Rav Zevi taught this as follows. Rami bar Hama said: With regard to one who drives his laden animal on Shabbat, if he does so unwittingly, he is liable to be stoned by sin-offering, and if he does so intentionally, he is liable to be executed by stoning.

Rava raised an objection based on that which was taught in a baraita: One who desecrates Shabbat by performing a matter that for its unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin-offering, then for its intentional performance one is liable to be executed by stoning. The Gemara explains: By inference, for a matter that for its unwitting performance one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, for its intentional performance one is not liable to be executed by stoning. This contradicts Rami bar Hama’s statement.

The Gemara answers: Was it taught in the baraita: By inference, for a matter that for its unwitting performance one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, for its intentional performance one is not liable to be executed by stoning? The baraita can be understood differently, and this is what it is saying: With regard to a matter that for its unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin-offering, for its intentional performance one is always liable to be executed by stoning. However, there is also a matter that for its unwitting performance one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, and nevertheless, for its intentional performance one is liable to be executed by stoning. And what is that case? It is the case of driving a laden animal.

Rava, the brother of Rav Mari bar Rahel,7 cites a different opinion with regard to the halakha of driving a laden animal on Shabbat, and some say that he was the father of Rav Mari bar Rahel and stated this halakha. As an aside, the Gemara comments: According to the latter version above, that Rava was the father of Rav Mari bar Rahel, the fact that Rav needed to validate the status of Rav Mari bar Rahel8 and only then appoint him as an official [pursei]9 of Babylonia is difficult. This incident teaches that Rav Mari bar Rahel’s father was not Jewish, and before he could be appointed his status required validation through the fact that his mother was Jewish. If Rav Mari bar Rahel’s father was a sage named Rava, why was it necessary to validate his status by means of his mother’s lineage? The Gemara answers: Perhaps there were two people named Mari bar Rahel. One was the son of a convert and a Jewish mother, and the other was the son of a Sage named Rava.

In any event, that Sage taught his halakha in the name of Rabbi Yohanan to exempt one who drives a laden animal, as Rabbi Yohanan said: One who drives a laden animal on Shabbat is exempt from any punishment.

Rav Mari bar Rahel – He is also called Rav Mari, son of Shmuel’s daughter, and was a Babylonian amora in the generation of Rava. Rav Mari’s unusual appellation can be understood genealogically to his mother, rather than to his father, since Issur converted after Rav Mari was conceived. Other Sages born to well-known mothers from prominent families were also known by their mothers’ names, unrelated to problematic lineage. Since Rava is a combination of the title, Rav, and the name, Abba, Rav Mari could not have been both the son of the Sage Rava and the son of Issur the convert. The version that identifies his father as Rava is referring to a different Rav Mari bar Rahel, who was known by the name of his mother for a different reason.

Rav Mari the son of Shmuel’s daughter was apparently a wealthy merchant, in addition to being a prominent Sage worthy of being appointed as an official in Babylonia. Rav Mari had three sons who were Sages: Rav Aha Sabba, Mar Zutra, and Rava bar Rav Mari.
HALAKHA

If one’s animal was laden with glass vessels – נד הבשיט – לַא שֶׁנִּיתַּן לְאַזְהָטַת מִיתַת בֵּית דִּין. According to most commentaries, this is referring to vessels already used for bloodletting that are therefore repulsive and not suitable for any use, not even to cover another vessel (Rashi). In that case, even Rabbi Shimon would agree that they are set-aside. Others explain that these vessels are set-aside due to monetary loss. Since they are designated for bloodletting, their owner treats them with extreme care and does not use them for any other purpose (Yosef Rtv).

And even according to the one who said that one is flogged for violating a prohibition that was given as a warning of court-imposed capital punishment, the halakha with regard to driving a laden animal can be derived by means of an inference from the language of the verse. Let the Torah write: “You shall not perform any manner of labor… and neither shall your animal.” Why do I need the superfluous word you in the phrase: You and your animal? Rather it is to teach that it is he himself who is liable for performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat; however, for a prohibited labor performed by his animal, he is not liable.

We learned in the mishna: Once he reached the outer courtyard, he may untie the ropes that attach his bags to the donkey, and the bags of vessels that may not be moved on Shabbat fall on their own. Rav Huna said: If one’s animal was laden with glass vessels, which would break if he let them fall to the ground, he may bring cushions and blankets and place them beneath the animal and untie the ropes and let the bags fall onto the cushions.

The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to unload glass vessels in so complicated a manner? Didn’t we learn in the mishna: He takes the vessels that may be moved on Shabbat off the donkey? As glass vessels fall into that category, why not simply remove the glass vessels and then untie the bags?

The Gemara answers: When Rav Huna stated this halakha, he was referring to the horns of a blood letter, which are not suitable for any other purpose and are therefore set-aside on Shabbat due to prohibition and repulsiveness. The Gemara asks: Isn’t he thereby negating a vessel’s preparedness? Initially, the cushion was available for any use. Since it now has the set-aside vessels on it, the cushion, too, may no longer be moved. The Sages ruled that one may not place a vessel in a circumstance that will render it prohibited to move. The Gemara answers: This mishna is referring to small bundles of glass vessels that will not break if the cushions are subsequently removed from beneath them.
The Gemara relates: Abaye found Rabba sliding his son on the back of a donkey on Shabbat to entertain him. He said to him: The Master is making use of living creatures on Shabbat, and the Sages prohibited doing so. Rabba said to him: I placed my son on the side of the donkey, and as they are sides, the Sages did not issue a decree prohibiting making use of them. From where do you say that this is so? As we learned in the mishna: One may untie the ropes and the bags fall on their own. What, is it not referring to a case where one attached the bags by means of guvalaki, where the bags are attached and it is impossible to remove the bags merely by untying the ropes. One must lean on the donkey in order to lift up the bags.

The Gemara raises an objection based on that which was taught in a baraita: If one’s animal was laden with untithed produce and chunks of glass, one unites the ropes and the bags fall on their own, even though they break. Apparently, placing cushions beneath the animal is prohibited. The Gemara answers: There, the baraita is not referring to vessels but rather to chunks of glass that are designated to be broken so that they can be melted and crafted into vessels. The Gemara adds: The language of the baraita is also precise, as it teaches that chunks are similar to untithed produce: Just as untithed produce is not fit for his use, here too, the chunks are also not fit for his use.

The Gemara explains: And what is the meaning of the phrase: Even though they break? If the mishna is indeed referring to chunks of glass, they are designated to be broken. Rather, lest you say that the Sages were also concerned about a minor loss, as certainly some small slivers of glass will be lost when the chunks fall and break, the tanna in the baraita teaches us that the Sages did not consider minimal loss a reason significant enough to permit carrying the prohibited glass.

It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai says: If one’s animal was loaded with a burden of untithed grain, he may place his head beneath the pile and move it in a different side of the animal, and it falls by itself. The Sages prohibited moving set-aside objects in the typical manner, but there is no concern about doing so in an unusual manner.

The Gemara relates: Rabban Gamliel’s donkey was laden with honey, and he did not want to unload the donkey until the conclusion of Shabbat. At the conclusion of Shabbat, the donkey died of fatigue. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: He takes the vessels that may be moved on Shabbat to entertain him. Why, then, did Rabban Gamliel not unload the honey? The Gemara answers: This is a case where the honey had spoiled. The Gemara asks: For what use is spoiled honey suited? Why did Rabban Gamliel bring it? The Gemara answers: It can be used to rub on the wounds of camels.

The Gemara asks: And let Rabban Gamliel untie the ropes and the bags will fall on their own. The Gemara answers: It was due to the concern that the jugs containing the honey would crack. The Gemara asks: And let him bring cushions and blankets and place them beneath the jugs. The Gemara answers: He was concerned lest they become soiled and he would thereby negate the vessel’s preparedness, i.e., the cushions and blankets would be rendered unusable. The Gemara asks: Isn’t there the matter of the suffering of a living creature? He should suffer monetary loss rather than cause the animal to suffer. The Gemara answers: Rabban Gamliel holds that causing a living creature to suffer is prohibited not by Torah law but rather by rabbinic law. Therefore, he need not suffer monetary loss due to the rabbinic prohibition.

The Gemara relates: Rabbi Shimon ben Yoĥai prohibited moving cushions beneath the animal is prohibited. The Gemara adds: The baraita teaches us that this is so? As we learned in an unusual manner. As we learned in the mishna: One may untie the ropes and the bags fall on their own. What, is it not referring to a case where one attached the bags by means of guvalaki, where the bags are strapped to the animal and the only way to loosen them involves leaning against the sides of animal in order to unstrap them? That is because it is a case of making use of the sides, and the Sages did not issue a decree prohibiting making use of an animal’s sides.
Abaye answered: No, this is a case where one attached the bags by means of agalavki, i.e., where the bags were not tightly strapped to the animal, but rather attached by means of a hook. In such a case, there is no need to make use of the sides of the animal in order to unhook the strap. Alternatively, the bags were tied to the sides of the animal with a rope, which could likewise be untied with ease and without leaning against the animal.

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba’s opinion based on that which was taught in a mishna: A sukkah that had two of its walls on the ground, built by a person, and one wall on a tree is valid and can be used to fulfill the mitzva of sukkah. However, one may not enter it on the festival day of Sukkot because it is prohibited to use trees rooted in the ground on Shabbat or a festival. What is this not referring to a case where one carved a hole in the tree and inserted a beam into the hole for support, in which case these are sides of the tree that are being used, and apparently, using the sides of the tree is prohibited?

Rabba rejected this: No, it is referring to a case where one bent the tree over and placed the roofing atop it; in that case, he is making use of the tree itself and not its sides. Abaye asked: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: If there are three walls built by a person and one on a tree, it is a valid sukkah and one may enter it on a Festival. And if one bent a tree and placed the roofing atop it, why may one enter it on a Festival?

Rabba rejected this question: Rather, what would you say? Making use of sides is prohibited. If so, the same problem still exists, why is the sukkah fit for use in the latter case? Ultimately, why may one enter it on a Festival? Rather, there it is referring to a case where the branches [gavaza] are spread out and where one made the tree itself into a wall, not where he leant a wall against it. The language of the mishna is also precise. The wall may not be used if it is an integral part of the sukkah, meaning that it is one of the three required walls. However, if it serves as a fourth wall, one may use the sukkah on a festival as it is taught that this is the principle: In any case where if the tree was taken the sukkah would still be able to stand, one may enter it on a festival. Then it is clear that the walls are not leaning against the tree; rather, the tree itself serves as a wall. The Gemara says in summary: Learn from here that this is so.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that these amora’im disagree in a dispute parallel to a dispute between tanna’im with regard to making use of the sides of a tree, as it was taught in the Tosefta: One may not enter a sukkah whose walls are leaning against a tree on a festival. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Meir: One may enter it on a festival. What, is it not that they are disagreeing about this issue, as this Master, meaning the Rabbis, holds that making use of the sides is prohibited, and this Master, Rabbi Meir, holds that they are permitted?

Abaye said: No. Everyone agrees that the sides are prohibited, and it is with regard to the sides of the sides, i.e., not a wall leaning against the tree itself, but a wall that is supported by a beam that is placed in the hole carved in the tree, that they disagree. This Master, meaning the Rabbis, holds that the sides of the sides are prohibited, and this Master, Rabbi Meir, holds that the sides of the sides are permitted.

Rava said: The one who prohibited making use of the sides also prohibited making use of the sides of the sides, and the one who permitted making use of the sides also permitted making use of the sides of the sides. Rav Mesharshiyya raised an objection to the opinion of Rava: If one drove