן מוֹתֵר וְכוּלְךָ אֶסְוִרִין, דְלֵא אִיכָּא אַחֲרֵינָא בְּתֵרִיהַ. אַבְל אֶמְצְעֵי, דְאִיכָּא אַחֲרֵינָא בְּתֵרִיהַ – מִשְׁתְּרִי. שְׁמַע מִינָּה: חֵד בְּחִבְרִיהַ מִתְּפִיס.

לְעוֹלָם אִימָא לָךְ בְּקַמָּא מִתְּפִסִּין, וּמֵאִי אַחֲרוֹן דְקִתְּנִי – אֶמְצְעֵי, וְאִיִּדִי דְתְּנָא רֵאשׁוֹן – תְּנָא אַחֲרוֹן.

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְתְּנָא בְּהֵדִיא: הוֹתֵר הָרֵאשׁוֹן – הוֹתֵרוּ בּוֹלְךָ, הוֹתֵר הָאֲחֵרוֹן – הָאֲחֵרוֹן מוֹתֵר וְכוּלְךָ אֶסְוִרִין, הוֹתֵר אֶמְצְעֵי – הֵימְנוּ וְלִמְשָׁה מוֹתֵר, הֵימְנוּ וְלִמְשָׁה אֶסְוִר. שְׁמַע מִינָּה: חֵד בְּחִבְרִיהַ מִתְּפִיס, שְׁמַע מִינָּה.

"הֲרִינִי נָזִיר וְשָׁמַע חֲבִירוֹ וְאָמַר פִּי כְּפִיו וְשַׁעְרֵי בְּשַׁעְרוֹ" וכו'. מִשּׁוּם דְאָמַר "פִּי כְּפִיו וְשַׁעְרֵי בְּשַׁעְרוֹ" הֲרִי נָזִיר?

The Gemara asks: **But** if the *tanna* wished to avoid repeating: And I, so many times, **let him teach** it only **once**, and **we** would learn that **they** are **all** nazirites based on that example. The Gemara answers: **Since** the *tanna* **teaches** in the latter clause: If the vow of **the first** was dissolved by a halakthic authority then **they** are **all** dissolved, but if the vow of **the last** individual was dissolved by a halakthic authority then the vow of **the last** individual is dissolved **and** all the others remain **bound** by their vows, one may conclude **by inference** that **there is a middle** person between the first and the last. It is **due to that** reason that the *tanna* **teaches: And I, and I**, so that the case would include three people, but not because a fourth person is unable to associate himself with the vow of the first in the same manner.

The Gemara suggests: **Come and hear** a proof from the mishna: If the vow of **the first** individual was dissolved, **they** are **all** dissolved. This indicates that it is only if the **first** one was dissolved that they are all considered dissolved. **However**, if the vow of the **middle** person was dissolved, **no**, the vows of the individuals following him are not considered dissolved. **Learn from this** that they all **associated** themselves with the vow of **the first** one.

The Gemara refutes this argument: I could say to you that **actually**, each associates himself with the vow of **the other** who immediately preceded him, and therefore if the vow of the middle person was dissolved, the vows of all those who came after him are also dissolved. **But since** the *tanna* **wanted to teach: They** are all dissolved, and **had he taught** the case where the vow of **the middle** individual was dissolved, he would have had to state that **there** is still the vow of the **first** individual that is **not** dissolved, because his vow is not dependent on that of the middle one. **Due to that** reason the *tanna* **teaches** the case where the vow of the **first** one was dissolved. Consequently, no proof can be brought from here.

The Gemara suggests another proof from the mishna: **Come and hear: If the last was dissolved, the last is dissolved and they are all bound** by their vows. It can be inferred from here that only in that case is the vow of the last one alone dissolved, **as he is not followed** by anyone. **However**, if the dissolved vow was of the **middle one, who is followed** by someone else, the vow of the last one who comes after him is also dissolved. One can learn from this that each **one** associates himself with the vow of **the other** individual.

The Gemara rejects this claim as well: **Actually**, I could say to you that they all associate themselves with the vow of **the first** one, and what is the meaning of: The **last** one, that the mishna teaches? It means **the middle** one, the dissolution of whose vow does not cause the vow of the person who followed him to be dissolved. **And** why is the middle one called the last one? **Since** the *tanna* earlier **taught: First**, here he **taught: Last**, despite the fact that he is referring to the middle one.

The Gemara further suggests: **Come and hear**, as it is taught in a *baraita* explicitly: **If the first one is dissolved, they are all dissolved; if the last one is dissolved, the last one is dissolved and they are all bound** by their vows. If the middle one is dissolved,^H the vows of anyone **from him and after** him are dissolved; those who vowed **from him and before** him are **bound** by their vows. One can learn from this that each associates himself with the vow of **the other** individual.^H The Gemara concludes: **Learn from this** that it is so.

§ The mishna taught that one stated: I am hereby a nazirite, and if another heard and said, my mouth is like his mouth, and my hair is like his hair, he is a nazirite. The Gemara asks: Just because he said: My mouth is like his mouth and my hair is like his hair, is he a nazirite?

ורמניה: "ידי נזירה" ו"רגלי נזירה" – לא אמר כלום: "ראשי נזירה" "כבדי נזירה" – הרי זה נזיר. זה הכלל: דבר שהנשמה תלויה בו – הרי זה נזיר!

אמר רב יהודה: דאמר הכי יעשה פי כפיו מנין, ושערי בשערו מלגו.

"הריני נזירה ושמע בעלה ואמר ואני אינו יכול להפר." איבעיא להו: בעל מיעקר עקר, או דלמא מיגו גיזי? למאי נפקא מינה?

לאשה שנדרה בנזיר, ושמע חבתה ואמרה "ואני". ושמע בעלה של ראשונה והפר לה; אי אמרת מיעקר עקר – ההיא נמי אישתראי, ואי אמרת מיגו גיזי – איהי אישתראי, חבתה אסירא. מאי?

תא שמע: "הריני נזירה" ושמע בעלה ואמר "ואני" – אינו יכול להפר. ואי סלקא דעתך בעל מיגו גיזי – ליפר לאישתו, והוא ליתסר! אלא לאו שמע מינה – בעל מיעקר עקר!

And the Gemara raises a contradiction against this. If one said: **My hand is a nazirite**,^h and similarly, if he said: **My foot is a nazirite**, he has not said anything of consequence. However, if he said: **My head is a nazirite**, or: **My liver is a nazirite**, he is a nazirite. This is the principle: If one accepted naziriteship by means of an entity upon which life depends, i.e., a limb or a body part that he cannot survive without, he is a nazirite. Conversely, if he mentioned part of the body that is not essential for life, he is not a nazirite. In this case, as he referred to his hair, which is certainly not a vital part of him, he should not be a nazirite.

Rav Yehuda said that it means that he said like this; this is what he intended: **Let my mouth be like his mouth**^h with regard to abstention from wine,^h and **my hair be like his hair** with regard to abstention from cutting it.

§ The mishna taught that if a woman said: **I am hereby a nazirite**, and her husband heard and said: **And I, he cannot nullify her vow**. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: When a husband nullifies the vow of his wife, does he **uproot** his wife's vow, making it as though she never vowed, or perhaps he merely **severs**^h her vow from that point onward, but her vow was still in effect until he nullified it? The Gemara asks: **What difference is there**ⁿ resulting from this dilemma?

The Gemara explains that the difference is with regard to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite, and another woman heard and said: **And I, and the husband of the first woman heard and nullified her vow**. If you say that the husband **uproots** the vow entirely, the vow of that second woman should also be dissolved, as she associated herself with a non-existent vow. And if you say he **severs** it from this point, the vow of his wife is dissolved, but the other woman remains bound by her vow, as the first vow was intact when she associated herself with it. **What**, then, is the answer to this dilemma?

The Gemara suggests: **Come and hear** the statement of the mishna: If she said: **I am hereby a nazirite**, and her husband heard and said: **And I, he cannot nullify her vow**. And if it should enter your mind that the husband **severs** the vow from that moment onward, let him nullify the vow for his wife and he will remain bound by his vow,ⁿ since if the vow is not nullified retroactively, her vow was intact when he associated himself with it. **Rather**, must one not conclude from the mishna that the husband **uproots** the vow entirely, which means he would also uproot his own vow by nullifying hers, and that is why he is unable do so?

HALAKHA

My hand is a nazirite, etc. – ידי נזירה וכו' – One who says: My hand is a nazirite, or: My foot is a nazirite, his statement is of no consequence. If he said: My head is a nazirite, or: My liver is a nazirite, he is a nazirite. This is the principle: If he mentions any limb whose removal would lead to his death, he is a nazirite (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a*, *Hilkhot Nedarim* 1:16).

Let my mouth be like his mouth with regard to abstention from wine – פי כפיו מנין – If one vowed to be a nazirite and another said: My mouth is like his mouth with regard to wine, or: My hair is like his hair with regard to cutting, the second person is also a nazirite (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a*, *Hilkhot Nezirut* 2:4).

He severs – מיגו גיזי – When a husband or father nullifies the vow of a wife or daughter he does not uproot it retroactively but merely from that moment onward. Consequently, if a wife vowed and another person took a vow by associating himself with her vow, and her husband subsequently nullified her vow, her vow is dissolved but the second person remains bound by his vow. The *Shakh* explains the Rambam's opinion, as his wording indicates the opposite conclusion (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a*, *Hilkhot Nezirut* 13:2; *Shulhan Arukh*, *Yoreh De'a* 234:51, 37).

NOTES

Let my mouth be like his mouth – יעשה פי כפיו: Some commentaries explain that he explicitly adds: With regard to the prohibition of wine (Commentary on *Nazir*). The reason the vow takes effect is that he himself can vow by saying: Let my mouth be prohibited from wine, etc., and therefore he can associate himself with the vow of another in a similar manner (Rabbi Avraham min HaHar). Others maintain that even if he did not actually mention wine, as his friend has just vowed naziriteship he clearly intends to prohibit himself from consuming wine and shaving, like the other person (*Tosafot*). This is no worse than intimations of naziriteship (see Chapter One).

What difference is there – למאי נפקא מינה: The commentaries point out that the Gemara could have added further differences, e.g., whether a woman is liable to receive lashes for drinking wine if her husband later nullifies her vow, and likewise whether she must bring the offerings of an impure nazirite if she became ritually impure before he nullifies the vow

(*Tosafot*). Some commentaries explain that the Gemara stated this particular difference of one woman stating: And I, after hearing the vow of naziriteship of another woman because it involves the extension of a vow, and the Gemara wanted to cite a similar proof from the mishna (Rabbi Avraham min HaHar).

Let him nullify for his wife and he will remain bound by his vow – ליפר לאישתו והוא ליתסר: The plain meaning of this statement is that if the husband merely severs the vow from this point onward, since she was a nazirite beforehand he can nullify her vow without affecting his own. However, if the husband uproots the vow entirely he would thereby be attempting to uproot his own vow, which he made dependent on hers, and one cannot, or according to the opinion of *Tosafot* may not, nullify his own vow in any manner.

Some commentaries ask: This principle that one cannot nullify his own vows applies only to one who vows and then nullifies the vow himself. By contrast, in this case the husband

did not nullify his vow but merely that of his wife. Although it is true that ultimately he nullifies his own vow as well, there is no reason why this should prevent him from nullifying his wife's vow or why this act should be prohibited (*Tosafot*). Consequently, they suggest a more complex interpretation: If the husband uproots the vow, his statement: And I, must be considered a confirmation of her vow, as otherwise he would nullify his own vow when he nullifies hers, which would mean that his statement was of no consequence. For this reason he cannot nullify her vow, as he has already upheld it.

Conversely, if the husband severs the vow only from this moment onward, his addition of: And I, is not an absolute confirmation of her vow, as his own vow would not be affected even if he were to nullify hers in respect to the future. Consequently, he has not upheld her vow and therefore he can nullify it later (*Tosafot*; Commentary on *Nazir*; see Meiri).

If the animal was his – אם שלו היתה הבהמה – Since the animal belonged to the husband, from the outset he gave it to her only to be used as an offering. Consequently, once it is established that she does not need the animal she no longer owns it, which means the sanctity of the animal is canceled as well (*Tosafot*, based on 24a). *Tosafot* add that even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that a husband is obligated to provide his wife with all the offerings she requires, this *halakha* applies only to her obligations, not to an animal that she does not need.

Since she requires no atonement – דלא צריכה כפרה – Once her husband has nullified her vow she is no longer in need of atonement, which means the animal is considered like a sin-offering whose owner has died, and therefore it is left to die (Commentary on *Nazir*). Some commentaries maintain that by right, no sanctity should apply to the animal at all, as she does not require atonement; however, as her act of consecration was valid at the time, the Sages decreed that the animal should not return to its initial state, and instead it should be considered like an offering whose owner has died. This decree was established to prevent people from treating consecrated objects lightly (Rid).

Other commentaries had a variant reading of the text: Since she requires atonement (*Tosafot*). They explain that her very acceptance of naziriteship is considered a sin due to her self-denial, in accordance with Rabbi Elazar HaKappar's dictum (19a) that a nazirite is called a sinner. Therefore, she still requires atonement, and consequently the animal is sacred. When her husband nullifies her vow, since in practice she can no longer bring the animal for her atonement, it is considered an animal whose owner has died without gaining atonement.

HALAKHA

A sin-offering whose owners have died – חטאת שמתו – בעליה: A sin-offering whose owner has died must be left to die (Rambam *Sefer Avoda*, *Hilkhot Pesulei HaMukdashin* 4:7).

לא לעולם מיגו גיזו. ובדין הוא דליפר לה, והיינו טעמא דלא מצוי מיפר: בין דאמר לה "ואני" – כמאן דאמר "קניי ליכי" דמי; אי מתשיל אהקמתו – מצוי מיפר, ואי לא – לא מצוי מיפר.

תא שמע: האשה שנדרה בגיור והפרישה את בהמתה, ואחר כך הפר לה בעלה, אם שלו היתה הבהמה – תצא ותרעה בעדר, ואם שלו היתה הבהמה, החטאת – תמות.

ואי סלקא דעתך בעל מיעקר עקר – תיפוק לחולין! אלא לאו שמע מינה – בעל מיגו גיזו.

לעולם אימא לך בעל מיעקר עקר, והיינו טעמא: בין דלא צריכה כפרה – הוה כחטאת שמתו בעליה, וגמירי דחטאת שמתו בעליה תמות.

תא שמע: האשה שנדרה בגיור, והיתה שותה יין ומשומא לא למיתים – הרי זו סופגת את הארבעים. היכי דמי? אילימא דלא היפר לה בעל – צריכא למימר?

אלא פשיטא – דהיפר לה בעל. ואי סלקא דעתך בעל מיעקר עקר – אמאי סופגת ארבעים? אלא לאו שמע מינה – בעל מיגו גיזו.

לעולם אימא לך בעל מיעקר עקר, ומשום דקתני סיפא: היפר לה בעלה והיא לא ידעה, והיתה שותה יין ומשומא למיתים – אינה סופגת את הארבעים,

The Gemara refutes this argument: **No; actually**, one can say that the husband **severs** the vow from that point onward. **And** if there were no other points to consider, **by right** the mishna should have taught that **he can nullify her vow for her; and this is the reason why he cannot nullify it: Since he said to her: And I, he is considered like one who said: It is upheld for you**, and once a husband has upheld his wife's vow he can no longer nullify it. Consequently, **if he requested to have his upholding dissolved by a Sage, he can nullify her vow, and if not, he cannot nullify it**. Consequently, the ruling of the mishna does not resolve the dilemma.

The Gemara cites another mishna (24a): **Come and hear: With regard to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite and separated her animal for this purpose (see Numbers 6:13–14), and afterward her husband nullified her vow, which means that she is no longer obligated to bring an offering, if the animal was his,**^N which he had given to her, it is as though it were never consecrated at all, and **it shall go out and graze among the flock** like a regular, non-consecrated animal, until it becomes blemished. **And if the animal was hers**, and it was designated for a **sin-offering, it must** be placed in isolation for it to **die**, in accordance with the general *halakha* that a sin-offering that may not be sacrificed must be left to die.

The Gemara explains the difficulty from this mishna: **And if it should enter your mind that the husband uproots the vow**, the sin-offering should be released as a non-sacred animal, in accordance with the *halakha* of a sin-offering of a nazirite whose vow was nullified (31a). **Rather**, must one **not conclude from** the mishna that **the husband merely severs the vow**, which means that she was a nazirite when she separated the animal, and therefore it is consecrated?

The Gemara rejects this proof: **Actually, I could say to you that the husband uproots the vow, and this is the reason for the above ruling: Since she requires no atonement,**^N as the vow is no longer in effect, this animal is treated as a **sin-offering whose owners have died,**^H and it is learned as a tradition that **a sin-offering whose owners have died must be left to die**.

The Gemara continues to cite relevant sources. **Come and hear** the following mishna (23a): **With regard to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite and nevertheless was drinking wine and rendering herself ritually impure by contact with the dead, she incurs the forty lashes for violating a Torah prohibition**. The Gemara analyzes this mishna: **What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that her husband did not nullify her vow, need this be said that she is liable to receive lashes? After all, every nazirite who transgresses their vow incurs lashes**.

Rather, it is obvious that the husband nullified her vow. **And if it should enter your mind that the husband uproots his wife's vow, why does she incur the forty lashes?** It is as though she never vowed at all. **Rather**, must one **not conclude from** the mishna that **the husband severs the vow**, and therefore she is liable for her earlier transgression?

The Gemara refutes this argument: **Actually, I could say to you that the husband uproots the vow, and the reason that the mishna teaches in this manner is due to the fact that the tanna teaches in the latter clause of the mishna: If the husband nullified her vow and she did not know, and she was drinking wine and rendering herself ritually impure by contact with the dead, she does not incur the forty lashes, despite her intention to sin, as she did not commit a transgression in practice**.