

NOTES

He remains under his father's authority – הא ברשותיה דאביו קאים: Most commentaries explain this question as follows: If the son's statement: If I am a minor I shall be a nazirite due to my father's vow, and if I am an adult, I shall be a nazirite due to my own vow, refers to the age of vows, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi must account for the fact that he has not yet left his father's authority completely, which means that his father's vow should still apply. After all, a father can impose a vow on his son even during the son's thirteenth year, and after he has reached the age of vows. Why, then, does this son have to accept his own naziriteship when his father's is still in effect? See the alternative explanations of the Commentary on *Nazir*, and the Rid.

One whose father was a nazirite – מי שהיה אביו נזיר: There are two versions of this mishna. According to the alternative reading, which is the reverse of that of the standard text, everyone agrees that a son who became a nazirite after his father's death may use his unallocated money. They disagree only with regard to a father and son who were nazirites at the same time. According to the standard version, Rabbi Yosei's reasoning is that if the father died before the son became a nazirite there is no connection between their naziriteship terms, whereas if they were nazirites concurrently he has a claim to his father's naziriteship money. Those who accept the other version of the text explain that a son who was a nazirite in his father's lifetime must tend to his own obligation, and therefore he may not make use of his father's offerings. Conversely, if he vowed after his father's death he may stipulate the use of his money (see Commentary on *Nazir* and *Tosafot*).

הא ברשותיה דאביו קאים! אלא, דאמר "אהא בשביל אבא, אהא בשביל עצמי".

אי אייתי שתי שערות מעיקרא – קאים בנזירות דילה, ולבסוף – קאים בנזירות דאביו. ואי אייתי במצעי מאי?

הניחא לרבי יוסי ברבי יהודה, דאמר עד שיגיע לעונת נדרים.

אלא לרבי, דאמר עד שביא שתי שערות, מאי איכא למימר? אמרי: לרבי ליכא תקנתא עד דיתב דילה ויתב דאבוי.

מתני האיש מגלח על נזירות אביו, ואין האשה מגלחת על נזירות אביה. כיצד? מי שהיה אביו נזיר, והפריש מעות סתומים על נזירותו, ומת. ואמר "הריני נזיר על מנת שאגלח על מעות אבא".

אמר רבי יוסי: הרי אלו יפלו לנדבה, אין זה מגלח על נזירות אביו. איזהו שמגלח על נזירות אביו? מי שהיה הוא ואביו נזירים, והפריש אביו מעות סתומים לנזירותו ומת – זה הוא שמגלח על נזירות אביו.

After all, he still remains under his father's authority<sup>N</sup> with regard to naziriteship, as he has yet to develop two pubic hairs. Rather, one must explain that he said the following: I shall be a nazirite due to my father; I shall be a nazirite due to my own vow. In other words, he did not link his statement to the question of whether he was old enough to vow but to the issue of his father's authority with regard to naziriteship, i.e., whether he had developed two hairs.

The Gemara asks: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, if he had developed two pubic hairs from the outset, i.e., before his father vowed, he would stand bound by his own naziriteship, and if he reached physical maturity at the end, i.e., after the vow ended, he would stand bound by his father's vow of naziriteship. But if he developed two hairs in the middle of his naziriteship term, of what use would the son's vow be?

The Gemara clarifies: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that a father can vow on behalf of his son until he reaches the age of vows. The reason is that this stage is by rabbinic law, and therefore the fact that the son has reached this stage does not automatically cancel the father's vow. The son would complete his term and bring his offerings.

However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said that a father can vow for his son only until he develops two pubic hairs, what can be said? If he grew two hairs during his father's naziriteship it is no longer in effect, as by Torah law he is no longer under his father's authority, so what is the *halakha* in that case? The Sages say in response: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, this child has no rectification until he sits for his term of naziriteship and also sits for the naziriteship of his father, i.e., he must be a nazirite for sixty days, to ensure that he completes a full term of thirty days, either for his own naziriteship or for that of his father.

**MISHNA** A man can shave, i.e., bring the offerings at the close of his term of naziriteship, by using offerings originally designated for his father's naziriteship,<sup>H</sup> but a woman cannot shave by means of the offerings for her father's naziriteship. How so; how is this *halakha* applied? It applies to one whose father was a nazirite<sup>NH</sup> and separated unallocated money for his naziriteship, i.e., he did not state which coins were for which of his offerings, and he died before buying the animals, and the son said after his father's death: I am hereby a nazirite on the condition that I will shave by means of the money that my father set aside.

Rabbi Yosei said: In that case these coins are allocated for communal gift offerings, and the son may not use them, as this is not the case of the *halakha* that a son can shave by using his father's naziriteship. Rather, who is the son who can shave by using his father's naziriteship? This is referring to a son and his father who were both nazirites<sup>H</sup> during his father's lifetime, and his father separated unallocated money for his naziriteship and died; this is the one who may shave by using his father's naziriteship.

HALAKHA

A man can shave by using his father's naziriteship, etc. – האיש מגלח על נזירות אביו וכו': A man who vowed naziriteship is permitted to make use of his late father's offerings. However, a woman may not do so (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 8:15).

One whose father was a nazirite, etc. – מי שהיה אביו נזיר וכו':

If one's father was a nazirite who had separated unallocated money for his offerings before he died, the son may use that money for his own offerings if he said after his father's death: I am hereby a nazirite on the condition that I can bring my offerings from the money set aside by my father. This is in accordance with the unattributed opinion in the mishna (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 8:15).

מי שהיה: A son and his father who were both nazirites, etc. – הוא או אביו נזירים וכו': In a case where both a man and his father were nazirites, and the father separated unallocated money before he died, the son may use the money if he stated after his father's death that he will shave by means of his father's money. If he did not declare this intention, the money is used for gift offerings (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 8:15).

הַלְלָהּ הִיא – הַלְלָהּ הִיא  
 הַלְלָהּ הִיא: A man may shave by means of his father's offerings, but a woman may not do so. This is in accordance with a *halakha* learned by tradition, as stated by Rabbi Yohanan (Rambam *Sefer Hafl'a'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 8:15).

גַּמְרָא מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַלְלָהּ  
 הִיא בְּנִיזוּר. פְּשִׁיטָא! מַאי לְמִימְרָא דְבֵּן יוֹרֵשׁ  
 אֶת אָבִיו. בֵּת לָא?

**GEMARA** The Gemara asks: **What is the reason** for this difference between a man and a woman? **Rabbi Yohanan said: It is a *halakha* transmitted to Moses from Sinai with regard to a nazirite.**<sup>H</sup> The Gemara asks: It is **obvious** that this is so, even without this *halakha*. **What is the purpose of stating this?** Is Rabbi Yohanan coming to say **that a son inherits from his father** whereas a **daughter does not**, and therefore only a son who inherits from his father can use his animals, but not a daughter? This is obvious, as it is stated in the Torah that a daughter does not inherit from her father if he has a son (see Numbers 27:8).

לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּלִית לִיהּ אֵלָא בֵּת. מַהוּ  
 דְּתִמְנָא: יוֹרֵשִׁין גְּמִירִין לָהּ.

The Gemara answers: **No**, this *halakha* is **necessary** in a case **when he has only a daughter**, who does inherit from him. **Lest you say that we learned this *halakha* with regard to heirs**, i.e., that the *halakha* is that all heirs, including a daughter, can shave by means of their father's offerings,

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the mishna therefore **teaches us** that it is a *halakha* that is unrelated to inheritance; there is simply a tradition that a son can use the offerings for his father's naziriteship while a daughter cannot.

אֵיבַעֲיָא לְהוּ: פְּלִיגִי רַבְנֵי עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אִו  
 לָא פְּלִיגִי? וְאִם תִּימְצִי לִזְמַר פְּלִיגִי, אֲרִישָׁא  
 אִו אֲסִיפָא? תָּא שְׁמַע: בֵּי צִד אָמְרוּ הָאִישׁ  
 מְגַלַּח עַל נְזִירוּת אָבִיו?

**§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Do the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yosei,<sup>N</sup> or do they not disagree? If you say they disagree, do they take issue with the first clause or with the latter clause of his *halakha*?** The Gemara suggests an answer: **Come and hear the following *baraita*: How did the Sages say that a man can shave<sup>H</sup> by using his father's naziriteship?**

מִי שְׁהִיָּה אָבִיו נְזִיר, וְהִפְרִישׁ אָבִיו מַעוֹת  
 לְנְזִירוּתוֹ, וְאָמַר "הֲרִינִי נְזִיר עַל מְנַת  
 שְׁמַגְלַח עַל מַעוֹת אָבִיא" – זֶהוּ שְׁמַגְלַח  
 עַל מַעוֹת אָבִיו. אֲבָל מִי שְׁהִיָּה הוּא וְאָבִיו  
 נְזִירִים, וְהִפְרִישׁ אָבִיו מַעוֹת לְנְזִירוּתוֹ, וְמַת –  
 הָרִי אֵלָיו יִפְלוּ לְנִדְבָה, דְּבָרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

With regard to **one whose father was a nazirite and his father separated money for his naziriteship and died, and the son said: I am hereby a nazirite on the condition that I can shave by using my father's money, this is the one who can shave by means of his father's money. However, if a son and his father were both nazirites, and his father separated money for his own naziriteship and died, this money is allocated for communal gift offerings. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei.**

רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבִּי מַעֲיָר וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אָמְרוּ:  
 זֶה הוּא שְׁמַגְלַח עַל מַעוֹת אָבִיו.

**Rabbi Eliezer, and Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Yehuda said: This is the one who can shave<sup>N</sup> by using his father's money.** Their emphasis of: **This is the one**, indicates that they disagree with Rabbi Yosei entirely. In other words, where Rabbi Yosei rules that one can use his father's money, they maintain that he cannot do so; and conversely, in a case where Rabbi Yosei says that one cannot spend his father's money for his nazirite offerings, the Rabbis rule that he can do so.

כִּיצַד אָמְרוּ – הַלְלָהּ הִיא  
 הַלְלָהּ הִיא: Whether he vowed naziriteship in his father's lifetime or after his death, a son can use the unallocated money his father left behind. The *halakha* is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yosei only with regard to his latter clause (Rambam *Sefer Hafl'a'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 8:15).

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פְּלִיגִי רַבְנֵי עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי – Do the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yosei? On the one hand, as the mishna itself does not explicitly cite a dispute in this regard, the entire mishna is apparently part of the traditional *halakha*, especially as the phrase: Rabbi Yosei said, usually indicates that he does not take issue with the previous statement. On the other hand, the phrase: Who is the one who shaves, indicates the existence of an opposing opinion that does not appear in the mishna. Some commentaries explain that the Gemara is asking whether Rabbi Yosei's colleagues accept his ruling (Rabbeinu Peretz).

זֶה הוּא שְׁמַגְלַח וְכוּ' – Some commentaries say that the phrase: This is, means: This case and no other, which indicates that the Rabbis disagree with both the first and last rulings, i.e., they maintain the reverse of Rabbi Yosei's opinion (Commentary on *Nazir*). In the Jerusalem Talmud a similar explanation is accepted, and the *Tosefta* explicitly states likewise. Others claim that the first clause is unanimous, and the phrase: This is, refers only to the last clause. Consequently, the son can shave in both cases in the opinion of the Rabbis. Most commentaries accept this explanation, for various reasons.

**Two nazirite sons** – שְׁנֵי בָּנִים נְזִירִים: If a father died, leaving unallocated money for his naziriteship offerings, his sons divide the money between them, and each can shave with his share. In keeping with his general opinion, Rambam rules in accordance with the option accepted as the basis of the clause beginning with: If you say (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 8:15).

**A firstborn and a regular son** – בְּכוֹר וּפְשוּט: If a father left behind unallocated money for his naziriteship, his firstborn son receives a double portion. Apparently, the Rambam maintains that Rava's unresolved question refers solely to consecrated property, whereas as far as the father's naziriteship is concerned, it is considered an inheritance (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 8:15 and *Kesef Mishneh* there).

**His father was a permanent nazirite, etc.** – אָבִיו נְזִיר עוֹלָם: If a father was a permanent nazirite and his son was a nazirite for a limited period, or vice versa, the son may use his father's unallocated money, in accordance with the opinion accepted as the basis of the clause beginning with: If you say (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 8:16).

**His father was an impure nazirite** – אָבִיו נְזִיר טָמֵא: If a father set aside money for the offerings of his impure naziriteship and died, his son cannot use them for his offerings of purity. Similarly, he cannot use money for pure offerings for his own naziriteship of impurity. Since this question was left unresolved by the Gemara, it is considered an uncertain case, and therefore the son does not fulfill his obligation if he uses the money in this manner (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nezirut* 8:17).

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**It is with regard to non-sacred matters that he has** – וּבְחֻלּוּיָן: According to the Commentary on *Nazir*, the Gemara is asking whether this *halakha* was stated concerning only consecrated money or concerning even fully consecrated items. For example, does a firstborn receive a double portion of sacrificial meat? Alternatively, the suggestion is that there is a difference between a father who uses an expression of consecration, such as: These are for the offerings of my naziriteship, and one who states: These are for my naziriteship. The second expression merely indicates the separation of money for this purpose rather than a full consecration (*Tosafot*; Rabbeinu Peretz). According to this explanation, this question is unrelated to the previous one, as it also applies to two sons who had an equal share in the inheritance. Others contend that this is a follow-up question to the earlier dilemma with regard to a firstborn and a regular son: Perhaps the advantage that a firstborn receives applies only to the inheritance of non-sacred items, as sacred objects are not included in the category of "All that he has" (*Deuteronomy* 21:17). This issue has ramifications for any case of a father who leaves behind consecrated items: Do all the sons divide the items equally between them or does the firstborn receive an extra share (see Rosh; *Shita Mekubbetzet*)?

BACKGROUND

**Shall stand** [*teiku*] – תִּיקוּ: Various explanations have been suggested for the etymology of this term. One suggestion is that the word is an abbreviated version of *tikom*, let it stand. Another is that its source is *tik*, a case or pouch, whose contents are unknown. Likewise, the resolution of this matter is unknown as though it were hidden inside a case (*Arukh*). Although not the literal meaning, some raise the suggestion that the term alludes to a Hebrew acrostic: *Tishbi yetaretz kushyot ve'abayyot*: the Tishbite, i.e., Elijah the Prophet, will resolve questions and dilemmas (*Tosefot Yom Tov*).

בְּעֵי רַבָּא: יֵשׁ לוֹ שְׁנֵי בָּנִים נְזִירִים, מַהוּ? הֵילֵכְתָּא גְּמִירִין לָהּ, כֹּל דְּקָדִים גְּלַח – גְּלַח, אוּ דִילְמָא יְרוּשָׁה גְּמִירִין לָהּ, וּפְלַגָּא הָוִי?

בְּעֵי רַבָּא: בְּכוֹר וּפְשוּט, מַאי? הֵילֵכְתָּא גְּמִירִין לָהּ – וְהֵילֵכְךָ לָא בְּעֵי גְלוּחֵי לְפָנִים מַאי דְשִׁקִּיל. אוּ דִילְמָא יְרוּשָׁה הִיא, וְכִי הֵיכִי דְשִׁקִּיל פִּי שְׁנַיִם – הֵכִי מְגַלַּח?

וְאִם תִּמְצִי לומר יְרוּשָׁה הִיא, וְלָפָנִים דְשִׁקִּיל מְגַלַּח, וּבְחֻלּוּיָן הוּא דְאִית לֵיהּ פִּי שְׁנַיִם, אֲבָל בְּהִקְדָּשׁ לָא. אוּ דִילְמָא בֵּינָן דְקָנִי לֵיהּ לְגְלוּחַ – לָא שְׁנָא?

אָבִיו נְזִיר עוֹלָם וְהוּא נְזִיר סֵתָם, אָבִיו נְזִיר סֵתָם וְהוּא נְזִיר עוֹלָם, מַאי כִּי גְּמִירִין הֵילֵכְתָּא – בְּסֵתָם נְזִירוֹת, אוּ דִילְמָא לָא שְׁנָא?

וְאִם תִּמְצִי לומר הֵכָא אִידִי וְאִידִי נְזִירוֹת טְהוֹרָה, בְּעֵי רַב אֲשִׁי: אָבִיו נְזִיר טָמֵא וְהוּא נְזִיר טְהוֹר, אָבִיו נְזִיר טְהוֹר וְהוּא נְזִיר טָמֵא, מַאי תִּיקוּ.

הַדְרֵן עַלְךָ מִי שְׂאֵמֵר

**Rabba raised a dilemma:** If a father has two nazirite sons,<sup>14</sup> what is the *halakha*? The Gemara clarifies the sides of the dilemma: Does one say that **we learned it as a *halakha*** that a son can shave using money left for his father's naziriteship, and therefore **any son who precedes his brother and shaves using his father's money has shaved and gained the entire sum? Or perhaps we learned this *halakha* from the case of inheritance, and consequently, each receives a half?**

Similarly, **Rava raised a dilemma:** If one has two nazirite sons, a firstborn and a regular son,<sup>15</sup> what is the *halakha*? Does one say that **we learned it as a *halakha*** that a son may shave using money left for his father's naziriteship, and this ruling is unconnected to inheritance, and therefore **he does not need to shave only in accordance with what he receives as an inheritance?** Instead, either each son receives half the money, or whoever precedes the other receives the entire sum. **Or perhaps it is an inheritance, and just as the firstborn takes a double portion of the estate, so too he shaves with a double portion of this money?**

**And if you say it is an inheritance and he shaves in accordance with the portion he receives, it is still possible that it is only with regard to non-sacred matters that a firstborn has<sup>16</sup> a double portion, but with regard to consecrated property this *halakha* does not apply. Or perhaps, since he acquires that money, although he uses it for the purpose of shaving it is no different, i.e., it does not matter that the money is for a sacred matter.**

The Gemara raises another dilemma: **If his father was a permanent nazirite<sup>17</sup> and he was an unspecified nazirite, or if his father was an unspecified nazirite and he was a permanent nazirite, what is the *halakha*?** Can this son shave using money left for his father's naziriteship? Does one say that **when we learned the *halakha*** that a son can shave using money left for his father's naziriteship, this applies only in a case where they are both **unspecified nazirites, or perhaps it is no different**, and the same *halakha* applies even if their naziriteships are of two different kinds?

**And if you say:** Here, both cases are at least similar in that they involve **ritually pure naziriteship**, and therefore the son can make use of his father's money, then **Rav Ashi raises a different dilemma:** **If his father was an impure nazirite<sup>18</sup> and he was a pure nazirite, or if his father was a pure nazirite and he was an impure nazirite, what is the *halakha*?** Can the son shave using money left for his father's naziriteship or not? No answer was found for any of these dilemmas, and the Gemara says that they **shall stand<sup>19</sup> unresolved.**

מתני' בית שמאי אומרים: הקדש טעות - הקדש, בית שמאי אומרים: הקדש טעות - הקדש.

**MISHNA** Beit Shammai say: Consecration that one performs in error nevertheless renders property consecrated,

ובית הלל אומרים: אין הקדש. כיצד? אמר "שור שחור שיצא מביתי ראשון הרי הוא הקדש" ויצא לבן. בית שמאי אומרים: הקדש, ובית הלל אומרים: אינו הקדש. דינר זהב שיעלה בידי ראשון הרי הוא הקדש ועלה של כסף. בית שמאי אומרים: הקדש, ובית הלל אומרים: אינו הקדש. "חבית של יין שתעלה בידי ראשונה הרי היא הקדש" ועלתה של שמן. בית שמאי אומרים: הקדש, ובית הלל אומרים: אינו הקדש.

and Beit Hillel<sup>p</sup> say it is not consecrated.<sup>h</sup> How so; what is considered an act of erroneous consecration? If one said: A black bull that will emerge from my house first is consecrated, and a white bull emerged first, Beit Shammai say it is consecrated<sup>n</sup> and Beit Hillel say it is not consecrated. Similarly, if one said: A gold dinar that will come up first in my hand is consecrated, and when he reached into his pocket a dinar of silver came up, Beit Shammai say it is consecrated and Beit Hillel say it is not consecrated. Likewise, if one said: A barrel of wine that will come up first in my hand when I enter the cellar is consecrated, and a barrel of oil came up in his hand instead, Beit Shammai say it is consecrated and Beit Hillel say it is not consecrated.

גמ' "בית שמאי אומרים הקדש" כו'. מאי טעמיהו דבית שמאי - דילפינן תחלת הקדש מסוף הקדש; מה תמורה - אפילו בטעות, אף הקדש - אפילו בטעות.

**GEMARA** The mishna taught that Beit Shammai say that consecration performed in error renders property consecrated, and Beit Hillel say it is not consecrated. The Gemara analyzes their dispute: **What is the reason of Beit Shammai?** They maintain that we derive the halakha of the initial stage of consecration from the final stage of consecration. The final stage of consecration is referring to substitution, when one attempts to substitute a non-consecrated animal for a consecrated one. **Just as an act of substitution takes effect even in error,**<sup>h</sup> i.e., if one meant to say that his black bull should be a substitute for his consecrated animal and he actually said: This white bull, the white bull is rendered consecrated, **so too, the initial stage of consecration takes effect even when done in error.**

ובית הלל אומרים: הני מילי - תמורה, אבל אחרותי הקדש בטעות - לא מזהתינן.

And Beit Hillel say: **This matter**, i.e., the halakha that consecration takes effect even when done in error, applies only to **substitution**, where there is an animal that is already fully consecrated. **However, we do not have the initial status of consecration descend upon an item in error.**

**HALAKHA**

Consecration that one performs in error...is not consecrated – הקדש טעות...אין הקדש – Any property which is consecrated in error is not considered consecrated. For example, if one said: A black bull that will emerge from my house first is consecrated, and a white one emerged first, it is not consecrated. Similarly, if one said: A gold dinar that will come up in my hand first is consecrated, and he drew out a silver one, it is not consecrated, in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel (Rambam *Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Arakhin VaHaramim* 6:34; *Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De'a* 258:2, in the comment of Rema).

תמורה אפילו – Substitution takes effect even in error – בטעות: If one substitutes an animal for an offering his action takes effect in that the animal becomes consecrated and he is liable to receive lashes. This is the halakha even if he erred in his statement, e.g., if he intended to say: This is the substitute of a burnt-offering, and he said: This is the substitute of a peace-offering (Rambam *Sefer Korbanot, Hilkhot Temura* 1:2).

**NOTES**

ויצא לבן...consecrated – הקדש: There are two explanations for Beit Shammai's opinion, as cited in the Commentary on *Nazir* and *Tosafot*. According to one interpretation, the meaning is straightforward: Although the individual specified a black bull and a white one emerged, the white bull is consecrated. Likewise, if he spoke of a gold coin and he picked up a silver one, the silver coin is consecrated. Similarly, the barrel of oil is consecrated despite his mention of wine. The idea is that he intended to consecrate the first item to emerge or be picked up, and he merely anticipated that the black bull, gold coin, or barrel of wine would be first. Alternatively, the first black bull to emerge is consecrated, even if it emerges after a white one. The same applies with regard to coins and barrels (Rabbi Avraham min HaHar).

**PERSONALITIES**

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel – בית שמאי ובית הלל – These titles refer to the schools of thought carried on by the disciples of Hillel the Elder and Shammai the Elder. Although there are only three recorded matters of dispute between Hillel and Shammai themselves, their students were relentless adversaries who served together in the Sanhedrin at the end of the Second Temple period and after its destruction. Their students were known to differ in many areas of halakha. With regard to the disagreements of these two houses, a mishna states (*Avot* 5:20): Any controversy waged for the sake of Heaven shall ultimately be of lasting worth, but any that is not waged for the sake of Heaven shall ultimately lead

to no permanent result. Which controversy serves as an example of one waged in the service of Heaven? The controversy of Hillel and Shammai. And which was not for the sake Heaven? The controversy of Korah and his companions.

Generally speaking, the disciples of Hillel and Shammai mirrored the personalities of their respective teachers: The open and tolerant Hillel, and the harsh, severe Shammai, although there are exceptions to this rule. A list of the cases in which the disciples of Shammai were more lenient than the disciples of Hillel appears in tractate *Eduyyot*. In almost all disputes between the two schools, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.